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This dissertation offers a historical sociology of the making and unmaking of 
rule in a frontier borderland in Vietnam. By thinking through the social processes 
accompanying the spatial expansion and configuration of state power, I argue that 
military conquest was a necessary but insufficient step towards an emergent nation-
state‘s lasting consolidation of territorial claims. Legitimating state claims to territory 
rested on mutually constitutive and spatialized processes of institutionalizing relations 
of rule; agrarian development and reciprocal exchange; constructing communities of 
nation and ethnicity; and social mobilization during, and for purposes of, warfare.  
Because the first Indochina war ended dramatically in Dien Bien Phu, the past 
of what is now a national frontier is remembered and forgotten in particular ways. In 
Vietnam, the site is celebrated as battle and setting for victory in 1954 of revolutionary 
ideals over foreign oppression. What is not remembered in such nationalist histories 
has equal significance for understanding the sometimes contradictory outcomes of 
state making. This dissertation analyzes human beings as complex, thinking persons 
with wayward agendas who did not always respond as intended.  
Grounded in archival research, the dissertation attends to the ways in which 
state claims to territory and legitimate rule are contested and how outcomes are 
contingent and non-linear. The narrative begins when colonial officers and map-
makers encountered the Sipsongchauthai confederation in the late 19
th
 century, 
recognized a ruling Thai elite, incorporated them into French Tonkin, and, in so doing, 
 remade the Black River borderlands into an imperial frontier. After World War II, 
France organized the Thai Federation, created splits among local elites, and 
unintentionally generated support for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam‘s 
nationalist alternative. Although cadres legitimized national rule by delegitimizing a 
neocolonial rival, Vietnam‘s emergent ―Northwest‖ region reproduced Tonkin‘s 
borders and underlying political configuration while political elites reproduced the 
colonial category of ―ethnicity‖ to regulate uncertain boundaries between community 
and territory, land and class. The unsteady incorporation of Black River peoples into 
Vietnam illustrates an evolving—and ongoing—negotiation between highlands and 
lowlands, center and frontier, state and society, nation and ethnicity.  
 
 iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Christian Cunningham Lentz graduated summa cum laude in 1997 from 
Cornell University where he studied conservation and development in Southeast Asia. 
After participating in a community resource management project in East Nusa 
Tenggara, Indonesia he worked for the US Department of State as an Indonesian-
language interpreter. He holds a Masters in Environmental Science from Yale 
University‘s School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, completed in 2001. He 
earned a Master of Science in Development Sociology at Cornell University in 2004 
with a thesis on cultural adaptation to environmental disturbance in Sumba, Indonesia. 
While pursuing a PhD in Development Sociology at Cornell University and assisted 
by two Foreign Language and Area Studies awards, his interests expanded 
geographically and topically. In 2006-2007, he was a Fulbright Scholar in Vietnam 
where he undertook fieldwork in Dien Bien Phu and archival research in Hanoi for his 
dissertation project. His paper on social mobilization earned the Department of 
Development Sociology‘s Taietz Award in 2010 for outstanding work presented at a 
professional conference. He is currently a Visiting Scholar in the Department of 
Sociology at Duke University.
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I thank my dissertation committee—Shelley Feldman, Phil McMichael, Max 
Pfeffer, and Eric Tagliacozzo—for patient support, sharp insights, and steady 
guidance. As my PhD advisor, Shelley gave crucial support at key moments and 
helped me balance the demands of academia and family. My MS thesis advisor Paul 
Gellert as well as my fellow students in Development Sociology, including Jason 
Cons, Nosheen Ali, Alex and Dia Da Costa, and Karuna Morarji, kept me in step with 
my studies and sent me down new paths.  
The students, faculty, and staff of Cornell University‘s Southeast Asia Program 
were a deep reservoir of intellectual resources, collegial camaraderie, and lasting 
friendships. Thak Chaloemtiarana, Ben Anderson, and John Wolff were early teachers, 
and I am grateful for how they shaped my encounter with Southeast Asia. Keith 
Taylor introduced me to Vietnam‘s history as an undergraduate and remained an 
invaluable resource during my graduate studies.  
At Yale University, Kay Mansfield and participants in the Agrarian Studies 
Program as well as students and faculty of the Council on Southeast Asian Studies 
offered an intellectual home. James Scott and Michael Dove encouraged me to think 
broadly about agrarian change and in depth about highland Southeast Asia. Steve Rhee 
was and remains a dear friend and caring colleague.  
Dirk Bonker, Jason Cons, and Bradley Davis were key participants in shaping 
this dissertation and improving its content. Writing group members Adriane D. Lentz-
Smith, Kathryn Mathers, Bruce Hall, Phil Stern, Jehangir Malagam, Kat Charron, and 
Emily Burrill all provided feedback and insightful comments on chapter drafts. Two 
dissertation workshops, one in Singapore by ChATSEA in 2006 and another in 
Atlanta by the Association for Asian Studies in 2008, both situated my work in larger 
 v 
debates and communities of scholars. Hue-Tam Ho Tai and participants at Harvard 
University‘s space in Vietnam workshop helped to clarify how my work meshed and 
engaged with Vietnam studies. 
Without the hard work, devoted interest, and sponsorship of Dr. Trần Đức 
Viên, the staff of CARES, and other colleagues at the Hanoi University of Agriculture, 
my research would never have been possible. Likewise, the staff of the National 
Archives of Vietnam Center 3 steered me through their impressive collections and 
offered insightful readings of their own. Philippe Le Failler and Andrew Hardy at the 
École Française d‘Extrême-Orient in Hanoi not only shared documents and 
experiences but also provided early encouragement and lasting collegiality.  
Support for this research came from a Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Award, 
Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowships, Cornell University‘s Southeast Asia 
Program and Einaudi Center for International Studies, the Vietnamese Advanced 
Summer Institute, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and Duke University‘s 
Department of Sociology. I am grateful to all for believing in and helping to realize 
this project‘s potential. 
Finally, I reserve my deepest thanks for my loving wife and closest colleague, 
Adriane D. Lentz-Smith. She helped this budding sociologist to think like a historian 
and kept a steady hand on this dissertation ship‘s sometimes wavering rudder. On this 
journey, we welcomed Zora Holloway Lentz who in addition to giving us daily joy 
also managed to discipline my working hours.
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Biographical Sketch iii 
Acknowledgments iv 
List of Tables vii 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 2: From borderlands to frontier 31 
Chapter 3: Contesting a frontier 80 
Chapter 4: Making the Northwest 147 
Chapter 5: Militarization, Liberation, and the Politics of Calculation 240 
Chapter 6: Mobilization in Places 329 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 416 
Bibliography 429 
 
 vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1.1: Population estimate of Thái Federation in early 1950s 64 
Table 1.2: Reported opium production in 4
th
 Military Territory, 1933-1940 73 
Table 4.1: Administrative divisions and estimated populations, 1952 186 
Table 6.1: Food supplies mobilized at point of origin  352 
Table 6.2: Supplies delivered to the front by point of origin 356 
Table 6.3: Laborers and means of transportation by point of origin 357 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Encountering past in present 
I visited Mr. L for the second time on an August morning in 2006 before the 
rainy season clouds gathered for the customary afternoon shower.
1
 His wooden house 
sat in the village of Noong Nhai 2, situated in Thanh Xương Commune south of town 
among the irrigated rice fields of Điện Biên District‘s verdant plain. When we arrived, 
the retired farmer and director of the Farmers‘ Association signaled for me to park my 
bike under his stilted house and beckoned us to mount the stairs and enter its living 
quarters. I introduced my wife and he, in turn, introduced his wife, his infant 
grandaughter, and his elderly parents. I explained that my wife and I were both 
interested in learning more about Điện Biên Phủ‘s local history. He sat us at a table 
while his wife fetched a bottle of ricewine, the contents of which he then poured 
repeatedly into our three cups—performing a gesture, he told us, signaling welcome 
and good cheer. On that day and others to come, he described events and pointed to 
processes significant to his home and its place in modern Vietnam.  
Mr. L responded patiently to my questions about the region‘s local history, its 
complex ethno-linguistic composition, and patterns of agrarian change. Like virtually 
all Thái people in and around Điện Biên Phủ, he identified himself and his neighbors 
as Black Thái. By contrast, the White Thái people lived to the north, clustered around 
the old regional capital of Lai Châu. ―White Thái and Black Thái are really the same, 
really only one,‖ he explained, ―but because of fighting became two.‖  
Before ―liberation‖ from French colonial rule in 1954, he said, there were very 
few Kinh people in the area, only those who worked with the French. ―No one else 
                                                 
1
 Conversation, bản Noong Nhai 2, xã Thanh Xương, huyện Điện Biên, 22 Aug 2006. 
 2 
spoke the Kinh language,‖ referring to a language I had always called Vietnamese. 
While the soldiers who arrived in 1954 with the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign learned to 
speak Thái quickly, he learned the Kinh language in school, ―like you learned 
English.‖ Kinh people, he continued, began to settle the area after the campaign‘s end 
in 1954, ―to clear the wilderness in the mountains.‖  
Many of the early migrants, some of whom brought wives and children, were 
veterans of the French war who, he explained, ―helped‖ restore productivity to Điện 
Biên‘s wartorn landscape. In 1975, after Vietnam was ―reunited‖ between north and 
south, many more Kinh people, mostly from Thái Binh Province, arrived to participate 
in the ―new economic zone‖ program.2 ―They came here,‖ Mr. L said, ―in order to 
unify the country.‖  
Although our conversation took place in Vietnamese, I was struck that so few 
local people had spoken this language before 1954. What appeared as something 
taken-for-granted, i.e. that all Vietnamese spoke Vietnamese, turned out to be 
something imported by Việt/Kinh people from the Red River Delta. Moreover, Mr. L 
and everyone else who self-identified as Thái—or as Khu Mu, Hmong, Lao, or any 
other of the region‘s many social groups—recognized the language not as Vietnamese 
but as the ―Kinh language‖ (tiếng Kinh). They destabilized the so-called ―national‖ 
tongue by referring to it in ethnic terms, associating linguistic facility with identity and 
origin. If this revealing slippage was common, then Mr. L went further by associating 
Kinh-ness with power. In Vietnam as everywhere else, he asserted, government power 
lies in the cities embedded in the culture and economy of the dominant ethnic group.   
Mr. L‘s narrative contained many dates and events commemorated in 
                                                 
2
 ―Clearing the wilderness‖ and ―new economic zones‖ refer to two state-sponsored migration programs 
known in Vietnamese, respectively, as, ―khai hoang‖ and ―vùng kinh tế mới.‖ For more on these and 
other resettlements from the Red River delta to montane Vietnam, cf., Andrew Hardy, Red Hills: 
Migrants and the State in the Highlands of Vietnam (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003).  
 3 
Vietnam—―liberation‖ in 1954; ―reunification‖ in 1975— yet his emphasis departed 
from nationalist narratives in illuminating ways. Mr. L dwelled on the year 1954 not to 
evoke a glorious battle and its outcome but, rather, to tell of its devastating local 
consequences. In April, while trench warfare raged only a few kilometers away, he 
recalled how a French airplane dropped a bomb on his village, killing over 400 people, 
―mostly women and children.‖3 He was 15 years old and survived only because he 
happened to be upstairs in his stilted house; those who died, many of them friends or 
relatives, had been sitting or standing on the ground. ―Everything was destroyed,‖ he 
said haltingly, ―houses burned.‖  
A memorial now marks the site and, notably, occupies ground next to the 
commune office complex. The memorial features a sculpture of a woman, dressed in 
Thái garb, who stands erect, stares forward stoically, and bears in her arms the limp 
body of a child. Flanking her are murals depicting, on one side, Thái women assisting 
soldiers of the People‘s Army and, on another, Thái women with infants on their 
backs, young children, and elderly folk all fleeing flames. Mr. L never mentioned this 
memorial. Nor did his memory of himself as a teenage boy feature in its 
representations, pointing to a gap between personal memory and official 
commemoration. State power rests, in part, on a privileged capacity to represent a 
national past. 
Later in October when the rice crop was approaching harvest, I revisited Mr. L 
to ask about agricultural change and, once again, his narrative began in 1954.
4
 ―Land 
reform,‖ he stated in response, ―there was none here at all—only downstream.‖ 
Instead, he explained, ―The government divided land for poor people,‖ because, ―land 
                                                 
3
 Recent scholarship questions whether the explosion was, in fact, a French aerial bomb or the 
detonation of a People‘s Army weapons cache. Cf., Philippe Le Failler, La Rivière Noire: L’Intégration 
d’une Marche Frontière au Vietnam (draft manuscript, 2010). 
4
 Conversation, bản Noong Nhai 2, xã Thanh Xương, huyện Điện Biên, 17 Oct 2006. 
 4 
was still plentiful.‖ Relative land abundance allowed also for settlers to clear new 
fields and for the army to establish state farms (nông trường). Between 1958-60, Mr. 
L and fellow farmers constructed an irrigation network that, when completed, 
―enabled production to be large.‖ The end of construction coincided with the initiation 
of collectivization in 1960-61. ―In 1966-67,‖ during a second round, ―I worked hard as 
the director of commune-scale collectivization: I had to go mobilize (vận động).‖  
In retrospect, what surprises me about my conversations with Mr. L was that 
we were able to have them at all. The first time we met, I was accompanied by four 
officials: my district minder and a junior cadre as well as two commune officials.
5
 
Such accompaniment was standard practice for village visits and, as a result, my 
attempts to talk with everyday folk were often mediated by a formidable battery of 
state personnel. Mr. L, however, seemed to enjoy a special status. After introducing 
us, the four officials wandered off and no longer joined our discussions. Fortunately, 
he had an excellent memory. Only after I consulted archival documents and news 
reports from the 1950s did I learn the significance of what he told me about land 
reform, mobilization, communitarian relations, and state power. 
 
A few days after my wife and I visited Mr. L, a local official serving in the 
mountains above the plain led me to rethink what the retired Farmers‘ Association 
leader had meant by ―unity‖ (đoàn kết).  
Before we left, my district minder explained that the commune of Núa Ngam 
differed from Thanh Xương in terms of livelihood strategies, population, and terrain. 
Unlike the plain commune where Kinh settlers and Black Thái tended irrigated rice, 
this mountain commune was populated mostly by Hmong and Lao farmers growing 
swidden corn and rice. Because it was the rainy season, he said, the dirt roads up to 
                                                 
5
 Ibid. 18 Aug 2006. 
 5 
ridgeline and mountain-top Hmong villages were inaccessible. Therefore, our visits 
were confined to villages proximate to the sealed road. Little did I know that weather 
vagaries had justifed a decision to exclude Hmong villages from my field research.  
To reach the commune of Núa Ngam, we left the irrigated fields behind. My 
minder led me on a riverside road which climbed steadily, wound past sheer cliffs, and 
afforded glimpses of ripening corn. We slowed down in a small cluster of shops and 
pulled into the commune‘s office complex.  
A representative of the People‘s Committee greeted us and granted our visit 
approval. Shortly afterwards, Mr. D introduced himself and invited me to a small, 
bamboo-walled room with dirt floors.
6
 From this modest office, he functioned as head 
of Núa Ngam‘s Fatherland Front and supervised branches of mass organizations, like 
the Farmers‘ Association and Women‘s Union. ―In 1976, I came here from Thái 
Binh,‖ he said. Here was one of the many Kinh people whose presence in Điện Biên 
Mr. L had traced to a state-sponsored migration program.
7
 ―Land was spacious, no 
people,‖ he remembered, echoing an old description of this montane region. ―We were 
scared of the ethnic people because we did not know one another,‖ he recalled. 
―Now,‖ thirty years later, he declared, ―we are no longer scared because we are 
already united.‖   
Behind this outward talk of unity, I realized, lay silently its dialectical twin, 
disunity. Only a few days earlier, Mr. L had said that fighting had characterized 
relations between Thái groups before ―liberation‖ in 1954; and that Kinh people had 
arrived to ―unify‖ both groups as well as ―the country.‖ Mr. D now added to the 
portrait of unity and disunity in an area of non-Thái groups: for him, the lived 
experience of disunity inspired fear even after ―reunification‖ in 1975. In spite of their 
                                                 
6
 Conversation, Trung tâm xã Núa Ngam, huyện Điện Biên, 24 Aug 2006. 
7
 For more on Thái Binh‘s connections with Điện Biên, cf., Tạ Long & Ngô Thị Chính, Sự Biến Đổi nền 
Nông nghiệp Châu Thổ-Thái Bình ở Vùng núi Điện Biên Lai Châu (Hanoi: NXB Nông nghiệp, 2000). 
 6 
different backgrounds and social positions, both informants defined unity in terms of 
harmonious relations between ethnicities (dân tộc) and endowed the Kinh people with 
power to unify them. Unlike the head of Núa Ngam‘s Fatherland Front, however, the 
retired Farmers‘ Association leader implied that unification was an ongoing, power-
laden process. The claim to already-achieved unity came from Mr. D who, like my 
minder, was an official from Thái Binh. More broadly, I observed that virtually all of 
Điện Biên‘s district and provincial officials, and many in its subordinate communes, 
self-identify as Kinh. As state agents recognized as ―Kinh people,‖ they embody a 
particularly salient form of social difference and give it everyday power.  
These conversations and others like them directed my attention to the making 
of a ―unified‖ nation out of multiple and diverse forms of socially different peoples, 
especially the form recognized as ―ethnicity.‖ I discovered that nationalism in 
Vietnam—or the idea that all people within its borders rise above other forms of 
association to become ―unified‖ as members of an imagined ―Vietnamese‖ 
community—was and still is a project. Such everyday discovery inspired me to learn 
more about the making of state in Điện Biên, to investigate how the formation of 
singular rule challenged, contested, and reworked multiple social differences and local 
power relations. Making Vietnam in Điện Biên Phủ was, and still remains, a historical 
process embedded in state power to regulate communal spaces and categories, 
legitimate and illegitimate political forms, as well as resource use and allocation.  
*** 
This dissertation examines the ongoing processes of state formation and 
nation-making that constructed the Black River region as Northwest Vietnam. It 
focuses on the decade between 1945-1955 when a border outpost, Điện Biên Phủ, 
became a centrally marginal place in an emergent Vietnam. Covering a crucial period 
when French colonial rule gave way to nation-state rule, this account of remaking a 
 7 
frontier—and with it, the categories and affiliations of the people within—underscores 
the extent to which both forms of domination, colonial and national, required local 
cooperation and the reconfiguration of spatially specific hierarchies.
8
  
The dissertation takes seriously the placement and displacement of the people 
of the Black River region. Though marginal in terms of cultural and physical distance 
from the rising political center of Hanoi, Điện Biên Phủ‘s reconstruction as a site of 
―national victory‖ in 1954 made it central to ideas of national unity and state territorial 
integrity.
9
 The architects and actors who built the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV), those seeking to overturn French colonialism, saw their task as building a new 
national body whose parts encompassed the people and land of the Black River region. 
In order to accomplish their task, DRV architects and actors both had to present 
themselves as state and convince local people, seen as a ―unified‖ society, that they 
fell within their legitimate power.  
 
Mobilization, legitimation, state formation 
I use the idea, practice, and process of mobilization as a way into thinking 
about legitimation and the negotiated practices that served to construct Vietnamese 
state and society. To do this, I draw on archival Vietnamese-language sources to  
focus on a violent and tumultuous decade in the 1940s and 1950s when the people and 
place of Điện Biên Phủ and the Black River region entered into a lasting relationship 
with the people, space, and idea of Vietnam. Examining how mobilization shaped, and 
was reshaped by, emerging political relations reveals a complex, uneven process 
                                                 
8
 Anna Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Mary 
Steedly, ―The State of Culture Theory in the Anthropology of Southeast Asia,‖ Annual Review of 
Anthropology 28 (1999): 431-54; Donald Moore, Suffering for Territory: Race, Place, and Power in 
Zimbabwe (Durham, Duke University Press, 2005). 
9
 Đặng Nghiêm Vạn & Đinh Xuân Lâm (1979); Nguyễn Hữu Hợp & Nguyễn Hữu Đạo, ―Sức mạnh 
tổng hợp của cả nước và chiến thắng Điện Biên Phủ,‖ in Viện sử học, Mấy Vấn đề về chiến thắng lịch 
sử Điện Biên Phủ (Hanoi: NXB Khoa học Xã hội, 1985), 89-106. 
 8 
marked by multiple inclusions and exclusions. Although mobilization became a 
dominant state tactic only in 1953, the process drew on and reproduced uncertain 
social, communal, and spatial boundaries.  
Investigating legitimation and mobilization in the Black River region during 
the 1950s opens inter-related discussions of unmaking colonial rule, making national 
rule, and remaking locally configured ruling relations. This was the work of 
constituting state and society. In Vietnamese, what most frequently linked evolving 
conceptions of state and society was a range of verbs—huy động, phát động, tác động, 
vận động, động viên—each containing the Sino-Vietnamese particle ―động‖ which 
means, ―to move or stir.‖10 In English, ―to mobilize‖ closely captures the Vietnamese 
verbs‘ literal and figurative meanings, ranging in transitive power from inanimate 
objects to human subjects, from individuals to collectives.
11
 In this socio-linguistic 
context, political agents and institutions put people into motion, acting on them and 
influencing their behavior in support of centrally directed goals.   
DRV cadres and Viet Minh activists developed and deployed mobilization as a 
novel means of making claims on agrarian labor, land, capital, and subjecthood.
12
 
Much more than simply altering resource availability in a contested political 
environment, mobilization was an organizational tactic and a complex social 
process.
13
 As tactic, mobilization drew on and produced disciplinary power to reorder 
                                                 
10
 Phan Văn Các, Từ Điện Hán Việt (TP HCM: NXB Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh, 2003), 163-164. 
11
 Đặng Chấn Liêu et al, Từ điển Việt-Anh (TP HCM: NXB Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh, 2001). 
12
 For current social science perspectives on mobilization, cf., Andrew Walder, ―Political Sociology and 
Social Movements,‖ Annual Review of Sociology 35(2009): 402; J. Craig Jenkins and William Form, 
―Social Movements and Social Change,‖ in The Handbook of Political Sociology, ed. Thomas Janoski 
et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 331-349; Joel Andreas, ―The Structure of 
Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion During the Chinese Cultural Revolution,‖ 
American Sociological Review 72 (2007): 434-458; Susan Olzak et al, ―School desegregation, 
interracial exposure, and antibusing activity in contemporary urban America,‖ American Journal of 
Sociology 100 (June 1994): 196-241; ; R. Ray and A.C. Korteweg, ―Women's Movements in the Third 
World: Identity, Mobilization, and Autonomy,‖ Annual Review of Sociology 25(Aug 1999): 47-71. 
13
 John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, ―Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,‖ 
American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977), 1212-1241; Bob Edwards and John McCarthy, ―Resources 
 9 
space, time, and community. As social process, mobilization shaped and was shaped 
by already existing and newly emerging social and spatial boundaries. In spaces later 
recognized as Vietnam and during a time when a Vietnamese community was 
violently in the making, mobilization was an ―everyday form of state formation‖ or, a 
tactic central to remaking quotidian relations between rulers and subjects.
14
 
During the first Indochina War (1946-54) state was not given but was itself 
some thing against which people struggled and that which they sought to construct.
15
 
At the middle of this ambivalent stance was the Vietnam Workers‘ Party (VWP) 
which in 1951 emerged publicly, positioned itself to lead a movement against French 
colonial rule, and used military force and emerging state institutions to establish 
national rule.
16
 If considering revolutions as ―emergent phenomena‖ helps explain 
institutional outcomes, then I argue that refocusing on legitimation embedded in the 
Party‘s mobilization agenda explains why these outcomes appeared in state form—
though not always as intended.
17
 
Using mobilization to think about state power raises historiographic and 
analytic questions about why, and whether, people in the Black River region joined in 
the project of making Vietnam. In an oft-quoted statement, Karl Deutsch defined 
social mobilization as ―the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and 
psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for 
                                                                                                                                            
and Social Movement Mobilization,‖ in David Snow et al, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Social 
Movements (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 116-152 
14
 Gilbert Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the 
Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994). 
15
 For accounts that associate ―politics‖ with contests over a government already formed and equate 
state power with given institutions ―responding‖ to movement action, cf., Charles Tilly and Sidney 
Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 5, 155; Jack Goldstone, States, 
Parties, and Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 20.  
16
 Dang Phong and Melanie Beresford, Authority Relations and Economic Decision-Making in Vietnam 
(Copenhagen: NIAS, 1998), 24-25 
17
 Jack Goldstone, ―Toward a fourth generation of revolutionary theory,‖ Annual Review of Political 
Science 4 (2001): 139-187. 
 10 
new patterns of socialization and behavior.‖ Although Deutsch identified mobilization 
as a transformative process, his explanation of why or how it ―happens‖ only points to 
coincident ―certain historical situations and stages of economic development.‖18 The 
making of Vietnam complicates this narrative. Even if war with Japanese and French 
―foreign invaders‖ provided conditions in favor of nationalist mobilization, ―‘the 
Vietnamese,‘‖ writes Patricia Pelley, ―were internally divided‖ and ―struggled 
violently among themselves.‖19 Such divisions belie appearances of national unity, 
particularly in the Black River region where social cleavages assumed ethnicized 
forms: French colonial rule empowered Thái elites in a space claimed by Kinh elites 
as integral to national territory. Analytically, to focus only on given warfare still fails 
to explain why and how political elites mobilized overwhelmingly rural populations.  
As much as episodic war, chronic rural inequalities created conditions 
favorable for mobilizing nationalist sentiment as well as a platform for an emerging 
vanguard party. National liberation in Vietnam accelerated in tandem with a mass 
movement for VWP-led social transformation lasting well beyond the French war‘s 
end in 1954, particularly through land reform (1953-57) and collectivization (1959-
1970s).
20
 Anti-colonial warfare and agrarian transformation were highly contested 
projects among ostensibly unified proponents of national liberation, yet both 
                                                 
18
 Karl Deutsch, ―Social Mobilization and Political Development,‖ American Political Science Review 
55 (1961), 494. His modernizationist perspective influenced scholars of the Chinese revolution who 
argue that war with Japan provided ―certain conditions‖ under which social mobilization became a 
―crucial occurrence in the onset of nationalism.‖ Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and 
Communist Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 26-27; Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State 
by Construction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 106. 
19
 Patricia Pelley, Postcolonial Vietnam (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 3. 
20
 For more on the Vietnamese revolution‘s dual goals, see Truong Chinh, Truong Chinh: Selected 
Writings (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 321-323; ―Hoàn thành giải phóng dân tộc, phát triển dân 
chủ nhân dân, tiến tới chủ nghĩa xã hội,‖ Feb 1951, Văn kiện Đảng vol 12, yr 1951 (Hanoi: NXB Chính 
trị Quốc gia, 2001), 73-76. These processes re-emerged in southern Vietnam following DRV absorption 
of the Republic of Vietnam and establishment of the Socialist Republic in 1975. Cf., Ngô Vĩnh Long, 
―Some Aspects of Cooperativization in the Mekong Delta,‖ in Postwar Vietnam, ed. David Marr and 
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nonetheless involved unprecedented mass political participation. This groundswell of 
rural political engagement sparked enduring questions as to how and why the 
peasantry becomes mobilized.
21
 These questions remain crucial to understanding the 
terms on which this agrarian hinterland became enmeshed in political organizing that 
was both nationalist and class-based. Conditions of warfare and agrarian inequality, 
then, enabled an elite to cultivate nationalism and promote radical social change to 
legitimate and institutionalize their political power. 
When anti-colonial warfare broke out in the Black River region, propaganda—
i.e., mass political education—featured prominently as accompaniment to organized 
force. Just as legitimation accompanied coercion, so too did coercion back up 
legitimation.
22
 Programs predicated on coercion and consent worked in tandem and 
their means varied in relation to one another. During the guerilla phase between 1945-
50, armed propaganda teams worked clandestinely to make revolutionary contact, to 
secure cooperation, and, at times, to intimidate or eliminate opposition. When guerilla 
tactics shifted to mobile warfare in late 1952 and changed again in early 1954 to fixed 
positions, cadres accompanied regular troops, organized study sessions to educate 
local people, and endeavored to mobilize them. They brought along a new police force 
and surveillence techniques capable of keeping watch over both friend and enemy. 
 Among their most important lessons was how to distinguish between ―friend‖ 
and ―enemy.‖ This strategy calls to mind jurist Carl Schmitt‘s idea of the political, 
which, he argues, results from recognizing and making this distinction in a moment of 
                                                 
21
 Eric Wolf, ―Peasants and Political Mobilization: Introduction,‖ Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 17 (1975), 385-388; Alvin So, ―Peasant Conflict and the Local Predatory State in the Chinese 
Countryside,‖ Journal of Peasant Studies 34 (2007): 560-581. 
22
 Antonio Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1999). I expand my discussion of 
coercion and militarization in Chapter 5. 
 12 
existential crisis.
23
 Although this strategy may have motivated cadres politically, its 
failure to work as planned in the Black River region reveals theoretical and empirical 
limitations. Schmitt‘s core assumption, i.e. that ―the concept of the state presupposes 
the concept of the political,‖ absolves state-making of any political content and cannot 
account for how cadres used legitimation work to construct nation and state 
mutually.
24
 Furthermore, that legitimation frequently failed suggests that binary 
categories were insufficient to capture, transform, and unify peoples of multiple and 
shifting identifications. Finally, ―politics‖ in this rural hinterland, as scholars of 
agrarian societies remind us, extended also to the means and ends of agricultural 
production. Cadres were well aware of agrarian inequalities and capitalized on 
material shortages by incorporating the provision of capital and consumption goods 
into their mass education curriculum. In the process, they created new circuits of 
reciprocal exchange among an emergent community. 
If it remains important to think about mobilization as a social process, then its 
use by elites to move masses calls for thinking of it as a tactic as well. Doing so points 
to its historical specificity and explains its deployment at a time when an emerging 
DRV could and did benefit from its intended effects—creating a society and territory 
subject to its rule. A technique of modern statecraft specific to the 20
th
 century, 
mobilization emerged when two trajectories—formation of mass politics and legible 
societies—intersected to make population management both possible and desirable.25 
Lineages of postcolonial legibility in the Black River region, like other corners of 
former French empire, grew out of colonial ethnology, a powerful project to know, 
categorize, and manipulate subjects.
26
 Mobilization increased legibility: it built on, 
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expanded, and intensified already existing programs of agricultural taxation and labor 
recruitment. All worked reciprocally as resource claims and unfolded iteratively as 
processes of learning about agrarian subjects and their productive capacities. As a 
capacity and prerogative of state, then, mobilization required knowledge of, and 
contributed to the making of, society.  
Similarly, mobilization as a mass form of legitimation drew on and extended 
construction of the state idea. As Philip Abrams has written, ―the idea of the state‖ is 
not the location of ―reality‖ but is, instead, an effect of legitimation—itself the 
façade—which ―conceals the actual disunity of political power.‖27 The institutional 
segments jostling to rule an emergent Vietnam worked to present themselves as the 
state, singular and solid. If labor recruitment and taxation presented the DRV as 
unified in aims and programs, then I show how a decision in 1953 to limit mass 
mobilization for land reform revealed splits within an unsteady political coalition that 
represented itself as always already unified. ―Unity‖ was not just a desired outcome of 
making a national society; it was also a means of reifying power. 
By attending to the institutionalization and legitimation of DRV power and to 
the construction of categories used to describe these processes and their outcomes, I 
examine what Abrams called ―politically organized subjection‖ and rethink the role of 
legitimation in producing ideas of state conflated with nation and party.
28
 Studying the 
observed disunity of political coalitions push what scholars of contentious politics call 
―claim making‖ beyond what social movements do to include taken-for-granted 
analytical categories as well.
29
 Even Weber‘s famous definition of state—―a human 
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community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force 
within a given territory‖—contains a claim made with regards to its own legitimacy 
that simultaneously accomplishes and conceals political domination.
30
 Uninterrogated 
descriptions and seemingly neutral names, Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer observe, 
―are in fact impositional claims.‖31 Here, then, is a strong argument to study 
mobilization as political practice that produces a particular, historically specific idea 
of institutionalized power. In post World War II-era Vietnam, political actors, many of 
whom were VWP members and local elites recognized as DRV officials, wielded a 
state idea to justify claims on an evolving, newly discovered, mass society. Although 
mobilization did not appear concretely until 1953, its use and deployment built on and 
initiated longer cycles of legitimation always backed by coercion.  
―State‖ and ―society,‖ then, arise mutually both as entangled analytical 
constructs and as powerful terms of political legitimation. To delineate a boundary 
between state and society and make the former appear a ―real‖ objective structure, 
writes Timothy Mitchell, is itself ―a product of political processes‖ specific to modern 
forms of power.
32
 Boundaries, he rightly notes, permeate knowledge categories as 
well.
33
 Rather than separate state and society into neat analytical units, Mitchell 
advocates starting with their ―uncertain boundary‖ and its generation through powerful 
regulatory and disciplinary practices.
34
 Even if cadres‘ propaganda efforts often failed 
to impart a distinction between friend and enemy, for example, their legitimation work 
exemplifed practices of boundary making. Likewise, the Party derived power not only 
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from influencing institutions directly through leadership and personnel recruitment 
but, also, from its ability to regulate uncertain boundaries between them. 
 
Making boundaries 
Writing a history of Dien Bien Phu in this period requires reading archival 
sources and silences. Like other state institutions, the national archive that imposes its 
claim on the Black River region and its people, frames its claim—to use Corrigan and 
Sayer‘s words—as ―seemingly neutral, natural, universal, obvious,‖ and denies the 
uncertainty of boundaries either geographic or analytic.
35
 To write this history, to read 
one‘s way into the silences and ambiguities, is to linger over the social construction of 
boundaries. Doing so leads this inquiry in three inter-related directions regarding 
temporality, nationality, and spatiality. 
First, temporal boundaries structure historical inquiry in and of Vietnam in 
general and Điện Biên Phủ in particular. Issues of periodization, historical silences, 
nationalist historiography, and archival access are enduring themes in this dissertation. 
I argue that periodization, for example, is a structuring effect of historic and ongoing 
legitimation work. Documentary organization, Corrigan argues, is itself a form of rule 
and ruling.
36
 His insight opens space for renewed engagement with the power 
underlying state archives and historical production.
37
 Histories of Vietnam often begin 
or end in 1954 when the People‘s Army defeated French Expeditionary Forces at Điện 
Biên Phủ. In so doing, these narratives discount the contemporaneous Geneva 
negotiations (resulting in partition) in favor of recounting a fetishized rupture, a clean 
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national break with the colonial past.
38
 By bounding struggle to a year-long period in 
1953-54, militarist nationalist histories of Điện Biên Phủ magnify the legitimation 
effect—mystifying historical antecedents and obscuring subsequent and ongoing 
struggles. I challenge naturalized and taken-for-granted temporal boundaries by 
offering a longer history attentive to continuities, changes, and transformations. I also 
respond to a scholarly call for renewed attention to understudied aspects of 
Vietnamese history and, along the way, attend to ways in which this history‘s telling 
became Vietnamized.
39
  
Second, just as communal categories of ―ethnicity‖ and ―nation‖ have evolved 
in relation to one another through a long and complicated process, so has the unstable 
boundary between them. Ideas of social difference result from complex processes of 
recognition, or what Katherine Verdery calls ―a play between ascription and self-
ascription.‖40 The remarkably diverse, multiple, and mutable suite of languages, 
cultural habits, and social relations found in montane Southeast Asia provide fertile 
ground for investigating how processes of recognition change in relation to emerging 
states and evolving nations. Drawing on research conducted in the hills of Burma, 
Edmund Leach reconceptualized ―static social systems‖ in favor of historical terms 
like process, instability, and change. His analysis of how Kachins ―become‖ Shans 
demonstrates the insufficiency of ―exact categories‖ for demarcating and cataloging 
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forms of social difference that, empirically, change over time.
41
 Observing that hill 
and valley terrains correspond to variable livelihood strategies and forms of socio-
cultural organization, Leach explained such differences as historically and relationally 
generated. Over centuries, migrants settled these varying altitudinal gradients, drew on 
multiple traditions, developed niche-sensitive agricultures and trading patterns, and 
coined linguistic expressions—i.e., ―ethnicity‖—to recognize one another. Insofar as a 
taken-for-granted country name obscures both underlying social difference and a 
cultural / political project of territorial domination, Leach‘s analysis of ―Burma‖ 
applies as well to my analysis of ―Vietnam.‖42 
If ascription and self-description produce unstable recognitions, then the 
processes of modern state formation tend towards fixing a given subject or group with 
a singular identity. State-making changes the dynamic interplay of recognition, putting 
power behind ascription to institute a given, fixed identity for political subjects. 
Similar to the taxonomies colonial ethnologists constructed and deployed to render 
Tonkin‘s montane societies legible, architects of the DRV state developed the idea of 
nationality or ethnicity (dân tộc) to catalog its subjects. Nationalist ideology worked in 
tandem with state-making to elevate a ―national‖ form of identity (i.e., being 
Vietnamese) and then subordinated others to ―ethnic‖ identifications (i.e., being Khu 
Mu, Hmong, Thái, etc.). Mobilizing multiple and diverse peoples created a power-
laden field of recognition. That peoples populating a territorial frontier became known 
as ―ethnic minorities‖ is comparatively new, resulting from a state form that served to 
consolidate a nationalist ideology.
43
 In modern Vietnam, everyone has a national 
identity and an ethnicity, although belonging to the ―national majority,‖ or being Kinh, 
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frequently goes unstated. In sum, as Verdery writes, ―national ideologies sort the 
world into ‗kinds of people‘ who relate to an actual or potential political entity known 
as a state (hence, ‗nation-state‘).‖44 I trace powerful efforts to regulate communal 
boundaries and their disciplinary effects—alternately joining communities together or 
pulling them apart. 
Third, attending to boundary-making in this frontier calls for discussing the 
processes and practices of spatial regulation. Building on Abrams and Mitchell, K. 
Sivaramakrishnan advances what he calls ―statemaking,‖ defined as the ―process of 
drawing lines between state and society… by organizing political subjection within a 
defined territory and imbuing this distinction with legitimacy.‖45 I interpret the process 
of defining state territory to be another mode of claim-making, one inseparable from 
and constitutive of sovereign state power.
46
 Attending to statemaking‘s spatial 
dimensions contributes to understanding how state power is actualized in local politics 
and territorialized through strategies of rural resource control.
47
 Studying legitimation 
and mobilization on an emerging frontier of mid-20
th
 century Vietnam throws into 
sharp relief the making of state as an historical and spatial process. Relations of rule 
were—and still remain—spatially constituted, distributed unevenly, and contingent on 
negotiation between central direction and local autonomy.  
My critical state formation perspective shares with social movement scholars a 
conviction that studies of mobilization must include space as a ―constituent aspect‖ of 
contentious politics. To think about collective action‘s ―spatial effects‖ means not 
accepting administrative units ipso facto as given variables but, rather, studying prior 
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and ongoing construction of spatial boundaries.
48
 Districts in the DRV‘s emergent 
Northwest Region inherited and incorporated spatial units, known as muang, 
originally formed in the pre-colonial era by early Thái-speaking settler communities. 
The muang governed land administration, labor allocation, residence, and rule and 
formed the basis for subsequent and enduring territorial administration.
49
 Studying 
practices of spatial regulation also highlights underlying conceptions of sovereignty. 
In contrast to the unfixed borders found in the Black River region‘s pre-colonial 
confederation of Thái muang, both the French colonial regime and the Vietnamese 
nation-state staked claims to homogenous, bounded space.
50
 Colonial and national rule 
shared an underlying regime of territoriality based on the demarcation and defense of 
linear borders; and the internalization and singularization of frontier spaces. By 
incorporating Thái muang elites and privileging them as officials, dialectically 
opposed political regimes unintentionally reproduced internal frontiers both imbued 
with ethnicity and contingent on localized political relations. 
The context of my inquiry can be located in what James Scott has called 
―Zomia,‖ a mountainous frontier of staggering ecological, linguistic, and cultural 
variety whose incorporation has long troubled lowland statemaking projects.
51
 
Following Scott, I use the term ―frontier‖ to refer to a peopled terrain of relative 
autonomy and isolation always socially constructed in relation to centers of power.
52
 
Although frontiers can be thought of as zones of encounter where peoples meet in a 
neutral ―middle ground‖ and engage in processes of transculturation, I study a period 
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of unequal power relations and organized violence.
53
 Although the Zomian frontier 
can also be thought of as a borderland, or an area of multiply contested boundaries and 
territorial claims, I use the term in a more restrictive sense.
54
 My narrative begins in 
the late 19
th
 century when colonial cartographers worked with local powerbrokers to 
construct boundaries between Indochina‘s protectorates of Tonkin and Laos against 
China. They transformed a borderland of fuzzy boundaries and overlapping territorial 
claims into an imperial frontier of linear borders and mutually exclusive, sovereign 
territorial claims. Half a century later, World War II and then revolutionary war 
contested these boundaries anew.  
That the colonial boundaries did eventually remain in place, and take on a 
particular new meaning, was far from foreordained. If, as historian Mark Bradley 
argues, ―the outcome of the French war in Vietnam was always a contingent one,‖ 
then I would add that the territorial shape, political relations, and social composition of 
Vietnam itself were also contingent.
55
 Unmaking colonial spatial distinctions and 
remaking them as intra- and interstate borders required intensive legitimation work. 
What Mr. L called ―liberation‖ in 1954 was simultaneously a longer social process 
greeted with deep ambivalence as well as an iterative, self-conscious state project 
aimed at territorial consolidation and legitimation. If borders refer to a line 
demarcating state sovereignty then, as a consequence of modern nationalisms‘ 
association of communal membership with territory, these lines had to be 
reconstructed as the national community‘s spatial extent.56  
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Associating nation with territory, however, raised a profound and vexing issue 
for historical actors in the early 1950s, known as the ―ethnicity question‖ (vấn đề dân 
tộc). Were so-called ethnicities entitled to territory? What was an ethnicity? What was 
a nationality? Who were the Vietnamese? Although these questions remain largely 
unsettled, political elites performed acrobatic legitimation work to regulate boundaries 
between these unstable categories. DRV and Party leaders settled on a temporary 
solution: limited self-rule for ―ethnic minorities.‖ In 1955, the DRV recognized the 
Black River region as the Thái-Mèo Autonomous Zone which, at 55,000 square 
kilometers, covered an enormous 1/3
rd
 of DRV territory; or ―1/6th the entire country‖ 
(i.e., a claim to an imaginary ―Vietnam‖ composed, also, of the break-away southern 
Republic of Vietnam).
57
 In its contemporary and historic forms, Vietnam is and was 
the outcome of contingent and multiply dialectical processes: pitting revolutionary 
liberation against colonial exploitation; proposing national unity versus ethnic 
division; defining a national self in relation to an ethnic or foreign other. I focus on a 
moment in the 1950s when the making of a national frontier was particularly 
contested, contingent, spatially uneven, and violent. I share with critical scholars of 
the American west their rejection of a triumphalist frontier narrative of inevitable 
expansion, incorporation, and assimilation.
58
  
Vietnam has its own frontier narratives to accompany population movements 
and territorial reconfigurations.
59
 Perhaps most explicitly, the ―southern advance‖ 
(nam tiến) posits an inevitable expansion of Việt/Kinh peoples southwards to fill out 
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the S-shaped boundaries of the modern nation-state. Keith Taylor challenges 
representations of this supposed ―singular event‖ by attending to linguistic and 
historical detail to counterpose regional histories composed of unsteady, shifting 
power relations.
60
 What Mr. L mentioned as ―clearing the wilderness‖ (khai hoang) 
was more than just the name of a state-sponsored migration program. Clearing the 
wilderness also figures as another determinist organizing principle narrating allegedly 
continuous Việt/Kinh expansion stretching from the 13th century Trần dynasty to the 
19
th
 c. Nguyễn court, through French colonial rule, and culminating in the DRV‘s first 
five-year plan in 1960.
61
 Similarly, stories of ―national victory‖ at Điện Biên Phủ 
over-determine an outcome by structuring narratives in terms of resistance, revolution, 
unity, and anti-colonialism all oriented towards a foreordained, singular endpoint.
62
 
All three narrative approaches adhere to an underlying telos: projecting the territorial 
shape of ―Vietnam‖ backwards in time to explain its ultimate borders with Laos, 
Cambodia, and China. Furthermore, they associate Vietnamese-ness with Kinh 
settlement, overlooking histories of violence with, and silencing trajectories of, 
multiple and diverse peoples. By contrast, I approach this frontier by attending to 
alternative trajectories, silences, and linguistic detail in order to retell a story of mutual 
accommodations and historical contingencies.  
In many ways, as my conversations above indicate, the area in and around 
Điện Biên Phủ remains a frontier, pointing to how its ―zonal character,‖ writes Peter 
Sahlins, ―persists after the delimitation of a boundary line.‖63 By describing local 
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conditions in terms of ―spacious land, no people,‖ Mr. D echoed a pervasive 
representation dating to the 1940s when local elites began a lasting engagement with 
an emergent political, cultural, and demographic center. The description of upstream 
montane conditions in terms of land abundance and population scarcity was 
constructed in relation to its obverse: downstream delta conditions of land scarcity and 
population abundance.
64
 In spite of a half-century of domestic migration to this 
frontier from Thái Bình and other Red River Delta sending sites, profoundly different 
average population densities continue to characterize Vietnam‘s northern lowland and 
highland, or downstream/upstream, regions.
65
 Comparing them in a national frame 
renders the delta ―crowded‖ or ―dense‖ and the mountains ―sparse‖ and ―spacious.‖  
These same (mis)representations function ideologically to legitimate various 
state projects and failures over time. Mr. D himself participated in one such 
development and migration project and, as a result, moved from ―crowded‖ Thái Binh 
to ―spacious‖ Núa Ngam in 1976. In an earlier era, officials used a discourse of 
―sparse land, few people‖ to perform a tremendous amount of legitimation work. In 
1949, an officialized Thái elite invoked the phrase to complain that the DRV‘s 
standard administrative units were a poor fit with local norms of space and patterns of 
settlement.
66
 Thái-Mèo Autonomous Zone officials in 1956- 1957 drew on the phrase, 
often in the first lines of their respective reports, to express a variety of concerns. 
Some fretted about frontier security and insecurity among politically wayward ―ethnic 
minorities,‖ reminding their superiors in Hanoi that the Zone‘s international borders 
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 Lò Văn Mười, ―Báo cáo UBKCHC LT Sơn Lai 3 tháng 7,8,9 năm 1949,‖ 21 Oct 1949, NAVC 3, 
phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 187, p. 12-14. 
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stretched along China and Laos for 700 km.
67
 Others drew on the phrase to grumble 
about the region‘s ―backward economy and agriculture,‖ justifying failures to increase 
production according to centrally-issued plans.
68
 Still others used the phrase to 
complain about the persistence of ―very backward ethnicities‖ to explain the failure of 
a civilization project to ―advance culture‖ in line with nationally dominant norms.69  
I argue that all of these (mis)characterizations tell more about the 
preoccupations of political elites than they do about the underlying conditions they 
purport to describe. By investigating the appearance of the ―sparse land, few people‖ 
discourse in the late 1940s, I show how it conceals and reveals an emerging political 
alliance between Thái elites and central leaders eerily similar to the colonial project 
they professed to replace: only this time, Kinh VWP leaders figured at the center, not 
French officials. Likewise, the DRV arrangement reproduced tensions and 
contradictions carried over from colonial forms of rule.   
To say there were ―no people‖ in Điện Biên, moreover, is not only empirically 
wrong but also obscures locally relevant, socially-produced differences. Disparities 
between hill and valley population densities repeat on a smaller scale within Điện Biên 
District, partially because of differing yields between forms of swidden and irrigated 
rice agriculture. My district minder, himself a proud Kinh migrant from Thái Binh, 
pointed to these (agri)cultural contrasts between Núa Ngam Commune‘s hill-dwelling 
Lao and Hmong swidden farmers and Thanh Xương‘s plain-dwelling Thái and Kinh 
wet-rice farmers.
70
 Comparing plains and mountains on multiple spatial and temporal 
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 UBHC KTTTM, ―Báo cáo công tác cải thiên đời sống vật chất và tình thân cho nhân dân các d.t.,‖ 10 
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people and 43 people per km
2
. Data collected from Statistical Office, Dien Bien District, 21 Aug 2006. 
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scales throws into relief how ethnicized patterns of agriculture and settlement came to 
be. That Mr. D and Mr. L dwelled at length on ethnicity in terms of fear, conflict, and 
state regulation points to categorical instabilities specific to evolving forms of 
communal membership. Both the local head of the Fatherland Front and the retired 
Farmers‘ Association leader, as officials and residents, were simultaneously agents in 
and products of powerful and ongoing processes of national incorporation and state 
territorialization. Their highly regulated identities—first Vietnamese and then Black 
Thái or Kinh—are products of boundary making embedded in these processes. 
Even seemingly neutral place names contain the effects of powerful 
legitimation work. The name Điện Biên Phủ can be translated as ―border post 
prefecture.‖71 Phủ is an old Sino-Vietnamese term for administrative unit dating back 
to Nguyễn dynasty rule, perhaps even earlier.72 Although the royal designation of this 
prefecture as a post (điện) on an edge or line (biên) predates the actual demarcation of 
the border in the late 19
th
 century, its naming nonetheless staked a powerful territorial 
claim.
73
 From the perspective of Vietnamese court and national center alike, the place 
name internalizes territory yet acknowledges its location on the edge of a sovereign 
domain. In short, calling this site a ―border post prefecture‖ simultaneously 
incorporates its territory and marginalizes it.
74
 Attending to local place names and 
spatial relations destabilizes what center-periphery relations the official name conceals 
and reveals. For Thái speakers, the name Mường Thanh (or, muang of heaven) calls to 
mind the place‘s historic, cultural, agricultural, and political centrality.75 For residents 
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 Bernard Fall offers another translation as ―Seat of the Border County Prefecture‖ but I disagree with 
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of its plain and surrounding hills alike, the town of Điện Biên Phủ serves as a locus of 
activity in its own right: a provincial political capital, trading entrepot, and cultural 
center.
76
 Both place names co-exist but each points to outcomes of differently 
conceived and located political projects. Whereas the place name Điện Biên Phủ is a 
product of a centrally produced, Vietnamese synoptic grid, Mường Thanh is a product 
of local Thái ideas of space, local rule, and community—a central, heavenly muang.  
In sum, I use legitimation in and mobilization of a contested frontier to 
highlight practices and processes of statemaking. I also amend an understanding of 
mobilization inherited from literatures on social movements and comparative politics. 
If the former presents mobilization as a dynamic social process altering resource 
availability, then the latter illustrates how, in 1950s Vietnam, it was also a tactic, i.e. a 
movement initiated and directed by enmeshed Party, military, and DRV institutions. 
Yet, with rare exception, these literatures stop short of analyzing what mobilization 
produced in terms of the ideologically-loaded categories—such as nation and 
ethnicity; party, state, society; Northwest Zone and Vietnam—structuring political 
relationships.
77
 The critical state formation literature suggests theoretical and 
methodological approaches to address this gap. Theoretically, an understanding of 
mobilization must incorporate analyses of boundary making and spatial regulation. 
Methodologically, a relational approach attentive to legitimation‘s terms and social 
effects guides this dissertation‘s study of how relations of rule were made, unmade, 
and transformed in time and space.  
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Narrative sequences 
The ethnographic encounters above both foreground sustained inquiry into 
mutually constitutive processes and practices of statemaking and mobilization; and 
illustrate their lasting effects. The dissertation focuses overall on the 1950s, a moment 
leading to and through the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign when an evolving national 
community and emerging state power intersected to produce a version of Vietnam. To 
get to this moment, the analysis is historically sequential, chronologically overlapping, 
and extends beyond normative periodization. By attending carefully to historic and 
ongoing legitimation work, the argument explores the reconfiguration and regulation 
of social, spatial, and temporal boundaries. The dissertation illustrates how terms of 
legitimation not only structured the actions of historical actors but also exerted subtle 
influence on analytical categories still used to assess them.  
With these ideas in mind, this dissertation is divided into five substantive 
chapters. The first two chapters provide background to the intensive legitimation that 
accompanied militarized state expansion discussed in the following three. In addition, 
the first two chapters present evidence to argue that statemaking reproduced relations, 
categories, and tensions of rule already evident in the colonial era.  
Although legitimation work accompanying Vietnam‘s making was 
transformative in many ways, to investigate underlying relations of rule requires a 
longer historical perspective. I introduce the Black River region and offer a longue 
durée of its settlement, livelihood practices, and forms of political organization.
78
 
Between the 17
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, a local political confederation of multiple muang 
(the Sipsongchauthai, or ―Twelve Thái Counties‖) existed at the margins of multiply 
overlapping sovereign kingdoms. I argue that a crucial transformation occurred in the 
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late 19
th
 century when Thái elites positioned themselves as arbiters, and beneficiaries, 
of rising imperial power. French colonial rule incorporated them into relations of rule 
predicated on a new regime of territoriality, repositioning and reconfiguring a 
borderlands confederation as a frontier of empire. Following World War II, 
reorganizing a colonial frontier as the Thái Federation amplified contradictions 
embedded in this alliance and generated support for an alternative.  
That the Black River region would wind up in a space called Vietnam was far 
from pre-determined. The second chapter begins a narrative of Vietnamese state 
formation, its interruptions and discontinuities, and its multiple colonial legacies. The 
period from World War II‘s end to 1950 figures as an early stage in making an 
alternative political project based on recruiting Thái elites disaffected with the local-
colonial alliance. Methodologically, I shift from a longue durée approach to an 
archival ethnography in order to query relations between knowledge and power, to 
investigate silences, and to interrogate the production of truth claims.
79
 By ending the 
chapter on the dissolution of DRV institutions and the Thái Federation‘s renewal, I 
aim to illustrate contingencies, uncertainties, and breaks in what is all-too-often 
represented as a continuous, teleological, and linear revolutionary nationalist narrative. 
The third substantive chapter discusses the DRV state-making project from 
1951-1954 during a period of growing Party and military strength. I argue that central 
political elites drew on and generated power through regulating claims on space, 
place, and land. Actors such as President Hồ Chí Minh and Party Secretary Trường 
Chinh established boundaries of communal membership isomorphic with state space 
to legitimate military expansion into Vietnam‘s emerging Northwest Zone. Just as 
cadres incorporated place-based relations of rule into DRV institutions, regional and 
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central political elites suspended land reform to re-empower, and win the loyalty of, a 
Thái landed elite. Poor peasants and local cadres expressed outrage over a perceived 
contradiction in the revolutionary program, exposing deep splits in ostensibly unified 
entities such as ―nation‖ and ―state.‖ Coincident with each of these policies, processes, 
and practices, the People‘s Army enforced a monopoly claim on state territory.  
Chapters five and six backtrack temporally, to 1952-1954, to explore how 
militarization, economic development, and institutional reorganization worked to 
secure claims on an emerging national society contained within expanding state 
territory. These processes were reciprocal. First, securing claims on agrarian labor and 
resources enabled the People‘s Army to claim more territory; more territory enabled 
claims on a broader pool of labor and resources. Second, making a national economy 
was as much about material goods as it was about their symbolic significance. What I 
call the revolutionary exchange represented overt efforts to legitimate relations of rule 
by ameliorating conditions of material scarcity. Exchange relations contributed 
towards the making society and state as hierarchically ordered entities structuring 
reciprocal claims unfolding within, but not limited to, an emerging realm of 
―economy.‖ Although chapter five focuses on 1952-1953 and chapter six on 1953-54, 
both chapters incorporate methodological comparisons to explore themes of liberation, 
exchange, and civilian support for military coercion. 
The deliberate strengthening of institutional capacity to know an agrarian 
population, to regulate its production, and to collect resources on behalf of the 
People‘s Army worked iteratively. Successive rounds of state learning enabled a 
militarized practice of claim-making known as mobilization. Like the revolutionary 
exchange (which it partially displaced in 1953), mobilization was also a process which 
produced and reproduced ideological effects of state and society—known in 
vernacular as Government and people. Iterative state learning also enabled a particular 
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retelling of the Black River region‘s history. Institutional capacity to know and 
regulate society as such developed alongside planning and calculating military 
logistics as well as enumerating a population‘s ability to bear them. Nationalist and 
militarist tellings of the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign are saturated with numbers of 
laborers, days worked, tonnages of rice, etc. Narrative recounting, I argue, depends on 
prior acts of counting and accounting. Just as I highlight the emergence of 
numerological abstraction, I endeavor to retell a story of Điện Biên Phủ that brings 
humanity—in its concrete and wayward forms—back into the tale. 
Although mobilization did generate massive amounts of labor and resources to 
move and feed a growing military, the process did not always produce results as 
intended. Hunger, anxiety, and population flight followed in the wake of each military 
campaign, threatening to unravel all the legitimation work that accompanied DRV 
statemaking. Highlighting the cyclicality of hunger and anxiety destabilizes a narrative 
tendency to recount social change in a linear fashion. Linearized narrative recounting 
also obscures alternative, dialectically produced trajectories stemming from 
statemaking‘s unintended consequences. As with the French colonial era, configuring 
central rule among Thái elites may have secured an international border with Laos and 
China but reproduced frontier spaces and social tensions within. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FROM BORDERLANDS TO FRONTIER  
      
 
Locating a frontier  
This dissertation on frontier politics opens with the making of a frontier space 
in the Black River borderlands where the eastern Himalayan massif enters what is now 
Southeast and East Asia.
1
 To refer to the Black River region prior to the consolidation 
of nation-state rule as ―northwest Vietnam‖ is both to use an historical anachronism 
and to acknowledge a territorial claim projected retroactively. Only in 1954, following 
the defeat of French forces at Điện Biên Phủ in May and ratification of the Geneva 
Accords in July, does locating part of this region within the territory of ―Vietnam‖ 
begin to make sense. Even then, however, the Geneva Accords produced two 
Vietnams, partitioned at the 17
th
 parallel between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV) in the north and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in the south.
2
 Subsequently, 
the DRV administered the Black River region for two decades as an Autonomous 
Zone (Khu tự trị), known from 1955 to 1962 as the ―Thái-Mèo‖ and from 1962 to 
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1975 as the ―Northwest.‖ In 1975, when the two Vietnams merged, uniform territorial 
administration replaced regional autonomy, recognizing the Black River region as 
provinces of Sơn La and Lai Châu. In 2004, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam carved 
from these two provinces the province of Điện Biên. 
This chapter begins when peoples of the Black River basin developed patterns 
of social relations, such as trade, tribute, and imperial dominations, distinctive to their 
own settlement histories and agro-ecological niches. From the 17
th
 to the 19
th
 
centuries, the Sipsongchauthai organized this region and, amidst overlapping claims to 
its territory and peoples, formed a political center of its own. By drawing a linear 
boundary line in the late 19
th
 century, French colonial rule remade this borderlands 
region into a frontier and, until the mid-20
th
 century, reoriented local political relations 
within the bounds of empire. From a semi-autonomous confederation displaying 
multiple sovereignty, French colonial rule transformed the Sipsongchauthai into a 
military territory located inside Tonkin‘s boundaries and outside neighboring Laos and 
China. Even within Indochina‘s colonial space, local leaders continued to exert a form 
of self-rule: Thái powerbrokers supported their own political and economic agenda by 
leveraging their frontier status and by reproducing local units of production and rule 
(the muang).
3
 Accommodation and negotiation underlay the making of empire and, 
later, of nation-state.  
The transition from borderlands to frontier was the first of two pivot points. In 
the late 19
th
 century Đèo Văn Trì assisted early French explorers to map and relocate 
this territory within Tonkin‘s border with Laos and within Indochina‘s border with 
China; he also positioned himself and his family as the region‘s rightful rulers. 
Through the mid-20
th
 century, this region was administered as, and figured in relations 
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(such as Mường Lai) and a particular ethno-linguistic group (the Mường peoples).  
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of domination as, an imperial frontier. In 1931, for example, the French Indochinese 
Union was composed of five ―countries‖ (pays): the colony of Cochinchina, two 
protectorates of Annam and Cambodia, and two ―mixed administration‖ protectorates 
of Tonkin and Laos.
4
 Mixed administration signified two forms of duality: first, 
empowering mandarins or ―native‖ (indigène) officials, like Đèo Văn Trì, to rule 
indirectly; second, joining military and civil administrations in ―military territories‖ 
(territoires militaires) along Indochina‘s northern frontier with China.5 These 
administrative distinctions also reproduced what French officials, geographers, and 
ethnographers constructed as binary, environmentally-determinist social categories of 
―mountains‖ and ―delta.‖6 Until World War II, colonial officials recognized the 
mountainous Black River region as the 4
th
 Military Territory and empowered White 
Thái Đèo clan members as officials to rule jointly.  
The wake of World War II was another pivot point, a moment when a 
reorganizing imperial frontier overlapped temporally and spatially with an emergent 
national frontier. Between the defeat of Japan and the arrival of allied forces, 
nationalist leader Hồ Chí Minh declared the Democratic Republic of Vietnam‘s 
independence from France in September 1945 and headed its provisional government. 
His announcement posed a national claim to an emergent ―Vietnam‖ configured from 
colonial territories and populations of Tonkin, Cochinchina, and Annam. Meanwhile, 
French statesman Charles de Gaulle had announced France‘s intention to reestablish a 
colonial regime and, in 1945, began to (re)organize the Indochinese Federation. In 
1948, colonial administrators worked with Đèo Văn Trì‘s son, Đèo Văn Long, to 
establish the Thái Federation in an attempt to regain control of the Black River region. 
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National and neocolonial political projects were antithetically posed but historically 
connected. On a frontier reproduced, claimed, and contested by these two projects, 
renewing local rule within French empire generated contradictions which, in turn, led 
to support for a national liberation movement.  
The bulk of this dissertation focuses on the remaking of a frontier during a 
period of armed contest over a political center, a time also known as the first 
Indochina war (1946-54). In a pattern similar to the late 19
th
 century, the Black River 
region once again became a site of multiple claims on its territory and population. 
Unlike the Sipsongchauthai‘s amorphous spaces and overlapping claims, however, by 
the mid-20
th
 century the region‘s bounded space structured contests for monopoly rule 
within a shared regime of territoriality.
7
 On the edges of both a reorganizing Indochina 
and an emergent DRV, the Black River region‘s borders placed local residents in 
particular relationships regarding two centralizing political projects.
8
 They had to 
choose carefully between aligning themselves with one or another project, between 
locating themselves on a frontier of new empire or evolving nation-state.  
 
Here, I advance preliminary arguments, historical and historiographic, 
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concerning the making of frontiers in relation to center(s) of power.   
If frontiers represent territorial limits and jurisdictional zones of sovereign 
state power, as Peter Sahlins and Lucien Febvre suggest, then I would add that for 
makers of centralized states, frontiers represent also a potential, i.e. the expansive 
capacity of their sovereign power.
9
 Yet to dwell on only one center tends to privilege 
one (powerful) perspective among others. Further, how to tell a history of a frontier 
exhibits a narrative tension between projecting backwards already-achieved, 
spatialized relations of power or tracing forward the contingent, uncertain process of 
making and transforming social relations in space. Historians of the American west 
have shown that the term ―frontier‖ carries analytical baggage: pointing to the work of 
Frederick Jackson Turner, critics of his ―frontier thesis‖ of 1893 highlight its 
underlying telos, ―denoting a triumphalist and Anglocentric narrative of continental 
conquest.‖10 These critics contribute towards a broader historiographic shift, 
endeavoring to decenter nationalist or statist narratives of steady and inevitable 
territorial expansion.
11
 In so doing, they enrich an analytical vocabulary, offering an 
idea of ―borderlands‖ to signify multiply contested spaces, amplify the agency of local 
peoples, and restore contingency to historical trajectories.
12
  
Although frontier and borderlands share similar properties, I follow this 
historiographic turn by offering definitions to highlight a historically specific 
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transformation.
13
 ―Borderlands‖ refers to a lived center whose undefined space lies at 
the edges of multiple, overlapping sovereign claims. ―Frontier‖ denotes a lived center 
whose delimited space lies on the edges of a singular claim. Frontier, then, means a 
transformed borderlands where one political center negotiates with local rulers to 
singularize rule and interiorize its territories and peoples.
14
 If French empire 
transformed the Black River borderlands and produced a frontier in the late 19
th
 
century, then opposing political projects—reorganizing French empire and emerging 
nation-state—converged on the initial transformation and, therefore, reproduced a 
frontier in the mid-20
th
 century. Notwithstanding this shared regime of territoriality, 
the DRV political project diverged from its predecessor regarding the terms and tactics 
of legitimation as well as the means and ends of production.    
To take these historical and historiographic concerns seriously renders locating 
a frontier in space and time usefully problematic. Locating a frontier speaks both to 
competing political claims on its territory as well as to multiple histories of its subjects 
and their collective (dis)placements. Referring to ―it,‖ as a given social fact in terms of 
contemporary or stable place names, is not a neutral exercise. One‘s very choice of 
place names often betrays an a priori ―conquest of illegibility,‖ or the effects of a 
political project to standardize and encode territory according to a synoptic 
administrative grid.
15
 Spatial practices and representations are embedded in, and 
enabling of, powerful claims to territory. The lived experience of space is always 
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multiple, yet relations of domination tend towards its singular, ideologically-inflected 
representation.
16
 How we know a given space‘s dimensions, names, or cartographic 
location reflect inherently political—and contingent—outcomes in power-laden 
processes of spatial production. To recite one place name among others indicates the 
effects of one political project among others.  
To describe a frontier uncritically risks accepting and reproducing the 
hegemony of one particular claim among others. Only by deconstructing the idea of 
―Northwest Vietnam‖ can we begin to understand how agreement on the 
transformation of borderland to frontier structured antithetical projects of imperial 
reconstruction and nation-state making. Only by demystifying the spatial 
representations of imperial and nation-state rule can we begin to understand how their 
projects came to be locally institutionalized and legitimized in an evolving spatio-
temporal context. Describing how a frontier came to be and where it happens to be 
located, therefore, illuminates historic and ongoing processes of making and unmaking 
relations of rule.  
 
Early patterns of settlement and organization 
A history of the middle Black River basin begins with histories of spatially-
organized dominations. Over a millennium ago, Thái migrants began to move south 
from China and into a borderland region of forested hills and high mountains 
intersected by narrow valleys and rushing rivers. These early migrants cleared and 
settled what little bottom land they could find and, over time, grouped their 
settlements according to a pattern befitting this rugged landscape. A cluster of villages 
(bản) formed a muang, a valley-based relation of spatial rule governed by a coterie of 
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Thái hereditary nobility, or lords (châu).
17
 Peasants gained access to wet-rice land by 
laboring in service to lords who, in turn, held land in common. Should a lord‘s rule 
prove too exploitative, peasants could flee one muang for another. Or, they could 
avoid labor service by heading for the hills above the valleys. Unlike the sedentary 
fields of irrigated rice, hill residents practiced shifting cultivation by opening dry-field 
swiddens in the forest. They earned relative labor sovereignty by making payments to 
the lords in grains, cotton, opium, or forest products.
18
 In folk narratives of this 
expansion and settlement, Mường Thanh, known today as Điện Biên Phủ, figures as a 
mythical point of origin for Thái-speakers now scattered across modern mainland 
Southeast Asia.
19
 
Over time, successive waves of migrants to this hill and valley terrain added to 
the population and diversified it according to elevation. In a pattern common to what 
James Scott and others have called ―Zomia,‖ a shorthand for the Southeast Asian 
Massif or the eastern foothills of the Himalayas, these societies became stratified 
along an altitudinal gradient, associating cultural forms with topography and 
agricultural specialization.
20
 In spite of its low population density relative to the 
downstream deltaic plains of major rivers like the Red or Mekong, most of the 
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region‘s topography was too steep to support wet-rice agriculture. Because the Thái 
had arrived first, according to what one scholar aptly describes as ―historical relations 
of chronological priority,‖ they controlled most irrigable bottom land.21 Therefore, 
subsequent waves of migrants settled higher and higher on the slopes to open 
swiddens, cultivate grains and cash crops, raise livestock, and collect forest products. 
Among others, Khu Mu (or Tsa/Xá) settled the midlands in proximity to the Thái 
muang. Later on, groups of Hmong (or Miao/Mèo), many fleeing a failed rebellion 
against expanding Qing administration in the mid-19
th
 century, settled the highest 
ridges and mountaintops.
22
     
Even if relative newcomers occasionally challenged their rule, the Thái 
endured as acknowledged sovereigns of this particular domain. Indeed, the Black 
River region was beginning to exhibit distinctive forms of rule and enduring patterns 
of culturally-inflected settlement, trade, and agriculture. From approximately the 17
th
 
to the 19
th
 centuries, the muang lords formed a confederation known as the 
Sipsongchauthai, or ―Twelve Thái Counties.‖23 This confederation was centered 
loosely in Mường Lay, or modern Lai Châu, located where the Black is joined by the 
Nậm Na and Nậm Lai Rivers. The confederated muang spread across the high plateau 
south of China‘s Yunnan province between the Mekong and Red Rivers. In the three 
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centuries prior to French contact, the Sipsongchauthai paid tribute to multiple 
overlords sited downstream, including the Qing dynasty, the courts of Luang Prabang 
and Vientiane, and the Nguyễn kings at Huế.24 These overlord courts were, in turn, 
often caught up in their own complex tributary networks: for example, the Nguyễn 
court sent trade missions to China and the Lao courts to Siam. For the overlords, the 
forested uplands were a source of great wealth as producers of forest products and 
bonded labor.
25
   
By underscoring the complexity and multiplicity of these claims to Black River 
territory, I speak to two different scholarly interpretations. First, nationalist historians 
in Vietnam hark back to Đại Nam‘s records to buttress a very contemporary territorial 
claim. By recalling that the Nguyễn kingdom‘s northern salient (Bắc kỳ) included the 
borderland province of Hưng Hoá, nationalist scholarship contributes to substantiating 
modern Vietnam‘s claim to, what is now, the nation-state‘s ―Northwest‖ region. ―In 
those days,‖ writes Đỗ Thiện, ―people referred to the [Black River] region as the ‗Síp-
song-châu-Thái‘ one part of Vietnam under Hưng Hoá.‖26 Certainly, the Nguyễn 
court‘s registers included this Black River terrain as the province of Hưng Hoá. Yet 
imperial Huế did not send mandarins to the area and preferred, instead, to deal with 
local power-brokers such as the Sipsong‘s Đèo clan.27 In light of contemporary 
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scholarship, I interpret this evidence as akin to a regal fiat, or a one-way 
administrative claim. In the late 19
th
 century alone, Sipsong rulers also negotiated with 
rival court centers, such as an expansionist Siam, and contended with rival power-
brokers, such as the Black and Yellow Flags who had immigrated from Canton and 
Yunnan in the late 19
th
 century.
28
  
Thongchai Winichakul expresses the political relations exemplified by the 
Sipsongchauthai as a form of ―multiple sovereignty.‖29 The idea of multiple 
sovereignty leads me, secondly, to respond to current revisionist interpretations of 
highland Southeast Asia‘s history. James Scott cites the Sipsongchauthai as a classic 
example of what he calls a ―hill state‖ characterized by unfixed borders and 
maintenance of tributary relations with larger, more populous ―valley state‖ 
kingdoms.
30
 His interpretation builds on Thongchai‘s important work historicizing the 
polyvalence of early Southeast Asian forms of rule. Thongchai argues that the 
Sipsongchauthai, by strategically manipulating external alliances, was a ―frontier 
tributary‖ that remained ―more or less independent and neglected.‖31 In other words, 
situated at the margins of three or more principal political centers (Vietnamese, 
Chinese, Siamese), the confederation paid tribute to all and, in so doing, earned the 
right to manage its own manpower, land, and system of levies.  
Although the idea of multiple sovereignty is analytically useful, to call the 
Sipsongchauthai a ―frontier tributary‖ appears less so. To call this region a ―frontier‖ 
prior to French colonial rule seems anachronistic because, as Thongchai explains, 
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borders were malleable and had yet to be fixed. To call its manner of rule ―tributary‖ 
only underlines how Sipsong rulers engaged in practices no different from competing 
overlords, all of whom engaged in unequal relations of trade-based recognition among 
one another and, ultimately, with the Chinese court. 
32
 Indeed, maintaining sovereignty 
was not limited to relations with or between large kingdoms, located outside the 
Sipsong domain. Relations of domination and trade recognition repeated, fractal-like, 
within the confederation‘s own shifting territory, between the Thái and growing 
migrant populations, many of whom, as Scott observes, had fled an expanding, 
centralizing Chinese administration.
33
  
Complicating ideas of Zomia as a refuge away from states, these new arrivals 
did not settle a non-state space. Rather, in Scott‘s terms, they had to negotiate relations 
enmeshed in the ―hill state‖ of the Sipsongchauthai. Groups of migrants who settled 
there acknowledged Thái sovereignty by developing complex relationships with 
muang lords—whether of subordination or autonomy, trade or tribute—to earn a place 
to live and farm.
34
 At one extreme, Khu Mu people settled in proximity to the 
―dominant [social] element‖ of the Thái who, in turn, ―oppressed them like half-
serfs.‖35 At another extreme, Hmong people engaged in trading relations at arm‘s 
length by producing opium and livestock in exchange for essential commodities: ―If 
we could produce salt,‖ stated a Hmong informant, ―we would have no need to 
descend to the plain.‖36 Although these more recent settlers often spoke multiple 
languages and practiced novel customs, they all entered into specific relationships—
often tributary and sometimes rebellious—with the local Thái lords. The fluidity of 
movement in and around this region was paralleled by a flexibility of internal and 
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external forms of rule, of constantly renegotiated relationships of domination and 
subordination, resistance and compliance. 
 
Colonial transformations 
The Black River region originally became part of French empire through a 
series of complex contingencies stemming from imperial expansion, negotiating local 
rule, and managing historically embedded rivalries. In the late 19
th
 century, after the 
Suez Canal and steam-power facilitated naval power and sea-borne commercial 
activity, western European nation-states scrambled to consolidate control over their 
respective colonies‘ hinterland regions. Eager to open trade routes through mainland 
Southeast Asia and gain access to China‘s ―backdoor,‖ Britain and France engaged in 
a fierce competition to secure territory and control riverine commerce. They avoided 
conflict among themselves by fixing colonial frontiers and mapping the borders 
between Burma, Siam, Indochina, and China.
37
  
France assembled its colonial empire from territories claimed formerly by the 
Vietnamese monarchy in two distinct stages: first, in the south (1858-1867); then, in 
the center and north (1873-1885). After France claimed the southern reaches of Đại 
Nam, christening it the colony of Cochinchina, the French navy was poised to seize its 
northern portions. In 1873 at Hanoi‘s citadel, the Black Flags, mercenaries in employ 
of the Nguyễn, repulsed a French expedition.38 A decade later, desperate for assistance 
when faced with another French expedition of renewed strength, the Nguyễn king Tự 
Đức drew on his tributary relationship and appealed for Chinese intervention to save 
the remnants of his kingdom. But by the end of the Sino-French war (1884-1885), 
China had renounced its ancient claim over its southern neighbor, ceding control to 
                                                 
37
 Nicholas Tarling, ―The Establishment of Colonial Regimes,‖ in The Cambridge History of Southeast 
Asia, ed. Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Cf., Brocheux and Heméry (2009). 
38
 For more on the ―Black Flags‖ and mercenary forces in colonial struggles, cf., Davis (2008).   
 44 
France. Ambitious naval officers conquered Đại Nam‘s central and northern salients, 
christening them, in turn, the protectorates of Annam and Tonkin.
39
  
French treaty-makers adopted Đại Nam‘s court registers to legitimate their 
colonial claim to territory. Among others, they claimed multiply contested territories, 
such as the Mekong Delta and the Black River borderlands.
40
 It was in the colonial 
interest to recognize Đại Nam‘s claim to the province of Hưng Hoá, i.e. the Black 
River borderlands, and fold it into an emergent colonial domain predicated on 
exclusive territorial sovereignty. The colonial government elevated one claim above 
all others to justify its own.
41
  
Enforcing territorial rule in the hinterlands required more effort, and 
negotiating with many more parties, than simply signing treaties in Đại Nam‘s 
imperial capital of Huế. Siam sent a military expedition to the Black River territory in 
1885, ostensibly to defend its Lao tributary from depredations by the Black Flag 
bands. Ranging as far as the Sipsong domain and even conquering Mường Thanh (aka, 
Điện Biên Phủ), the expedition aggrandized both Đèo Văn Trì as well as the territory‘s 
rising colonial claimant. Đèo Văn Trì retaliated in 1887 by razing the city of Luang 
Prabang, a vassal of Siam as well as the rival, and sometimes overlord, of the 
Sipsong.
42
 What remained for the French was to secure the frontier and delineate its 
borders, two tasks that cemented Đèo Văn Trì‘s place in the new colonial order.  
French colonial rule expanded into the montane borderlands in the late 19
th
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century through diplomatic maneuvering, threatened force, and armed conquest. 
Auguste Pavie featured prominently in this drama as an explorer, diplomat, and map-
maker. Capping a series of events that grew out of Siam‘s ―invasion‖ of Laos and 
Tonkin in 1885, Pavie prevailed on Siam in 1888 to relinquish its claim to the 
Sipsongchauthai. During the Franco-Siamese crisis in 1893, after French gunboats 
sailed up the Chao Phraya River towards Bangkok, Pavie secured a favorable 
agreement with the Siamese kingdom to relinquish its claim to Laos and cede it to 
France.
43
 Meanwhile, French military forces conquered and suppressed—or, 
euphemistically, ―pacified‖—any armed resistance in Tonkin and its highland regions, 
including a royalist restoration movement (Cần Vương).44 Together, these diplomatic 
negotiations and military excursions cleared a path for Pavie‘s scientific expeditions to 
map, fix, and delineate boundaries in borderlands spreading from the upper Mekong 
basin eastwards across the Black River and to the Red River valley.
45
 If Pavie‘s 
expeditions established the modern borders between units of French Indochina (i.e., 
Laos and Tonkin) and between China, Siam, and British colonial Burma, then local 
assistance and negotiation simultaneously enabled his efforts and determined the form 
of colonial rule there.  
Đèo Văn Trì developed a fortuitous, mutually beneficial relationship with 
Pavie. Aware that his former Burmese, Chinese, Lao, and Siamese overlords had all 
been subdued by French and British imperial force, he transformed himself from an 
early opponent of French rule to become an enabler and a beneficiary. By the late 
1880s, as the royalist movement lost ground to the French military in the Red River 
                                                 
43
 Wyatt (2003), 186-190; Thongchai (1994), 98-100, 109-112; Martin Stuart-Fox, ―Conflicting 
Interpretations of the State: Siam, France and Vietnam in the Late Nineteenth Century,‖ Journal of the 
Siam Society 82 (1994), 140. 
44
 Tarling (2001), 182; Brocheux and Heméry (2009), 51-64. 
45
 Auguste Pavie, Pavie Mission Exploration Work, trans. Walter E. J. Tipps, vol 1 (Bangkok: White 
Lotus Press, 1999a). 
 46 
Delta, the French turned their attention to the highlands.
46
 When Colonel Pernot 
marched a column into Lai Châu in February 1888, he reported to Pavie that the town 
lay in ruins, torched at the behest of a fugitive regent and leader of the royalist 
restoration to whom Đèo Văn Tri had offered asylum.47 Around this time, Đèo Văn 
Tri evidently decided his interests lay with rapprochement.  
In 1890, the Đèo lord offered his loyalty and services to France at Mường 
Thanh, now known as Điện Biên Phủ, through a symbolically-rich ceremony. He 
presented Auguste Pavie with an ancient golden seal (retrieved during his sack of 
Luang Prabang in 1887) bestowed by Chinese kings to the sovereigns of the Lao 
hinterlands. Weighing almost 6 kg and measuring 11.5 cm
2
 at its base, it features a 
camel kneeling to receive its load. This seal, wrote Pavie, ―constitutes a document 
establishing the vassalage of this country to China, the rights of which have become 
ours.‖ With his family in audience, Đèo Văn Trì took a vow before an altar to his 
ancestors and declared, ―We will be loyal to the French like we have been loyal to the 
kings of Annam.‖48 In other words, Đèo Văn Tri accepted French domination in 
exchange for continued leadership and control over the Sipsongchauthai.
49
  
In 1893, with the approval of the Governor General, the clan-leader and 
borderlands power-broker became an official representative of the French Republic, 
earning the title of Frontier Lord (Quản đạo or, chef de marche frontière).50 In 1894 
Đèo Văn Trì assisted Pavie with delineating Indochina‘s borderlines with China and 
cemented himself as the semi-autonomous sovereign of the Black River region.
51
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Maps and treaties resulting from these expeditions and negotiations formed the legal 
basis for French claims to the outer reaches of colonial territory.
52
 Out of these 
contingent and negotiated processes of claim-making and boundary delimitation, the 
Sipsongchauthai became a part of Tonkin and Indochina emerged as a colony of 
France.  
If exclusive territorial sovereignty and fixed borders replaced multiple 
sovereignty and fluid borders, then this process produced a frontier territory under 
nominal imperial rule. By recognizing the Đèo claim to the historic Sipsong domain, 
colonial officers and officials elevated one among other Thái subgroups as rightful 
local rulers. By folding Đại Nam‘s claim to this territory into the colonial domain, 
they positioned the French empire as the region‘s singular, ultimate overlord.  
From a longer perspective, the Sipsongchauthai was never foreordained to 
become part of the French empire, never mind Vietnam. Compared with the Đại 
Nam‘s court center in Huế, local Thái lords had more in common culturally and 
linguistically with Ayutthaya and Bangkok, more in common historically and 
geographically with Luang Prabang and Vientiane. Examining an early history of 
multiple sovereignty and its trajectory towards a singular form demonstrates the 
mutual negotiations and accommodations, violence and contest, uncertainty and 
contingency with which this region came to be part of empire. Only after similar 
processes, contests, and uncertainties did this corner of French empire become part of 
Vietnamese nation-state.  
 
For the next half century, French Indochina administered the former 
Sipsongchauthai and neighboring regions as ―military territories‖ under the dual 
oversight of military and civil authorities. Colonial officials subdivided all of montane 
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northern Tonkin and Laos, i.e. Indochina‘s frontier with China, according to five 
military territories: the 4
th
 was located in Lai Châu (IV
e
 Territoire Militaire), 
sandwiched between the 5
th
 in Phong Saly, Laos, and the 3
rd
 in Hà Giang, Tonkin. In 
contrast to civil administration, French administrators justified supplementary military 
oversight in the highland frontier with China as necessary for suppressing ―piratry‖ 
(piraterie).
53
 In so doing, they echoed both a Vietnamese notion of ―piracy‖ (giặc) 
which, according to the mandarin tradition, functioned to delegitimize rebellion and 
according to the French Republican tradition, worked to legitimize repression in terms 
of a pacifying and civilizing colonization.
54
 
Tonkin‘s form of ―mixed administration,‖ or indirect rule, exemplified by the 
special relationship with the Đèo clan, fulfilled two broad goals of colonial 
administrators.
55
 First, cultivating relationships with select ―native‖ or ―local‖ 
(indigène) rulers figured in an evolving strategy of suppressing opposition to colonial 
rule by building boundaries between, and separating spaces according to, ―ethnic‖ or 
―racial‖ difference.56 Second, the establishment of military territories along the 
frontier with China formed a protective ring around the core area of the Red River 
delta.
57
 In particular, the colonial relationship with Đèo Văn Trì enabled Indochina‘s 
administrators to establish indirect rule; to map and fix the borders of Laos, Tonkin, 
and China; and to consolidate a claim to territory along China‘s frontier.    
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For Đèo Văn Trì, the relationship provided him a measure of autonomy, 
French protection in a rough neighborhood, and military assistance against local 
revolts. By cooperating with French diplomats, map-makers, officers, and officials to 
extend colonial rule into this hinterland, he reduced the number of threats to the 
confederated muang domain and enabled his clan to retain privileged positions of local 
rule.
58
 Đèo Văn Trì secured continued leadership of the historic Sipsongchauthai 
albeit in a different form—as Frontier Lord in the Fourth Military Territory. By 
gaining a coveted position as an official colonial representative, Đèo Văn Trì cleverly 
formalized his—and his family‘s—rule in modern guise.59  
Indeed, Đèo Văn Trì capitalized on the privileges of being a Frontier Lord and 
a self-styled guardian of the Chinese border. He emerged as a cosmopolitan political 
figure who lavishly entertained officials, journalists, and other curious travelers at his 
palatial home in Lai Châu.
60
 He also proved adept at manipulating the colonial 
administration to his advantage. With the encouragement of Pavie, he sent his sons 
and nephews to attend the Colonial School in France where they studied, among other 
subjects, French administrative procedures and law.
61
 Đèo Văn Trì transformed local 
tributary relations into a revenue system by collecting and enforcing colonial taxes and 
monopolies. He and his family became rich through (il)licit trading activities, both by 
expanding riverine trade in tea, salt, and opium upstream into China and by smuggling 
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the same goods in contraband form. Whenever he encountered criticism from suspect 
French officials, Đèo Văn Trì pointed to his role defending the border and supporting 
expeditions to ward off Chinese incursions.  
When Đèo Văn Trì died in 1908, his will named Auguste Pavie executor and—
much to the chagrin of Indochina‘s government—Pavie mobilized his contacts in Paris 
to secure for his first son, Đèo Văn Kháng, the right to succeed. The Governor General 
bowed to the Minister of Colonies‘ wishes. Nonetheless, the colonial government 
initiated a long process of chipping away at the expression of local prerogatives by 
reforming the region‘s territorial administration to conform with downstream Tonkin 
and the underlying organization of the Vietnamese monarchy.
62
 For example, they 
subdivided the military territory into the provinces (tỉnh) of Sơn La and Lai Châu and 
restricted the Đèo clan‘s formal power to the latter. The death of Đèo Văn Kháng in 
1930 presented awaiting colonial authorities with ―the occasion,‖ writes Philippe Le 
Failler, ―to bring a decisive coup to the power of the Đèo clan.‖ No longer challenged 
by Pavie and other Đèo allies in Paris, managing the clan was now an affair internal to 
the Tonkin protectorate. Administrators both abolished the title of Frontier Lord 
(Quản đạo) and continued to restrict territory under Đèo clan officials. The colonial 
government also attempted to undercut the autonomous power of muang lords by 
repeatedly redrawing—and shrinking—their respective bailiwicks; by limiting their 
control over land allocation through privatization of wet-rice fields held in common; 
and by sending them to serve in other colonial regions.
63
 The start of world war in 
1939-40 and subsequent colonial reconstruction, however, would reverse these 
initiatives aimed to restrict local power. 
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Colonial knowledge and power 
Notwithstanding later administrative attempts to restrict its expression, 
institutionalizing Đèo clan power above other groups articulated with an ongoing 
imperial project to know, classify, and rule colonial subjects apportioned territorially. 
In Indochina and Tonkin, the colonial government and its military pursued a ―politics 
of race‖ founded on, what a Committee on Colonial Defense called in 1910, ―the old 
Latin precept: ‗divide ut régnes.‘‖64 The strategy of ―divide and rule,‖ explained the 
Committee, aimed to arm and empower one among other colonized societies—in 
particular, the ―natives‖ of highland Tonkin—against a potential uprising by a more 
numerous, downstream social group.
65
 Favorable treatment accorded to the White 
Thái in general and the Đèo clan in particular conforms to this policy.  
―Divide and rule‖ policy unfolded in four concrete, over-lapping programs: 
military tactics, imprisonment, administrative divisioning, and knowledge production. 
Through these programs, I argue, colonial strategy aimed to regulate boundaries 
around highland and lowland regions together, constructing a boundary ―external‖ to 
Indochina‘s territories; and between and among highland social groups in relation to 
Kinh/Viet peoples, constructing boundaries ―internal‖ to its territory of Tonkin, for 
example.
66
 Although these colonial boundaries were unstable, and their effects 
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contradictory, they nonetheless structured later attempts by nationalist revolutionaries 
to incorporate the Black River region‘s population and territory.67 
Self-consciously emulating the British experience in colonial India, the 
Committee on Colonial Defense argued for taking advantage of ―hereditary hostility‖ 
among the ―thổ‖ or ―indigène,‖ i.e. residents of highland Tonkin, towards the 
―Annamite race,‖ i.e. Việt or Kinh peoples. They counted on the former to treat the 
latter as ―an external enemy in case of insurrection.‖ The Committee credited General 
Galliéni with inaugurating a policy ―to place at the head of different races chiefs tied 
by blood‖ in order to ―procure a certain administrative autonomy and to resuscitate a 
certain idea of their nationality.‖68 It was this logic that informed the selection and 
elevation of the White Thái Đèo clan in Lai Châu to rule indirectly the 4th Military 
Territory. Further, the Committee on Colonial Defense recommended that 
―autonomous‖ battalions of ―frontier infantry‖ be formed in each of Tonkin‘s military 
territories.
69
 So-called ―montagnard‖ troops from Tonkin‘s highlands, like 
Cambodians, were an exception to the rule limiting Indochina‘s ―native armies‖ to 
only an ―external‖ role; in addition to their defense of the frontier, the military 
territories‘ ―Partisans‖ operated routinely in their home region.70 By the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, the so-called Thái Battalions had emerged to share military 
responsibilities with French regular troops to fight against Việt Minh guerilla units and 
the People‘s Army of Vietnam.    
French policy sought to cultivate and exploit ―racial‖ or ―ethnic‖ difference 
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through practices of punishment and administrative subdivisionings. Just as colonial 
officials and military officers recruited one social group as soldiers to fight another, so 
too did a similarly divisive logic inform recruitment of prison guards and selection of 
punishment sites. In 1932, following an upsurge in anti-colonial uprisings, colonial 
administrators transformed the small penitentiary in Sơn La into a maximum security 
prison to house ―exiled‖ Kinh/Viet dissidents and criminals where, they calculated, the 
likelihood for collusion between inmates and the local population would be reduced.
71
 
As ―Tonkin‘s most important detention center for political prisoners,‖ the Sơn La 
penitentiary housed, among others, Trường Chinh, born in the Red River delta 
province of Nam Định, who was jailed for seven years in the early 1930s.72 The 
punitive logic worked in reverse as well. Cầm Văn Dung, member of a prominent 
Black Thái family and a former district chief of Mai Sơn (1930-33), was imprisoned 
not in his native Sơn La but far away in Hanoi‘s notorious Central Prison (Hỏa Lò).73 
Like Trường Chinh, he would be heard from again. 
Amidst frequent changes in local administrative divisions, administrators of 
colonial Tonkin produced one among many lasting ethnically-inflected territorial 
boundaries. In 1909, they created the province of Lai Châu from a portion of Sơn La 
province to reflect the distribution of, and demarcate the boundaries between, their 
respective ―ethnic‖ populations—Black Thái in Sơn La and White Thái in Lai Châu. 
―From a political perspective,‖ noted Resident Superior of Tonkin Arthus de Miribel, 
this spatial partition allotted domains accounting for ―old political hatreds‖ among 
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―hereditary chiefs‖ recognized as ―mandarins‖ by the French administration.74 In 
addition to managing muang rivalries between ethnicized ruling families by 
subordinating their rule to counties (châu) and prefectures (phủ), the establishment of 
provinces (tỉnh) represented a colonial attempt to reorganize territory according to 
imperial Vietnamese traditions of administration.
75
 Years later, the DRV would 
frequently resort to the same administrative practice—the creation or dissolution of 
provinces, districts, communes—in an attempt to recoup central control. In both 
instances, for the myriad non-Thái groups in the region, the French colonial regime 
and its successor appeared to favor ethnically-identified muang elites and their 
followers. Such apparent favoritism engendered growing discontent and, even, 
discussed below, open rebellion. 
For officers and administrators to practice divide and rule, they endeavored in 
the late 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 centuries to construct categories to know subject 
peoples and facilitate this policy.
76
 Colonel E. Diguet‘s Les Montagnards du Tonkin, 
with a preface by Auguste Pavie himself, exemplifies how knowledge production 
enabled and informed the expansion of colonial power.
77
 To familiarize scholars, 
bureaucrats, and military officers with so-called ―montagnards,‖ early French 
ethnologists systematized knowledge of these montane Others according to a 
primordialist understanding of race and ethnicity.
78
 Tellingly, their authors, like 
Diguet, frequently served dual roles as agents of militarized French expansion and as 
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reporters of the peoples they encountered and ―pacified.‖79 Diguet, an officer in the 
Colonial Infantry, compared the territory he had conquered as ―so different from the 
Red River delta,‖ and the peoples there as ―entirely different from the Annamites.‖ 
Note how this comparison fits these inhabitants within a spatial frame of colonial 
Tonkin, i.e. not the Lao protectorate, much less China or Siam. Tonkin‘s external 
delimitation was the first of multiple socially-produced boundaries; the second was 
internal to this colonial space—i.e., highland and lowland.  
Within this conjured space of highland Tonkin, Diguet adopted local 
ethnonyms used to distinguish one group from another and assigned them a fixity and 
rank. In so doing, he contributed to making a third social boundary. In his words, he 
―enumerated and ordered‖ the many ―ethnic‖ groups by forming a ―hierarchy 
corresponding to the altitude of their habitat… and based on the degree of [their] 
civilization.‖80 Diguet judged the valley-dwelling White Thái better suited to office 
than their more numerous rivals, the Black Thái, both of whom were nonetheless 
superior to, or ―more important than,‖ the mountain-dwelling ―barbarian‖ Hmong and 
Dao.
81
 In short, Diguet constructed a colonial frontier taxonomy—at the top of which 
rested the White Thái and, foremost among others, the Đèo clan. His assessment of 
local ―civilizations‖ rests on, and reproduces, an idea of a singular, racially-specific 
(i.e., white Euro-American) form of superior social organization and degree of cultural 
attainment; he ranked all other forms of culture-bound attainment in reference to this 
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unstated norm.
82
 Such colonial knowledge, I argue in later chapters, was confined 
neither to the colonial era nor to colonial scholars.
83
 Later, powerful state-makers and 
allied scholars not only reproduced an external territorial frame justified as national 
community, i.e. the ―Vietnamese‖ space of former Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina. 
They also structured knowledge and administration of ―national ethnicities‖ according 
to an internal, ranked hierarchy similar to the colonial model, one based on settlement 
elevation, agricultural techniques, and alleged degree of cultural attainment.  
By delegating office and domain based on ranked ethnological categories, 
French colonial rule imbued the categories themselves with power. Over half a 
century, the ―politics of race‖ articulated with older patterns of self-identification, 
agriculture, and rule to reconstitute social difference as a basis for and justification of 
political and economic inequalities. True to its intent, colonial rule produced a social 
order riven with tensions. Among the muang lords, privileged White Thái families, 
such as the Đèo, maneuvered amongst themselves and with or against rival Black Thái 
factions for control of office and scarce wet-rice land. Poor Thái peasants gained 
access to irrigable land through corvée, a practice similar to pre-colonial forms of 
bonded labor.
84
 Meanwhile, swidden cultivators, from groups such as the Hmong and 
Khumu, resented taxes levied on their bodies (capitation, or head tax) and cash crops, 
notably opium. From 1918-1922, a Hmong ―messianic‖ revolt, known as the Batchai 
(or Bả Cháy) movement, spread across northwest Tonkin and into northeast Laos, an 
uprising originally targeting local Thái rulers and Chinese traders.
85
 The French 
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colonial military intervened to crush the revolt, mounting one of the largest armed 
expeditions in Indochina up to that time.
86
  
The Batchai rebellion both highlights tensions of colonial rule and points to the 
politics of representing colonial-era rebellions. What may have appeared to colonial 
authorities as antagonisms between ethnicities endowed with primordial attributes can, 
instead, be interpreted as a tax revolt, or an extreme form of everyday struggles over 
profoundly unequal access to institutional privileges and rights to agrarian resources.
87
 
What may appear to nationalist historians to be exemplary of ―a tradition of resistance 
to foreign invaders‖ overlooks complex and evolving relationships between lords and 
overlords, or local rulers and colonial hegemons.
88
 Even if one were to accept that 
Hmong rebels revolted against Thái rulers only as proxies of French overlords, then 
the fact remains that Đèo Văn Trì cleverly manipulated relations with such ―foreign 
invaders‖ to enable him—and his successors—to rule locally in a domain not yet 
known as ―Vietnam.‖  
 
WWII and colonial reconstruction 
The Southeast Asian experience of World War II reinforces that the region‘s 
history was and remains a world history. When the Japanese army and navy defeated 
all manner of European power with stunning speed and skill, they inspired a sense of 
pride among colonized subjects that a fellow ―Asian‖ people could defeat a form of 
rule that had seemed intractable only a decade earlier.
89
 Japanese invasions swept 
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aside British rule in Burma, Singapore, and Malaya; French rule in Indochina; Dutch 
rule in the Netherlands Indies; and American rule in the Philippines. David Marr‘s 
observation of an emergent Vietnam during WWII holds for other Japanese-occupied 
countries as well: ―Vietnam had to be seen in regional and global context, not in 
isolation.‖90 No less than five foreign powers—France, Japan, China, US, UK—were 
interested in the territory of ―Vietnam‖ alone during WWII. Three of these global 
powers occupied and contested the Black River region.    
The subsequent war for independence in Indochina indicates the determination 
of France to retake its colonial holdings and stifle nationalist movements. Or, looked 
at another way, mass-based and armed support for nationalism, socialism, and anti-
colonialism indicated local determination to resist colonial domination and to institute 
independent governments. As the dawning Cold War altered the calculus of 
international relations, however, the bilateral pattern of metropole-colony relations 
was shattered. With anti-colonial movements otherwise under-equipped and 
outgunned, the engagement of rising Cold War powers—the US assisting France to 
rebuild at home and abroad; Soviet and Chinese support for the nascent DRV—proved 
decisive to the outcome of national liberation. In other words, ―independence‖ was not 
achieved autonomously but, rather, with substantial foreign aid distributed along the 
ideological fault lines of the Cold War.  
It is possible to read the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia as a catalyst for 
nationalist self-determination, but this is only one interpretation. Among an aging 
generation, the war is remembered as a period of profound deprivation. In the Red 
River Delta, allied bombing of shipping routes and the devastation left by multiple 
typhoons led to wide-spread famine: an estimated one million people starved to death 
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in 1944-45.
91
 Meanwhile, Japan‘s impending defeat raised questions and stimulated 
debates among the allies about rebuilding postwar Europe, China‘s growing power 
and, moreover, the status of European colonies following the war. These discussions 
indicate that independence was never guaranteed and, as histories of post-WWII anti-
colonial warfare demonstrate, still required a protracted struggle to decolonize 
Southeast Asia. This fact became stunningly clear in late September 1945 when the 
allies arrived, ostensibly, to disarm Japanese troops: British troops landed in Saigon 
and Chinese Nationalist (GMD) troops moved into Tonkin and, in both cases, 
marginalized the provisional DRV government and facilitated the return of French 
troops and colonial administrators.
92
   
During and immediately after the war, French domestic political leaders, 
supported by peers in Britain and Holland, argued for the restoration of colonial 
holdings, including Indochina, in order to rehabilitate and secure Western Europe.
93
 It 
was an age of new imperialism. At Brazzaville in January 1944, Charles de Gaulle had 
ruled out the possibility of colonial autonomy and development ―outside the French 
Empire.‖ Instead, he articulated a vision for the Indochinese Federation to remain 
within the French Union, centered in Paris.
94
 Colonial administrators were anxious to 
reclaim Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina—the same territories that Ho Chi Minh had 
declared on September 2, 1945 to constitute an independent Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam. At first, the two parties attempted to negotiate but, by late 1946, they turned 
instead to confrontation. Based in the mountains north of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh worked 
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with the Viet Minh Front and the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) to gain control 
over spontaneous demonstrations of anti-colonialism, to channel them into a unified, 
nationalist movement to make a DRV state.
95
 As counter, French officials worked to 
restore power by assembling a coalition of collaborators and isolating their nationalist 
opponents.   
 
Shortly after the Japanese Imperial Army‘s surrender in August 1945, Chinese 
Nationalist forces spread through Tonkin to disarm them. For the people of Tonkin‘s 
northwest, the most pressing issue at the end of World War II was how to rid the 
region of Chinese troops who looted Japanese armories and ―robbed the countryside 
bare.‖96 Members of the region‘s ruling elite sought French assistance both to 
repatriate Chinese forces and to squelch any revolutionary resistance to their continued 
rule. In 1940, Đèo Văn Long had left his post as district chief (Tri châu) of Điện Biên 
Phủ to wait out the war in China with French exiles.97 After the war, in February 1946, 
the second son of Đèo Văn Trì accompanied returning French military forces and 
asserted his position in Lai Châu as a ruling clan-leader and official of French 
Indochina. After a tense standoff in spring 1946 at Điện Biên Phủ between Chinese 
forces and a mixed column of French and Thái soldiers, the GMD troops began to 
return northwards; the last units did not depart until September.
98
 
For the moment, select Thái lords and French colonial officials endeavored to 
renew their claims to this frontier territory. In 1948, the colonial government 
reaffirmed its relationship with the Đèo clan by recognizing Đèo Van Long president 
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of the newly created Thái Federation. For architects of new French empire, this 
collaboration re-established indirect rule in a strategic frontier. For the leader of the 
Thái Federation, capitalizing on French political assistance and military aid enabled 
him to reassert a claim to rule the historic domain of his ancestors, the 
Sipsongchauthai. Their alliance recreated a semi-autonomous political unit within a 
corner of French empire. In so doing, their relationship reproduced the approximate 
spatial and social boundaries of a frontier territory.  
If, over the next decade, the uplands of northwest Tonkin gradually assumed 
greater importance in the anti-colonial struggle, at this conjuncture it more closely 
resembled a backwater. The return of the colonial alliance scattered bands of the Viet 
Minh Front and reestablished a localized form of colonial rule. The nationalist 
revolutionary movement had few adherents among local people, except for a few 
youths and, notably, the former official and clan-leader, Cầm Văn Dung, who led a 
brief revolt in Sơn La. 
And so this story begins in a land of competing claims to its territory. The 
setting was west of the Red River and east of the Mekong, in sharply rising mountains 
bisected by the Black River, where rugged topography structured socially-produced 
relations between lowlands and uplands, competing centers and a re-emergent frontier. 
It was this peopled terrain that, simultaneously, became focus both of colonial designs 
to circumscribe it, to rule the mountain region separately within Tonkin; and of 
revolutionary designs to transcend it, to integrate the region into a rising national state.  
 
The Thái Federation 
During the early years of the First Indochina War (1946-54), an alliance 
between Thái leaders and architects of new French empire reproduced an ethnicized, 
semi-feudal form of rule in Tonkin‘s northwest corner. On 15 July 1948 the French 
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reaffirmed their special relationship with Đèo Văn Long by creating the Thái 
Federation and recognizing him as its president.
99
 Initially, the Thái Federation was 
attached formally to the French Union. In 1949, the Federation became part of the 
ostensibly independent Associated States of Vietnam led by former emperor Bảo 
Đại.100 Over its six year life the Federation‘s degree of autonomy remained largely 
unchanged, that is, circumscribed and negotiated within French empire. The 
Federation‘s boundaries followed those mapped by colonial explorer Auguste Pavie in 
collaboration with Đèo Văn Trì in the late 19th century. French advisors managed the 
Federation‘s finances and reported to superiors in Hanoi.101 Federation leaders 
remained dependent on French military support to fend off a rising nationalist 
challenge to their territorial control.  
Within the Associated States of Vietnam, the Thái Federation was one of 
several ethnicized units collectively referred to as the Montagnard Countries of the 
North (Pays Montagnard du Nord).
102
 In the Central Highlands, another site of ethno-
linguistic heterogeneity, lay the Montagnard Countries of the South.
103
 Militarily, the 
Federation fit within the French Expeditionary Force‘s Northwest Autonomous Zone 
(Zone Autonome Nord-Ouest or, ZANO) whose primary mission was to protect the 
Thái Federation.
104
 Based to the northwest of Indochina‘s capital of Hanoi, ZANO‘s 
personnel reflected the composition of France‘s larger colonial empire, with soldiers 
recruited locally and from as far away as Morocco.
105
 The Federation itself 
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commanded three battalions recruited from the region‘s own Thái peoples, i.e. the 
Thái Battalions. These roughly 2500 soldiers and officers were charged with 
protecting political infrastructure which, in practice, meant quelling popular unrest, 
collecting taxes, and countering a growing guerilla insurgency.
106
  
As President of the Thái Federation, Đèo Van Long drew on modern symbols 
to reassert what he considered his patrimony, to rule over the domain of the historic 
Sipsongchauthai. Like its pre-colonial predecessor, the seat of Federation authority 
was located in the town of Lai Châu. The Federation included three provinces (Sơn 
La, Phong Thổ, Lai Châu) and one special zone (Nghĩa Lộ) subdivided into 16 
counties (châu).
107
 Administratively, in keeping with traditions of colonially-
recognized local rule, these districts drew on the historic shape and authority vested in 
the muang. A former colonial civil servant explained, ―The châu was commanded by a 
châu muang, a member of the most influential local family.‖108 Each county chief (or, 
châu muang) enjoyed broad latitude in organizing his own bailiwick, subdivided 
according to communes and villages. Through his leadership of this hybrid structure, 
Đèo Văn Long regained for himself and his allies privileged positions atop a 
colonially-supported, ethnically-inflected administrative hierarchy. 
Although the Thái Federation‘s administrative hierarchy recognized Thái units 
and leaders above others, the frontier remained a plural society. From 1950-1954, Jean 
Jerusalemy was the Thái Federation‘s assistant civil administrator. His 1953 title, 
―Monograph on the Thái Country,‖ provides invaluable insight into, among other 
topics, the frontier‘s demographic composition.109 He estimated the Federation‘s total 
population at approximately 260,000 inhabitants (see Table 1.1), identifying the most 
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numerous residents as Black Thái (100,000), followed by Hmong (50,000), and White 
Thái (35,000).  
 
Table 1.1: Population estimate of Thái Federation in early 1950s.
110
 
 
Settlement type Social group Number of inhabitants 
 
 
 
plains 
Xa [Khumu] 15,000 
White Thái 35,000 
Black Thái 100,000 
Lu 6,000 
Lao 8,000 
Nhang [Nyang] 20,000 
Tho 8,000 
plains subtotal:  192,000 
 
 
mountains 
Koui Tchou 1,000 
Meo [Hmong] 13,000 
Man [Dao] 50,000 
various 2,000 
mtn subtotal: 66,000 
town Chinese 4,700 
town subtotal: 4,700 
population total:  262,700 
 
Although his estimates most likely do not account for all inhabitants (nor for their self-
described social groupings), Jerusalemy‘s data provides a unique snapshot of this 
frontier in the neo-colonial period. Several features are worth noting. First, 
notwithstanding what he calls a ―superiority complex‖ among the White Thái, they 
composed only 13% of the population compared with more numerous Black Thái 
(38%) and Hmong (19%) inhabitants. Yet it was the White Thái who, with French 
colonial support, enjoyed what he called a ―spirit of domination‖ in relation to all 
other groups, particularly their Black Thái rivals.  
In contrast to Diguet‘s lumpen label of ―montagnard,‖ Jerusalemy 
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acknowledged local conceptions of identity and geography by disaggregating 
population figures according to settlement type. His categories of ―plains‖ and 
―mountains‖ correspond roughly to the agroecological niches of irrigated and swidden 
agricultures.
111
 Irrigated rice cultivation was organized on the muang-based principles 
of land and labor management. In general, wet-rice affords greater harvest returns per 
unit of land, allowing for more densely-settled, agriculturally-intensive populations. 
Shifting cultivation rewards returns per unit labor, favoring more scattered, 
agriculturally-extensive populations.
112
 In addition to fitting with the hills‘ 
demographic pattern of low population density, shifting cultivation afforded a degree 
of autonomy in relation to the muang-based control of land and labor.
113
 Swidden 
agriculturalists participated in the rural market economy by growing cash crops and 
engaging in town-based relations of trade. Foremost among other swidden growers 
and products were the Hmong, whom Jerusalemy called ―large producers of opium.‖  
The so-called Chinese who lived in the towns of Sơn La, Lai Châu, Điện Biên, 
and Nghĩa Lộ worked mainly as brokers and merchants. Not only did they mediate 
between the two local forms of settlement and agricultural production, they also acted 
as nodes in larger exchange relations both between upstream and downstream, i.e. 
between the Thái Federation and the Red River Delta, and between Tonkin, China, 
and Laos. Jerusalemy traced these Chinese settlers to remnants of ―pirate‖ bands, or 
the Black and Yellow Flags.
114
 Perhaps because their numbers were so small, 
Jerusalemy did not report any population of Kinh/Viet residents. Evidently, except for 
a few junior officials working in colonial administration and traders working alongside 
Chinese migrants, the Kinh/Viet population was negligible. Overall, Jerusalemy 
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reported a population density of 15-20 people per square kilometer.
115
 
Notwithstanding his geographic distinction between hills, plains, and towns, 
Jerusalemy nonetheless reproduced an influential means of categorizing the 
population. He conflated complex, socially-produced identities with natural, 
unchanging communities. For the colonial civil servant, there were ―Black Thái‖ and 
―White Thái‖ or ―Chinese,‖ ―Mèo [Hmong]‖ and ―Xá [Khumu]‖ living here whose 
social identities were a given fact. For him, the boundaries of community were neither 
malleable, multiple, nor dialectically-generated. Rather, he ascribed these communal 
categories, or ethnonyms, in a one-way exercise of knowledge and power. Although 
he does not use the term ―ethnicity,‖ his deployment of given ethnonyms conform to 
this colonially-produced category. It was a pattern later copied by post-colonial 
demographers who, by reporting results according to ―ethnicity,‖ continued to imbue 
this social category with lasting and profound political valence.  
 
The establishment of the Thái Federation continued a colonial tradition of 
ruling areas of ―ethnic minorities‖ separately by empowering ethnically-identified 
elites to rule locally. Contests over Federation offices alternately united or divided 
elite Thái factions. Đèo Van Long attempted to consolidate his leadership position in 
the Federation by manipulating alliances predicated on family ties and ethnicized 
forms of identification. Unintentionally, such political maneuvering rebounded in 
support for his avowed enemy, i.e. the rising anti-colonial opposition. Among the 
White Thái, he placated his main rival in Phong Thổ by awarding Đèo Văn An the 
position of Province Chief (Tri phủ). Among the Black Thái, the results were mixed. 
In Điện Biên Phủ, Đèo Văn Long replaced the district chief (chánh tổng), Lò Văn 
Hặc, with one of his own sons, Đèo Văn Ún, in 1946. Outraged, the ousted chief 
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joined the resistance and, in turn, the younger Đèo imprisoned Lò‘s wife, confiscated 
his property, and burned his house.
116
 Nursing his antipathy for the Đèo family, Lò 
Văn Hặc turned to the Viet Minh United Front and, later, emerged as one of its most 
influential local leaders. 
To the south in Sơn La, the traditional seat of Black Thái communal power, 
Đèo Văn Long deployed his battalions in 1946-47 to quell an uprising led by 
supporters of the Viet Minh Front against French and Đèo clan rule. Then the 
Federation‘s President chose among five rival Black Thái families—each from 
different muang—to appoint Bạc Cầm Quý (of Thuận Châu) Sơn La‘s Province Chief 
(Tri phủ). Bạc Cầm Quý nursed a personal vendetta towards the Viet Minh whose 
affiliates had assassinated his brother in 1946 and another sibling by 1948.
117
 The 
families passed over in this selection joined the vanquished leader of Sơn La‘s revolt, 
Cầm Văn Dung.118 Prior to World War II, while imprisoned in Hanoi Central Prison, 
Cầm Văn Dung had befriended members of the Indochinese Communist Party and, 
evidently, had learned how to organize accordingly.
119
 By 1948, the Thái Federation 
sponsored a bounty of 25,000 piasters on his head.
120
 Xa Văn Minh of Mộc Châu (and 
its former colonial official, or bố chánh), Chairman of the Sơn-Lai Inter-Provincial 
Committee, led the DRV administrative body charged with galvanizing such 
discontent with the Federation into an oppositional movement. 
By now, the earlier ―divide and rule‖ policy regulating relations between 
upland ―montagnard‖ peoples and lowland ―Annamites‖ in Tonkin began to manifest 
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two unintended consequences. First, if French colonial policy ―rigidified the ethnic 
boundaries‖ in ―Vietnam‖ as a whole, then it also contributed to tensions within the 
plural society particular to these historic borderlands, i.e. between the ―ethnic 
minorities‖ themselves.121 By acknowledging the Đèo as legitimate rulers of this 
region—and protecting them militarily—the French colonial government reproduced 
bitter tensions not only within the White Thái, i.e., between powerful families. Joint 
colonial and Federation rule also reproduced antagonisms between the White Thái and 
Black Thái, as well as between Thái peoples generally and various other groups. Many 
Hmong cultivators, for example, chafed at continued Thái control over the trade of 
their most valuable cash crop, opium. These tensions were endemic to the restoration 
of colonial rule and the contested claims it inspired. Such tensions also led to the 
second unintended consequence of colonial ―divide and rule.‖ If this policy had 
originally attempted ―to transform the ethnic minorities into hostile communal 
barriers‖ between lowland Kinh/Viet people and potential Chinese assistance, then the 
splits reproduced under Thái Federation rule now motivated local oppositional figures 
to seek alternatives among the rising Viet Minh Front.
122
 A rising coalition of Viet 
Minh organizers, ICP members, and DRV cadres, in turn, sought to use the Sino-Viet-
Lao frontier to establish a base area through which they could funnel Chinese military 
assistance. 
 
A Contested Economy and the Politics of Opium 
If the Federation‘s ethnicized and familial politics alienated many among the 
Thái elite, then a suite of its social policies—including taxation, state monopolies, 
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resettlement, and land tenure—contributed to growing disaffection among the 
common folk. Formal and informal tax requirements were onerous. Local 
implementation of the ―head tax‖ (capitation or thuế thân) mandated payments in both 
rice and cash, the latter levied at 10 piasters per registered adult.
123
 In 1951, for 
example, a Khumu family in the village of Huổi Hoa (District of Tuần Giáo, Sơn La 
Province) reported an annual tax burden of 200 kg rice, 50 kg pork, 10 piasters, and 3 
taels (114 g) opium; because they could not afford to pay the head tax directly, 
wealthier families took their livestock in exchange.
124
 In addition, resident soldiers and 
officers compelled families living near ubiquitous military posts to supply them with 
food and grain.
125
 Trade in salt was subject to a state monopoly and its sale in 
Indochina was taxed accordingly. Salt in this region, like farm tools and medicine, was 
in chronically short supply.
126
 In areas threatened with insurgency, Thái battalions and 
French colonial soldiers forcibly moved residents from their natal villages and 
relocated them in concentrated settlements (gros villages).
127
 Jerusalemy explained the 
―withdrawal‖ of Thái, Hmong, and Dao settlements from throughout the region to 
these ―large villages‖ as a means of making them ―more easily controllable.‖128 
Resettlement weighed particularly heavily on swidden agriculturalists who had to 
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move the greatest distance and learn new agricultural techniques suited to unfamiliar 
agro-ecological conditions. 
Under Federation rule, tenure for irrigated land was managed under a complex 
system that grew out of old, muang-based traditions. By the early 1950s, in exchange 
for their loyalty to the Federation, the Thái nobility (phìa tạo) continued to enjoy 
dominant social positions; in addition, those who were its officials could call on 
bonded labor to farm the fields they allotted themselves. The principal of local rule 
accorded to the district chiefs and their subordinates meant they enjoyed considerable 
autonomy with regards to managing land and labor within their respective muang 
bailiwicks.
129
 Except for a few fields the nobility owned privately, wet-rice land 
continued to be held in common. The Federation empowered senior males from noble 
families to distribute ―common land‖ (ruộng công) to peasants in usufruct. ―Free‖ 
peasants became eligible to receive a portion of common land should a member of 
their household serve the Federation as soldier (male), or dancer (female), or corvée 
laborer working on, for example, road crews.
130
 Dancers joined troupes of young 
women trained in a ―traditional‖ style of dance using fans (xoè) to entertain soldiers 
and officials—placing them at risk of abuse.  
The Federation remunerated its officials by offering them a choice of grants in 
labor, grain, official land, or some combination thereof. According to their rank, 
officials were entitled either to receive a portion of taxed grain as annual payment; to 
control a parcel of land complete with peasants to farm it; and/or to keep female xoè 
dancers to serve as entertainment. Those farm families who labored on this ―official 
land‖ (ruộng chức) were, essentially, bonded labor (cuông for Black Thái; nhốc for 
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White Thái). To gain access to official land required these ―unfree‖ peasants to 
surrender a portion of their harvest and to provide farm labor such as cooking, hauling 
firewood, planting, etc.
131
 For example, a district chief (Tri châu) in Lai Châu 
province was entitled to choose either a simple annual allotment of 250 quintaux of 
rice (25 metric tons); or 28 mẫu of wet-rice land (13.5 hectares) complete with 24 
nhốc farm laborers to work it and 24 dancers to serve as entertainment.132  
By virtue of their location in the mountains above valley muang politics, 
swidden agriculturalists were buffered from the feudal system controlling land and 
labor. Unlike the valley-dwelling Thái, the Hmong and Dao peoples living and 
farming at higher elevations had neither to perform corvée nor to provide sustenance 
for the Thái Battalions.
133
 Nonetheless, Federation policies and politics alienated them 
as well. In particular, ―the production of opium,‖ according to John T. McAlister, ―had 
a sharp effect on the topographically stratified settlement pattern and complex ethnic 
mosaic.‖134 Hmong cultivators, as Jerusalemy noted, were among the largest raw 
opium producers because their highland fields provided conditions under which the 
poppy grows best, i.e. at elevations above 1,000 meters. Grown only in these heights 
by ethnically-identified cultivators, contests over the frontier‘s most lucrative cash 
crop throws into sharp relief the tensions embedded in the political-economy of 
colonial frontier rule. 
 
Like other European colonies in Asia, French Indochina benefited substantially 
from revenue earned through regulating the production and trade of opium.
135
 Prior to 
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and through World War II, French Indochina maintained a public monopoly on 
opium‘s purchase and sale. Cultivators in Tonkin‘s northern mountains were allowed 
to grow poppies only on the condition they declare and sell production to Indochina‘s 
Customs and State Monopolies (Douanes et Régies).
136
 From 1898-1922, 
contributions from the opium industry contributed between 25-42% of the colony‘s 
total budgetary income.
137
 Yet, in tacit acknowledgment of this crop‘s shamefully 
addictive properties, Sylvain Lévi‘s Indochine, an encyclopedic two volume work 
from 1931, fails to mention opium in a description of the colony‘s agricultural 
products.
138
  
The Đèo clan grew rich, in part, by taking advantage of their local power in 
relation to this monopoly. They taxed opium‘s traffic, local consumption, and 
production; and, furthermore, engaged in their own illicit smuggling.
139
 Between 
1933-1940, colonial administrators of the 4
th
 Military Territory reported annually the 
area of opium cultivation, the quantity produced, and its value, a summary of which 
appears below (see Table 1.2).  
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Table 1.2: Reported opium production in 4
th
 Military Territory, 1933-1940.
140
 
 
Year area cultivated 
(hectares) 
Quantity 
produced 
(metric tons) 
value 
(piasters) 
1933 60 1 7,200  
1934 350 15 108,000 
1935 200 9 9,000 
1936 45 2 2,600 
1937 56 0.144 5,760 
1938 95 3 -- 
1939 347.2 0.844 1,688 
1940 397.2 1.322 99,150 
 
Note that the quantity ―produced‖ (produit) was not total gross production but, rather, 
the amount purchased locally by the Customs Service.
141
 Nonetheless, these reported 
figures indicate that officially recognized opium production in the 4
th
 Military 
Territory reached a peak in 1934 at 15 tons, 350 ha cultivated, and a value of 108,000 
piasters; tonnage, area, and value then declined irregularly for five years. This decline 
was, perhaps, a result of pressure from the League of Nations exerted on France and 
other colonial merchants to prohibit the opium trade. With the outbreak of World War 
II, however, this trend reversed: the area under cultivation reached new highs (almost 
400 hectares) and the market value jumped considerably.  
The large rise in opium‘s value between 1939-1940 reflects the quadrupling of 
its per unit price on the world market between 1939-43.
142
 Alfred McCoy explains that 
war precipitated a world-wide opium ―crisis.‖ Following the German conquest of 
France and the Japanese invasion of Indochina, the British navy imposed an embargo 
on shipping to and from Indochina, severing a historic supply line from the poppy 
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fields of Persia and colonial India. To make up for lost overseas sources, Indochina‘s 
colonial government launched, what McCoy calls, a ―massive effort to boost… opium 
production‖ among Hmong growers in Laos and northern Tonkin.143  
Following restoration of colonial rule after World War II, opium emerged as a 
focal point of contested trade and production. When Đèo Văn Long returned from 
China to lead the Thái Federation, he not only positioned himself as indispensable to 
French efforts to secure Tonkin. He also grew richer by making opium central to their 
relationship. Notwithstanding the colonial government‘s abolishment of Indochina‘s 
opium monopoly in 1946, they granted the Thái Federation permission to structure its 
―autonomous‖ budget based on the taxation and sale of opium.144  
Cultivators bore a high tax on their opium crop. In Lai Châu, Hmong 
households were assessed at 5 taels in kind (1 tael = 38 g) per registered resident and a 
―swidden tax‖ averaging 50 taels.145 For the three years of 1947, 1948, and 1950, the 
opium tax earned the Federation, respectively, 753,000, 1.2 million, and 330,000 
piasters based on officially reported harvests of 4.5 to 5 metric tons.
146
 McAlister 
estimates, however, that Hmong cultivators declared only one-third of their annual 
opium harvest, raising production from the official 5 tons to approximately 15 tons per 
year.
147
 Jerusalemy blamed the Customs Service for allowing all opium trade—legal 
commerce and contraband—―[to fall] into the hands of the Chinese.‖148 In an attempt 
to recover a portion of contraband income, the Federation licensed and taxed gambling 
dens, the proprietors of which were mainly Chinese migrants. As such, the Federation 
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levied a double tax on opium: first, to claim a portion of the declared crop; second, to 
recover some of what was smuggled.
149
  
The Thái Federation introduced, and French forces amplified, the use of 
coercion in opium production and trade.
150
 As the region‘s chief opium broker, Đèo 
Van Long used the Thái Battalions to purchase the product directly from Hmong 
growers and other cultivators. So, in addition to their role as tax collectors, the Thái 
battalions acted as merchants as well, enforcing the Federation‘s legal monopoly on 
opium‘s purchase and trade. Although Jean Jerusalemy ordered opium to be removed 
from the Federation budget in 1951, the region‘s growers and traders found new 
buyers.
151
 Thereafter, French military intelligence, in a program known as ―Operation 
X‖ under the command of Major Trinquier of the Mixed Airborne Commando Group 
(MACG), assumed control of the opium trade and redirected its proceeds to fund 
counterinsurgency operations.  
Between 1951-1954, Operation X‘s peak years, Trinquier coordinated the 
purchase of opium through French-allied Thái Federation and Lao buyers; and then 
shipped the commodity to Saigon for marketing and distribution. Trinquier used the 
income to fund efforts to recruit and transform hill peoples into maquis—self-
sustaining units working in tandem with the French military to supply intelligence and 
to fight ―insurgents.‖ McCoy lists three such maquis as active during the first 
Indochina War: the Thái maquis under Đèo Văn Long; the Hmong maquis under 
Touby Lyfoung in Laos; and another Hmong maquis east of the Red River in northern 
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Tonkin.
152
  
Opium had emerged, according to Philippe Le Failler, as, ―the nerve of the 
war,‖ in reference to the topic‘s sensitivity, its contested production and exchange, and 
its role in the underground arms trade.
153
 Agents allied with the DRV observed that 
opium cultivators, foremost among others the Hmong, chafed not only at the force 
used to purchase their crop but also at the low prices paid in relation to that fetched 
downstream in Hanoi‘s markets.154 Jerusalemy confirms this inequality and observes 
the role of local Chinese traders: they purchased opium at prices between 800-1500 
piasters per kilogram and sold the product in Hanoi for between 13,000-15,000 
piasters per kg.
155
 The roughly ten-fold price disparity drove a thriving underground 
market, one that linked growers to revolutionaries exchanging salt for opium. 
Salt and opium were the principal commodities animating a politically 
significant exchange in the frontier and across its borderlines. During World War II, 
David Marr reports that salt could be purchased on Tonkin‘s coast for 0.20 piasters per 
kilogram but, in the Indochina/Yunnan border areas, salt was known as ―white gold‖ 
and sold for as much as 50 times its purchase price.
156
 Ten years later, Jerusalemy 
reported salt‘s selling price in the Thái Federation as 12-15 piasters per kg for rock salt 
mined in Yunnan versus 20-25 piasters per kg for sea salt evaporated along the Red 
River delta‘s outer fringe.157 One estimate places these two commodities in terms of a 
roughly equivalent relation: 1 kg opium = 1000 piasters = 100 kg salt.
158
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By bringing salt from the Red River delta to trade for opium with highland 
growers, Viet Minh agents manipulated these geographically-determined price 
disparities to arm themselves. Once Viet Minh agents obtained opium, they bartered it 
for weaponry by tapping into a transnational network of Chinese merchants trading in 
surplus from China‘s civil war.159 Expressed monetarily, the sums involved were 
staggering: McAlister estimates that in 1947 all of Indochina (i.e., northern Tonkin 
and Laos) produced 38 tons of marketable raw opium worth approximately 400 
million piasters. This monetary sum was roughly equivalent to the 1948 value of what 
was, officially, Indochina‘s most valuable commodity—233,000 tons of exported rice. 
He estimates that opium proceeds from this illicit trade amounted to income sufficient 
to arm all six divisions of the People‘s Army in 1952.160 In subsequent chapters, I 
return to the political implications of the salt exchange with regards to Viet Minh 
organizing and rising DRV power: by providing nutritive use value to local residents 
accustomed to salt‘s scarcity, cadres appropriated the commodity‘s exchange value to 
legitimate their personal power as well as that of the DRV. 
In sum, Federation and French (mis)management of the opium trade led to two 
significant contradictions. First, incomplete ―legal‖ regulation of the opium crop 
contributed to ―illegal‖ smuggling and, ironically, empowered their adversaries. By 
capitalizing on a form of lucrative arbitrage among cross-border smugglers, anti-
colonial leaders armed themselves against the French and the Federation. Second, the 
use of force exacerbated uneven exchange relations and contributed to a willingness 
among many Hmong cultivators to support the revolutionary cause against the Thái 
Federation.
161
 More broadly, many Hmong people grew suspicious of what they saw 
as a White Thái bid towards regional supremacy and, in increasing numbers during 
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Federation rule, joined a growing anti-colonial movement. Initially, according to a 
1949 report by the DRV‘s Sơn-Lai Committee, the Hmong were only ―lukewarm‖ 
(lừng chừng) towards the ―Việt Minh regime.‖ But once the French began ―killing‖ 
and ―arresting‖ Hmong people as well as ―burning‖ and ―destroying‖ their property, 
they began to ―hate‖ the French and turned favorably towards the resistance.162   
If French, Federation, and DRV reports alike tend to treat ethnicity as given 
social fact, then note that no one ethnically-defined social group acted as a unified 
bloc, as though their interests were exclusively ―ethnic‖ in nature and immutable over 
time. In the Black River region, opposition among Hmong peoples towards the 
Federation was similar to disaffected Black Thái peoples who increasingly followed 
Cầm Văn Dung around Sơn La and Lò Văn Hặc around Điện Biên: the Federation‘s 
own practices reproduced ethnic identity as a basis for advantage or disadvantage with 
respect to enmeshed relations of rule, production, and exchange. Although many 
Hmong supported the anti-colonial cause through 1954, their long-term allegiance to 
DRV-led social transformation was never guaranteed. In the Việt Bắc region to the 
east, many Hmong sided with the French and against Viet Minh and DRV. To the west 
in northern Laos, many Hmong remained loyal to the French and resisted the 
revolutionary Pathet Lao.
163
 In these latter cases, such spatialized and ethnicized 
opposition among poppy-growers to revolutionary anti-colonialism was, at least 
partially, an effect of counter-insurgency operations and, by extension, a chimera-like 
outgrowth of colonial divide and rule.  
Perhaps no place better exemplified these ethnicized contests over political 
office and agrarian production than the district of Điện Biên Phủ. Stretching like a 
north-south island in a sea of mountainous terrain, the Mường Thanh plain is a 
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geological anomaly, what Pierre Gourou called, a ―profound accident.‖164 The 
spacious, flat terrain (18 km long by 6 km wide) supported irrigated rice cultivation on 
a scale (up to 6000 hectares) possible in few areas of mainland Southeast Asia outside 
the alluvial plains located far downstream. In the late 1940s, approximately 15,000 
Black Thái residents lived and grew rice there. Their labors made the district‘s annual 
rice crop the largest of any muang district in the Federation. In 1953, at 4,000 tons, 
rice production amounted to 30% of the Federation‘s total potential. Situated above 
the plain, another 12,000 Hmong residents lived in the hills and mountains where they 
farmed swidden, raised livestock, and grew poppies. In the early 1950s, approximately 
10% of all northern Tonkin‘s marketable opium, or half the Federation‘s total, 
originated in these heights: ―Điện Biên Phủ,‖ McAlister writes, ―was the most 
concentrated producer of opium in Vietnam.‖165 When Đèo Văn Long dismissed Lò 
Văn Hặc in 1946, many Black Thái residents saw a bold assertion of White Thái 
power, an expansionist attempt from Lai Châu to claim this rice bowl. Many Hmong 
understood this same move as part of a broader Thái effort to gain greater control of 
their most saleable agricultural commodity. Like many Black Thái residents on its 
plain, many Hmong in Điện Biên Phủ‘s hills sought an alternative by supporting the 
revolutionary movement. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONTESTING A FRONTIER 
 
Archival silences and historical uncertainties 
From the mid-1940s to the early 1950s, the Black River region appeared to be 
a borderlands all over again: site of multiply contested, powerful projects to claim its 
territory and people. French Indochina endeavored to reconstitute itself after World 
War II and supported the establishment of the Thái Federation to rule northwest 
Tonkin‘s strategic frontier. Meanwhile, popular uprisings known collectively as the 
―August Revolution‖ and the DRV‘s declaration of independence in 1945 signaled 
rising challenges to colonial claims and an evolving project to institute an alternative 
form of rule. Like the French colonial regime, central elites cast the Black River 
region as a frontier, an edge of their rule, and worked to configure relations among 
local and regional Thái elites. Notwithstanding their mutual exclusivity, the two 
projects shared a regime of territoriality based on bounded space and sovereign rule. 
The previous chapter focused on the making and remaking of French rule. This 
chapter focuses on oppositional movements and the unsteady making of a Vietnamese 
political project. 
If competing political projects both cast the Black River region as a singular 
frontier and denied the persistence of multiple frontiers, then telling this story must 
contend with paucity of source material. State-based sources provide spotty coverage: 
for seven or so years, archival source availability is the exception rather than the norm. 
National Archives in Hanoi contain no locally produced source material from 1945 to 
mid-1948 and from late 1950 to late 1952.
1
 Between mid-1948 to mid-1950, the 
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archives only offer reports issued by the Sơn La-Lai Châu Interprovince Resistance 
and Administrative Committee.
2
 There are two distinct gaps, therefore, covering what 
might be considered two separate periods in the Black River region‘s history: first, 
local uprisings and the onset of anti-colonial warfare; second, escalation of warfare 
pursuant to a reorganized DRV‘s rapid territorial expansion.  
Alternative source materials betray revealing tendencies. Vietnamese-language 
official histories and nationalist scholarship present narratives that tend to paper over 
any breaks. They offer unbroken stories of ―resistance‖ to French colonialism or 
steady ―construction‖ of Party, state, and/or military institutions continuing from the 
so-called August Revolution of 1945 to the endpoint of ―national victory‖ at Điện 
Biên Phu in 1954. In these accounts, rupture only comes with the purported end of 
colonial rule.
3
 Like narratives of frontier expansionism, stories of ―revolution‖ and 
―resistance‖ present a telos guided by steady progress and linear advance from a state-
centric perspective.  
Nationalist and official histories, as well as their (limited) source materials, do 
other work as well. Nationalist scholars tend to reify historically emergent 
collectivities by explaining causality and outcome according to preconceived 
chronologies, categories, and territories.
4
 Official histories not only repeat these 
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nationalist tendencies but also obscure their own authorship and that of historical 
events: often authored by ―committees,‖ these works name names only at foundational 
moments and, from then on, tend to grant institutions a life of their own.
5
 Archived 
official documents are their first draft, contributing as well to the reproduction of 
powerful silences.
6
 In language they all use, seemingly neutral social categories such 
as the ―masses‖ (quần chúng) or territorial descriptors like the ―Northwest‖ (Tây Bắc) 
do powerful legitimation work: local Thái elites and Kinh cadres deployed these 
ideological (mis)representations to portray a singular region and a unified people 
always already located in Vietnam.
7
 Just as homogenizing social categories silence 
socially-different peoples, the flattening cartographic descriptor erases their alternative 
spatial orientations.  
By reading multiple silences against such official and nationalist vocality, I 
argue that this period figures in a longer, ongoing social process of legitimation and 
boundary-making.
8
 That all these histories and contemporaneous reports were written 
in the Vietnamese ―national script‖ (quốc ngữ) is, in and of itself, analytically 
significant. In the 1940s and early 1950s, very few residents of the Black River region 
even spoke Vietnamese—the language of emerging bureaucracy and dominant 
community—much less read or wrote it. Reading these sources critically and taking 
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their language seriously, however, provides a methodological tool to understand both 
what happened in the past and how outcomes are justified in the present.   
Historiographic commissions do do something: historical silences speak to 
telling omissions. That residents of the Black River region and subjects of the Thái 
Federation would end up ―Vietnamese‖ was contingent on their reconstruction as 
members of a rising nation, on terms often at odds with alternative forms of communal 
and spatial solidarity. This was a long, violent, and highly contested process. By 
opening up these silences and tracing archival ambiguities, I show the contentious and 
conflicted processes of statemaking. 
How does one open up these silences? How does an analyst tell a story marked 
by discontinuities in the historical record? This is a methodological problem with 
empirical significance. Critical scholars read limited contemporaneous source 
materials as indicative of real, on-the-ground uncertainty and conditions of rapid 
social change. In his classic history of World War II and the (re)emergence of 
―Vietnam‖ in 1945, David Marr acknowledges limited primary sources and observes 
regional disparities in political developments to make a bold claim. In contrast to 
efforts aimed at producing ―national history‖ or demonstrating ―Party‖ leadership 
from 1930 or 1941 onward, his work demonstrates that ―no one was in control.‖ After 
March 1945, he argues, ―events took on a spontaneous momentum‖ and Indochinese 
Communist Party (ICP) members and Viet Minh followers ―were successful more 
because of their ability to react quickly to sudden changes than because of any 
adherence to a master plan.‖9  
Marr‘s deft handling of source ambiguities provides a vital historical and 
historiographic insight, one echoed in subsequent scholarship, including my own. On a 
larger spatial scale, authors of a history of French Indochina observe, ―The period 
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from 1947 to 1950 was characterized by uncertainty.‖10  Regarding the Black River 
region, Philippe Le Failler characterizes the years between 1945-48, or the end of 
World War II and the founding of the Thái Federation, as a moment of 
―disappearance, revolution, and confusion.‖11 On a longer temporal scale, a diplomatic 
historian reconsiders ―Vietnam‖ during one of its many wars in the post-WWII period. 
―The outcomes and legacies of the French war,‖ writes Mark Bradley, ―were 
considerably more uncertain than the apparent Vietnamese victory in 1954 would 
suggest.‖12 I draw from these insights to argue that the ambiguities, discontinuities, 
and uncertainties found in the archival record serve to indicate the very conditions 
historical actors themselves confronted in their everyday lives.  
In a similar vein, advocates of reading archives ethnographically have 
questioned the premise that archives contain un-mediated, objective accounts of 
actions, figures, and events. Archival production and historical reproduction are sites 
of inter-related power in which silences coexist alongside textual vocality.
13
 This 
insight provides a key to interpreting Hanoi‘s archival holdings: in between two 
moments of silence—and reproducing more along the way—the DRV scribes and 
state-makers who made sources between 1948 and 1950 worked in uncertain, rapidly 
changing conditions among peoples they did not always understand. Indeed, archives 
are ―records of uncertainty and doubt,‖ writes Anne Stoler, ―in how people imagined 
they could and might make the rubrics of rule correspond to a changing world.‖ She 
advocates an approach grounded in historical ethnography that takes the ―sentiments 
expressed and ascribed‖ in archival records ―as indices of relations of power and 
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traces of them.‖14 In this chapter, I track power in the Black River region—and the 
limits of any one of its projects—by bringing archival silences together with the varied 
historical sources that interrupt or deny them.  
What emerges from a critical engagement with source materials is a composite 
picture of the Black River region in a period—or periods—of competing displays of 
solidarity, institutional development and legitimation, alliances broken or remade, 
emergent systems of exchange, and politically organized violence. Even defining who 
exactly was competing with or against whom risks simplifying complex and mutable 
social relations: statist categories of ―friend‖ and ―enemy‖ changed frequently and 
reflected an ideological agenda. Moreover, DRV record-makers and Viet Minh agents 
deployed a self-styled comparison to differentiate themselves from French colonial 
and Thái Federation rule in order to legitimize their own project.  
As such, the analyst must treat the ideologically-loaded claims to difference 
between ―colonial‖ and ―revolutionary‖ political projects with skepticism. For 
example, in a Sơn Lai Committee report from mid-1949, the Thái elite and 
revolutionary partisan Lò Văn Mười discussed the two ―apparatuses‖ (bộ máy), or 
forms of local government, contesting one another to rule people and territory. He 
observed that the ―French pirates‖ mistreat Sơn La‘s ―puppets,‖ or Black Thái (Thái 
Federation) officials, and (un)intentionally cause unrest among the people there. Then, 
French administrators approach Lai Châu‘s ―puppets,‖ or White Thái (Thái 
Federation) officials, to complain about the ―mediocrity‖ of Sơn La‘s officials and 
offer a deal: should Lai Châu‘s officials be able to suppress the ―movement and 
struggle‖ in Sơn La, then the French military will reward them by allocating the 
domain of Mường La to ―the people of Lai Châu to rule.‖ Reflecting on this situation, 
Lò Văn Mười concludes with some advice for contemporaries and successors 
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associated with the DRV project: ―[we] can take advantage of this above attitude to 
split the puppet ranks.‖15  
This anecdote calls into question what nationalist scholars and state scribes 
alike have attributed only to colonialism: a strategy of divide and rule. Evidently, an 
emergent coalition of elite Thái partisans, DRV cadres, and Việt Minh agents 
countered colonial strategy not only by ostensibly ―unifying the nation‖ but also by 
using divide and rule against itself. Lò Văn Mười described, in his own words, a larger 
contest between two competing centers pursuing strikingly similar goals: to gain the 
loyalty of an hereditary Thái elite (phìa tạo); to take advantage of their control over 
muang spaces and populations; to enlist local rulers in centralizing political projects 
and position them on the edge of respective domains.  
If there were similarities between these opposed state-making projects, 
particularly with regards to the recruitment of Thái elites, then there were also socially 
recognized differences. As the above anecdote suggests, DRV and Thái Federation 
had, by 1949, staked out two spaces and populations with oppositional forms of rule: 
the former in parts of Sơn La province and the latter in much of Lai Châu. Within its 
self-styled ―free zones,‖ the DRV and the Việt Minh Front operated a nascent 
territorial administration and a series of economic, political, and social programs—all 
of which posed as alternatives to ―enemy occupied‖ zones, or the Federation‘s form of 
territorial rule. These differences, and their ideological import, figured as a consistent 
theme in DRV propaganda and education. I concentrate on the production of 
difference and recognize its ongoing reproduction in official and nationalist histories.  
The historiographic question of linearity and progress regarding the DRV‘s 
political program hinges, perhaps, on the question of territorial sovereignty. Between 
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1948-1950, guerilla forces destabilized muang spaces allowing Việt Minh agents to 
work and a DRV administration to establish itself. To put it another way, military 
force attempted to secure territory for emergent state institutions, the personnel of 
which then worked to legitimate their power among resident populations. Yet, by late 
1950, a newly strengthened colonial military demonstrated that the DRV‘s military 
force was either unwilling or unable to secure the Black River region. That the DRV 
lost control of Sơn La and Lai Châu, halting production of archived local reports, 
disrupts any idea of steady linear progression towards singular, undisputed rule. 
 
Opposition, revolt, alliance 
During and immediately after World War II, oppositional movements and 
revolutionary sentiments emerged in Sơn La and, then, apparently, disappeared. 
Notwithstanding the tumultuous and under documented years of world war, the period 
from the end of World War II to creation of the Thái Federation in 1948 is the first of 
two large gaps in the region‘s historical record; this chapter ends with another gap, 
from late 1950 to late 1952. Papering over gaps such as these, nationalist historians 
devote much attention to what they consider to be an originary moment, i.e. the 
―August Revolution‖ of 1945, and presume continuity and solidarity with later anti-
colonial and statemaking activities. I investigate the appearance of a revolutionary 
movement and not its disappearance but, rather, its subsequent transformation. I argue 
that local Thái elites refashioned competing political claims to serve their own 
interests, engaging in a heavily-contested process with uncertain outcomes. 
During World War II, under Japanese occupation, Thái leaders worked with 
Viet Minh Front agents to organize Thái peoples populating the valleys, and along the 
road, from Sơn La town to Mai Sơn and Mộc Châu. The Việt Minh United Front had 
been established at the ICP‘s 8th Plenum in May 1941 to act as a united front 
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organization, led by the Party, to work against fascism and towards a goal of ―national 
liberation.‖16 The Council of Thái People‘s National Salvation and Young Thái for 
National Salvation, both founded in 1943, became the region‘s first ―national 
salvation‖ (cứu quốc) organizations.17 Through a short-lived bilingual newspaper 
(printed in Thái script and Romanized Vietnamese) called Lắc Mường, these 
organizations proclaimed a message of ―Thái-Kinh unity.‖ Cầm Trọng writes that 
these local front organizations appealed to elites disaffected with the current state of 
affairs, assembling members from two strata of ―wealthy peasants without office or 
power; and Thái aristocracy who had lost power [and] office.‖ Their goal, he writes, 
was to ―resist the lords (phìa tạo) holding power.‖18   
In late World War II, a coup de force by Japanese forces presented emerging 
oppositional alliances, and allied local elites, with new opportunities. On 9 March 
1945, Japanese forces in Indochina suddenly reversed 4 years‘ of collaboration, 
toppled the French administration, and began to rule directly. Thái elites and Việt 
Minh agents began to plot seizure of the local government. Only days after the coup, 
some 200 political prisoners, all of whom were Party members, escaped from the Sơn 
La penitentiary. After making contact with ICP superiors in Hanoi (Xứ ủy), some 
returned back to Sơn La to organize locally and assumed leadership of the Việt Minh‘s 
provincial unit. In July and August, units of the Liberation Army crossed the Red 
River, moved into Thái areas on its west bank (including Yên Bái, Nghĩa Lộ), and 
crossed the Black River into eastern Sơn La.19 They encountered little resistance from 
                                                 
16
 Brocheux and Hémery (2009), 350; Huỳnh Kim Khánh, Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1982), 256-264. 
17
 Or, Hội người Thái cứu quốc in Sơn La and Mường La and Thanh niên Thái cứu quốc in Mường 
Chanh (Mai Sơn). Cầm Trọng (1978), 500-503. 
18
 Cầm Trọng (1978), 505-06, 515, 519. 
19
 The Vietnamese Liberation Army (Quân giải phóng) was modeled on, and supported by, China‘s 
People‘s Liberation Army. Cf., Huỳnh Kim Khánh (1982), 280-284. With the DRV‘s Declaration of 
Independence on 2 Sept 1945, its name changed to the People‘s Army of Vietnam (Quân đội Nhân dân 
Việt Nam). Cf., Greg Lockhart, Nation in Arms (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1989), 142-143. 
 89 
demoralized Japanese forces. In late August, Chu Văn Thịnh, a Party member 
appointed and trained by the ―Central Government‖ (located in the Việt Bắc region 
north of Hanoi), convened a conference in Sơn La town attended by Viet Minh 
organizers and Thái elites: together, they issued a call for an uprising.
20
  
The call to revolt found an audience among select Thái communities. On 22 
August 1945 an uprising spread through some of Sơn La‘s muang, part of a loosely 
coordinated effort known as the ―August Revolution.‖ Armed supporters marched 
from Sơn La town to challenge Bạc Cầm Quý in Thuận Châu and led to his rule‘s 
―collapse.‖ After former colonial official Xa Văn Minh joined the Việt Minh uprising 
in Mộc Châu, they found themselves competing with another nationalist party (Đại 
Việt). Cầm Văn Dung led the revolt in Mai Sơn and forced tri châu Cầm Văn Chiêu to 
surrender. Following displays of revolutionary solidarity (like hoisting the flag), 
seizure of weaponry from Japanese soldiers, and raids on grain storehouses, 
participants fell back to Sơn La town and endeavored to coordinate a two-pronged 
resistance government. Chu Văn Thịnh led the Việt Minh‘s Sơn La Provincial 
Leadership Council; Lò Văn Mười (of Thuận Châu) served as treasurer and Cầm Văn 
Minh as secretary. Cầm Văn Dung chaired the Sơn La Province People‘s Provisional 
Revolutionary Committee; Chu Văn Thịnh was vice-chair and Xa Văn Minh a 
representative.
21
 
Notwithstanding what nationalist histories allege was their ―success,‖ the 
uprisings of August 1945 were spatially limited, short-lived, and multiply contested.
22
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Revolts occurred along two axes: one south of the Black River from Thuận Châu 
through Sơn La town to Mộc Châu; the second west of the Red River, closer to the 
Việt Bắc base area, in Yên Bái and Nghĩa Lộ.23 On August 31, Nationalist Chinese 
forces arrived in Sơn La town from Yunnan and, in response to a revolutionary 
delegation‘s diplomatic gesture, disarmed them and usurped their self-proclaimed 
authority. Members of Sơn La‘s Viet Minh Council and Revolutionary Committee 
scattered.
24
 In addition to their superior force, the Chinese units supported a rival 
organization, the Nationalist Party of Vietnam (Quốc dân Đảng or VNQDĐ) which, in 
contrast to Viet Minh failures in Lai Châu, gained support of Đèo Văn Ân of Phong 
Thổ.25 The presence of a rival anti-colonial political party in Lai Châu and Yên Bái, 
like the Đại Việt party in Mộc Châu, points to contests already underway, and the 
inter-party violence ahead, regarding representations and aspirations of anti-colonial 
nationalism.
26
  
On 1 February 1946, shortly after the departure of VNQDĐ organizers, Đèo 
Văn Ân welcomed his fellow clansman Đèo Văn Long who accompanied French 
forces returning from exile in Yunnan. Over the next year, Đèo Văn Long worked 
with the French forces to renew and enforce a claim to the Black River region. 
Notwithstanding scattered resistance, by mid-1947, writes Cầm Trọng, all ―Thái 
areas,‖ or muang-based population centers, were controlled by the ―enemy.‖27 In other 
words, the Thái Federation was on the rise.  
Nationalist historians trace leadership of Sơn La‘s revolt to elite Thái families 
and point to their emerging extra-local relations with several powerful opponents. 
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Identifying who participated in the Sơn La uprising (such as Cầm Van Dung, Xa Văn 
Minh, Lò Văn Mười) and who did not (Bạc Cầm Quý, Đèo Văn Ân, Đèo Văn Long) 
points to the rivalries and contests inherent in, and emerging from, muang control. 
These early relations also illustrate how Việt Minh organizers, their nationalist rivals, 
and architects of neocolonialism all drew on these splits among Thái elites to form 
alliances.
28
 As noted by Cầm Trọng above, and confirmed by other observers, 
organizations in Sơn La affiliated with the Việt Minh Front appealed to members of 
elite Thái families either disaffected with or dismissed from positions associated with 
prevailing forms of local rule—either Japanese occupation or renewed French 
colonialism—and did not (yet) generate mass support.29 Although John T. McAlister 
associates Việt Minh with Black Thái and Federation with White Thái, the actions of 
historical actors belie any neat ethnic division to explain support for, respectively, 
revolutionary or neocolonial rule.
30
 Rather, Thái elites forged coalitions with agents 
representing one of multiple colonial or nationalist political formations to reproduce 
claims to muang-based and, even, regional rule.  
If members of the Thái elite claimed continued rule of respective muang 
domains, then what Cầm Trọng calls ―Thái-Kinh unity‖ points to departures from 
earlier patterns. First, that only the ―Thái‖ feature locally in this self-proclaimed unity 
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indicates that neither group had yet to recognize claims or rights of myriad non-Thái 
peoples living amidst and between the muang. From World War II to 1947, traces of 
non-Thái peoples are notably absent in official and nationalist histories. This limited 
form of unity indicates the uncertain work of redrawing national boundaries to include 
or exclude the region‘s diverse local populations.  
If such exclusion was not dissimilar to past and future Đèo clan rule, the arrival 
of Việt Minh units indicates a profound shift. Revolutionary agents were the outriders 
of the latest in-migration to the Black River region, this time by armed Kinh/Viet 
peoples. Indeed, the idea of ―Thái-Kinh unity‖ shows that prior to the ―August 
Revolution,‖ Việt Minh agents had already begun to arrive in sufficient numbers and 
with sufficient force to contest colonial boundaries regulating traffic between 
upstream and downstream peoples.
31
 World War II and the uprisings in its wake signal 
an emerging—and lasting—political relationship between Thái and Kinh elites.  
How did Kinh elites commanding these units conceive of their agenda? In 
early 1947, the Minister of Defense sent a revealing letter to the army‘s ―Western 
Advance‖ (Tây tiến) units. Minister Võ Nguyên Giáp warned of colonial strategies to 
―use Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese, split the sibling minorities, [and] establish 
minority Vietnamese military units to fight us.‖ In response, the Minister from Quảng 
Bình admonished his soldier audience to consider that ―each bit of land in the West is 
a bit of land belonging to the Vietnamese homeland‖ and to remember that ―each 
compatriot from the Western region is a Vietnamese person.‖32  
The letter articulated—and served to naturalize—a powerful two-fold claim on 
the Black River‘s people and place, refiguring them on the margins of national 
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community and projected state space. Coming from a Kinh military commander, the 
letter staked a forceful claim to Black River soil, yet one that relocated its place as 
―our rear area,‖ or a frontier on the edge of centrally-projected territory. Giáp‘s letter 
also repositioned the region‘s residents as members of a community divided against 
itself, yet in terms that disadvantaged them as ―minorities.‖ These ideas of national 
community and territory configured together as ―Vietnamese‖—and the force that 
accompanied them—provide an early example of militarized state-making at work.   
 
Emergent organizations 
By the late 1940s, according to accepted scholarly accounts on ―Vietnam,‖ 
local revolutionary organizations throughout Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina began 
to assume a lasting shape. Drawing on popular support and personnel organized by the 
Viet Minh United Front during World War II, elected Popular Assemblies (Hội động 
nhân dân) emerged in 1945 and 1946 as newly formed democratic institutions. After 
diplomatic negotiations gave way to warfare in December 1946, however, the DRV 
issued a decree in October 1947 ordering the suspension of Assemblies and 
reallocating their executive function to combined committees composed of appointed 
members.
33
 Resistance Committees merged with Administrative Committees to act as 
the revolutionary government‘s executive branch at each territorial division.34 In so 
doing, the DRV attempted to join military ―resistance‖ and civilian ―administration‖ 
organizations to corral and cajole locally emergent revolutionary sentiments and 
outbursts of support.  
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This consolidation did not happen uniformly across the space claimed as 
―Vietnam.‖ Beginning in 1948, archival documents from the DRV open a 
contemporaneous perspective on this period with regards to organizational activities in 
the Black River region. These documents confirm the significance of Administrative 
Resistance Committees but contradict the alleged abolishment of Popular Assemblies. 
Much like nationalist and official histories, however, archival sources can also 
mislead. I argue that this textual confusion might well reflect conditions on the ground 
similar to the aftermath of World War II.  
Institutions came and went while the people constituting them shifted back and 
forth. For example, a DRV report from 1948 mentions that Cầm Văn Dung was 
chairman (chủ nhiệm) of Mountain Nation Interzone 10 (Quốc Dân Miền Núi L/K 10); 
it also relayed a request from the people of Mai Sơn that Cầm Văn Dung, as 
―Chairman of the FQDMN,‖ lead an inspection tour of newly created revolutionary 
organizations.
35
 What was this organization? Cầm Trọng writes that in early 1948, the 
Central Government founded a regional revolutionary base (căn cứ địa), administered 
by ―Mountain Nation Interzone X‖ and led by ―Cầm Văn Cung.‖36 Yet the 
organization itself appears only ephemerally in these two sources, its short-lived 
existence perhaps the result of a Party order.
37
 In any event, the Mountain Nation did 
not merit its own file in the archives. Both full of uncertainty and ambiguity, the 
historical sources reflect rapidly changing historical conditions.   
Even if the region‘s revolutionary activity assumed fluid and fleeting forms, 
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the DRV‘s administrative orders did appear to reshape institutional structures and 
spatial configurations. The October 1947 administrative reforms led in June 1948 to 
the establishment of the Sơn La-Lai Châu Inter-province Resistance and 
Administrative Committee. As an administrative unit, the Sơn-Lai Committee reported 
to the President‘s Office, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Interior. As a military 
unit, the Committee worked closely with the encompassing Military Interzone (Liên 
Khu). The Interzone‘s command included Regiment 148 (Trung đoàn 148) whose 600 
soldiers had arrived in late December 1945 to support Sơn La‘s uprising.38 Over the 
years, both Interzones and Committees changed frequently in terms of names, spatial 
expanse, leadership composition, and base location.
39
 Nonetheless, this pattern of 
overlapping military and civilian spatial jurisdictions established an enduring 
organizational pattern, forming the first two legs of a tri-partite institutional 
structure.
40
  
Adding a third leg to these military Interzones and civilian Committees, the 
ICP erected a parallel, secret command. Officially, President Hồ Chí Minh in 
November 1945 declared the dissolution of the ICP in order to broaden the DRV 
government‘s appeal and to conform with united front policy. Only in 1951 did the 
Party appear publicly—and in different guise—to lead a statist anti-colonial 
movement. In the interim, the ICP was referred to cryptically as the ―Organization‖ 
and worked clandestinely to steer political developments, personnel recruitment, and 
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decision-making.
41
 At its ―center,‖ the Party‘s organizational structure mirrored that of 
the military: the Party‘s Central Executive Committee (Ban chấp hành Trung ương 
Đảng) matched the military‘s Central Command. Regional Party Committees (khu ủy) 
matched frequent administrative changes in the military Zones and Interzones. At 
provincial and subordinate units, Party organization shifted to mirror civil 
administration. By observing this principal of parallelism, the Party developed 
hierarchical organizations to recruit, staff, and influence leadership positions in rapidly 
evolving civil and military bureaucracies.
42
 
Party leaders in Sơn La and Lai Châu formed organizations rapidly between 
1946 and 1949. The Việt Minh delegation that arrived in Sơn La in October 1945 
included Dương Văn Ty, a senior delegate from the Party‘s Central Committee.43 In 
June 1946, the Central Committee delegated Trần Quyết to replace Dương Văn Ty and 
to create a Provincial Party Chapter (Tỉnh ủy). In October 1946, he founded the Sơn 
La Party Committee (Đảng bộ) and gleaned members from Regiment 148‘s own Party 
organization. Because the Thái Federation controlled Lai Châu more firmly, Party 
organizations developed there more slowly. Three years after a unit formed in Sơn La, 
the Interzone 10 Party Committee founded the Lai Châu Provincial Leadership 
Council (Ban cán sự tỉnh) chaired by Trần Quốc Mạnh. In December 1949, he and his 
two fellow council members established the Lai Châu Party Cell (chi bộ).44 Both Sơn 
La‘s and Lai Châu‘s Party organizations ran parallel to the Sơn-Lai Committee and the 
military Interzone. Institutional missions, spatial jurisdictions, and leadership 
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overlapped: Trần Quyết, for example, served as the Sơn-Lai Committee‘s Vice-Chair 
as well as the Interzone‘s senior Party official.45  
From a forward base area in Yên Bái, the Sơn-Lai Committee became the 
DRV‘s senior regional authority, charged with administering its territory, government, 
and population and overseeing what its members called the inter-province‘s 
―Resistance Administration apparatus.‖ Specifically, the Sơn-Lai Committee was 
responsible for coordinating subordinate Resistance and Administrative Committees 
modeled on downstream territorial units in districts (huyện) and communes (xã); 
supervising specialized line agencies (ty chuyên môn), such as postal services and 
police work; coordinating military affairs; shepherding and housing refugee 
populations; and reporting on local conditions to superiors in the Việt Bắc. As a 
clearing house for implementing orders from ―above‖ and reporting on conditions 
―below,‖ the Sơn-Lai Committee‘s archived records provide a revealing vantage point. 
As with other regional institutions at this time, the personnel who composed 
the Sơn-Lai Committee changed frequently but their backgrounds nonetheless indicate 
the sustained power of Thái elites. In 1948 and 1949, Xa Văn Minh of Mộc Châu 
emerged as the Committee‘s Chair. Vice-Chair Trần Quyết was one of two explicitly 
―Kinh‖ representatives, another of whom, Nguyễn Ba Toản, managed military affairs. 
Aside from Xa Văn Minh, ―local Mountain‖ representatives included Lò Văn San, 
Điêu (Đèo?) Chinh Tho, and Lò Văn Mười.46 After Trần Quyết, first Xa Văn Minh 
and then Lò Văn Mười—two Thái elites and former leaders of the Sơn La revolt—
signed off on Committee reports. Now recognized as DRV government officials, these 
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muang leaders and regional representatives traveled back and forth to the Việt Bắc 
base area. Thái elites worked with, and helped create, enmeshed institutions—i.e., 
military, government, and Party organizations—to lead opposition to the Thái 
Federation.  
 
Guerilla spaces and activities 
Between 1948 and 1951, these evolving and enmeshed organizations attempted 
to destabilize the Thái Federation, to establish contact with oppositional groups, and to 
organize a viable alternative government. Beginning in 1948, armed propaganda units 
(đội tuyên truyền vũ trang) moved into Federation territory and positioned themselves 
as the vanguard of a growing revolutionary presence. Hồ Chí Minh and Võ Nguyên 
Giáp intended these guerilla units to use weapons for self-defense only and to 
emphasize political agitation over armed confrontation.
47
 Composed of 116 soldiers 
and political cadres, the Determined Advance Forward Unit (Đội xung phong Quyết 
tiến) was the largest of four such units operating in the region, all of which fell under 
Regiment 148‘s command.48 Part of an ICP program to infiltrate ―enemy‖ territory in 
northwest Tonkin and Laos, these units attempted to expand the spatial scope and 
broaden the social appeal of a revolutionary movement.  
That the armed propaganda units operated fluidly across the Lao-Viet border 
points to how senior military and Party leaders initially conceived of anti-colonial 
warfare across the frame of Indochina as a whole. At its Fourth Central Executive 
Committee Conference held in April 1948, the ICP decided to ―expand the battlefield 
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into Cambodia and Laos.‖49 Shortly thereafter, in May 1948, the military‘s Central 
Command established a ―Lao-North [Vietnam] Forward Council.‖ The Central 
Command ordered Interzone 10‘s commanders to establish a base area in Mộc Châu 
and to create ―footholds‖ across the border—ostensibly for their Lao allies. The Lào-
Bắc Forward Council worked with the Sơn-Lai Committee to build and coordinate 
organizations straddling the border.
50
 Ranging from Mộc Châu, the four armed 
propaganda units spread south through the Lao province of Sam Neua and followed 
the borderline west by northwest through Phong Sa Lỳ and back into Điện Biên.51  
Because of its position on the Lao border, Điện Biên emerged as an early 
target; armed propaganda units quickly moved to recruit highland populations there. In 
1948-1949, these units moved in almost mirror-like opposition to the colonial alliance. 
Whereas the Federation occupied the plains and sought support among valley-
dwelling Thái peoples, armed propaganda units roamed in the highlands, making 
contact with and recruiting among Hmong and Dao peoples.
52
 By late 1949, the ICP‘s 
Lai Châu Provincial Leadership Council felt emboldened to dispatch work teams (đội 
công tác) to the districts of Điện Biên, Tuần Giáo, and Quỳnh Nhai. In these forward 
areas, workteams followed up on advances made by the armed propaganda units in the 
highlands and began seeking ―footholds‖ in the lowlands.53 In mid-1950, the Lai Châu 
Council moved from Than Uyên district, Yên Bái province to new headquarters in 
Tuần Giáo where they aimed to oversee a rising movement‘s westward expansion.54 
At its Third National Conference in early 1950, the ICP once again confirmed 
its military commitment to Indochina as a whole. They attempted to counter the 
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recently created, French-backed national monarchies in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam 
through a coordinated strategy of waging war in Indochina broadly.
55
 ―In this war of 
resistance,‖ the ICP‘s resolution declared, ―all of Indochina is a single battlefield.‖56 
Notably, the resolution assumed that Vietnamese cadres would remain in leadership 
positions until the time they deemed Lao and Cambodian counterparts sufficiently 
trained to take their place.
57
 Behind the Party‘s unified transnational front, in other 
words, lay a dominant national elite directing militant anti-colonial activities.  
In terms of guerilla tactics, the coercive program included assassinations, 
economic sabotage, and disrupting communication and transport. Armed propaganda 
units worked with regular soldiers (i.e., Regiment 148), forward police units (Công an 
xung phong), and irregular militias (dân quân). Militia members, recruited from Front 
organizations, reached 2000 irregulars by mid-1949.
58
 Among others, assassinations 
included murdering two of Bạc Cầm Quý‘s siblings as well as the killing of other 
―important traitors‖ (Việt gian quan trọng), such as Xa Van Nuc and Xa Kim Tien on 
12 August 1948.
59
 In mid-1949, a military offensive into Mường La and Mai Sơn 
resulted in wounding Sơn La‘s Province Chief and his wife.60 Economic sabotage 
included destroying Federation rice granaries as well as encouraging farmers to delay 
debt repayment and refrain from supplying the ―enemy.‖61  
Disrupting, displacing, and replacing lines of communication and transport 
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indicate early attempts to wrest control over the boundaries regulating upstream and 
downstream exchange. By staging ambushes and blockading roads, guerilla forces 
were able to force the Thái Federation to rely increasingly on French aircraft for 
transport and resupply.
62
 By mid-1949, they had effectively shut down the principal 
water (Black River) and road routes linking the mountains to colonial strongholds 
located in old downstream market centers of Hòa Bình and Hanoi. Road travel was 
limited to one route, known in French as the ―Piste Pavie,‖ between Sơn La and Lai 
Châu. These road closures forced the Federation and its French allies to rely even 
more heavily on air-based travel and transport.
63
 Meanwhile, the DRV and its military 
met its growing needs for transportation and materiel by overland routes. Increased 
demand on the east-west route through Yên Bái to and from the Việt-Bắc base area led 
the Sơn Lai Committee to request another north-south road be opened through 
Interzone 4 to Thanh Hoá.
64
 This latter route would become a primary means of 
supply during the 1953-54 Điện Biên Phủ Campaign.  
Just as they destabilized the Thái Federation, these soldiers and cadres 
endeavored to build an alternative government within ―liberated‖ zones among a 
population committed to ―struggle‖ (đấu tranh). In 1949, the Sơn Lai Committee 
reported the establishment of temporary Popular Assemblies as well as Administrative 
and Resistance Committees in the districts (huyện) of Mường La and Mai Sơn and 
their subordinate communes (xã). Each commune committee, ideally, included a chair, 
vice chair, secretary, military officer in charge of militia, and someone responsible for 
both provisioning the military and maintaining communications; in practice, one 
representative often performed multiple functions.
65
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These committees appealed to popular legitimacy by institutionalizing an 
alternative to the increasingly unpopular Thái Federation. After conducting field 
inspections in June 1949 with Trần Quyết, Lò Văn Mười observed that, with the 
establishment of district and commune offices, the masses appeared ―happy‖ with 
their representation in local government. Without these representatives, he said, the 
masses would ―only know the sibling cadres of the Viet Minh Front and the 
military.‖66  
 
Vast area, sparsely peopled 
In mid-1949, shortly after establishing administrative committees in 
―liberated‖ districts of Mường La and Mai Sơn, a revealing expression appears in the 
DRV‘s official correspondence. In a report to his superiors, Thái cadre Lò Văn Mười 
charted the Sơn-Lai Committee‘s progress towards crafting territorial administrative 
units and staffing them with suitable personnel. He requested ―organized transport‖ to 
facilitate the Committee‘s visits to, and inspections of, newly formed districts and 
communes. ―The geographic scale of one commune in Sơn La Province [where] the 
area is vast and sparsely peopled,‖ he explained, is such that, ―one commune is as 
spacious as one or two districts below downstream.‖67  
Lò Văn Mười‘s invocation of ―vast land, sparse people‖ prefigures 
representations of, and relations of domination in, a region that was becoming a 
frontier all over again under rapidly evolving historical circumstances. Lò Văn Mười 
was doing more than just asking for a car or an armed escort. He was also legitimating 
his own powerful position by referencing his knowledge of local conditions relative to 
downstream areas of ―Vietnam.‖ The content and directionality of his request point to 
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a developing relationship between Thái powerbrokers and an ascendant, Kinh-
dominated political center. His reasoning and very language point also to an emerging 
discourse, one based on and formative of this same relationship.  
What did the expression ―vast land, sparse people‖ mean? Certainly, the phrase 
captures something of this hinterland‘s observed conditions where, approximately, an 
average of 20 people settled a square kilometer. Yet, to be meaningful, the Sơn Lai 
terrain could only be ―vast‖ and its population ―sparse‖ in comparison with some other 
referent, one Lò Văn Mười located explicitly ―below downstream‖ (dưới Xuôi). He 
referred implicitly to the Red River Delta, where upwards of 800 people squeezed 
onto a square kilometer and, according to a popular expression, ―land was tight, 
people densely settled‖ (đất chặt người đông).  
In some ways, this was an odd comparison. Populated with wet-rice farmers 
and few if any swidden cultivators, the Red River Delta‘s Kinh/Viet population 
practiced cultural conventions still uncommon in the Black River region. For example, 
few highland peoples could speak, much less read or write, the Vietnamese language 
in which this phrase was recorded. Contemporary Laos, by contrast, had a ratio of land 
to people similar, if not even more ―sparse,‖ than population densities in Sơn Lai‘s 
bailiwick. Moreover, Laos displayed many more commonalities in terms of shared 
languages, ecologies, agricultural practices, as well as ongoing trade and kinship 
relations. The very oddity of the phrase‘s comparative referent highlights a spatial 
orientation guiding evolving relations of rule. 
What did the expression do? Discursively, the phrase performed ideological 
work towards constituting a singular region (re)located in spatializing relations of 
power. As one among a coterie of local Thái elites working with a rising DRV, Lò 
Văn Mười figured in a powerful process, one that remade a malleable, indeterminate 
space into a bounded region fixed in larger relations of spatialized domination. The 
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late 1940s presented conditions similar to the late 19
th
 century: once again, multiple 
and competing power centers claimed the Black River region. At this juncture, 
however, Lò Văn Mười recognized territorial borders in order to relocate this space as 
a ―unified‖ region within Vietnam. It was a region he and other Thái elites like him 
claimed to represent. He wrote of the local population, 
 
Among all strata of the Mountain compatriots like Thái, Mường, Mán 
[Dao], Mèo [Hmong], Puôc, Xá [Khumu], there is still one heart loyal 
to the government proving unity among them. We are paying the most 
attention to the Mán [Dao] and Mèo [Hmong] compatriots, who during 
the French period did not have to do corvée or supply [the military] like 
the Thái or Mường; these days these compatriots do have to provision 
and labor but not as though the regime forced them, and they are still 
happy to follow orders from above.
68
 
 
Lò Văn Mười‘s use of ―unity‖ to describe the Black River‘s population reveals 
and conceals manifold tensions. Note the slippage describing ―Mountain compatriots‖: 
if ―all strata‖ were truly ―unified,‖ then why distinguish among them? Indeed, any 
attempt to describe such multiple and wayward social groups as ―unified‖ must be 
regarded skeptically and understood as an ideological claim. In fact, the statement 
above contains reasons to postulate conditions of dis-unity. First, he represented ―the 
government‖ that had reversed colonial precedent and now expected Dao and Hmong 
peoples to labor and provision on its behalf. Second, in spite of supposed ―happiness‖ 
among Hmong and Dao peoples to comply with orders from ―above,‖ the regional 
Committee nonetheless monitored compliance. If they were truly happy to obey, then 
why suspect them of disobedience? 
Moreover, at this historical juncture, any ―unity‖ among and between Black 
River peoples was patently false, for the following reasons. French forces fought the 
revolutionary army. The Thái Federation controlled Lai Châu and much of Sơn La. 
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DRV cadres, elite Tháis, and Việt Minh organizers violently opposed the Federation, 
particularly in Sơn La and Yên Bái. All over, poor peasants did the hard work 
officially recognized muang leaders commanded of them. Finally, Dao and Hmong 
peoples appeared to be suspicious of Thái power—whatever its form.  
Within a re-emergent frontier remained old, multiple, scattered frontiers. 
Indeed, Thái peoples—Black or White—were only some among many social groups 
in this region, not all of whom accepted their (fractured) rule as legitimate. In the hills 
and mountains surrounding valley-based muang units lived another panoply of social 
groups, some of whom aspired to alternative forms of rule. Like the idiom ―of vast 
area, sparse people,‖ the claim to ―unity‖ naturalizes an emerging relationship in 
bifurcated national terms of peripheral region and rising center—between mountains 
and delta, upstream and downstream—that disguised manifold, and hotly contested, 
social differences.  
Over time, the terms of ―vast area, sparse people‖ came to be a dominant 
representation and the Vietnamese language a means for expressing it.
69
 Perhaps in 
ways he did not foresee, Lò Văn Mười reproduced a discourse with concrete and 
lasting ramifications: a frontier region located on the edge of rising state power and 
defined in terms of its cultural difference with respect to the center‘s population. Over 
its long life in official reports and nationalist histories, ―vast area, sparse people‖ 
emerged as a frontier discourse, an oft-repeated refrain to describe and prescribe 
different state projects reflective of historically-mutable relationships and priorities. 
By projecting an idea of a unitary frontier, the discursive idiom denied the multiplicity 
of peoples inhabiting distinct spaces traveling along an uncertain historical 
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trajectory—sometimes together, sometimes apart. 
 
It was no accident that this ideologically-loaded description of ―upstream‖ 
conditions appeared when it did. One estimate places the total population in Sơn La‘s 
growing ―liberated zones‖ at 25,000 people.70 Indeed, the struggle in 1948 for Sơn 
La‘s southern tier had created ―wide and growing space‖ for DRV government, 
leading the Sơn Lai Committee in January 1949 to request an influx of cadres trained 
in ―resistance administration.‖71 Cadres came bearing instructions codified in a pair of 
Presidential Decrees dated 19 November 1948 (SL-CTN 254 & 255) which specified 
the composition and function of administrative committees and popular assemblies 
organized as province, district, and commune.
72
 In April 1949, Lò Văn Mười reported 
that communes in districts of Mai Sơn and Mộc Châu had yet to implement the 
decrees, in part blaming a lack of paper for election ballots.
73
 After conducting 
inspection tours in June 1949 of Mường La, Mộc Châu, and Mai Sơn, Lò Văn Mười 
deployed a curious kind of double-speak. His conclusion invoking the region‘s ―vast 
area, sparse people,‖ followed—in the same report—a confirmation that each 
commune had organized assemblies and committees ―completely‖ and a reservation 
that ―not even one‖ conformed to the laws.74 What was happening on the ground?  
It appears that the regional Committee‘s attempt to implement Decrees 254 and 
255 generated revealing problems regarding the units and shapes of territorial 
administration as well as the personnel to staff them. What was, and what should be, 
the fundamental unit for organizing local government? On the one hand, regional 
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leaders interpreted the center‘s decrees as orders, ―to organize a people‘s local 
government in our country only as far as the commune,‖ i.e. not allowing for village 
leadership.
75
 On the other hand, people in these ―upstream‖ areas were accustomed to 
different and more numerous organizational forms: one ―commune‖ featured multiple 
subunits, from lông (?) to bản (mountain village) to xóm (neighborhood). Furthermore, 
settlement patterns displayed remarkable diversity: villages ranged from a low of 
several households up to six dozen; households might be packed densely together or 
spread hither and yon across the landscape. Organizing communes reproduced 
underlying settlement diversity (from 20 to 200 villages) and distances between them 
(30 kilometers from the nearest office) which, in turn, compromised the ability of 
commune-based local government to function as intended.  
French administrators had addressed these problems by recognizing the village 
unit, and village heads (tạo bản), as the fundamental form of local government. The 
multiple subunits, lông and xóm, worked to close the distance between scattered 
villages. The Sơn Lai leadership therefore faced a difficult choice. ―If we dismiss the 
person responsible for the village,‖ rued Lò Văn Mười, ―then we either follow the 
decree and work will not happen; or we do not dismiss them and we violate the 
government‘s decree.‖  
―Even more difficult‖ than this village issue, he continued, were problems 
encountered in administering highland spaces and peoples, in areas identified as 
Hmong and Dao. Recall that, historically, these peoples had settled the slopes, 
ridgelines, and mountaintops between and amidst Thái settlements. French colonial 
administrators had used a principal of proximity to form spatially uniform and 
contiguous administrative units with their adjoining communities. By including Dao 
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and Hmong settlements in units dominated by Thái and Mường peoples, colonial 
administration reproduced the muang in modern guise. The reorganization of local 
government offered highland peoples opportunity to express both discontent with Thái 
domination and ―aspirations‖ to form an alternative. In one district, Hmong and Dao 
peoples ―proclaimed‖ their own ethnically distinct communes, creating patchy units 
connecting villages upwards of 100 km apart. Their unorthodox decision—creating a 
spatially non-contiguous unit—allowed for peoples linked by social commonalities 
(trade, language, kinship, etc.) to achieve democratic representation. For Lò Văn Mười 
and others in the Sơn Lai Committee, however, the spontaneous recreation of 
communes linking distant settlements once again raised what he felt was the 
underlying problem of village administration. ―To dismiss the village head,‖ rued the 
administrative representative, ―makes work very hard.‖  
The Sơn Lai Committee thus faced a difficult choice: either adhere to the 
Central Government‘s regulations ordering the abolishment of village government and 
dismissal of village heads; or follow a functioning, popularly supported administrative 
precedent with long historical roots recognizing village leadership. To follow orders 
jeopardized official work, ―especially among the Mountain people,‖ or Hmong and 
Dao groups, explained Lò Văn Mười, ―because geographical conditions are such that 
people in these villages only know the person in charge of their village.‖ In other 
words, the Committee could ill afford to alienate trusted local leadership. The sources 
are unclear whether or not village leadership remained in place as before. What is 
clear is that these parties reached a compromise. Officially, the Sơn-Lai Committee 
recognized no ―village government.‖ Yet they allowed for each Commune 
Administrative Committee to employ local ―assistants‖ responsible for the everyday 
work of corresponding between village and commune. 
According to the regional Committee‘s assessments, these early attempts at 
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creating an ―administrative apparatus‖ (bộ máy hành chính) or ―local government‖ 
(chính quyên) all failed because they did not conform with centrally issued decrees. 
Yet, what may have appeared a failure, I argue, was the result of negotiations between 
multiple groups as to the appropriate scale and shape of a territorializing, 
hierarchically-organized form of rule. These negotiations called into question 
underlying assumptions and powerful norms guiding the construction of spatially-
delineated administrative units. For peoples accustomed to, or chafing under, historic 
Thái patterns of bản-muang settlement and domination, the remaking of territorial 
units offered opportunity to question spatial administration and allocation of office. 
For the Dao and Hmong above, the normative construction of territorial units as 
spatially uniform and contiguous made little sense and, worse, risked diluting their 
representative power. They posed a solution that linked villages together according to 
social commonality and shared settlement altitude.
76
 
These debates and negotiations regarding the administration of ―vast‖ space 
raised another question. With such a ―sparse‖ population, who was qualified to staff 
and steer newly created government offices? Regional leaders interpreted incomplete 
implementation of Decree 254 to mean, ―representatives at districts and communes are 
all short of capacities; among them are commune representatives who cannot read 
quốc ngữ,‖ or Romanized Vietnamese. The language of capacities (năng lực) 
indicated a general assessment of skills that could be learned. To this end, the Viet 
Minh Front had already organized literacy teams (Bình dân học vụ) to teach peasants 
Vietnamese, the language of revolutionary solidarity and emerging bureaucracy. By 
contrast, Lò Văn Mười‘s report reserved particular evaluations for ―Mountain People‖ 
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who were, supposedly, ―culturally insufficient‖ and ―hygienically backwards.‖77 This 
second evaluation, presumably of Hmong and Dao peoples among others, recalls a 
culturalist language of civility and savagery specific to Thái ideas of muang-based, 
wet rice settlement and its opposite, a realm of swiddeners in a wild untamed forest.
78
  
His remarks speak to a pattern. Regional DRV leaders, Thái and Kinh alike, 
decided that the local population for reasons of education or culture, respectively, was 
either not yet qualified or fully unqualified to lead itself. Reflecting on local 
―command‖ capacity in 1948, Xa Văn Minh in January 1949 approved of province 
leaders yet rated commune leadership ―lacking‖ and requested the assistance of more 
Việt Minh cadres.79 In mid-1949, Lò Văn Mười repeated the disparaging appraisal of 
commune leadership and expanded his predecessor‘s request in more culturally 
specific language: he asked for one cadre from ―downstream‖ (dưới Xuôi) to sit on 
each province and district committee.
80
  
Cadres (cán bộ) led everyday forms of state formation in revolutionary and 
early independent Vietnam. Technically, cadres were trained individuals directly 
employed by the Party or state in an official capacity.
81
 Yet all cadres were not the 
same. Just as local cadres (cán bộ địa phương) were deprecated in terms of their 
capacities and/or culture, ―downstream cadres‖ were exalted in terms of their 
knowledge, skills, and ―high degree of culture.‖ As noted above, two seats on the Son-
Lai Committee were occupied by, and reserved for, ―ethnic Kinh.‖ The mid-1949 
report rated the ―capabilities‖ of these ―downstream people‖ (Trần Quyết and Nguyễn 
Ba Toản) as ―relatively higher‖ than those of the ―Mountain people‖ (Sa Văn Minh, 
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Lò Văn San, and Lò Văn Mười)—all rated ―so-so.‖82 Whether referred to as ―Kinh‖ or 
―downstream‖ cadres, they enjoyed prestige among regional and central officials not 
only for their learned administrative skills but also for allegedly intrinsic superior 
cultural attributes.  
The discussion of cadres indicates a real or potential convergence between 
Thái and Kinh ideas of civility and savagery. When Lò Văn Mười requested 
―downstream cadres,‖ he specified three tasks: first, to ―scrub all representatives of 
Mountain people [so they] know how to work‖; second, ―to lead official business and 
specialized agencies‖; third, ―to learn how to improve peoples‘ livelihoods.‖83 The 
Sơn Lai Committee reserved a privileged role for Kinh cadres to staff the rising state 
structure, to instruct locals in statecraft, and to ―improve the hygiene‖ among peoples 
whom Thái elites and Kinh alike conceived as akin to dirty hillbillies.      
Kinh cadres remained in short supply, however, because itinerant 
―downstream‖ cadres were reluctant to make the journey ―upstream.‖ This was an old 
problem, not unique to anti-colonial organizing. From at least the Nguyễn dynasty 
through French rule, Kinh officials considered the mountains to be a punishment post 
and an ―unhealthy‖ place, owing in part to prevalent malaria.84 In the late 1940s, 
reasons cited for not going to the mountains ranged from a reluctance to separate from 
families, to difficulties adjusting to the weather, to problems maintaining one‘s health. 
Indeed, of the Kinh cadres who did make the journey, many either quit or promptly 
fell ill with fevers (most likely malarial).
85
 Kinh cadres, in other words, feared and fled 
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from the very same conditions they were supposed to improve. 
In sum, the discourse of ―vast area, sparse people‖ reveals emerging 
relationships between Thái and Kinh leaders positioning themselves as leaders of 
region and center, respectively. The discourse also works to obscure the Black River 
region‘s manifold social differences as well as differential power and knowledge at 
multiple scales. The rapid construction of administrative structures both reproduced 
and initiated enduring problems of rule. Just as new districts and communes spread 
along Sơn La‘s southern tier among Thái muang-based populations and recognized 
their hereditary leadership, the highlands above and between them remained spaces 
apart.
86
 Strategies to organize this region according to models developed elsewhere in 
―Vietnam‖ could only partially and temporarily overcome the models‘ poor fit with 
local settlement patterns and traditions of rule. Meanwhile, local partisans challenged 
leaders to modify and adapt a program developed elsewhere, according to norms 
suited to a lowland, Kinh/Viet spatial and social context. Emerging from these 
different perspectives was a debate regarding issues of spatial regulation, personnel 
recruitment, and culture-bound logics. Alternately convergent and divergent 
conceptions of spatialized and ethnicized rule foreshadowed a much longer, and 
ongoing, process of negotiating relations of domination on a re-emergent frontier.  
 
The revolutionary exchange, or salt and power 
Peasant hunger and its alleviation were closely linked to Việt Minh organizing 
and to the institutionalization and legitimation of DRV power. During the Great 
Famine of 1945, mass starvation led to the death of an estimated 1-2 million people in 
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the Red River Delta and in adjoining provinces of Thanh Hoá and Nghệ An. ―No 
disaster of this magnitude,‖ writes historian David Marr, ―had afflicted Vietnamese 
society in living memory.‖87 In contrast to the ignorance and ineptitude of French 
administrators and occupying Japanese forces, the Việt Minh Front emerged as the 
only organization willing to alleviate famine conditions or even able to understand its 
political implications.
88
  
On 2 September 1945, in his Declaration of Independence of the DRV, Hồ Chí 
Minh cited the famine as evidence of how ―our people‖ had suffered under the 
―double yoke‖ of French colonialism and Japanese fascism. Turning paternalist 
colonial rhetoric on its head, the famine, he observed wryly, demonstrated France‘s 
incapacity to ―‘protect‘ us.‖89 For DRV leaders assisted in the field by Việt Minh 
organizers and emergent agencies, ensuring adequate supplies of food and preventing 
hunger became an unstable linchpin on which hung a shared claim to popular 
legitimacy.  
The Black River region‘s politicized economy presents a fascinating example 
of these complex processes at work. As discussed below, providing food was never an 
exercise in one-way charity: rather, revolutionary agents and agitators engaged 
peasants in a complex process of reciprocal exchange. When Việt Minh organizations 
and emerging DRV institutions provided scarce materials, their agents worked both 
symbolically to legitimize their power and organizationally to institutionalize evolving 
relationships. By accepting these goods, peasants entered into a relationship in which 
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their loyalty and support were expected in return. Over time, the evolving DRV state 
and its military also called on its junior exchange partners, or emerging subjects, for 
more than just recognizing their power as legitimate: they claimed, in addition, 
peasant resources, particularly their labor and food. Although reciprocal, the relations 
made and unmade through this exchange were uneven, contingent, and, often, highly 
contested.  
In late 1940s northwest Tonkin, warfare between competing state-making 
projects led to a deteriorating economy. The Sơn Lai Committee‘s first archived report 
from July 1948 provides a snapshot of difficult conditions and a footloose population. 
In areas controlled by the Thái Federation, farmwork had come to a ―standstill‖ 
because of labor shortages: men were forced to work off-farm to supply the military, 
work as corvée, or serve as soldiers; the ―enemy‖ killed water buffalo, wasting meat 
and draft labor. Imported goods like salt, knives, tobacco, and medicine were available 
only from ―westerners‖ and at grossly inflated prices, rendering staples unaffordable 
luxuries. Above all, salt was so scarce that ―people say they have not seen a single 
scoop for three or four months.‖ In short, the people in ―enemy occupied areas‖ were 
―hungry and miserable.‖ In ―free areas,‖ where the Sơn Lai Committee claimed 
control, conditions were only marginally better: only about one-third the population 
had enough corn and rice to feed themselves, yet even these fortunate few still 
supplemented their diet with forest tubers.
90
 Nonetheless, these conditions appealed to 
people ―fed up‖ with heavy Federation labor requirements, prompting some to cross 
over into Sơn-Lai zones where people were ―happier and more comfortable.‖ In the 
midst of these contests and combat, some chose not to choose sides: people 
―everywhere‖ either hid out in forest hollows and lived hand to mouth; or they left 
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house and livestock behind to start all over again in Laos.
91
  
This report, like any archival document produced by and for state, must be read 
critically. Descriptions of conditions in either ―enemy occupied territory‖ or ―free 
zones,‖ as these value-laden terms indicate, may be self-serving. Although the alleged 
labor conditions, food shortages, and high prices do appear consistent with Thái 
Federation policies and their outcomes, the Federation alone was not responsible for 
creating difficulties among the broader population.
92
 Rather, food shortages and high 
commodity prices stemmed, in part, from ongoing guerilla actions intended to 
―sabotage the economy,‖ or disrupt trade, obstruct transport, and torch ―enemy‖ 
granaries.
93
 Both sides resorted to force which must have disrupted the agricultural 
calendar, displaced farmers from their fields, reduced crop production, and contributed 
to wide-spread hunger.  
Given shared responsibility for conditions of scarcity, what accounted for 
socially-recognized differences—however marginal—between two zones claimed by 
armed opponents? Notwithstanding those peasants who fled to Laos or went into 
hiding, why did people move from Federation to Sơn Lai territory and not the other 
way around? Why, in spite of ongoing labor and food shortages, did peasants go on to 
provide labor and provisions willingly to agencies of the Sơn Lai Committee and allied 
military forces?   
The same report from mid-1948 that notes preferable conditions in emerging 
DRV territory, and their social recognition as such, hints also at an explanation—salt 
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and its political-economic value. The report states this observation clearly: in 
comparison with areas controlled by the ―enemy,‖  
 
People in free zones are relatively happier and more comfortable: 
especially since [we] have been able to provide salt, the people already 
feel that their lives are guaranteed, that the government cares for them 
with all its heart.
94
  
 
Of all the material goods DRV-allied agents and institutions brought into disputed 
territory, salt was the most important. With no local sources available, salt was 
desperately scarce. In addition to everyday nutritional requirements and condiment 
ingredient, peasants used salt to preserve meat and make medicine. For cadres and 
revolutionary agitators, among the range of goods they could pack upstream, salt‘s 
high value to volume ratio made it the most easily transportable commodity.  
The delivery of salt facilitated organizing predicated on a dialectical process of 
recognizing power‘s (il)legitimacy. Note how ―government‖ above is presented as 
though a singular paternal figure, one that ―cares‖ for its people in a manner akin to a 
parent rearing his or her own children.
95
 The report makes a claim to state 
legitimacy—one undoubtedly repeated in public meetings—based on its role as a 
caretaker affectively attached to a population and committed to caring for it materially. 
The population, in turn, rewards a parentalized state with something akin to filial 
attachment. In contrast, the ―enemy‖ appears neglectful, either unable or unwilling to 
perform its normative duties: this logic delegitimized French colonialism as a form of 
―exploitation‖ (bóc lột).96 As President Ho declared in 1945, a state‘s intent and 
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organizational ability to ―protect‖ (bảo hộ) its population indicated its legitimacy. By 
making salt differentially available to the Black River population, cadres provided 
concrete means and ends to differentiate one regime from another. In so doing, the 
DRV meant to demonstrate its own legitimacy as an ascendant state and, dialectically, 
to criticize the illegitimacy of its rival form.  
Salt indicates how early revolutionary cadres working in contested territory 
observed popular discontent and devised a means to capitalize on it. Through close 
observation of local labor and trade relations, cadres identified what goods were in 
shortest supply and, in turn, what they could deliver to solicit and confirm popular 
support. Xa Văn Minh reported in autumn 1948 that, in terms of ―our economic 
activities,‖ the revolutionary government was ―unable to do anything else…aside from 
bringing salt, rice, and farmtools up to the people.‖ The word ―up‖ indicates the 
exchange‘s explicit directionality, i.e. from delta sites of production to mountain sites 
of consumption, and the implicit political forces driving it. In January 1949, a 
discussion of salt features in two sections under headings of ―Politics‖ (Chính trị): Xa 
Văn Minh observed, first, that the ―masses‖ were in short supply of salt, knives, and 
tobacco; and reported, second, that the Committee had delegated the Economic 
Service (Ty kinh tế) to distribute these same goods. By ―helping‖ the people obtain 
―things they need most,‖ the chairman observed an intended effect: ―the people feel 
the care and encouragement of the Government truly and clearly.‖97  
Just as cadres constructed an alternative system of exchange, they built also the 
institutions of an alternative local government. Beginning in late 1948, the movement 
of goods coincided with the building of mass organizations, such as women‘s and 
youth unions, and the construction of a local ―resistance and administrative 
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apparatus,‖ i.e. local government.98 The Economic Service figured in this institutional 
medley not only by distributing salt: it also provided markets for buying local produce 
such as ramie (gai or Boehmeria nivea) and cotton; selling foodstuffs and tools at 
subsidized prices; and, all the while, using a DRV currency (đồng) intended to replace 
the Indochinese piaster.
99
 Although opium figures in archived Sơn-Lai Committee 
reports only insofar as French and Federation forces confiscated production in 
―occupied‖ territory or purchased it clandestinely through intermediaries in ―free 
zones,‖ it would be surprising if the region‘s most valuable cash crop did not figure in 
the DRV‘s emerging exchange.100 At the very least, opium registered as a commodity 
subject to contest.  
Relations of exchange emerged in the spatial and temporal contexts of state-
making. The symbols and materials associated with just rule were closely intertwined. 
For peasants, to accept the symbols of DRV power portended material benefits. For 
cadres, distributing material goods legitimized the making of state institutions. It was a 
two-way exchange that rested on commitments from both parties. Furthermore, 
reciprocal relations generated bonds of debt and obligation, cycles of payment and 
repayment. At what point in time the DRV chose to exercise its reciprocal claim 
became, in and of itself, a form of power. 
What, at first, may have been an implicit exchange became, over time, more 
explicit and demanding: cadres initially expected loyalty from the local population 
and, later, demanded increasing shares of their labor and food. Initially, the local 
population‘s outpouring of material and labor support appeared spontaneous. 
Following guerilla attacks and the configuration of state structures in late 1948 and 
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early 1949, local people endowed institutions with more than just abstract legitimacy. 
In April 1949, the Committee reported: 
 
Because of their enthusiasm, the masses have sacrificed all their rice, 
corn, [and] cassava in order to supply the military and each office in 
such large quantities that, in many places, the masses must eat forest 
tubers; and, on days they cannot find [tubers], they must beg.
101
 
  
Just as they drew from their own food stores to feed soldiers and cadres, presented 
here as ―military‖ and ―office,‖ the ―masses‖ also departed from household and farm 
to participate directly in the labors of revolution. In spite of their ―desperate straits,‖ 
they remained ―enthusiastically willing to participate in resistance activities,‖ such as 
joining guerilla raids and working as porters to transport supplies and wounded 
combatants. They demonstrated solidarity with the anti-colonial, revolutionary project, 
recognized above in approving terms of  ―sacrifice‖ (hy sinh). Soldiers and cadres 
shared in the conditions of shortage and, like their local supporters, went begging.
102
  
That these exchanges unfolded in a context of warfare is significant: giving up 
one‘s own food and labor for a broader cause brought danger, and potential death, to 
all these participants. Exchanging socially necessary goods and labor both signified 
and contributed to forming a relationship between cadre and peasant as partisans 
bound to one another through common danger: the very act of sharing began to 
constitute a community. Notwithstanding statist attempts to cultivate and direct such 
popular support, I argue that these spontaneous demonstrations of solidarity—and 
willingness to die—point at once to an emerging and anticipated sense of belonging to 
a larger community.
103
 Of course, this emergent communal form was also subject to, 
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and of, a state-making project. What may have been a euphoric moment of recognition 
became, in short order, a relationship predicated on different terms, i.e. between 
―state‖ and ―society,‖ or ―government‖ and ―masses.‖  
 Officials and soldiers could not—and did not—live on legitimacy alone. 
Statemaking placed increasing demands on local resources: cadres and soldiers needed 
food to subsist and labor to resist. Although sharing scarce resources and enduring 
difficulty together indicated emergent forms of solidarity and community, these 
gestures were not enough to meet rising state consumption. After a (recorded) year of 
providing the local population with ―things they need most,‖ cadres and soldiers not 
only received, but also expected other things in return. What may have started as 
spontaneous sharing became increasingly the product of claim-making.  
In mid-1949, early reports of local labor usage sometimes blur descriptive 
supply and prescriptive demand. For example, notwithstanding their purported 
―enthusiasm,‖ the Committee stated that, ―the masses must go laboring...‖104 Did they 
volunteer? Or were they forced to work? The distinction was crucial because, as 
described above, the legitimacy of DRV claims on labor hinged on the explicit 
comparison with the supposedly ―exploitative‖ or illegitimate colonial variant. In 
practice, the two labor regimes were similar, drawing on (male) labor to support 
military activities. How did the rising state normalize claims on the rural population? 
Routinizing state claims on local food and labor meant addressing the 
unintended consequences these claims had already begun to manifest. First, local food 
supplies plummeted. With no hint of irony, a report chided peasants for ―too 
zealously‖ (sốt sắng quá) supplying officials and soldiers with food, depleting their 
already limited household stores. Evidently, many supporters had been operating on 
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the assumption that such outlays would end quickly. But ongoing conflict and the 
continuing demands of soldiers and cadres meant that, over months, the additional 
consumption stretched everyone thin. Second, agricultural production also fell. The 
use of mature male labor off-farm left only the elderly, women, and children on-farm, 
depressing overall agricultural production. State demands on local food and labor 
supplies meant that the local peasantry, once again, had to resort to increasingly scarce 
forest foods to survive.
105
 Claim-making worsened the very conditions the DRV 
purported to improve.  
The report from April 1949 indicates that the Sơn Lai Committee attempted a 
number of different strategies simultaneously to solve labor and food supply problems, 
not all of which worked as intended. These various state strategies—market 
mechanisms, coerced labor participation, increased rewards, limited local labor 
recruitment—unfolded in the same spatial and temporal context. These strategies 
worked not only to meet short-term demands for labor and food; they also assumed 
longer-term significance as a means of institutionalizing and legitimizing a rising 
state‘s claims on agrarian resources.  
To support the military‘s advances in 1948-49, revolutionary officials initially 
tried to hire ―laborers‖ (lao công) for transport and to purchase grains, meat, and 
vegetables for provisions. The Economic Service tried to entice ―manpower‖ (nhân 
công) by offering lucrative lump sums of 100 piasters, at wages of 5 piasters a day. 
Even this daily wage, however, at inflated rates of exchange, was insufficient to 
purchase daily subsistence rations of corn and rice. Moreover, farmers expressed 
concern about opportunity cost, that working off-farm was not worth foregoing ―care 
for home and hearth‖ (nuôi cơm hộ). Officials complained they ―could not hire people 
at all.‖ Similarly, the Economic Service also experimented with procuring food for 
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cadres by creating markets. They sold salt, tobacco, and rice at a subsidized ―special 
price‖ and used proceeds to purchase what perishable produce the out-of-towners 
needed. But their revenue stream amounted only to a trickle because farmers remained 
reluctant to part with the same food they and their families needed to subsist.
106
  
The failure of market-based approaches to generate sufficient labor and food 
resources led the Committee to draw on and exercise coercively their growing 
institutional power. Just as cadres could not live on legitimacy alone, they did not 
make institutions for their own sake. Recall that commune representatives were 
required to ―help the military and offices, hands together with locality, to mobilize and 
collect labor, to collect provisions.‖107 In these reports, the use of force appears 
ambiguous, couched in euphemism. Faced with peasants unwilling to sell their 
produce, the Economic Service endeavored to ―take‖ or ―collect‖ (lấy) provisions: 
they invoked ―the name of local government‖ (danh nghĩa chính quyền) to ―request‖ 
(nhờ)—or compel?—farmers to sell produce at prices set by the service. Yet, by mid-
1949, during the annual hunger season, rice, corn, and forest tubers became so scarce 
that market-based coercion resulted in perverse consequences: in order to meet their 
required grain ―contribution,‖ some peasants sold their water buffalo—parting with 
their productive capital—in order to purchase rice and corn from the Economic 
Service and, then, turned these grains over to military units and civil offices.
108
 
Likewise, the Committee used the ―power of paper‖ (sức giấy), or issued written 
orders, to ―request‖ commune officials to ―mobilize‖ (huy động) the ―masses‖ to work 
as laborers.
109
 Still faced with a short supply of labor in mid-1949, officials began to 
expand the pool of eligible laborers by ―mobilizing‖ women living along roadways to 
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work as porters.
110
 Indeed, all the worry that the regional committee expressed about 
the efficacy of commune committees was, in large part, due to the latter‘s 
responsibility for extracting labor and supplies from constituent populations. Officials 
could call on the power of ―state‖ to stake a claim on agrarian resources only if their 
subordinates were willing, or able, to heed the call.   
Even these exercises in proclaiming authority, and enacting it coercively, could 
not overcome the early DRV state‘s locally-conditioned institutional limits. For 
commune representatives to gather provisions and labor was difficult work, noted Lò 
Văn Mười, both because of widespread hunger and because of the region‘s ―vast area 
[and] sparse population.‖ To ―collect‖ labor, a given commune representative had to 
trudge from village to village, ―as though each step was climbing a mountain.‖111 Yet, 
by vacating his office, he was not available for everyday bureaucratic work. As such, 
the early DRV state lacked sufficient bureaucrats (empowered to represent themselves 
as state to society) to match either its own territorial ambitions or the population‘s 
spatial distribution. Institutional coercion could not squeeze sufficient labor and food 
from a population beset with conditions of scarcity—conditions the practice of claim-
making worsened. Perhaps in recognition of its own limits, the Sơn Lai Committee 
opted to increase the volume of exchange and to change its course of policy.  
The provision of locally scarce goods figured increasingly as compensation for 
people who participated in the military struggle. In late 1948, the Committee began 
using salt and tobacco as payment for farmers who built ―secret‖ granaries to store 
corn and cassava and planted improved varieties of cotton.
112
 Hiding grains from 
marauding opponents and increasing the yield of cash crops fed back into resource 
availability; salt completed the loop. Moreover, salt increasingly became a reward for 
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popular support of armed struggle. In mid-1949, on behalf of the Sơn Lai Committee, 
Lò Văn Mười requested that ―upper levels‖ of government provide 2 metric tons of 
salt every month ―in order to do political work.‖ In areas where ―struggle‖ emerges, he 
explained, the people ―give all their energy to follow us but are short of salt and have 
no money to buy it.‖ In other words, he wished to compensate peasants who supported 
allied combatants.  
―If Sơn La has any land and any people now,‖ declared the Committee 
representative in his report‘s closing line, ―one reason is because there is salt to 
conduct political work.‖113 In this contested region, the distribution of salt enabled the 
DRV state to configure itself territorially and to appeal popularly. Political work (công 
tác chính trị) meant the activity of legitimation. Salt stood for a larger pattern of 
exchange in which the rising DRV state appealed to popular legitimacy by 
remediating everyday shortages and rewarding popular support. Along the way, the 
DRV expanded its territorial claim, yet one contingent on its military‘s ability—and 
the Party‘s willingness—to secure it. 
Finally, the Sơn Lai Committee responded to ongoing labor shortages by 
changing policy to reduce local recruitment and import substitutes from neighboring 
regions. In early 1949, the Sơn Lai Committee first reported limiting the recruitment 
of local labor, ―in order to give the people time to increase [agricultural] 
production.‖114 A few months later, the Committee issued an order ―to limit the work 
of collecting local labor‖ but reported that the ―masses‖ remained over-worked and 
underfed.
115
 Although the order stopped short of ending local labor recruitment, it 
seemed a logical response to regional hunger and on-farm labor shortages. Increasing 
agricultural production, however, was not just a means of feeding the local population. 
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Just as salt rewarded peasants who secreted away grains and informed cadres of their 
whereabouts, the policy can also be read as a strategy to increase future resource 
availability for state consumption.  
Reducing demands on local labor raised other questions. Who, then, served as 
porters to the military? Who transported the massive amounts of salt from downstream 
into these mountain hinterlands? The Committee exercised an option of last resort: to 
rely on manpower from outside their bailiwick. ―Only by requiring [Sơn La‘s people] 
to work in the domain of Sơn La,‖ wrote Lò Văn Mười, ―do they obtain enough time 
to raise [agricultural] production.‖ Beginning on the Red River‘s shores, pedestrian 
porters ―mobilized‖ in Phú Thọ Province crossed the western Red River Delta bearing 
arms for the military and bringing ―downstream‖ salt and rice to ―help‖ Sơn La‘s 
residents. On the shores of the Black River, near its confluence with the Red, local 
residents picked up the ―heavy burden‖ and headed uphill to complete the transit.116  
 
The early revolutionary program and its limits  
The legacy and ongoing practice of colonial rule hindered and favored 
oppositional organizing. On the one hand, persistent problems associated with 
recruiting leaders points to the social conditions growing out of Đèo clan rule. Neither 
the colonial French nor the Đèo clan and its deputies had done much to provide 
popular access to basic social services such as health care or education. Malaria and 
water borne diseases were endemic and frequently went untreated.
117
 Wide-spread 
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hunger, displacement, and forced resettlement all increased vulnerability to disease. 
Illiteracy was very high among the population and only a small fraction could read and 
write in any language.
118
 In short, many local leaders could not read, and Kinh cadres 
unused to these conditions often fell ill. 
On the other hand, cadres capitalized on these wide-spread social problems by 
casting blame squarely on the colonial regime. Summarizing conditions in 1948, Xa 
Văn Minh‘s report provides textual clues as to what many Việt Minh organizers must 
have been speaking orally. In terms of education, he accused the French and the 
Federation of following a policy of ―dumbing down the people‖ (chính sách ngu dân) 
by neglecting education and opening ―only a few‖ schools. In terms of public health, 
he accused them of ―withholding medicine from the masses‖ and running so few 
hospitals that they ―only plucked from the people at large.‖ He accused them of 
deliberately creating conditions of debauchery: ―The enemy creates degenerate (hủ 
hại) customs such as: gambling, extra-marital affairs, drunken youth, opium.‖ He 
summarized a policy of deliberate neglect: the ―enemy does not pay attention to 
improving rural society‖ (cải cách nông thôn).119  
In a dialectical twist of such ostensible neglect, social improvement emerged 
as a means to legitimize institutions alternative, and militarily opposed, to colonial 
rule and the Thái Federation. Xa Văn Minh captured the revolutionary mood and 
assumed a programmatic posture: ―we attend exhaustively and particularly to the 
problems of culture and society,‖ and claimed that, ―the work of improving rural 
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society has been thoroughly implemented.‖120 He echoed a broader theme: to march 
towards progress along a path cleared by emerging state institutions and Việt Minh-led 
mass organizations. In this endeavor, these overlapping institutions and organizations 
invoked a power of representation, to re-present social conditions in ideologically-
loaded terms of comparison.  
As with material exchange, progress and legitimacy were closely intertwined. 
Wherever conditions permitted, and particularly in ―liberated‖ zones, cadres 
established social service programs and mass organizations coordinated by the Sơn 
Lai Committee. In contrast with ―enemy areas,‖ self-proclaimed ―free zones‖ became 
sites where the same ―degenerate‖ conditions listed above were (supposedly) absent 
and mass organizations distributed modern medicine and encouraged learning through 
wide-spread popular education.
121
 Education (giáo dực) and propaganda (tuyên 
truyền) went hand in hand as cadres taught locals to differentiate between a just 
―democratic‖ government and unjust French ―exploitation.‖ Revolutionary outreach 
preached a curriculum with pointed lessons about legitimate and illegitimate rule.  
As with much of ―Vietnam‖ during and after the anti-colonial war, a literacy 
campaign educated people in the Romanized Kinh/Viet language script known as quốc 
ngữ.122 In 1948, a delegation of 13 cadres staffed a Popular Education Service (Ty 
bình dân học vụ) to work with village heads in districts of Mộc Châu and Phù Yên.123 
By April 1949 they reported the following results: out of a population of 11,637 in 
Mộc Châu aged 8 and up, 1512 could read and write quốc ngữ; out of 467 people in 
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Phù Yên, 57 became literate.
124
 Yet even these modest results were recorded in areas 
where ―the movement‖ reached its highest popular appeal: much of Sơn La‘s 
population and all of Lai Châu‘s did not have access to literacy training. Indeed, by 
mid-1949, regional promoters of literacy campaigns acknowledged broader limits. 
Adult learners had difficulty learning how to ―pronounce‖ Vietnamese sounds and 
tones; and written materials did not feature local scripts. The proposed solution, to 
provide more written materials translated into local languages, seems to beg the 
problem of literacy in any language.
125
 For early learners, the construction of schools 
―had no results‖ because ―people don‘t want to go far from their home to study‖ and, 
for those living proximate to schools, ―the numbers are very small.‖126 One can 
imagine that educating children may have posed vague benefits while costs were clear: 
many parents had neither the means (to board students close to school) nor the interest 
(to lose a source of labor) to send children off-farm for extended periods.  
Notwithstanding these efforts to institutionalize formal education, the ongoing 
problem of local (il)literacy has three inter-related theoretical, historiographic, and 
methodological effects. Theoretically, if Vietnamese had already assumed what 
Benedict Anderson calls ―politico-cultural eminence‖ among urban and downstream 
residents, then it took hard work to spread Vietnamese in the Black River as both a 
bureaucratic language and a language in ―common‖ (phổ thông). Cadres worked self-
consciously to propagate Vietnamese and endow it with a dominant status in relation 
to other spoken and written languages.
127
 Over time, Vietnamese achieved normative 
status equated with national communicability and state correspondence, adding a 
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socio-linguistic dimension to emerging relations of political and cultural domination.  
Historiographically, lack of local proficiency in quốc ngữ means that much of 
this region‘s historical record—i.e., archived Vietnamese-language reports—must 
have been written by ―downstream cadres‖ for whom it was their first language.128 
Because they spoke, read, and wrote in Vietnamese, Kinh cadres were uniquely able 
and empowered to record affairs of state.
129
 In contrast, that so many people did not 
learn Vietnamese indicates the vibrancy of the region‘s many diverse spoken 
languages. Methodologically, as Shail Mayaram argues, oral traditions remain an 
under-utilized source for a critical study of state formation.
130
 Although studying this 
topic orally was and is beyond this project‘s scope, historical actors certainly did grasp 
the potential of non-written communication. Indeed, agents of the DRV state and Việt 
Minh educators engaged their audiences orally and publicly, either through local 
interpreters or by learning local languages. However limited their content may be, 
archived reports serve as textual traces of oral discussions.  
How did cadres establish relations with everyday people? How did the former 
educate in the latter a desire for education? In official parlance, how did cadres 
working either in ―free zones‖ or behind enemy lines ―generate a political influence 
among the masses‖? Early reports indicate that Việt Minh organizing efforts had to 
overcome two difficulties: a peasantry pre-occupied with their own subsistence and a 
rival political program. Local peasant residents initially expressed a ―desire‖ only to 
―make a living in peace.‖131 For them, evidently, ―liberation‖ (giải phóng) meant 
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pursuing a livelihood untroubled by warfare—an aspiration diverging from the cadres‘ 
expressed interest in armed struggle against colonialism and for social revolution. To 
further complicate matters, the ―enemy‖ Thái Federation was pursuing its own 
political agenda, one not altogether different: employing nationalist rhetoric, using 
―propaganda,‖ and, simultaneously, organizing ―puppet‖ militaries and officials.132 
Notwithstanding the condemnatory language, the Federation approach seems very 
similar to its rival: seek legitimacy while constructing institutions and developing 
capacity for force. So what did the Việt Minh do that the Federation did not? 
 In contrast to the Federation, the Việt Minh Front developed a sophisticated 
program that, by incorporating everyday local conditions into education and 
propaganda, did more explanatory work. Hunger and food shortages among peasants 
and cadres alike provided an immediate point of entry for agitation. An excerpt on 
―politics‖ from January 1949 suggests how cadres appealed to hungry people by 
linking the (bad) economy with (unjust) politics and provided them with a 
revolutionary solution.
133
 
 
We cope [with the Federation] through opening eyes to the wallet of 
Đèo Văn Long and Bạc Cầm Quý, peeling away the skin so the people 
know that when the Thái Federation comes, all their draft animals are 
lost; all rice, chickens, ducks are lost; they die of starvation, die on 
corvée, die in military service;  
 
For cadres and allied educators alike, observing and reporting was part and 
parcel of using these conditions to recruit popular support for the revolutionary 
cause. Peasants were taught to associate their suffering with the Federation 
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and, therefore, to find its form of rule unjust. Note the simple language 
accessible to an audience lacking formal education: wallet stands for wealth; 
―peeling the skin,‖ as one might do to a piece of fruit, means exposing a 
purported truth lying just underneath lived experience. Again, this is logic 
intended to reveal exploitation.  
Next, cadres attempted to cast pupil peasants within a broader 
community, one defined by militant opposition to alleged exploitation. The 
lesson continued: 
 
[the people‘s] death can be replaced with the death of the enemy; to 
explain the story with pamphlets and National Salvation newspapers 
(Cứu Quốc) in all areas of enemy control; to announce the news from 
our front; to praise the masses who support the struggles rising to the 
surface in Mường Mân, Hát Lót, Mường Sai, Mai Sơn; to teach the 
people to plant a [communal] garden, not one planted by or for each 
house;  
 
Should they heed the call, the peasants in the Black River region were not alone: they 
were cast as part of a broader community, one constituted through struggle and shared 
danger. Mass organizations coordinated by the Việt Minh Front gave organizational 
form, and provided politically loyal leadership, to this emergent community. To plant 
a garden for public use, rather than household subsistence, worked in a double 
register: metaphorically, to think communally and cultivate shared benefits; literally, 
to provide sustenance for visiting cadres and soldiers.  
Next, the lesson provided concrete steps to support the revolutionary cause: 
 
Assist cadres to go deep, to get to their target in all rear areas in order 
to organize and create secret base areas. Persuade puppet authorities 
and mobilize puppet soldiers. Organize the provision of salt, tobacco, 
knives, etc. in order to create a political influence among the masses.   
 
That cadres required assistance indicates how they needed local knowledge to navigate 
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unfamiliar terrain among people they did not know. ―Creating a political influence‖ 
was the result of a number of lessons, one capped by the distribution of scarce goods 
and the onset of exchange.  
As this extended excerpt demonstrates, the revolutionary message involved 
making several cognitive leaps. Cadres instructed local people to imagine beyond the 
confines of regionally specific rule and to associate themselves with a broader 
movement, i.e. ―our front‖ or ―National Salvation.‖ In short, cadres invited peasants to 
join a revolutionary community supposedly united in opposition to colonial rule. 
Membership in this community portended benefits, such as salt, as well as 
responsibilities, such as feeding cadres and guiding them. Who, or what, decided these 
terms of membership and exchange? Significantly, the above passage continues and 
ends on this message:  
 
Create immediately a local people‘s government in the areas where 
struggles explode in order to call upon the masses to unify in killing the 
French pirates.
134
  
 
In sum, convincing peasants to support the revolution required providing them, first, 
an explanation for their suffering and, second, an alternative to improve their lot. Once 
guerilla actions destabilized the Federation‘s local government and secured local 
support, cadres endeavored to build rival local institutions featuring themselves as key 
players. As such, the extended lesson in legitimation worked teleologically—and self-
consciously so—by containing in its beginning a desired end: a statist agenda ended 
with the creation of the idea and institutions of state itself.
135
 In addition to joining the 
work of legitimating and institutionalizing emerging state power, cadres also aimed to 
create a ―masses‖ on whose resources this power enabled them to use and direct. If 
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state formation is a form of analysis, then for DRV-affiliated political cadres in the 
Black River region it was also a self-conscious program. 
A self-assessment follows this explicitly political program and rates its 
efficacy. Among others, the program‘s ―strengths‖ (ưu điểm) included increasing 
popular support, distrust and hatred for the ―French pirates‖ and Federation leaders, 
luring Federation officials and soldiers to the revolutionary cause, and the creation of 
secret base areas. Meanwhile, the program‘s ―weaknesses‖ (khuyết điểm) included a 
mismatch between commune-based ―local government‖ and village-based settlement; 
insufficient funds for ―political work,‖ i.e. the purchase of salt; the overuse of local 
labor; and the heavy demands ―offices‖ placed on local rice supplies.136 Although 
referenced to work conducted in 1948, I have discussed how each of these so-called 
―pluses‖ and ―minuses‖ carried forward for the next year or so. What bears repeating 
is the reciprocality embedded in an evolving relationship conceived and enacted as 
political. How this relationship changed over time, and how the claims organized by 
and for ―state‖ grew with respect to an emerging ―society,‖ is the subject of 
subsequent chapters. 
 
If the revolutionary program was eliciting popular support during this time, it 
was through a mixture of coercion and consent. In early 1949, Lò Văn Mười observed 
that, ―the army has arrived up here in large numbers‖ and, through their armed 
challenge, had made people ―gain confidence.‖ In apparent fulfillment of the program 
above, he described how committees and line agencies, cadres and mass organizations 
had quickly ―grasped the opportunity‖ by ―seizing‖ popular ―optimism‖ and 
harnessing it to the long-term resistance struggle. Along the way, these state agencies 
constituted themselves organizationally and oriented their activities both towards 
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supporting the military effort and attempting to remediate local shortages and boost 
agricultural production.
137
  
Whatever happened later, he seems to say, the armed challenge came first. 
Whether this sequence was always so is not clear. What is clear is that nascent state 
institutions relied fundamentally on the military‘s coercive power. Indeed, militarized 
coercion destabilized the Federation, demonstrated its vulnerability, and secured 
territory to establish DRV institutions. Although both local peasants and Thái elites 
featured as the intended audience, each played different roles in the coercive 
performance: the former served as porters and larders; the latter either as targets or 
potential DRV officials.  
Loyalties of the Thái elite, in particular, became the focus of sustained—and 
often violent—struggle. Thái hereditary nobility (phìa tạo) serving the Federation 
found themselves, their families, and their staff targeted by armed propaganda teams 
for assassination. Selective murder served as a revolutionary tool to enforce allegiance 
among lords of hotly disputed muang. In between Federation compradors and 
revolutionary loyalists, many Thái lords remained equivocal. Even Bạc Cầm Quý, the 
Thái Federation‘s Sơn La Province Chief (tỉnh trưởng), reportedly expressed 
ambivalence about which side to choose: ―I want to come out very badly, but am 
suspicious of the Việt Minh [who] have killed two of my younger siblings, suspicious 
of what might result.‖ Caught between two powerful claimants to Sơn La‘s population 
and territory, many lords agreed amongst themselves that, ―when the Việt-Minh come, 
just let them be, attend to them, and don‘t tell the Westerners anymore.‖ Cầm Bình, 
chief lord (châu muang) of Yên Châu, announced to his subordinates: ―Should you see 
the Việt Minh coming, don‘t say anything and give them food and drink secretly.‖138 
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Some lords played both sides of a moving fence, apparently supporting French 
soldiers by day and Việt Minh affiliates by night.  
Other officials changed sides more openly, yet for reasons perhaps departing 
from revolutionary fervor. Lù Văn Dương of Mường La wrote an order calling on ―all 
his colleagues‖ still loyal to the French to ―turn‖; his title, Vice Chairman (phó Chủ 
tịch), indicates that, by ―turning,‖ he retained his leadership position in the DRV‘s 
local government.
139
 Lò Văn Puôn, Lord of Mường Chanh, decided to change 
allegiance yet added a revealing request: in self-deprecating language, he called on Lò 
Văn Mười, ―to protect me so the Việt Minh will not murder me.‖140 Indeed, some 
elites joined the movement not because they bought the program. Rather, as these 
examples indicate, some pledged allegiance to preserve their status and position or, 
simply, to save their own skin. Inquiring why these elites joined the revolutionary 
opposition exposes one limit to consent: coercion divided the loyalties of Thái 
officials, sometimes even within one person, and forced them to make a difficult 
choice. Furthermore, any coercively achieved allegiance counted on the lords‘ 
traditional authority to command their muang domains and subject populations. 
Regardless of why they joined, the DRV welcomed elite Thái leaders because they 
often carried along Thái peasants loyal to their lord.  
The revolutionary program‘s stated emphasis on consent reached another limit 
among peoples who acted less according to its logic and more in line with their own 
form of reason. Seeking legitimacy based on a rejection of ―exploitation‖ and an 
embrace of ―freedom‖ rested on a foundation of rationality—convincing an audience 
to weigh the costs and benefits of unjust and just rule, respectively. Education and 
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propaganda used a logic of persuasion to ―peel away the skin‖ of perceived reality, 
thereby exposing the underlying injustice of the French colonial project and its local 
instantiation, i.e. the Thái Federation. The program presented an alternative, one that 
could be achieved only through struggle (đấu tranh). It was a struggle for nation, a 
form of community imagined to transcend social differences. Once the locals 
identified with this struggle, accepted its burdens, and unified as a nation along the 
way, then a new state would appear to represent their interests justly. True progress 
could then begin—or so the program went. Black River peoples did not always act in 
concert with this underlying logic.  
To take the idea of social difference seriously means accepting that the logic 
underlying this revolutionary program, i.e. its inherent rationality, was not the only 
reason motivating diverse groups of people—even if the outcome was the same. A 
story recorded in mid-1949 illustrates the depth of difference in a moment of 
encounter: 
 
At a French post in Mộc Ly one day, a lightning bolt struck the French 
flagpole, smashing it to pieces and leaving the flag hanging in tatters; 
one time a forest rooster came to the post to flirt with a domestic 
chicken and it was captured and eaten; another time a deer came to the 
French post and was also captured and eaten; the masses in the 
occupied area who were reactionary or still of superstitious mind read 
[these events] as inauspicious omens meaning the French would lose to 
the Việt Minh; and they looked for a way to cross over to our free zone. 
Result: as many as 20 people close to our position in Mộc joined us.141  
 
What are we to make of this story? Whether or not the story happened exactly as 
recorded is beside the point: the archived text presents these events alone as enough to 
convince a group of people to join the revolutionary cause. Some signifying events 
appear self-evident, such as the lightning bolt striking the French flag. Although other 
events, such as the appearance of a wild rooster and deer, remain incomprehensible to 
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the report‘s readers, their appearance was fully comprehensible—as ―inauspicious 
omens‖ (điềm gở)—to the historical actors. The story is a conversion narrative, yet the 
reason underlying why this group converted was—and still is—unclear for everyone 
except them. Even though the report claimed achievement of its stated goal (support 
for ―us‖), the actors‘ collective decision appears unrelated to the program‘s professed 
rationality. Why exactly these twenty people took a profound, even deadly, risk 
remains unknown. 
I argue that such inexplicability carries important historiographic implications 
for a study of state formation in an area of profound and multiple forms of social 
difference. The report‘s author, Lò Văn Mười, did not understand the motivations of 
these people; one can assume that the report‘s contemporaneous readers shared his 
lack of understanding. To call the historical actors ―reactionary‖ (phản động) cannot 
begin to explain why these 20 people suddenly abandoned their homes and crossed 
military lines at great risk. To call them ―of superstitious mind‖ (có óc dị đoạn) was, 
most likely, a pejorative dismissal of uninformed thinking. Yet the dismissal itself 
betrays the limits of a self-revealing logic oriented always towards building some 
―Vietnamese‖ community with its own form of rule. It also points to unwillingness 
among collaborating Thái officials and Kinh cadres to think beyond a shared culture-
bound logic, to grasp a series of events as the historical actors themselves did. 
Presumably, the actors were highland peoples, the same ―Mountain people‖ the 
emerging political coalition treated as inextricably Other, yet whose participation they 
nonetheless sought. 
Scholars reading this archived report would do well to differentiate their 
interpretation of these and other curious events from the ideological work the cadres 
and officials were doing. In a critical treatment of Prasenjit Duara‘s Rescuing History 
from the Nation, Keith Taylor offers some useful advice. He welcomes Duara‘s 
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invitation to disentangle history from History, to find an alternative to a teleological 
interpretation of events oriented always towards a national end. ―If we can clear our 
minds of ‗Vietnameseness‘ as the object of our knowledge,‖ Taylor writes, the scholar 
can better embrace the motivations of historical actors in their specific historical and 
spatial contexts. Indeed, it appears that the historical actors above had no shared sense 
of what ―Vietnam‖ was or what the officials meant it to be. Yet Taylor differs with 
Duara over the very interpretability of textual ―traces‖ from the past. He argues that 
the ―historical specificities of the archive‖ may speak ambiguously, potentially 
disconnected and discontinuous with any linearized notion of ―common history.‖142 
 Like Taylor, I wish to preserve the ambiguity presented in archival traces. Yet 
even if the event remains ambiguous on its own terms, I would argue that its location 
in a Vietnamese state archive tells us something about a region in the making. This 
trace reveals the limits of a culture-bound logic informing officials and cadres 
operating in an unfamiliar context among diverse peoples. Within the lumpen and 
undifferentiated ―masses,‖ in other words, were spatially and historically specific 
social cleavages that belied the ostensible unity of this category. The Black River 
region presented cadres with profound and multiple forms of social difference, 
historically produced and reproduced in terms of class, status, gender, and ethno-
linguistic identities. The official report recorded this encounter in a Vietnamese 
language and idiom its official audience understood: calling on a discourse of self and 
Other, recognizing the former as reasonable and the latter as un-reasonable. Archived 
in state documents, traces of the region‘s historically multiple and fluid social relations 
reappear in a transformed guise: reframed as culturally uninformed thinking on the 
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fringes of state power and national community; simplified as regional differences 
between frontier and center. Just as the state‘s national archives muffle or mute 
alternative understandings and trajectories, they amplify an ascribed interpretation, 
working to cast a frontier of ―vast land sparse people.‖ 
Persuasion did not always win over the population on the merits of education, 
reason, and rationality. However the 20 people arrived at their decision, their sudden 
pledge of support was historically specific and potentially temporary. Like the Thái 
elites who changed allegiances to preserve their own positions, the many and diverse 
peoples populating the Black River region sometimes acted according to their own 
interests, for their own reasons. Even among ostensible revolutionary converts, social 
difference did not melt away: joining a movement might mean sublimating differences 
and not transcending them fully and forever. The story foreshadows a series of events 
that would trouble post-colonial state formation, belying the ascribed unity of a 
national frontier, revealing its own brand of ―internal‖ disunity.143 If the ―Resistance 
War against the French‖ in northwest Tonkin did ultimately produce a local coalition 
to topple the colonial regime, then any unity achieved was, at best, temporary. In this 
region specifically and in Vietnam more generally, particularly during the 1950s, 
disunity and unity were always in dialectical tension.  
 
If archival traces sometimes speak ambiguously, then archival gaps present 
another difficulty for historical analysis. The last archived report from the Sơn-Lai 
Committee is dated 20 November 1950. From that date, the National Archives of 
Vietnam contain no locally produced documentation until December 1952. As such, a 
two year-long gap in DRV-produced primary source documentation separates inquiry 
into what may be thought of as early and later efforts to form a state in a time of war. 
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What happened during this period? How do Vietnamese-language secondary 
sources handle what appears to be a gap? How do the primary sources end? 
The emergence of the People‘s Republic of China in October 1949 altered the 
calculus of political and strategic planning in Indochina generally and in Tonkin‘s 
northwest corner in particular. Leaders of Indochina‘s armed resistance against French 
colonialism gained a new source of material, ideological, and strategic support located 
north of the Sino-Indochinese border.
144
 Emboldened by the advantageous conditions, 
the ICP convened its Third National Conference in January and February 1950 where 
Trường Chinh and Võ Nguyên Giáp announced an escalation in military strategy from 
―equilibrium‖ (cầm cự) to ―general counteroffensive‖ (tổng phản công) against the 
French.
145
 These stages were modeled on Mao Tse-Tung‘s strategy for waging 
revolutionary war, prescribing movement from guerilla, to mobile, and, finally, fixed-
position warfare.
146
 As noted above, these ICP leaders also used the occasion to 
declare Indochina to be a single battlefield. If the borderlines between Indochina‘s 
―nations‖ (i.e., Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos) remained blurred, then the border between 
―Vietnam‖ and China took on new significance—not as a barrier but as a conduit for 
revolutionary support. That the People‘s Liberation Army of China had advanced to 
―the Sino-Việt border,‖ declared Giáp, ―means that our international isolation has 
come to an end.‖147  
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The Sino-Viet border‘s potential for facilitating this broad strategic shift bore 
particular significance for the northern regions of Tonkin. On 6 January 1950, only 
two weeks before the Conference convened, Trường Chinh had issued an order to 
―open a Northwest Campaign and to prepare the battlefield in the Northeast.‖148 He 
contrasted the ―Northwest,‖ as the ―enemy‘s weakest area,‖ with the ―Northeast,‖ i.e., 
the Việt Bắc, as ―our important battlefield.‖ Accordingly, his plan ordered the 
Northwest to prepare ―quickly and just enough‖ while the Northeast was ordered to 
prepare for the ―long term.‖ For the Northwest—and not for the Northeast—the Party 
Secretary specified that ―after each victory, our army will withdraw.‖ These 
distinctions point to a significant element of Maoist military doctrine. As John T. 
McAlister writes, the general counteroffensive adhered to the principle of mobile 
warfare, ―a war without fronts‖ or a ―war without territorial objectives.‖149 Yet, as the 
next two years made clear, the principle did not apply equally to DRV objectives in 
north Tonkin‘s western and eastern marches. 
The Party‘s de-emphasis on territorial control in northwest Tonkin was 
accompanied by an emphasis on expanding control of territory in its northeast, or Việt 
Bắc. Recall that the latter had been site of a revolutionary base area since World War 
II. In September-October 1950, the People‘s Army launched a series of attacks in Cao 
Bằng and Lạng Sơn: not only did the offensive expand the Việt Bắc base area, it also 
opened a secure overland route to facilitate exchange with the People‘s Republic of 
China. Meanwhile, whether in response to the early ―Northwest Campaign‖ or on their 
own initiative, French-allied forces counterattacked in the Black River region to great 
effect, recovering contested territory and allocating it to the Thái Federation. The 
formation in 1949 of a 3
rd
 Thái Battalion under Thái Federation command, writes Jean 
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Jerusalemy, ―permitted the recovery and pacification of all Black Thái country in Sơn 
La‖ such that, in 1950, he observed, ―the entire country between the Red and Mã 
Rivers, between the Chinese and Lao frontiers was calm and pacified.‖ Beginning in 
June 1951, in a new strategy tested during the battle of Hoà Bình in winter 1951-52, 
continues the colonial official, French forces built a series of blockhouses ―to reinforce 
all the Thái country‘s front, facing East.‖150 With additional French troops and a 
fortified barrier to protect approaches from overland routes to and from the Việt Bắc, 
the Thái Federation emerged militarily stronger and in control of a broader territory.   
Was the early Northwest Campaign a decoy, a feint to lure French-allied forces 
away from their ―important battlefield‖? A document from 1951 chastises cadres still 
active in northwest Tonkin for ―bragging irresponsibly‖ about ―bridging over‖ (bắc 
cầu) the Black River during the general counteroffensive which, not surprisingly, 
made the people ―suspicious‖ towards cadres and the government they represented.151 
Notably, the criticism is oriented towards tone and does not deny content. To what 
degree Trường Chinh and other Party leaders intended the loss of one territory in order 
to gain another, thereby allowing for reprisals against local supporters in the former, is 
unclear. If so, then they revealed a marginal preference: in spite of Hồ Chí Minh‘s 
1945 Declaration, military objectives trumped the population‘s wellbeing; perhaps the 
alterity of the frontier population made them expendable. What is clear is that the 
Party‘s choice to de-emphasize territorial control in the Black River region bore grave 
consequences for both emerging institutions and their early supporters. If Mao himself 
warned that, ―the fighting in this stage will be ruthless and the country will face 
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devastation,‖ then the fighting‘s resulting devastation was spatially specific.152  
Party documents and official histories portray northwest Tonkin and its people 
during the period from late 1950 to 1952 in a particular light. Military and Party 
histories recount how French-led ―raids‖ or ―military sweeps‖ (càn quét) destroyed 
―revolutionary infrastructure‖ around Điện Biên Phủ, all along Route 41 throughout 
Sơn La‘s southern tier, and north into Yên Bái; cadres either went into hiding or took 
flight.
153
 The counterattack crushed nascent forms of DRV administration in all the 
same places where they had only recently appeared. A republished Party document 
from 1952 announcing the re-opening of guerilla bases states that, particularly in 
1951, ―cruel repression‖ led to the ―destruction of our guerilla bases, the dispersion of 
our armed forces.‖154 ―All armed forces,‖ explains one Party history, ―were not yet 
strong enough to support the masses‘ political resistance.‖155 Although the military 
neither secured territory for state or Party control nor did they protect the ―masses,‖ 
this outcome was partly a matter of choice, of allocating limited force capability 
eastward to the Việt Bắc. Together, these official accounts focus disproportionately, if 
not tellingly, on political-military institutions to the exclusion of those local people 
who supported them. Moreover, told as background and prelude to the Party‘s project 
to re-open guerilla bases in June 1952 and the People‘s Army‘s commencement of a 
(second) Northwest Campaign later in October, these official narratives claim a 
questionable retroactive continuity with earlier efforts.  
What happened to the people these soldiers and cadres left behind? Rather than 
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try and fill in this silence, let us instead end with the two archival documents from 
1950 which, admittedly, only hint at what was to come. In mid-1950, the Sơn Lai 
Committee reported on ―military conditions‖ in familiar and unfamiliar language: 
 
Land is spacious, people few, forest and mountains many: the few 
plains areas have many bandits and are in enemy hands; nonetheless, 
over the past few years, laborers have continually devoted 
transportation and provisions to the military, guerillas, and offices; [we] 
don’t know why they can love [us] any longer.156  
 
Here, the discourse of ―vast land, sparse people‖ appears to excuse the military‘s 
territorial losses and to mitigate its effects by minimizing the population affected. That 
―plains areas‖ were in ―enemy hands‖ highlights the obverse of what Jerusalemy 
observed with regards to the Thái Federation: the DRV and its military lost control of 
the few muang areas in which they had established institutions in 1948-49. The report 
continues: ―throughout‖ one such muang, in Yên Châu, the people ―struggled‖ to 
evade French ―capture‖ and relocation in ―concentrated settlements,‖ or the gros 
villages, wanting only to ―return to their villages and make a living.‖157 Local people 
who had earlier pledged support now suffered terribly from hunger, displacement, and 
collective punishment. Nonetheless, local peasants still worked to transport military 
supplies, join guerilla teams, and provide soldiers and officials with food.  
The above passage is curious for its expression of affect by local people for 
military and state agents. That peasants continued to perform brute labor and share in 
their food evidently surprised the Committee, leading the report‘s author to wonder 
why they continued to ―love us.‖ The expression demonstrates, perhaps, an affective 
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depth imbuing relationships formed over the previous years; and, certainly, the 
difficulty that this relationship entailed for those who labored on its behalf. Yet 
subsequent passages seem to imply that, for regional leaders at least, the affection was 
not returned. The report reserves praise for cadres who demonstrated ―extraordinary 
perseverance‖ in face of many hardships, including a ―poor and culturally backwards 
people.‖158 If the peoples of these mountains expressed some kind of affection for 
cadres and soldiers, the official report betrays a powerful expression of disaffection for 
them as mountain people.   
The last archived report of the Sơn Lai Committee dates to November 1950 
and provides a rejoinder to the above description. Under the heading of ―political 
conditions in areas of armed struggle,‖ the report describes the consequences of 
people‘s participation in revolutionary activities:  
 
Initially, the masses were healthy and eager to struggle; after some time, they 
were cruelly repressed; they fled to the forest where they became hungry and 
cold, fell ill, and [found themselves in] miserable straits (eating tubers instead 
of rice year round means the tubers are also gone); there are places where two 
to three dozen people die of starvation…159   
 
If cadres and soldiers escaped Thái Federation and French counterattacks by fleeing to 
safer base areas in Laos or the Việt Bắc, then the people they left behind suffered 
collectively for all their previous activities together.
160
 Starvation and broader 
displacement only added to a list of severe consequences the local population already 
faced for allying themselves with Việt Minh and DRV.161 The chilling depiction above 
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concludes this early period of organizing. Subsequent to this report, the Sơn-Lai 
Committee ceased reporting, indicating the degree to which the counterattack 
damaged the DRV‘s local infrastructure. The next archived report from this area 
comes two years later. This absence speaks loudly of discontinuity in the revolutionary 
program. It speaks as well to the silence of death.  
147 
CHAPTER 4 
MAKING THE NORTHWEST 
      
Reorganization, centralization, expansion 
From World War II through the early 1950s, the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam consistently recognized Thái leaders and configured their muang-based 
authority within institutions of state.
1
 Just as DRV state formation did not always 
proceed as planned, attempts to configure state rule locally through Thái elites after 
1952 demonstrates ongoing unsteadiness, tensions, and unintended consequences. If 
resuming the local configuration of state rule points to continuity in this period of state 
making, then the increased use of centrally-organized force beginning in late 1952 
signaled one of several major changes. This chapter analyzes the spatial patterns and 
social consequences of making DRV rule in the Black River region and, in so doing, 
remaking it a national frontier. 
Like the late 1940s, in 1952-54 Thái muang leaders not only figured 
prominently in their communities, they once again became recognized officials in 
institutions of DRV local and regional government. ―Village politics contribute to 
making the state,‖ argues political anthropologist Anna Tsing, just as ―the categories 
of state rule are actualized in local politics.‖ What she studies in the village, I attend to 
in multiple sites and scales of locally configured power. In line with her approach to 
Indonesian Borneo and the production of marginality there, my study of the Black 
River region also attends to what she calls ―the subjective experience of being both 
outside and subject to state power.‖2 Indeed, during the early 1950s Northwest 
Vietnam in general and Điện Biên Phủ in particular became—and still remain—
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centrally marginal places: figuring centrally in nationalist narratives and located on the 
margins of state power. How the Black River region came to be known and ruled as 
Northwest Vietnam was a contingent and contested outcome predicated on refiguring 
local Thái rule differently. Looking at Zimbabwe, Donald Moore analyzes similarly 
knotty ―entanglements‖ produced and reproduced by the articulation between 
historically overlapping configurations of spatialized rule.
3
 Like contemporary 
Zimbabwe, ruling relations in contemporary Vietnam emerge from a colonial past, 
build on legacies of violence, and incorporate historically divergent local rulers.  
If this pattern of entangling and configuring state rule through village and 
muang politics continued, a significant shift appeared in late 1952. What changed was 
the rising state‘s ability to secure its territorial claim to a self-proclaimed ―Northwest 
Zone‖ through the coercive actions of the People‘s Army. As such, it is important to 
examine this latter iteration of configuring state rule locally within the additional 
framework of militarized state expansionism. 
During this period in the first Indochina War, from late 1952 through mid-
1954, Vietnam was on the march in and around the Black River region. It was a 
violently expansionist political project: by defeating rival claimants, the People‘s 
Army of Vietnam secured DRV claims to territory and subject populations. Organized 
coercion then enabled cadres to legitimate co-configured bureaucratic and traditional 
forms of power as state authority. ―Liberation‖ (giải phóng), for example, figured 
prominently in their legitimation work as abstract idea, political project, and spatial 
category. Liberation became concrete—and highly contested—in the Black River 
region after its conquest by the People‘s Army in late 1952. Indeed, to take the idea of 
militarized expansion seriously means thinking not only about territory but also about 
relations in space and their multiple transformations. Producing national state space 
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(territory) was a project akin to, and inseparable from, producing state power itself: 
both were and remain mutually-constituted, contested, contingent, and transformative 
social processes. 
4
 I conceive of such spatial relations in terms of inclusion and 
exclusion in order to identify the mutable boundaries regulating who ruled where, on 
what terms, and to what effect. Theoretically, this entails a study of boundary-making. 
I analyze relations of domination through the mutual construction of complex 
entities—such as, emergent ―Government‖ (Chính phủ), ―Party‖ (Đảng), 
―ethnicity/nation‖ (dân tộc/quốc gia), ―people‖ (nhân dân)—used to legitimize and 
enact forms of rule and ruling.
5
  
By incorporating a historically simultaneous making of nation into an analysis 
of state-making, I build on Charles Tilly‘s work on relations between war-making and 
state-making.
6
 Just as war‘s conduct required new institutions to coordinate and 
organize coercion, so too did leaders of these evolving institutions enact and centralize 
their power through coercive practices. I also build on Peter Vandergeest and Nancy 
Peluso‘s work on the territorialization of state power.7 Constructing state and feeding 
an army required scarce resources just as staking claims on labor and foodstocks 
transformed their production and circulation. To these insights into institutional 
reorganization and resource appropriation, I also attend to processes of legitimation. 
The idea of Vietnam was at once the grammar of legitimation (and Vietnamese its 
language), a militarized political project, and a socially produced communal effect. 
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The Vietnamese nation emerged through processes of configuring DRV 
territory as isomorphic with national communal space. What Philip Corrigan and 
Derek Sayer observe for the emergence of modern England applies as well to the 
emergence of Vietnam after World War II: the making of nation was coeval with and 
inextricably linked to the making of state.
8
 Militarized territorial expansion linked 
these two processes together, contributing to an unsteady, highly contested 
configuration of state and nation, or the country of ―Vietnam.‖9 Making war in the 
Black River region during 1952-54, I argue, figured centrally in these co-
configurations and entanglements. Not only did the People‘s Army claim its territory 
for a rising DRV state, but questions of how to include or exclude its peoples as 
―Vietnamese‖ prompted a broader remaking and regulation of unstable social 
boundaries in relation to territory.   
In addition to a strengthened and reorganized coercive apparatus, what also 
changed during this phase of state formation was the power and intent of a 
reorganizing DRV state center. Mao Zedong‘s victory in China transformed a broader 
political and strategic calculus with regards to the significance ―great powers‖ 
accorded to the Indochina War. In January 1950, the People‘s Republic of China and 
the Soviet Union formally recognized the DRV.
10
 A month later, following France‘s 
abandonment of the Indochinese Federation in favor of a ―nationalist‖ (i.e., non-
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communist) solution, the United States recognized the Associated State of Vietnam 
led by former emperor Bảo Đại. Diplomatic recognitions enabled France and the DRV 
to gain access to respective sources of material, logistical, and strategic support.
11
 
Thus did a colonial conflict become enmeshed in a broader Cold War—and one of its 
hottest spots.  
In response to these international developments, what the rising Party 
Secretary Trường Chinh called ―major changes in the world following World War II,‖ 
the Indochinese Communist Party convened its Second Congress in February 1951.
12
 
Held in the Việt Bắc base area in Tuyên Quang Province, the occasion marked its first 
overt activity since the ICP‘s (supposed) dissolution in November, 1945.13 With 200 
Party members in attendance from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, the delegates 
passed a resolution to dissolve and divide into 3 national branches. The Vietnam 
Workers‘ Party (Đảng  ao Động Việt Nam) was officially inaugurated.14  
The public inauguration of the Vietnam Workers‘ Party (VWP) signified the 
ascendance of a radical socialist Party within emerging relations of state rule. The 
Party officially stepped from the shadows to embrace a Marxist-Leninist program and 
to proclaim leadership, and prompt reorganization, of three other institutional forms: 
DRV state institutions, mass organizations, and the military.
15
 The DRV state 
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followed the principle of democratic centralism in which territorialized administrative 
officials were, in theory, electorally accountable to the ―people‖ while, in practice, 
executed orders issued by superior members of an enmeshed Party-state 
bureaucracy.
16
 Democratic centralism (nguyên tắc dân chủ tập trung) ensured that the 
seat of ultimate power rested firmly at the center, one dominated by the VWP.
17
 In 
March 1951, the Việt Minh Front officially joined with the Vietnam National League; 
the new Liên-Việt Front, led by the Party, formed the umbrella for revolutionary mass 
organizations.
18
 The People‘s Army of Vietnam remained the principle force waging 
―people‘s war,‖ or armed struggle on behalf and alongside the popular political 
struggle. As Minister of Defense and Politburo member Võ Nguyên Giáp stated in 
1951: ―The military force is the Party‘s essential arm for any political aim.‖19  
My interest in legitimation and forms of authority as well as issues of class, 
status, and party lead me to engage the ideas of Max Weber. I described above the 
emergence and co-configuration of entangled forms of traditional and bureaucratic 
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authority in village and muang leadership.
20
 Likewise, Weber‘s ideas on class, status, 
and party help to understand the DRV‘s emergent institutional forms, their relations to 
emerging class power, as well as the underlying, and still evolving, Party agenda.
21
 If 
the VWP ―reside[d] in a sphere of power‖ and used emerging state institutions to 
―dominate a community,‖ then in early 1950s ―Vietnam‖ they and a target community 
were locked in a contested process of constituting one another mutually. In other 
words, where and whom these institutions dominated were multiply uncertain, 
destabilizing what Weber calls an ―existing dominion.‖ Indeed, for some time, the 
People‘s Army fought the French Expeditionary forces for control of an ambiguous 
dominion—Indochina or Vietnam?22 If Vietnam, then who was Vietnamese? The 
Party did propose a Weberian ―ideal cause‖ to transform class and status hierarchies. 
Yet the VWP agenda was neither stable nor evenly applied. Rather, the Party cause 
evolved during highly mutable historical conditions and by incorporating or 
suppressing multiple social movements. As a result, its application was contingent on 
the unsteady making, unmaking, and remaking of community and territory.  
Trường Chinh‘s February 1951 address as rising Party Secretary provides the 
most complete vision of social revolution and the VWP‘s vanguard role.23 His speech 
described the Vietnamese revolution as ―a people‘s national democratic revolution‖: 
national for its fight against imperialism, democratic for its aim to abolish feudalism, 
popular for its representation of worker and peasant interests.
24
 ―National liberation,‖ 
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or the defeat of colonial rule, was the primary and over-riding goal.
25
 Even if peasants 
(nông dân) constituted 90% of the population and contributed much to the movement, 
he argued that their adherence to an individualistic mode of production and possession 
of private property meant that they must follow working class leadership. Though 
small in number (4% of pop.), the proletariat (công nhân) owned nothing but their 
labor and, hence, the Party considered them—and counted themselves as—most 
committed to revolutionary struggle against the combined weight of foreign 
imperialism and domestic feudalism. Together, the workers and peasants formed ―the 
people‖ (nhân dân), a political alliance he based on ascribed class affinity. Trường 
Chinh predicted that the revolution, in its progression from a bourgeois democratic 
revolution to a socialist one, would move through three phases: to achieve national 
liberation, eliminate feudal exploitation, and prepare for socialism.
26
  
Although the enmeshed Party-state would pursue each step in turn over the 
next decade, smashing feudalism and, not coincidentally, the agrarian reform agenda 
followed a different path in the Black River region than elsewhere in a real or potential 
DRV. Incorporating a local elite and reconfiguring their roles within state posed a 
contradiction with regards to the revolutionary agenda. I emphasize how ostensible 
―feudal‖ local rule persisted in an emerging ―Northwest Vietnam‖ during, and in spite 
of, the making of an ostensibly egalitarian ―Vietnam.‖ This spatial un-evenness has 
historiographic and analytical ramifications. I argue that the idea of rupture 
supposedly achieved in 1954 between an ―exploitative‖ colonial past and a ―liberated‖ 
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national present/future conceals the remaking of social relations that belie any neat 
divide between bondage and freedom or, for that matter, between state and society. 
While Trường Chinh‘s address articulated a revolutionary program guided by 
Marxist-Leninist principles and led by a national Party, a crucial question emerges in 
his speech which, tellingly, remains partially obscured. Where did central elites 
proposing a nation-state locate its boundaries? The question arises in two different 
discussions, regarding both the role of Vietnam in Indochina and the place of 
communal forms in and of Vietnam. First, how did and how would the DRV treat 
territorial borders established during the colonial era? Where were the spatial limits of 
the national liberation movement? Trường Chinh referred to this spatial issue as the 
―Lao question.‖ Second, how did and how would the DRV categorize subjects over 
which it claimed dominion? On what terms did national community include or exclude 
forms of social difference? Trường Chinh referred to this social issue as the ―ethnic 
question.‖ Whether the question of boundaries is conceived of as external (as spatial 
border) or internal (as social boundary) to the rising nation-state, either conception 
bears directly on the Black River region‘s territory and population.27  
This chapter is organized according to a roughly historical sequence with 
analytical properties. I track how an emergent state staked a claim to territory and 
enforced its power through space, place, and land. Led by the VWP, the DRV renewed 
a claim on the Black River region by imagining its singular authority there. As such, 
Trường Chinh and other central elites imported the region into abstract state space. 
Once the military enforced this monopoly claim (but did not yet fully secure it), cadres 
and soldiers set about integrating and consolidating place into a (seemingly) uniform 
                                                 
27
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grid of institutions, policies, and practices.
28
 Peluso and Vandergeest contend that the 
―lack of fit‖ between abstract space and lived place contributes to the ―instability of 
the territorial strategies of the modern state.‖29 Extending the discussion of space and 
place to include contests over land further illustrates this instability and points to re-
emerging relations of local rule.  
Rather than think about land as a thing, to be divided and allocated, I consider 
the evolving social relations of land in relation to rising state power. Not reforming 
relations of land in the Black River region, I argue, reproduced local relations of 
production and rule which, in turn, structured the boundaries and capacities of state 
power. Thinking of the social production of space, place, and land relationally and 
together illustrates the contested remaking of a frontier. As the chapter moves from 
policy discussions at a reorganizing center to constructing a local bureaucracy and 
debating land reform on an emerging frontier—from centrally-imagined space, to 
administered place, to land lived and worked—I aim to highlight how the process of 
making and remaking relations of rule became more entangled and more contested. 
 
The Lao Question and the Northwest in Vietnam  
―The level of Vietnam,‖ stated Trường Chinh in the opening line of his address 
to the 2
nd
 ICP Congress in February 1951, ―is different from the level of Cambodia 
and Laos regarding each aspect of economy, politics, society, and culture.‖ By 
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―different level,‖ the Party Secretary implied that the Vietnamese revolution had 
achieved a more advanced stage of development, a fact he demonstrated by pointing to 
the founding of the Democratic Republic. Although they shared ―a common enemy in 
French colonialism and American interventionism,‖ recognition of ―different 
revolutionary conditions‖ in Laos and Cambodia, he explained, prompted the ICP to 
divide into three separate parties.
30
  
Reorganizing nationally, however, should not indicate that leaders and 
members of the Vietnam Workers‘ Party intended to reduce what they now considered 
―international‖ (quốc tế) involvement in Indochina. Rather, the ICP‘s division was 
accompanied by the VWP‘s renewed political and military commitment to support 
companion national revolutionary movements in Laos and Cambodia. ―Vietnamese 
communists,‖ stated Trường Chinh, ―do not take lightly their own international duties, 
especially the duty to help the Cambodian and Laotian revolutions.‖31 The number of 
cadres sent from Vietnam to strengthen party organizations in Cambodia and Laos 
grew steadily over the course of the war.
32
 As discussed in the previous chapter, cross-
border organizing and military action were already everyday activities on the 
Lao/Viet-Tonkin border. Indeed, the second Congress reaffirmed the ICP‘s decision of 
a year earlier and echoed what General Giáp considered a crucial strategy: to conduct 
war on ―the single battlefield‖ of Indochina.33    
The People‘s Army of Vietnam‘s subsequent military campaigns revealed the 
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significance of Laos to Vietnam‘s national revolution and, in turn, renewed emphasis 
on securing Tonkin‘s northwest. In April 1953, the People‘s Army launched a 
campaign on this ―Indochinese battlefield‖ against French forces stationed in Laos, a 
maneuver cloaked in official secrecy. ―Our attitude regarding the Lao question,‖ 
Trường Chinh instructed Party members, ―is to do much and speak little, or just do it 
but don‘t speak.‖34  
What was the value of this terrain? Officially, the People‘s Army set out to 
―assist‖ their revolutionary allies, the Pathet Lao, by clearing a base area for the latter 
to operate safely and stage guerilla warfare. Yet other reasons suggest themselves. 
Expanding the battlefield dispersed French forces over a wide area and lessened their 
strength in Vietnam.
35
 The timing in mid-spring overlapped with the opium harvest in 
the Laotian highlands.
36
 Moreover, the ―liberated‖ Lao territory—an enormous swath 
stretching from Phongsaly, through Sam Neua, to Xiang Khoang—bordered territory 
in what was, by then, claimed as Vietnam‘s own ―Northwest.‖37 ―By helping the 
people of an allied country,‖ wrote Hồ Chí Minh in a letter to People‘s Army 
combatants in Laos, ―it means we are helping ourselves.‖38 In other words, even if the 
three countries of Indochina formed a single anti-colonial battlefield, Vietnam‘s 
national revolution was for and of itself.
39
 Just as Indochina became a site of 
―international‖ struggle, the ―Northwest‖ became a strategic site to internalize a 
frontier zone and to regulate the borders of national territory. 
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Through the processes of institutional reorganization and preparation for 
renewed military struggle, the ―Northwest‖ of Vietnam emerged as an imagined 
administrative unit with concrete Party leadership. In a letter to the Minister of 
Defense dated September 1951, Chief of Staff Major General Hoàng Văn Thái 
forwarded the Việt Bắc Interzone Administrative Committee‘s recommendation that 
the Sơn-Lai Interprovince be re-split into its constituent provinces.40 Reflecting on the 
―general counteroffensive‖ launched in 1950, the Chief of Staff explained that the 
interprovincial military command had failed by paying ―too much attention to Sơn 
La.‖ Further, he argued that there were too few cadres to work in the region‘s ―too 
vast area‖ and among ―backwards people.‖ The over-emphasis on Sơn La meant that, 
―by early 1950, it was as though Lai Châu knew nothing about the Government of 
Vietnam… and our influence [among the people] amounts to nothing.‖ Any uprisings 
that occurred in Lai Châu were ―scattered,‖ such as the ―struggle‖ of 3,000 Hmong 
people there in late 1950.
41
 Finally, the population‘s alleged ―persistent 
backwardness‖ (trình độ còn lạc hậu) combined with divisive French policies to the 
extent that ―…the Black Thái people (Sơn La) and the White Thái people (Lai Châu) 
still have prejudice and hate one another.‖ In order to gain the trust of Lai Châu‘s 
people, he proposed creating independent provincial commands, administrative 
committees, and ―Organization‖ (i.e., Party) cells.42  
On 12 January 1952, Vice Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng supported the 
Chief of Staff‘s analysis by issuing a decision to divide the provinces ―like before‖ 
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and keeping them within the Việt Bắc Interzone‘s bailiwick.43 Like so many other 
changes in territorial administration, however, Phạm Văn Đồng‘s decision to split Sơn 
La and Lai Châu only foreshadowed more administrative shuffling. If many of these 
changes followed colonial boundaries, they also declared the Party-state‘s intent to 
wrest control of the region‘s territory and population from the Thái Federation.  
On 17 July 1952, the Secretary‘s Council of the Party‘s Central Committee 
established the Northwest Zone (Khu Tây Bắc).44 The Zone included four provinces 
that, heretofore, had been included in the Việt Bắc Interzone: Sơn La, Lai Châu, Yên 
Bái, and Lào Cai.
45
 The boundaries of this politico-military unit mirrored the French 
Expeditionary Force‘s own ZANO (Zone Autonome Nord-Ouest) which was designed 
to defend the Thái Federation and guard a gateway to Laos.
46
 Like the French unit, the 
cartographic referent was Hanoi, to which this zone lay west by northwest. Yet it was 
France, and not Vietnam, which still had de facto control over both the Northwest and 
the urban center to which it referred. 
The Party‘s Central Committee provided two rationales, one familiar and 
another new, to justify the creation of the ―Northwest‖ territorial unit. The July 1952 
order cited the Zone‘s ―vast area, sparse people,‖ the former of which ―is temporarily 
occupied‖ and the latter ―are almost all ethnic minorities.‖47 By echoing a language of 
―vast area, sparse people‖ (đất rộng, người thưa), central decision-makers accepted a 
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particular frontier discourse. They also reproduced its underlying ideology: 
(mis)representing the contested and fractious Black River region as unified and 
attached to yet somehow different from Vietnam. That the order ascribed to its people 
an ―ethnic minority‖ status signifies a rising national consciousness: similar enough to 
be counted as Vietnamese but somehow different enough to be called ―ethnic.‖  
If reproducing a frontier discourse signaled national domination, then the 
order‘s accompanying instructions foreshadowed sustained military occupation. 
Departing from the January 1950 decision to de-emphasize territorial control there, the 
July 1952 order cited the Northwest Zone as an ―important and strategic region now 
and later.‖ Consequently, the socio-spatial dimension of organizing activities shifted. 
No longer would cadres only ―hang around‖ (quanh quẩn) montane Hmong and Dao 
communities like they had, presumably, during the period (1950-1952) following the 
abandonment of muang-based Administrative Committees in Sơn La. Now, in 
addition, cadres would ―develop‖—or, rather, re-establish—relationships among 
―dense and populous‖ settlements, i.e. among the valley-dwelling Thái.48 This shift 
signaled a renewed commitment to confront and displace the Thái Federation on the 
same populated terrain where the latter concentrated military activities and recruited 
elite support.  
The Secretary‘s Committee, referring to itself as the ―Center,‖ empowered the 
Northwest Zonal Party Committee (Khu ủy Tây Bắc) to lead the newly constituted 
region‘s ―military, people, government, and Party cells.‖ Composed of between 5-7 
members chosen by the ―Center,‖ the order specified that the Northwest Party 
Committee ―prioritize military duties above all else‖ and to ―prepare the battlefield.‖49 
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Prioritizing the war effort fit a broader pattern of institutional reorganization and 
ongoing preparation for another Northwest Campaign.
50
 The long-term goal of this 
Zonal Committee was to provide leadership for ―resistance and nation-state building‖ 
(kháng chiến, kiến quốc). The Zonal Committee was granted responsibility for 
activities encompassing military, police, economy, finance, and education as well as 
construction and oversight of Administrative and Resistance Committees. In 
particular, Party elites ordered the regional committee to (re)build political 
infrastructure, prepare people to serve the front, train cadres, and implement the 
Party‘s evolving ―Ethnic Policy.‖51   
The VWP‘s central leaders created the Northwest Party Committee shortly 
before the former issued a version of ―Ethnic Policy,‖ empowering the new institution 
to regulate the Black River population with respect to an emergent social category of 
―ethnicity.‖ The policy delineated ethnicity‘s relationship to class struggle and 
specified how the institution should form new alliances on behalf of ―the people.‖52 
Recall that ―the people‖ (nhân dân) was conceived as a political alliance between 
proletarians and peasants. Because, ostensibly, there were no proletarians among 
―ethnic minorities,‖ the Party‘s August 1952 Ethnic Policy advocated the broad 
mobilization of so-called minorities as peasants, regardless of their position among the 
―base‖ or ―upper class.‖53 Except for clearly traitorous members of the upper class 
whose transgressions merited public trials, the policy advocated ―winning [them] 
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over‖ (tranh thủ) towards a ―great unity‖ because the elite ―still has much influence 
among mountain people.‖54  
If the Ethnic Policy emphasized nation over class and status and prioritized 
unity over social transformation, then an accompanying order specified how the 
Northwest Committee should implement this policy in practical terms. Regarding the 
composition of local government at province, district, and commune units, 
Administrative Committees ―need‖ (cần) to include three forms of representation: 
from each ―ethnicity‖; from select grades of peasants (landless, poor, middle); and 
from ―hereditary nobles‖ (thổ ty) and Thái elites (phìa, châu).55 Perhaps because the 
emphasis on building alliances with ―feudal strata‖ (tầng lớp phong kiến) must have 
appeared jarring to cadres committed to social revolution, the orders were very clear: 
incorporate elites ―who have status among the people‖ because ―we also need them to 
participate in local government, though we must help and re-educate (cải tạo) them.‖56 
Even allegedly ―feudal exploitation,‖ such as the cuông practice of bonded labor, was 
exempt from any immediate ―limitation.‖ The order required cadres interested in 
―eradicating‖ any such practices to submit requests to the Northwest Party Committee 
which, in turn, forwarded its findings to the ―Center‖ which, finally, would issue a 
ruling.
57
 For the time being, the policies advocated leaving class-inflected, social 
hierarchies intact in order for cadres to take advantage of elite power and social 
influence, to harness them to the national cart of anti-colonial struggle.  
In sum, the Central Party empowered the Northwest Committee, in Weberian 
terms, to ―dominate a community,‖ raising two important issues that I explore.58 First, 
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how the people of the new Northwest fit territorially and socially into ―a‖ 
community—i.e., a singular nation—was still a matter of debate. Second, domination 
always involves legitimation. Indeed, the Northwest Committee‘s mission self-
consciously incorporated legitimation work: the ―Center‖ ordered the immediate 
establishment of two sub-committees concerned with propaganda, one on ideological 
training among cadres (Tuyên huấn) and another on popular agitation (Dân vận).59 As 
Kim Ninh notes, ―propaganda‖ (tuyên truyền) in Vietnamese at this time did not carry 
the negative associations (i.e., brainwashing) that it does in contemporary English. 
Rather, she defines the way propaganda operated in Vietnam as an ―effort to broadcast 
the revolutionary message to the public through persuasion.‖60 I think of propaganda 
as a state effort to educate the public about itself and the Party‘s leading role. In short, 
propaganda was legitimation work.  
The creation of two propaganda sub-committees indicates the degree to which 
Central Party leaders accorded priority to gaining support through political persuasion. 
What conditions did they encounter? On the one hand, historic and ongoing Thái 
Federation rule forestalled DRV legitimation work in Lai Châu. Recall Hoàng Văn 
Thái‘s observation of Lai Châu where in late 1950 the ―people knew nothing about the 
Government of Vietnam.‖ Another document from this time further indicates the 
difficulties of legitimation work.
61
 Lai Châu‘s people said the ―French‖ were ―good‖ 
for selling salt and cloth and providing shelter. On the other hand, Sơn La posed 
different problems. Organizing activities there had attracted popular support for two 
years until DRV military priorities shifted in late 1950, leaving participants 
undefended against French counterattacks and Thái Federation reprisals. By 1952, 
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former supporters in Sơn La must have felt abandoned, even embittered. Indeed, 
people there felt a broad sense of ―anxiety‖ and expressed ―pessimism‖ regarding 
projected outcomes. They countered with disarmingly simple questions, such as: 
―Why do enemies re-occupy areas of certain victory?‖ When residents learned about 
the Black River‘s strategic role in the counteroffensive of 1950-51, they reacted with 
―suspicion‖ towards loose-lipped cadres and, moreover, towards ―the government.‖62  
In response to these legitimation problems, a revised curriculum instructed 
cadres to meet local residents at their level, to nudge them along towards a higher 
level of ―revolutionary awareness‖ (giác ngộ). Officials fretted that many people in the 
Black River region did not know how to answer—to their liking—questions such as, 
―Who is the enemy? Who is the friend?‖63 Previously, cadres had allegedly failed to 
instill popular hatred (căm thù) for the French by exposing their ―wicked plot.‖ As a 
result, the region‘s multiple ―ethnicities‖ only hated and blamed one another for 
―enemy intimidation,‖ such as burning homes, crop destruction, and raping women. 
As such, the content of propaganda shifted towards making a national ―friend,‖ one 
dialectically recognized in opposition to a foreign ―enemy.‖ By teaching people to 
distinguish between friend and foe, cadres led a lesson on their own regime‘s 
legitimacy.
64
 Questions about loyalty during a time of violent conflict, however, are 
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never easy to answer because, in order to survive, one‘s response depends on who 
does the asking. Furthermore, the binary categories themselves did not allow for the 
kinds of gray areas—colonial bureaucrats recognized as DRV officials, for example—
that years of warfare produced among the many peoples of the Black River.    
At this point in mid-1952 the Party decision to create the Northwest Zone 
expressed a dual ambition: both to annex the Thái Federation‘s territory and to re-
orient relations of rule there towards the Party‘s own rising center. The spatial 
boundaries of the newly created Northwest Zone followed those inherited from, and 
still defended by, the Thái Federation. During the Northwest Military Campaign from 
October to December 1952, the Zone‘s Party Committee was the Party‘s—and 
DRV‘s—superior regional institution. Only on 28 January 1953 did President Hồ Chí 
Minh sign a decree formally establishing the Northwest Zone and creating an 
accompanying Resistance and Administrative Committee.
65
 Evidently, the VWP was 
seizing the initiative in military and civilian affairs by constructing institutions, 
regulating political relations, and staking claims to territory—all of which were 
recognized later by, and as, the Democratic Republic. The Party would do the same on 
the crucial question of how ethnicity, and how peoples of the imagined Northwest, 
figured in a Vietnamese nation. 
 
 
 
 
Spaces and peoples within: autonomy and the making of national ethnic minorities  
In what terms did DRV and Party leaders imagine the people or peoples of an 
emergent Vietnam? How did territory figure into their powerful construction of, and 
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boundary demarcation between, ideas of ethnicity and nation?  
To understand how political leaders reconstructed multiple peoples to fit, 
uncomfortably, into a singular people, it is useful to revisit the idea of ―dân tộc.‖66 The 
concept troubled historical actors and its translation is revealingly problematic for 
contemporary analysts. The compound word combines two Sino-Vietnamese roots: 
―dân‖ or social person, member of a community; and ―tộc‖ or type, ethnos, relation. 
How does one render this combination in English—as nation, ethnicity, or 
nationality?
67
 The term appears to be a Vietnamese exemplar of what Katharine 
Verdery calls, ―kinds of people,‖ or a typology according to which nationalist 
ideologies ―sort the world‖ in relation to an ―actual or potential political entity.‖ She 
argues that nation and ethnicity, although similar as signifiers of community and 
bearers of a shared kinship idiom, display distinct genealogies. Historically, the 
construct ―nation‖ is defined at the level of state while ―ethnicity‖ occupies a lower 
order, something akin to, ―‘tribes,‘‖ she writes, ―to be managed during the process of 
state consolidation.‖68 Verdery identifies both a hierarchy of communal categories by 
which state-makers organize social difference as well as a relational and historical 
method for disentangling the highly mutable meanings of dân tộc. 
Likewise, Kim Ninh and Patricia Pelley argue for understanding dân tộc within 
its historical context and trace its permutations. Drawing on written texts from the 
1920s through 1940s, Kim Ninh traces the development of ―dân tộc‖ from 
                                                 
66
 I echo and amend a question posed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ―Ce quit fait qu‘un peuple est un 
peuple?‖ Or, what makes a people a people? ―On the Social Contract,‖ in The Basic Political Writings, 
trans., Donald Cress (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987), 147. For a treatment of this question, 
its philosophical genealogy, and its political (and highly ideological) valence, cf., Etienne Balibar, 
―What makes a people a people? Rousseau and Kant,‖ in Masses, Classes, and the Public Sphere, ed. 
Mike Hill and Warren Montag (New York: Verso, 2000), 105-131. 
67
 Phan Văn Các, Từ Điển Hán Việt (TP Hồ Chí Minh: NXB TP Hồ Chí Minh, 2003), 116-117, 417. 
Viện Ngôn ngữ học, Từ điển Việt-Anh (TP Hồ Chí Minh: NXB TP Hồ Chí Minh, 2001), 195. 
68
 Katherine Verdery, ―Ethnicity, nationalism, and state-making,‖ in Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers, 
eds., The Anthropology of Ethnicity: Beyond ‘Ethnic Groups and Boundaries’ (Amsterdam: Het 
Spinhuis, 1994), 50.  
 168 
―peoplehood‖ to ―nation‖ or ―nationhood.‖ These ideas all assumed meaning through 
debates on what it meant to be Vietnamese, touching on qualities in realms of culture 
and language but, she notes, not territory. By the mid-1940s, the concept gained 
heightened prominence, she writes, to connote what it meant to be ―uniquely 
Vietnamese‖ yet still distinguished ―ethnic and cultural-linguistic factors‖ from 
―territorial concerns.‖69 Carrying this work into the 1950s and beyond, Pelley traces 
dân tộc‘s genealogy to vacillations between two sources often held apart, one 
revolutionary socialist and another colonial.
70
 Its earlier meaning as ―nation‖ she links 
to pre-World War II debates in the Soviet Union over how to achieve a viable mode of 
revolutionary solidarity, whether through class-based alliances and/or through 
communal affinities based on language, territory, and economic life.
71
 Its later, and 
now dominant, meaning as ―ethnicity‖ she links to a post-colonial ethnological project 
that aimed to organize and categorize forms of social difference within territory 
defined nationally. Notwithstanding an alleged break with French domination, national 
ideas of social difference and territorial boundaries reproduced colonial distinctions. 
Pelley observes that ongoing ―linguistic confusion, ‖ or oscillations between dân tộc‘s 
meaning as ―ethnicity‖ or ―nation,‖ can be read to indicate real, unresolved tensions in 
reimagining Vietnam and Vietnamese-ness given ―other‖ peoples who may not—and 
often do not—think of themselves in these terms. Yet a palpable shift did occur.72  
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I posit that the first Indochina War presented state-makers with conditions, 
perceived as an imperative, to regulate the unstable boundaries between dân tộc and 
kindred communal forms. Shortly after Hồ Chí Minh declared the Democratic 
Republic in Ba Đình Square, warfare with returning French forces in 1946 forced him 
and an emerging group of lowland political elites to retreat north to the mountains. 
Removed from the familiarity of delta regions and relations, they endeavored to 
establish the Việt Bắc base area among different ―kinds of people.‖ The elite‘s 
collective displacement and resettlement in a new cultural and agro-ecological 
landscape forced reconsideration of what it meant to be Vietnamese or, for that matter, 
what it meant to be Kinh, Tày, Thái, Hmong, etc. Old forms of group identity and 
community—based on patterns of settlement, language, agricultural practice, cultural 
habit—mixed again in new historical conditions. It was a moment of renewed 
encounter between groups that, historically, had differentiated and formed in relation 
to one another.
73
 Yet as the war entered a new phase, beginning in 1950, these 
encounters increasingly took place on unequal terms. Supplied with military aid from 
the recently-victorious People‘s Republic of China, the People‘s Army became a 
modern fighting force capable of claiming territory on behalf of the DRV. Adding 
territory to ideas of community forced another revision of dân tộc. State-makers and 
Party leaders embraced a self-proclaimed role to manage ambiguities stemming from 
questions of who belonged where in the communal space they called ―Vietnam‖—and 
on what terms.   
Trường Chinh used his platform at the ICP‘s 2nd Congress to address precisely 
these questions.
74
 The VWP became one of three parties leading revolutionary 
movements in the ―nations‖ or ―states‖ (quốc gia) or ―countries‖ (nước) of Vietnam, 
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Laos, and Cambodia. He also declared that the primary task of Vietnam‘s revolution 
was ―national liberation‖ (giải phóng dân tộc). Note the terminology. Like dân tộc, 
quốc gia is Sino-Vietnamese compound word with multiple meanings: as nation or 
country (nước), the two are very similar, indicating a community based on shared 
culture and origin; as state (nhà nước), the two depart ways because quốc gia indicates 
a form of modern rule predicated on sovereign territory.
75
 How to distinguish them?  
In a crucial passage called, ―resolving the ethnicity question‖ (giải quyết vấn 
đề dân tộc), the Party Secretary ventured a solution: ―Vietnam includes many dân 
tộc.‖ The seemingly simple statement bore profound implications: at a stroke, he 
ranked communal forms and assigned them relations to state power. If Vietnam, 
defined as quốc gia, delineated the outer bounds of nationhood, then dân tộc, defined 
as ethnicity, demarcated a subsidiary form of difference within.
76
 In this light, quốc 
gia‘s slippage between nation and state simultaneously concealed and revealed an 
emergent form of rule, i.e. the so-called ―nation-state.‖ Trường Chinh simultaneously 
pointed to an emergent ―nation‖ as the highest form of communal identity and enlisted 
it as a legitimating device for an evolving ―state.‖ On behalf of rising DRV institutions 
and reforming Workers‘ Party, Trường Chinh performed a powerful act: drawing, 
delineating, and ranking communal boundary lines; and assigning them a relation to 
state power.  
Ranking communal forms allowed the Secretary to reposition ethnicity as an 
emergent category within the regulatory purview of a state legitimized nationally. 
Once he had relegated ethnicity (dân tộc) to a secondary status below nation (quốc 
gia), the Secretary continued:  
 
Next to the Viet people, there are some ethnic minorities. There are 
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some races (chủng tộc), of small population scattered about 
haphazardly like compatriots [who are] Mèo, Trại, Lô Lô, etc. There 
are some ethnicities living in relatively dense clusters to make a few 
large regions, like compatriots [who are] Mường living in the Northern 
Salient‘s southwest and in the Central Salient‘s north; the Thái living in 
the Northern Salient‘s northwest; the Ra Đê living in the Central 
Salient‘s northwest plateau. 
 
Note here two features regarding Trường Chinh‘s construction of powerful social 
categories and the boundaries he erected between them. First, who were the ―Viet 
people‖ (người Việt)? Does this category bespeak a nation or an ethnicity? Second, the 
Secretary articulated a tripartite typology of ―ethnicity‖ within the ―nation‖ of 
Vietnam: the under-specified ―Viet people‖; and two types of ―ethnic minorities,‖ one 
small and scattered and another dense and clustered. Unlike the ―Viet people,‖ he 
marked these ostensible ―minorities‖ with one or two modifiers: the old ―đồng bào,‖ 
or members of the same sack of eggs, he applied to both;
77
 one type earned an 
additional marker of racial difference (chủng tộc).78 I return to the implications of his 
slippage and typology in due course.  
Perhaps most importantly, this passage harks back to the emerging nation-state 
form by modifying the earlier definition of nation, subtly redefining it in relation to 
territory. Having already established nation as a transcendental communal category, 
Trường Chinh now apportioned Vietnam an equivalent space. Note the recitation of 
regions: Northern and Central Salients recalled, as well, a Southern one. These 
regions, also known as Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina, bespeak a spatial frame 
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laden with colonial past and present. Ironically, Vietnam‘s national territory had been 
cartographically demarcated—and was still claimed by—―foreign‖ non-nationals. 
That the space remained imaginary is significant: at this time, the DRV controlled 
very little territory. What he articulated was nothing short of an emergent Vietnamese 
geobody, a space he linked discursively to community.
79
 Yet this equation raises 
another question: how does the national claim to territory affect the relation between 
space and ethnicity? 
In the next paragraph, he accused the French of ―division and trickery,‖ of 
creating, among other local-colonial spatial configurations, the ―Thái country,‖ by 
which he referred to the Thái Federation. In contrast to this alleged divisiveness, he 
proposed unifying Vietnam‘s multiple ―ethnicities‖ through application of Marxist-
Leninist principles of ―equality, self-determination, and interdependence.‖ To this list 
of ideals, he added the notion of voluntarism. ―The ethnicities of Vietnam,‖ he 
declared, ―majority and minority, voluntarily unify to form a single nation to defend 
this right.‖80   
A concealed and revealed paragraph addresses directly the question of 
ethnicity‘s relation to national territory by posing the possibility of ―autonomy‖ (tự 
trị). The above analysis draws on the speech‘s text as reprinted in the multi-volume 
2001 edition of collected Party papers, Văn kiện Đảng. Yet, in that edition, an ellipsis 
is all that remains of one paragraph. The redacted paragraph is available in another 
volume on Party Ethnic Policy (noting, parenthetically, ―Stored in Internal Affairs‖), 
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its cover stamped ―secret.‖81 ―We decide,‖ declared Trường Chinh in the missing and 
found paragraph, ―to recognize a right to local autonomy for those ethnic minorities 
living in relatively dense clusters in certain established regions.‖ In other words, he 
referred to the above typology and allowed only Mường, Thái, and Ra Đê peoples the 
right to self-rule; evidently, those living in allegedly ―haphazard‖ (linh tinh) 
settlements did not meet his criteria. He added important caveats. Within the densely 
clustering type, according to its given ―level,‖ an ethnicity may be entitled to ―all 
forms‖ of autonomy (―political‖) or only its ―administrative‖ variant. Unlike the 
colonial practice, he argued, autonomy does not amount to having one‘s own 
―country.‖ Amending earlier ICP statements denouncing ―divide and rule‖ and 
rejecting ―autonomous separation,‖ he proposed autonomy within the Vietnamese 
nation subject to DRV state regulation.
82
 Yet, for fear of these areas falling prey to 
―imperialist invaders,‖ he insisted on delaying any immediate implementation. This is 
power at work in two distinct registers: at the time, Trường Chinh simultaneously 
offered and denied limited territorial rights to certain ethnically-defined peoples; much 
later, his Party successors chose to restrict their textual reproduction. 
More broadly, the typology of ―ethnicities‖ signals new categories in the 
making and points to power-laden relations between communities conceived and 
regulated as such. In stark contrast to its stated egalitarian ideals, the emerging policy 
betrayed a remarkably unequal agenda: the Secretary conflated description and 
prescription, i.e. how ―ethnicities‖ of various types did (supposedly) and should 
(normatively) relate to one another. To recap: his speech defined dân tộc as subsidiary 
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to the community of, and subsumable within the territory of, quốc gia; next, the 
Secretary projected nationally-bounded population counts to sort ethnic types 
according to group membership. Thus indexed to ethnicity, he then implied that 
smaller ―ethnic‖ groupings could be summed together, aggregating towards a 
consolidated category of ―ethnic minorities.‖ In other words, the sublimation of 
ethnicity (in relation to the nation idea) and its recombination as a subsidiary plurality 
(according to national population) amounted to a double-displacement. This is 
marginalization at work. The category ―ethnic minorities‖ obscures the power 
exercised in its ideological construction: my discursive analysis illustrates the work 
required to make it. To reproduce this category analytically risks contributing towards 
the legitimation of multiple—and powerful—disciplinary acts.83 Nonetheless, ―ethnic 
minorities‖ was on its way towards becoming a highly regulated, if still unstable, 
political category.
84
  
Not only did the speech articulate a category of ―ethnic minorities,‖ the Party 
Secretary also contributed towards making a nationally-determined, ethnically-defined 
majority. Dialectically reconstituted as a singularity, this one population outnumbered 
all other ethnically-identified, nationally-enumerated populations.
85
 In addition to 
numerical dominance, Trường Chinh endowed this group with cultural and economic 
superiority and ordered them to wield it among a panoply of inferior others. He 
obliged the majority, ―to help ethnic minorities build their economies and cultures in 
order to catch up with the ethnic majority.‖ The language echoes an early 20th century 
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civilizing mission: one ―ethnicity‖ now became standard bearer for national 
civilizational norms, privileging one bundle of cultural habits with the same normative 
status earlier accorded to French civilization. So who was this one group, this 
allegedly singular majority? Recall that the opening line referred, ambiguously, to 
―Viet people.‖ Notwithstanding the powers Trường Chinh now accorded them, he 
called at last for destroying ―colonially-generated discrimination‖ between ―ethnic 
minorities‖ and—this time specifically, yet bracketed in quotes—―‘Kinh people.‘‖    
Except for the opening and closing lines, the textual absence of an ethnonym in 
reference to a ―majority‖ signifies and contributes to the powerful naturalization of 
Kinh/Việt cultural norms. Trường Chinh himself hailed from the Red River delta 
province of Nam Định. At times during this speech before the assembled Party 
delegates, he spoke in the third-person inclusive ―we‖ (or, chúng ta).86 
Notwithstanding the presence of Lao and Khmer representatives, this dual slippage—
between Viet and Kinh and majority; between the speaker, audience, and self/group 
identifications—conceals a series of telling conflations. In this instance, ―we‖ 
collapses distinctions between state, nation, Party, and a dominant ethnicity, revealing 
an emergent collectivity empowering themselves to act as state in the name of nation 
among ethnicized others.
87
  
 
So far, this analysis of nation and ethnicity in Vietnamese has highlighted a 
discursive form of power to delineate uncertain social boundaries and to reconstruct 
them as ranked communal categories always in relation to evolving statist 
prerogatives. To regulate and discipline forms of community, however, was not the 
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only source of DRV power: the rising state also commanded a military force with 
which to expand its claim to national territory. Elevated to an ideology, as in a 
―national liberation struggle,‖ nation departed from ethnicity as a means to justify 
coercion organized by and for state. By identifying nation with territory, nationalism 
serves to legitimate a state claim to monopolize the means of organized violence and 
pursue the ends of territory.
88
 Historically, the People‘s Army‘s rapid advances in the 
early 1950s transformed the relationship between the DRV state‘s territorial expanse 
and the Vietnamese nation‘s imagined boundaries.  
Subsequent versions of what Trường Chinh first articulated as ―ethnic policy‖ 
(chính sách dân tộc) continued to evolve in relation to military advances and, in turn, 
expanding DRV territory. From 1951 through the end of the first Indochina War, what 
was first promulgated as Party Ethnic Policy and, later, as DRV Ethnic Policy, 
followed the basic principles Trường Chinh had outlined: on the one hand, open 
adherence to equality, interdependence, and self-determination; on the other, muted 
marginalization of ―ethnic minorities‖ and privileging of an ―ethnic majority.‖ Yet the 
prospect and achievement of militarized state territorial expansion drove debates on a 
key point: over how and when to recognize ―local autonomy.‖ Notwithstanding the 
Secretary‘s efforts to solve it, the ―ethnicity question‖ remained unresolved. 
In August 1952, the Workers‘ Party approved two decisions—neither of which 
mentions autonomy—in preparation for a military offensive scheduled for later that 
autumn. First, the Politburo approved the ―Party‘s Ethnic Minority Policy‖ and, 
second, the Party Secretary‘s Council approved an order guiding its implementation in 
the imagined space—and still to be secured place—of the Northwest Zone.89 The 
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Northwest Committee‘s marching orders began with a preamble that constituted its 
bailiwick as a ―very complex and backwards area.‖ In addition to demeaning local 
capacity, the order privileged Kinh-ness by reserving leadership positions for 
―downstream cadres‖ in local government, such as Vice Chair or representative on any 
given Committee, in order to ―help‖ local cadres and ensure the masses follow the 
proper line.
90
 They were also instructed to implement ―unity‖ between ―compatriot 
ethnic minorities‖ and ―Kinh‖ in opposition to the French ―colonials.‖ Like the 
propaganda curriculum‘s emphasis on distinguishing between friend and foe, an 
alleged foreign-ness became a basis for national recognition. Behind this national 
―unity,‖ however, lurked the basis for two social cleavages to reappear within the 
evolving state‘s local institutions: Committees reserved a privileged role for Kinh 
cadres and incorporated locally-produced, highly unequal social hierarchies. 
The dramatic expansion of territory under DRV control in late 1952 
emboldened President Hồ Chi Minh to broach, once again, the idea of autonomy. In 
January 1953, in his opening speech to the Workers‘ Party‘s 4th Plenum, he proposed 
that it was now ―time‖ to resolve the ―ethnic question.‖ In contrast to ―false 
autonomy‖ under French Empire and the Associated State of Vietnam, he offered 
―true autonomy‖ within the DRV as a mode of spatial inclusion to ―unify all 
ethnicities.‖91 The Party‘s Executive Committee accepted his proposal yet still 
stipulated a number of conditions before establishing, what they called, ―zones of 
ethnic minority autonomy.‖92  
Six months later, in June 1953, the DRV government issued a formal ―Ethnic 
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Policy‖ which summarized and proclaimed official thinking regarding relations 
between communities conceived as nation and ethnicity.
93
 Its preamble reads, ―All 
ethnic majority and minorities [who have] long lived together in the homeland (đất 
nước) of Vietnam have come together to build the nation (quốc gia) of Vietnam.‖ 
According to this document signed by Vice Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng, then, 
territory and nation become one in ―Vietnam.‖ ―Ethnic Policy‖ stated that inter-ethnic 
unity be predicated on egalitarian principles and ―mutual assistance‖ oriented towards 
a two-fold goal: in order to advance ―nation-state-making‖ (kiến quốc); and to achieve 
the ―establishment of ethnic autonomy (to be defined later).‖ In other words, if the 
policy recapitulated nation and ethnicity as hierarchically organized communal forms, 
then it also preserved for policy-makers the power to regulate fundamental 
ambiguities. On behalf of the DRV, Phạm Văn Đồng embraced ―ethnic‖ autonomy yet 
decided to delay any implementation. Moreover, the formula of ―nation-state-making‖ 
subtly equated nation (nước or quốc gia) and state (nhà nước or quốc gia) based on a 
common project: to construct exclusive territorial sovereignty. Vietnam was on the 
march and it was a project in the making.   
All of the policies discussed above were issued by Party and Central 
Government elites. They were prescriptive in nature, designed to regulate from afar 
relations of power expressed regionally. How they came to be implemented depended 
on their enactment by officials on the ground. Localizing central policy meant 
negotiation among diverse peoples in historically mutable conditions. This negotiation 
fed back into renewed attempts to refine Party and Central Government policies, 
especially regarding the national space afforded ―ethnic minorities‖ and the role state-
led social transformation would play among them. 
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Remaking relations of rule in place  
On the night of 7 October 1952, the People‘s Army and supporting laborers 
(dân công) crossed the Red River to commence a Northwest Military Campaign.
94
 The 
30,000 combatants and laborers were guided by instructions from the Party‘s Central 
Executive Committee to wipe out the enemy‘s vitality (sinh lực), win over the people, 
and ―liberate‖ territory.95 The emphasis on securing territory marked a new phase in 
state formation: unlike the first Northwest Campaign of early 1950 when military 
tactics de-emphasized territorial control, this second campaign emphasized holding 
territory now considered by Party leaders to be ―strategic and important.‖96  
Coercive techniques changed accordingly, shifting from guerilla assassinations 
and selective terror to combat among regular troops.
97
 Indeed, many of the 
Northwest‘s residents first encountered the DRV in the guise of its armed forces and, 
as such, the question of the People‘s Army‘s relations with local inhabitants assumed 
profound importance. In anticipation of this militarized encounter, President Hồ Chí 
Minh had issued on 9 September 1952 the ―Eight Government Orders‖ on exemplary 
military conduct.
98
 Just as the military was creatively interpreting Chairman Mao‘s 
stages of revolutionary warfare and applying it to a new context, President Hồ‘s eight 
orders did the same for military conduct, guiding how soldiers and officers should 
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behave in relation to the ―masses.‖99 Through the exercise of exemplary restraint, 
behavior, and service, Hồ‘s eight orders aimed to provide a concrete means with 
which the People‘s Army could differentiate themselves from French-allied forces.  
From early October through December 1952, the People‘s Army ―liberated‖ 
much of the Northwest Zone. The military enlarged its territorial control from the Việt 
Bắc base area westward to capture both banks of the Red River crossing through Yên 
Bái and Lào Cai; southward to include much of Sơn La; westward to the Lao border at 
Điện Biên Phủ; and, finally, northward to the outskirts of Lai Châu town. They also 
controlled the two main roads leading from the lowlands up and into the montane 
frontier: Road 41 from Hoà Bình, Mộc Châu, Sơn La, and west to Điện Biên Phủ; and 
Road 13 from Yên Bái into Nghĩa Lộ.100 Though still protected by 5-7 battalions, 
including one Thái battalion (9
ème
 BAT), the spatial extent of the Thái Federation was 
reduced to a corner of its former domain: from the town of Lai Châu stretching 
northwest to Mường Tè in triangular frontier territory formed by the 
Chinese/Lao/Viet-Tonkin borders.
101
 In addition, 11 battalions of French-allied forces 
regrouped and formed a fortified base at Nà Sản where they could be supported by 
French airlifts. In spite of repeated People‘s Army assaults, they held out for months 
until evacuated by air in August, 1953.  
 
The advance of the People‘s Army during the (second) Northwest campaign 
recast territorial control in new, yet not uncontested, terms. ―After liberation, a new 
life began,‖ reads a typical account, ―and the Party, Government, and President Ho 
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Chi Minh perceived clearly the many difficulties of the Northwest‘s ethnic 
compatriots…‖ and set about solving them.102 As with so many official histories 
written well after the event in question, this kind of remark is best read as reproducing 
a dialectical, two-fold claim. The key word ―liberation‖ both marks a point of rupture 
and makes an assertion about regime legitimacy. If to liberate (giải phóng) means to 
free an area from enemy occupation or foreign control, then in a prima facie sense, the 
People‘s Army accomplished this dramatically.103 Alternatively, to accept the terms of 
―liberation‖ implies accepting, also, that the displaced regime was foreign and 
belonged to the enemy—in short, illegitimate. Yet not all residents believed that the 
Thái Federation was their enemy, nor did they accept the French as ultimately 
responsible for their alleged un-freedom. In fact, French partisans also used the word 
―liberation‖ to describe the Expeditionary Forces‘ territorial gains on behalf of the 
Thái Federation.
104
 Liberation, then, is best understood as a rising regime‘s claim to its 
own legitimacy, one linked dialectically to a rival‘s illegitimacy. Subsequent histories, 
such as the above, echo this claim. Quotation marks bracketing ―to liberate‖ point to 
the term‘s euphemistic intent (for comparison, substitute ―to conquer‖) and signal its 
underlying import—i.e., to legitimate territory claimed by an evolving state ostensibly 
on behalf of an emergent nation.  
Political elites legitimated warfare on the principle of national liberation and 
once an area was ―liberated,‖ officials moved in and worked openly to (re)assume a 
project of state-making. ―Liberation‖ became also an official spatial referent to 
demarcate administrative units and organize everyday activities of governing, making 
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war, production, and exchange. Within newly acquired territory, the rising DRV 
subdivided the Zone‘s terrain into a tripartite spatial matrix to guide, simultaneously, 
the construction of institutions and the transformation of society.
105
 ―Free zones‖ 
(vùng tự do) included areas with established ―resistance‖ bases and institutions, such 
as eastern Lào Cai and Yên Bái, and were first to experiment with agrarian programs. 
Much of the Northwest Zone, including most of Sơn La Province, eastern and 
southern parts of Lai Châu Province, and Điện Biên Phủ District, fell into the category 
of ―recently liberated zones‖ (vùng mới giải phóng), requiring the (re)construction of 
government infrastructure. Meanwhile, cadres in ―temporarily occupied areas‖ (vùng 
tạm bị chiếm)—i.e., what remained of the Federation in the northern part of Lai 
Châu—focused on propaganda and guerilla warfare. The distinction between recently 
liberated and occupied zones was also known in military parlance as ―rear‖ and 
―front,‖ a distinction used both to organize provisioning, labor recruitment, and 
exchange relations and to signal future iterations of militarized state territorial 
advance. I return to these topics in the next chapters. 
The military campaign‘s sweep through the Black River region prepared the 
ground for the Workers‘ Party and the DRV to assert themselves in territory they 
claimed and administered together as ―Northwest Vietnam.‖ As soon as the military 
entered Sơn La, supporters posted a bulletin to signal the regime change. Dated 16 
October 1952 and signed by Sa Văn Minh, Chair of the DRV‘s Sơn La Province 
Resistance and Administrative Committee, the bulletin announced to the public a new 
form of rule and its dispatching of the old.
106
 Notably, not once does the bulletin 
mention the Thái Federation and its local leadership but, instead, casts aspersions at an 
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undifferentiated foreign enemy. Indeed, the ―Bulletin re cancellation of cruel 
prohibitions of the Western Bandits‖ blames only these vaguely conceived 
―Westerners‖ for Sơn La‘s suffering. Moreover, the bulletin credits President Hồ, the 
province‘s Administrative Committee, and the People‘s Army for enabling Sơn La‘s 
―compatriots‖ (đồng bào) to be ―forever free and happy‖ (tự do và sung sướng mãi 
mãi). Now these compatriots could enjoy ―rights to the following freedoms‖: 
 
1) Return to old villages and no longer live in concentrated settlements; 
2) Ownership of rice by the grower and no longer has to be concentrated; 
3) Abolition of payments in rice, meat, wine, women, etc. to military posts; 
4) Freedom to enter the forest to open swiddens, to fish at night; 
5) Freedom of movement, assembly, worship. 
 
Certainly, as later reports and secondary sources document, the restrictions from 
which this Bulletin ―freed‖ them had been burdensome on the local population.107 But, 
with one important exception—releasing women from obligations to entertain officials 
and soldiers—these stated freedoms largely amounted to a restoration of ―rights‖ 
according to peacetime norms.  
The bulletin‘s explanatory intent both revealed and concealed important 
lessons for the target audience. Should the ―compatriots‖ have questions regarding 
―any difficulties,‖ they were instructed to ask their village head or to consult the 
relevant Commune Committee. Evidently, village leadership was no longer prohibited 
from DRV administration: the title of mountain village head (trưởng bản) now 
replaced the colonial variant (tạo bản) but, as discussed below, the person in charge 
often remained the same.
108
 The bulletin is notable for its discursive flourish: by 
positioning the DRV state and its military not only as guarantors of ―freedom‖ but 
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also, by neglecting to mention the Thái Federation, it positioned DRV local 
government as the only stated alternative to ―oppressive‖ foreign rule. Absent from the 
list of new ―freedoms‖ was the right to one‘s labor power while the alleged 
―ownership‖ of rice by the grower did not last long. In short order, the DRV would 
institute renewed claims on labor (as dân công porters) and produce (as military 
provisions).  
If public bulletins trumpeted the ostensible liberator‘s virtues, the first internal 
reports from this time read as descriptions of a newly discovered land and peoples. A 
report dated 22 December by the Prime Minister‘s delegate, Phan Mỹ, exemplifies a 
crucial discursive shift in comparison with reports dating to the earlier period of 
guerilla warfare.
109
 Unlike earlier state reports, his does not boast of sabotaging the 
enemy or count, for example, roadways destroyed or granaries burned. Rather, the 
delegate writes in a tone of assumed responsibility by describing, in contrast, how 
military engineers now built bridges and soldiers assisted farmers in harvest work.
110
 
Phan Mỹ acquainted central leaders with a place over which, only a few months 
earlier, they could express only an aspirational claim to sovereignty. The delegate 
informed the Central Government of its new territory, why they must care for the 
population, and how to rebuild damaged infrastructure. Among others, it was Phan 
Mỹ‘s job to make this new terrain and its population legible, to render an imaginary 
space into concrete place governable from afar.
111
 The DRV had, it seems, matured 
quickly from a position of resistance to one of partial domination. 
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If the DRV now claimed much of the Northwest Zone‘s area—estimated at 
three quarters its total or 28,500 square kilometers—Phan Mỹ described land in terms 
of its strategic and economic value and the population in terms of its territorial 
administration.
112
 The Việt Bắc base area now connected overland with Laos: he 
measured the distance at 270 km, ―as a bird flies,‖ from eastern Mộc Châu west to 
Điện Biên Phủ‘s ―border‖ (biên giới). If the value of Điện Biên Phủ was self-evident 
to his audience, recall that the DRV now controlled a route all the way to a strategic 
pass (Tây trang) affording passage to and from northern Laos. He also recognized this 
particular border—not Indochina‘s—as an edge of the DRV‘s sovereign territorial 
claim. In so doing, he demarcated internal and external state spaces.  
Phan Mỹ allocated the Northwest Zone‘s internalized terrain according to the 
prior delineation of 4 provinces (tỉnh) and subdivided their populations among 12 
districts (huyện). Many of these districts, particularly in Sơn La, had been site of 
revolutionary organizing in 1948-50 (see table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1: Administrative divisions and estimated populations of the Northwest Zone, 
December 1952.
113
 
 
Province (tỉnh) District (huyện) Estimated Population 
Yên Bài 1. Văn Chấn (Nghĩa Lộ) 30,000 
2. Than Uyên 20,000 
 
 
Sơn La 
3. Phù Yên 30,000 
4. Mộc Châu 12,000 
5. Yên Châu 12,000 
6. Mai Sơn 20,000 
7. Mường La 20,000 
8. Thuận Châu 30,000 
 
Lai Châu 
9. Quỳnh Nhai ―unclear‖ 
10. Tuần Giáo ―unclear‖ 
11. Điện Biên Phủ ―unclear‖ 
Lào Cai 12. Phong Thổ ―unclear‖ 
Total estimated population:  300,000 
 
Note that although administrative units bear the label of ―huyện,‖ i.e. Vietnamese-
language names associated with delta regions, these units by and large reproduced the 
historic muang form, also known as the ―châu‖ of the Thái Federation. Indeed, Thái 
leaders were poised to reproduce the muang form not only in DRV administrative 
guise but also through reasserting their locally enmeshed rule and control of agrarian 
relations of production. 
Phan Mỹ endeavored to communicate the territory‘s value according to the 
locally dominant Thái language. The ―recently liberated territory‖ included the 
Northwest Zone‘s four largest ―rice baskets,‖ known to local Thái speakers, as ―nhất 
Thanh, nhi Lô, tam Tac, tu Than‖; or, respectively, Mường Thanh (Điện Biên Phủ), 
Nghĩa Lộ, Phù Yên, and Than Uyên. All of these wet-rice areas he recorded in terms 
of area, implicitly noting their agricultural potential.
114
  Indeed, ―liberating‖ these 
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areas occurred at a conspicuous time—―when,‖ he noted, ―rice harvest was happening 
or about to happen‖—enabling the self-proclaimed liberators to claim not only land 
but also what crops farmers grew on it. 
 ―Aside from rice‖ the delegate described a bounty of ―local forest products‖ 
(lâm thổ sản). His list included: opium ―in Hmong areas‖; deer antlers and bear bones 
in Yên Châu and Mộc Châu; cloth, dye, and cotton in Yên Châu and Mai Sơn; 
cardamom in Sơn La; and cinnamon in Yên Bái. Production of these same ―forest 
products‖ extended into Laos. He described lively riverine commerce: traders plied the 
Black River on some 700 boats, exchanged for these products, and landed downstream 
to resell them in Hoà Bình‘s Phương Lâm market. In spite of their association with 
―forests,‖ note that many of these items originated in agroforestry gardens (cinnamon, 
cardamom), swidden plots (opium), or fields (cotton) cultivated by farmers. He stated, 
revealingly, that all these products had yet to be ―statistically counted‖ (thống kê), 
indicating an interest in taking stock of goods for future state regulation of production 
and exchange.
115
  
Out of the region‘s estimated total of 300,000, the population in recently 
liberated zones included approximately 250,000 people. He described this population 
ethnically and located them according to settlement elevation: a ―majority‖ Thái and 
the ―Thái-ized‖ Mường lived in the valleys; the ―Mán‖ (Dao) worked swiddens on 
mountain slopes; and at ―even higher‖ elevations lived the ―Mèo‖ (Hmong). Of the 
newly claimed territory, only Văn Chấn (or, Nghĩa Lộ, now in Yên Bái province), he 
regretted, had statistics enumerating its population ethnically: ―10,000 Thái; 2,000 
Mường; 6,000 Mèo [Hmong]; 5,000 Mán [Dao]; 7,000 Thổ [Tài]; 1,000 Kinh; 300 
Hoà Kiêu [overseas Chinese].‖116 Like data cited above on the territory‘s strategic and 
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economic values, these demographic data were not neutral. Stated as social fact, such 
data were a complex outcome of dialectical processes of self-description and state 
ascription. If ascription dated back to the colonial era or earlier, then the DRV‘s 
emerging preoccupation with knowing and classifying the ―national‖ population in 
terms of ―ethnicity‖ renewed a political project with a slightly different goal: making a 
national frontier.  
 
Governing this population, however, proved to be a daunting task beset by 
unforeseen difficulties. DRV and Party reports describe how French and Thái 
Federation rule had rendered the population sickly, abused, divided along ethnic lines, 
and profoundly displaced. Sexually transmitted disease and smallpox were endemic 
but had yet to be treated in any systematic fashion. In Điện Biên Phủ smallpox 
―routinely‖ led to the death of 500-600 people.117 Gambling, theft, and drunkenness 
were common.
118
 In addition to heavy taxation, the Thái Federation forced 
provisioning of military posts (nộp bốt), impressed corvée labor (bắt phu), and bonded 
peasant laborers (cuông nguốt) to hereditary local rulers. In Sơn La, for example, a 
Lord (Phìa) was entitled to 4 mẫu of wet-rice land, 20 bonded families, and 2 corvée 
laborers; a Vice-Lord (phó phìa) to 2 mẫu of land, 12 families, and 1 laborer.119 The 
Federation abused women as ―dancers‖: Phan Mỹ reported the discovery of circulars 
presented in each commune calling on all ladies (―cô gái‖) to study dance (xoè) in 
order to serve and attend to (―hầu‖) Federation and French soldiers at parties.120 Rape 
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and sexual abuse perpetrated by these soldiers against local women appears to have 
been both routine (in a manner akin to provisioning, villages close to military posts 
had to ―submit‖ (nộp) their women weekly); and a calculated means of exacting 
punishment or spreading terror (mass rape in Dêu village, Nghĩa Lộ was carefully 
planned and chillingly executed).
121
 
Reports charged the ―colonial gang‖ with a ―policy of ethnic division‖ to 
provoke tensions between groups defined ethnically. Thái Federation military 
commanders deployed a given battalion outside their area of recruitment: for example, 
a battalion recruited from Sơn La‘s Black Thái population operated in Lai Châu‘s 
White Thái areas, and vice versa. The Federation facilitated land grabs by employing 
Thái peoples to banish Hmong residents from their villages, encouraging the former to 
encroach on the vacated land. They forbade the use and study of the ―Kinh language.‖ 
Presumably, restricting the use of an emerging ―national language‖ was an attempt to 
forestall revolutionary organizing predicated on learning Romanized Vietnamese.
122
  
The Federation‘s practice of ―concentrating settlements‖ meant that, in some 
cases, entire villages suspected of revolutionary sympathies were moved forcibly from 
mountain redoubts to lowland camps. Clearing the mountains of its population served 
two purposes. The Federation could more easily capture subjects for corvée labor. 
Second, the Expeditionary Corps could regain control of areas long targeted by armed 
propaganda teams. Hmong groups suffered gravely from forced resettlement, with 
horrifying results. Not only did their montane swidden fields lie fallow, but they did 
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not adjust to cramped quarters and hot climate of valley areas. In the village of Pu-ten, 
Mai Sơn district, 450 of 500 resettled people died. Among the Hmong of Tu-lêj, of 
200 families forced downhill, 160 perished.
123
 Subsequent DRV administrators 
documented additional cases of forced resettlement and mass starvation.
124
   
Certainly, some of these accusations may amount to misinformation, 
something the French and Federation engaged in as well regarding the ―Viet Minh.‖ 
Although the language of ―debauchery‖ (truy lạc) and ―exploitation‖ (bóc lột) 
rehearses an anti-colonial trope of a society debased by its colonial rulers, the 
documented practices of Thái Federation rule (abuse of women, bonded labor, forced 
provisioning, etc.) are corroborated in histories of French colonial rule in this region 
(see Chapter 2). Moreover, it would be a mistake to dismiss how Federation rule and 
DRV efforts to destabilize it together contributed to heightened levels of violence and 
broad social displacement. Indeed, the (in)voluntary flight of people out of the 
Federation can be interpreted as popular confirmation of brutal conditions there. Prior 
to the Northwest Campaign of late 1952, ―many people‖ from Văn Chấn, Sơn La, and 
Lai Châu had either fled to ―liberated zones‖ in the Việt Bắc or crossed the border into 
Laos.
125
 Jean Jerusalemy confirms large scale displacement within the Federation 
itself: in 1952, he estimated that ―refugee‖ populations had swelled to 1,500 in Phong 
Thổ, 3,000 in Than Uyên, and upwards of 4-5,000 in Sơn La.126 
Understandably, years of warfare and shrill accusations—from all quarters—
had led the population to greet ―liberation‖ with a healthy dose of skepticism. 
Notwithstanding bulletins posted in regional centers, like that in Sơn La, many people 
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had no communication with the new regime nor were some even aware of its recent 
military victory. A Hmong village in Nghĩa Lộ, even one month after their 
―liberation,‖ still believed the ―West‖ was in power and, much to a DRV official‘s 
dismay, provided assistance to a defeated army remnant (tàn binh).
127
 Cadres and 
soldiers reported frequent ―misunderstandings‖ about their intent. They worried that 
peasants still did not properly distinguish the ―Government‘s borrowing‖ from the 
―post payment‖ made to the French, i.e. between what they considered to be legitimate 
and illegitimate military provisioning.
128
 Moreover, distinguishing (phân biệt) 
between the two regimes was not enough: officials continued to express grave concern 
about a lack of popular ―hatred‖ (căm thù) for the old regime.129  
Cadres and soldiers, therefore, renewed a commitment to legitimation work 
and engaged local people through education and propaganda. The military earned 
praise for adhering to President Hồ‘s Eight Orders by rebuilding war-damaged homes, 
leaving vegetable gardens intact, and assisting farmers with harvest activities.
130
 Then 
cadres picked up when and where the soldiers left off: ―assuring‖ the people who had 
fled the fighting, explaining the Eight Orders, and announcing the abolishment of 
Federation regulations.
131
 Professional propagandists accompanied the military and 
brought specialized knowledge on how to ―agitate the masses.‖ Arriving in a given 
location secured by the People‘s Army, propaganda educators split up and visited each 
village in order to school residents in comparisons between old and new regimes. 
They announced the abrogation of ―oppressive and exploitative‖ rules enforced by the 
―colonialists.‖ In addition to the Eight Orders, cadres explained DRV policies such as, 
                                                 
127
 Phan Mỹ, ―Báo cáo sơ lược…‖ 22 Dec 1952, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 456, p. 4. 
128
 Nguyễn Kháng, ―Báo cáo…‖ 29 Dec 1952, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 1306. 
129
 Ibid. p.14; ĐLĐVN, ―Báo cáo…‖ 27 Feb 1953, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 471, p. 4. 
130
 Phan Mỹ, ―Báo cáo sơ lược…‖ 22 Dec 1952, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 456, p. 3-4. 
131
 Nguyễn Kháng, ―Báo cáo…‖ 29 Dec 1952, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 1306, p. 5-6, 
14. 
 192 
leniency for former Thái Federation combatants and officials, circulation of a new 
currency and modes of exchange, and on the people‘s rights—and duties—as citizens. 
In sum, the propaganda curriculum emphasized that the people‘s capacity for 
―liberation,‖ their ability to be ―free,‖ was due to DRV military intervention.132  
Notwithstanding this preliminary legitimation work, the conditions that had 
troubled early revolutionary activities—extensive area, difficult terrain, and a shortage 
of cadres—persisted into this next phase of state formation.  
 
To rectify alleged popular misunderstandings about the rising regime‘s actions 
and intent, the Northwest Party Committee organized propaganda sessions in each 
district between December 1952 and January 1953. The agenda was notable both for 
what they discussed and what they did not. In all districts, according to one report, 
cadres used these events to explain President Hồ‘s Eight Orders, to broadcast the 
―meaning of the victory,‖ and how to use ―grievances‖ to ―expose crimes‖ and direct 
popular ―hatred‖ towards ―bandits‖ (giặc).133 In other words, legitimation work 
attempted to impart the determined politics of (national) friend and (foreign) foe. 
Although the Northwest Zone‘s Political Commissar reported ―implementation‖ of the 
Party‘s Ethnic Policy as of February, public discussions only began on the subject in 
January and only in the district of Văn Chấn.134  
Why here and, as of yet, nowhere else? I would argue that Văn Chấn fit two 
important criteria and figures in a broader pattern. First, this district of Yên Bái was 
considered a free zone and was located close to the Việt Bắc base area. Perhaps cadres 
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and their superiors felt more secure introducing an unsettled topic there. Second, state 
knowledge of Văn Chấn‘s ethnic profile made it a good test case. More broadly, the 
use of one site to test policy implementation points to a consistent model and pattern 
of state learning, applied as well with respect to emergent agricultural taxation and 
labor recruitment.  
Over two months in recently liberated areas of Sơn La, the Northwest 
Committee organized six ―ethnic conference festivities‖ (hội nghị liên hoan dân 
tộc)—in which, ironically, cadres did not broach the Ethnic Policy—attended by over 
1000 representatives. One representative stated, ―before conferences like this, only 
nobles (Phìa) and higher [social ranks] were allowed to participate; now even the 
people can also participate.‖ He described in his own words a new style of mass 
politics in contrast to colonially recognized feudal norms. Assembled audiences were 
shown films such as Vietnam Resistance produced by a Chinese cinematographic team 
in 1952 from footage shot in the Red River Delta. For many, it was a first exposure to 
moving pictures, signaling a sea change in revolutionary propaganda from the 1940s 
when cadres could rely only on spoken word and print.
135
 In spite of changes in 
audience and medium, there was continuity in content: representatives were instructed 
in the ―solicitous care of the cadres‖ (sự săn sóc ân cần của cán bộ) towards the 
people. Results were, according to the region‘s Political Commissar, ―good.‖ By the 
conclusion of these conferences, he continued, the representatives ―understood clearly 
the meaning of resistance, trusted in President Hồ and the Government, and hated the 
enemy.‖ After returning to their villages, he described how these representatives 
―enthusiastically‖ reported back to their communities.136  
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These meetings indicate the self-conscious construction of a state idea.
137
 
Building on Emile Durkheim‘s notion of constructing a repertoire of collective 
representations, Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer highlight the ―representational—i.e., 
performed and visible—features of power.‖ I concur that theatrical performances, such 
as the above, contributed significantly towards constructing a moral order predicated 
on an idea of state that could, and would, lead society‘s improvement on a forward 
march to progress. However, unlike Corrigan and Sayer‘s observation of English state 
formation, Vietnamese cadres at this time did not construct an image of State in a 
Hobbesian mold as rational, impersonal, and transcendent.
138
 Rather, cadres aimed to 
construct an idea of state as personal, solicitous, and caring—much like an ideal parent 
behaves towards a child.  
Behind these formalized scenes, legitimation work unfolded in more everyday 
forms as well. Legitimation involved state-mediated relations of exchange that did not 
always work as intended. For example, by late December, peasants all over ―worried‖ 
about the scarce supply of salt. This pressing grievance—and the government‘s 
inability to solve it—led the Northwest‘s Political Commissar, Nguyễn Kháng, to fret 
that Committees and cadres might be perceived as not ―truly interested [and] caring 
for the people‘s livelihood.‖ In turn, he expressed concern that not providing salt and 
farmtools might be detrimental to planned state claims on peasant labor, grains, and 
foodstocks.
139
 In subsequent chapters I return in detail to emergent relations of 
exchange and their political import. What is significant here is an idea of state as 
caring and interested in popular livelihoods. 
Building an idea of state was closely linked to ongoing construction of state 
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institutions. General guidelines described how village chiefs (Tạo bản) would be 
retained temporarily while a ―new local government‖ would be established. Gradually, 
cadres consulted with residents in order to select village heads (Trưởng bản) to replace 
chiefs. Once village leadership was secured, the work of establishing a Commune 
Committee (Ủy ban xã) began and cadres from the area in question gained priority as 
representatives. In the interim, until these Commune Committees were fully 
―authenticated‖ (chân chính), province and district level cadres directly supervised 
administrative affairs. ―In general,‖ reported Phan Mỹ, ―these are the procedures but 
the work of implementation is up to the locality.‖140  
Indeed, the above procedures were an ideal form of making a political 
transition. In practice, however, it was precisely their local implementation that 
complicated the work of legitimating and institutionalizing power in state form. 
Implementation prompted and required negotiation. As such, DRV legitimation work 
echoed and paralleled the reconstruction of pre-existing ruling relations configured 
within bureaucratic structures; and encouraged their social recognition as the DRV. 
Constructing an idea of state, therefore, was a dynamic process that changed and 
shifted in relation to prior and ongoing configurations of local and extra-local rule in 
guise of a singular, uniform ―state.‖  
As was the case during the late 1940s, cadres identified problems regarding the 
size and shape of jurisdictions and the backgrounds of personnel needed to staff them. 
Once again, officials charged with implementing Central Government plans drew on a 
familiar trope both to complain about their bailiwick and to explain the difficulties 
they themselves created there: ―The Northwest Zone has vast land and sparse people, 
few cadres, the people‘s level is still low, and we still do not clearly understand the 
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locality‘s capacity or its situation…‖141 They blamed local people for problems 
produced in the making of DRV rule. 
If the Northwest Zone‘s evolving territorial administration reproduced the 
underlying muang as districts, then subdividing the districts into communes (xã), once 
again, ran into two fundamental problems. On the one hand, creating communes based 
on a notion of appropriate population size resulted in units too spacious to be 
administered effectively. Such was the case in Phù Yên District where Quang Huy 
Commune included 10,000 people in 36 villages but spanned from 10 km in length to 
1-4 km in width—all over mountainous terrain. ―The Commune Committee,‖ 
complained Phan Mỹ, ―cannot grasp [its jurisdiction] at all.‖ Alternatively, creating 
communes based on communal affinities and settlement patterns reproduced a 
patchwork administrative quilt, equally hard to manage. Such was the case in Văn 
Chấn where one Hmong commune included many non-contiguous areas interspersed 
by separate Dao and Thái communes.
142
 Although spatially non-uniform communes 
expressed a local desire to avoid Thái domination and achieve representation, their 
shape was unacceptable—perhaps even unthinkable—to Kinh officials accustomed to 
contiguous jurisdictions. Both cases revealed the limits of using standards developed 
downstream and applying them in a very different socio-spatial context.  
Evidently, making communes in other montane areas of Vietnam yielded 
similarly unwieldy jurisdiction sizes. In response, the DRV‘s Central Government 
issued revised guidelines on dividing communes in May 1953. Because ―the commune 
is the fundamental unit of organization,‖ stated Vice Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng, 
any given commune ―should‖ (nên) have population and area such that commune 
officials enjoyed ―close relations with the people and the people participated directly 
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in local government work.‖143 These guidelines incorporated regionally-specific 
geographic criteria to determine the shape and size of a given commune: ―delta 
regions and midlands prioritize population criterion; mountain regions prioritize 
length criterion.‖144 At one extreme, delta regions could have as many as 3,500 
residents in an area as narrow as 3 km while, at another, montane swidden cultivators 
could have as few as 100 residents in an area as wide as 10 km. Even if the 
administrative grid involved the same fundamental unit, the Central Government 
recognized that one size did not fit all.  
The Vice Prime Minister stated clearly that the commune was ―fundamental‖ 
because, in addition to administration, the unit also functioned as a ―resting place (chỗ 
dựa) for the peasantry‘s struggle.‖ His emphasis is consistent with an emerging state 
program for land reform, or class-based agrarian transformation. As such, his order 
also called for commune cadres to be ―clean,‖ that is unsullied by ―landlords, wealthy 
peasants, or village tyrants.‖ He called for the ―rectification‖ (chỉnh đốn) of commune 
staff based on recruitment from the ranks of ―landless, poor, and good middle 
peasants.‖145 Unlike the allowance for geographically adjusted area and population, 
however, the revised commune orders did not mention any similar adjustments for 
their bureaucratic composition. Recruiting cadres based on class and status-based 
distinctions, therefore, betrayed a growing contradiction in relation to Ethnic Policy 
which, in ―mountain areas,‖ allowed for just these sorts of social cleavages to persist 
within local government. 
Prior to this revised commune order issued in May 1953, cadres in the 
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Northwest had already begun to staff the DRV‘s ―new local government‖—i.e., 
nascent district, commune, and village bureaucratic positions—in urgent conditions. 
As mobile warfare rapidly expanded DRV territory in late 1952 and early 1953, 
demand for bureaucrats rose rapidly. Although the Ethnic Policy was clear on its 
preference for local representation overseen by ―downstream cadres,‖ the devil was in 
the detail of this policy‘s implementation. The Northwest Committee selected from 
three pools of candidates: locals with revolutionary credentials, Kinh cadres, and 
officials from the Thái Federation. Each of them carried distinct sets of problems and 
complications. 
Because individuals with ―stalwart‖ (trung kiên) backgrounds in mass 
organizations were few and far between, these recruits gained priority for district 
office.
146
 Yet their ―vigilant‖ performance often did not prepare them for day-to-day 
work as government officials.
147
 Training and fostering (bồi dưỡng) them as ―cadres‖ 
took time (upwards of a month or more) exceeding the urgent task of filling positions. 
As a result, Phan Mỹ observed, ―Local cadres are few and downstream cadres are 
many.‖148 Although identifying and training local candidates was an acknowledged 
Central Government priority, Nguyễn Kháng admitted that this task ―was not yet 
specially attended to.‖149 Meanwhile, the ranks of commune and village officials were 
in even more dire straits: a ―majority‖ of commune officials and village heads turned 
out to be the same ―old village chiefs‖ who ―do not understand our government and 
who work by [issuing] commands.‖150 One person approved for maintaining village 
law and order in Quang Huy turned out to be a ―professional thief.‖151 In another case, 
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when cadres appointed an entirely new committee sui generis, the new representatives 
had no ―prestige‖ (uy tín) among their people.152  
These examples illustrate the difficulties in creating a bureaucracy during a 
moment of rapid revolutionary transition. The few local candidates with suitable class 
and status backgrounds were unskilled in government administration. Training was 
meant to equip them with clerical skills, Vietnamese language literacy and 
proficiency, and an understanding of institutional norms—in short the technical 
knowledge of a bureaucracy. Yet identification and training took time and regional 
leaders were preoccupied: in short, local candidates for office with proper 
revolutionary credentials were few and far between.  
For the time being, therefore, only Kinh cadres and former colonial officials 
possessed the requisite bureaucratic capacities to staff a rising DRV territorial 
administration. How did regional officials decide between them? In addition to 
technical knowledge and skills, one‘s ability to lead is also predicated on an 
underlying relationship with those being led, or the social recognition of uneven power 
as legitimate. If possession of bureaucratic skills and technical knowledge are 
hallmarks of what Weber calls ―legal authority,‖ then what Phan Mỹ recognized as 
prestige points to ―traditional authority,‖ or a claim to legitimacy based on ―age-old 
rule and powers.‖153 Although tradition must be socially reinvented, reinvested with 
power, and often emerges in hybrid forms, Weber‘s distinction between bureaucratic 
and traditional authority does shed light on a pragmatic and pressing choice facing 
regional cadres. On what basis would Nguyễn Kháng and others choose local 
officials? On the one hand, they could rely on knowledgeable, bureaucratically-skilled 
Kinh personnel. On the other, they could recognize prestigious Thái muang lords in 
                                                 
152
 Phan Mỹ, ―Báo cáo sơ lược…‖ 22 Dec 1952, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 456, p. 5. 
153
 Weber, ―The Types of Legitimate Domination‖ (1978), 212-231. 
 200 
spite of their officially suspect backgrounds. Either choice presented complications 
and ultimately entailed powerful entanglements. 
Although Kinh cadres knew much of DRV administration and Party policy, 
they often knew little about local conditions. In other words, the technical knowledge 
of DRV bureacracy did not translate well into administering the Black River region. 
Because Kinh cadres were unfamiliar with local languages, they could only 
communicate through interpreters. Many of their interpreters, however, were former 
―puppet authorities‖ (ngụy quyền), rendering ―the voice of the Government unable to 
reach the people.‖ In addition, because many ―downstream‖ cadres hailed from urban 
areas or were accustomed only to their own culturally specific norms of wet-rice 
cultivation, they ―did not yet understand the rural situation.‖154 For example, lowland 
cadres did not know how to assess wealth and poverty according to particular, local 
norms. During the military campaign, cadres in Nghĩa Lộ calculated household grain 
taxes based on average per capita village production. As a result, poor people supplied 
rice beyond their means and their loyalty to the revolutionary cause waned.
155
 
Notwithstanding a lack of familiarity with local customs and traditions, Kinh cadres 
―acted like poobahs‖ (bao biện), contributing to the ―utter confusion‖ (lung tung) of 
committee work.
156
 Just as in the late 1940s and earlier, many Kinh cadres often 
resented working in the region and requested a post ―closer to their families.‖157 
Faced with local stalwarts unskilled in governance and Kinh cadres prone to 
grandiosity, misinterpretation, and homesickness, the Northwest Zone‘s regional 
government confronted the question of how to handle former Thái Federation 
officials. Some escaped altogether, like Sơn La‘s deposed province chief, Bạc Cầm 
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Quý, who slipped into exile.
158
 In line with the Party‘s Ethnic Policy, any remaining 
high-level ―traitors‖ were captured and punished, especially members of the Đèo clan. 
The police assembled files on members of the former regime and, in addition, relied 
on people to ―denounce lackeys‖ before sending any ―arch criminals‖ (đại gian đại ác) 
to be tried before a front tribunal.
159
 Among others, Đèo Văn Long‘s nephew Đèo Văn 
Ngọc was found in Nghĩa Lộ working as Assistant District Chief (Bang tá) and living 
under an alias (Đang-ta-Ngọc); he was accused of laying waste to his domain as well 
as ―torturing cadres and compatriots savagely.‖160 By February 1953, the Northwest‘s 
Executive Party Committee reported the capture of 314 individual ―reactionaries,‖ 
including two commanders (chỉ huy) who may have led French counter-insurgency 
maquis units: Vang a Long, a Hmong leader in ―Tram Tay‖ [Trạm Tây?], and Schooff, 
leader of a Dao unit in ―Sai Luong‖ [Sài Lương?].161 Processing all of these prisoners 
through criminal procedures took months, another indication of how slowly the new 
government began to function according to its own bureaucratic procedures.
162
 
Notwithstanding cases involving such high level ―traitors‖ and ―criminals,‖ the 
Government instituted a policy of leniency (khoan hồng) for soldiers and civilian 
functionaries associated with the Thái Federation. Regulars from the Thái battalions 
were re-educated, ―won over,‖ and released, a gesture that increased support among 
soldiers‘ families for the DRV.163 Moreover, former Federation officials retained 
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comparable positions in DRV-recognized communes and villages. Their retention 
elicited far more equivocal results among the population and increasing concern 
among regional officials. 
―Organizing the local government,‖ observed Nguyễn Kháng in late December 
1952, ―has brought along all sort of reactionary traitors, leading the people to resent 
and dislike the local government.‖ He observed that Thái lords (phìa) held influential 
positions as commune chairmen (Mường Trai, Mường La) or on their distribution 
committees (Chiềng Đóng, Yên Châu), enabling them to divert ―national‖ labor and 
food aid to their own households, shirk labor service, avoid taxation, and remain in 
control of common fields. Evidently, their traditional authority outmatched any 
bureaucratic authority held by stalwarts. Overall, he worried that these ―comrades‖ did 
not grasp the importance of ―building a government and using the government to 
execute each Party policy and, by contrast, still do whatever—sickening and loosening 
the trust between people and local government.‖ For Nguyễn Kháng, the region‘s 
Party Political Commissar, the problem and solution lay in (lack of) compliance with 
Ethnic Policy and (lack of) Kinh cadres. District committees did not have the requisite 
number of ―downstream cadres‖ to oversee their activities, ―violating the Center‘s 
orders,‖ and he assured his superiors that the Zone had ordered a ―correction.‖164    
What Nguyễn Kháng observed was part of an emerging pattern. Central 
Government policy on labor service, taxation, and agrarian reform all reflected efforts 
to adjust payments along a progressive scale. The elite‘s domination of local 
government disrupted the channel of state power at its most basic level, defeating its 
redistributive intent and intercepting its benefits. Indeed, DRV recognition of 
traditional authorities in bureaucratic positions enabled them to bend or obstruct the 
implementation of policy to their own advantage. The old guard‘s continued presence 
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in the new regime risked alienating poor peasants who had supported the revolution at 
great personal risk and, moreover, whom the revolution was ostensibly to benefit. 
 
Subsequent to Nguyễn Kháng‘s report and over the next few months of 
institutionalizing DRV rule, the region‘s Party Committee worked with districts to 
―reinspect‖ the backgrounds and personnel files of local government representatives. 
On the one hand, their findings revealed ―many major errors‖ among local government 
officials. In six surveyed districts of Sơn La and Lai Châu, between 60-95% of 
commune representatives and village heads were ―old puppet authorities‖ and hailed 
from Thái hereditary nobility (Phìa tạo). Yet, except for some egregious cases 
requiring dismissal, the Committee also acknowledged that many of these ―former 
puppets‖ had brought along skills and specialized local knowledge that made them 
―comrades‖ suitable for DRV local government.165 On the other hand, their findings 
revealed the results of what Nguyễn Kháng had proposed to do to solve these 
problems, i.e. to rely on ―downstream‖ Party members. As of February 1953, of the 
Zone‘s total 513 official VWP Party-member cadres, 425 were identified as ―ethnic 
Kinh‖ and only 18 as ―ethnic minority.‖166 The new Kinh Party regime became 
inextricably bound up with a Thái bureaucracy carried over from the old.
167
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By March 1953 spatial patterns began to emerge with respect to the Northwest 
Zone‘s free and newly liberated areas. Free areas in the Zone‘s eastern reaches of Yên 
Bái had ―long established government‖ where cadres and representatives had been 
―authenticated.‖ Yet assessments of recently liberated areas in the Zone‘s western 
provinces of Sơn La and Lai Châu were far more equivocal: ―regarding our local 
government, enemy puppet authorities have been wiped out and new government 
established but the backgrounds of a vast majority are puppet authorities.‖168 This 
statement betrays a contradictory form of double-speak: if old officials were truly 
―wiped out‖ (xoa bỏ), how did they hang on in the new regime? Moreover, many 
communes in Sơn La and Lai Châu ―still had no local government,‖ indicating, 
perhaps, that Federation officials continued as before even in areas of nominal DRV 
control.
169
 While the eastern province of Nghĩa Lộ instituted training sessions to 
school officials in ―democratic sensibility‖ by late December 1952, the western 
provinces of Sơn La and Lai Châu reported comparable sessions only as of mid-April 
1953.
170
 In other words, the further west one traveled, the more the change in rule 
appeared to be a change in name only: the bureaucracy remained much the same.   
Based on the use of ―Phìa,‖ or Thái lord, in association with DRV-recognized 
local leaders, many—if not all—of the examples cited above appear to come from 
muang areas of historic Thái settlement and spatialized relations of domination. What 
about leadership of non-Thái social groups inhabiting the slopes and mountains 
between the Thái-dominated valleys? Although the sources are largely silent on this 
question, the strange case of ―Khu Mèo 99‖ or ―Hmong Zone 99‖ provides a revealing 
glimpse. In December 1952, Nguyễn Kháng located this Hmong Zone in Sơn La 
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province either in the district of Phù Yên or lying alongside it. Unlike other districts, 
where, ―governments are being established,‖ he stated that Hmong Zone 99 ―still 
allowed the old regime principle‖ with a distinct set of local rulers bearing titles 
distinct from any recent or ongoing forms of rule, i.e. contemporary DRV, French 
Military Territory, and Thái Federation.
171
 In fact, the titles of ―thong ly, thong quan, 
Xa phai‖ most likely originated with recognition of local leaders by Chinese dynastic 
courts dating as far back as the 6
th
 century!
172
  
In March 1953, while reporting that many communes in the Zone‘s west had 
―no local government,‖ Nguyễn Kháng reported ―separately‖ (riêng) on Hmong Zone 
99, referring to it as an ―old base area‖ (cơ sở cũ)—implicitly indicating long-standing 
ties between local residents and early revolutionary guerilla activity.
173
 Cadres 
working there, he explained, had ―still not yet established local government because 
they evaluated the people‘s level as too low, did not believe they had reached the 
proper level for local government.‖ This is a language of cultural superiority and 
alleged inferiority. ―Although the upper class is rightist deviationist (hữu khuynh),‖ he 
continued, ―they still have prestige among the people and we have held onto old 
leaders (thong ly).‖174 Notwithstanding their allegedly distasteful political sensibilities, 
traditional authority remained in place as before. In contrast to neighboring Thái areas, 
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therefore, not even the titles of officials in this one Hmong area changed. Given the 
titles appear to date from a period long before French colonial rule, their acceptance 
by DRV officials indicates the persistence of an externally-recognized, culturally-
specific set of Hmong ruling relations. Indeed, the DRV would later recognize 
―Hmong Zone 99‖ and two other Hmong ―Ethnic Districts‖ (Mu-cang-chai, Tua chua) 
as Hmong Autonomous Districts (Châu Mèo tự trị) within the Thái-Mèo Autonomous 
Zone in 1955.
175
 
By mid-April 1953, the Party‘s Northwest Committee ―still‖ had yet to 
―authenticate‖ all ranks of local government. Yet, by now, official language had 
changed from a concern with ―old puppet authorities‖ to a concern with class and 
status background. The Committee reported that ―landlords, rich peasants, and gentry‖ 
composed ―most‖ of the leadership on a ―majority‖ of Committees and Front 
organizations. Regional leaders worried that allowing a re-emergent local elite to 
remain in local offices—precisely those institutions that represented ―the state‖ to ―the 
people‖ in everyday affairs—risked the new government‘s legitimacy. In contrast to 
an ideal of radiant light, their institutional role was ―dim‖ (lu mờ) because the 
personnel effectively ―obstruct the implementation of Party and Government 
policy.‖176  
In addition to local government, the Party Committee also expressed grave 
concern over composition of the police force, the very institution charged with 
regulating and inspecting (i.e., ―authenticating‖) local government personnel. In 
compliance with a Central Decision, the Northwest Committee reported on personnel 
files assembled from each police post (ty). They found ―many rather serious facts,‖ 
such as the post in Lào Cai where 80% of policemen had ―relations with the enemy‖; 
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many had worked with Japanese occupiers; and many had served as soldiers with, 
and/or attended the military academy of, the Nationalist Party (Quốc Dân Đảng).177 
Although Lào Cai‘s police ranks appeared to be an extreme case, the findings exhibit a 
broader pattern. As a highly-contested frontier in the remaking, the region‘s complex 
and mutable relations of rule rendered labels such as a single ―enemy‖ opposed to a 
single ―friend‖ overly simplistic. Nonetheless, Party officials and regional leaders used 
these labels to enforce—and justify—their singularizing political project.   
The shift in language noted above, from worries about old officials in the new 
regime to preoccupations with their class and status background, indicated a larger 
reorientation as to how to regulate Vietnam‘s emerging relations of rule. Shortly after 
the Northwest Committee‘s April report, Phạm Văn Đồng issued orders in May 1953 
to select commune officials with ―clean‖ (trong sạch) class backgrounds consistent 
with an emerging program of national, class-based land reform. This order not only 
conflicted with both the Ethnic Policy‘s emphasis on building a united front among 
―ethnic minority‖ peoples (i.e., encouraging elite participation in government) and the 
leniency policy‘s allowance for colonial officials to do the same. His policy also 
conflicted with the ongoing and profoundly uneven implementation of land reform: as 
discussed below, the ―Northwest‖ stood in stark contrast to other parts of ―Vietnam.‖ 
More than recognizing old officials in new guise, reproducing traditional authority 
was also a matter of reproducing elite control over the means of agrarian production. 
What may have been a pragmatic choice, therefore, opened the emerging DRV regime 
to a potentially damning contradiction: collaborating with the same reactionary 
traitors, feudalists, and enemies the so-called people‘s revolution sought to replace.   
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(Not) reforming land relations  
Just as the People‘s Army enforced a nation-state claim on the Northwest and 
cadres set about (re)constructing DRV institutions, Central Party leaders moved mass 
mobilization for land reform to the top of its agenda. For revolutionary leaders and 
their supporters alike, this temporal coincidence in early 1953 raised a spatial 
question: how to proceed with revolutionary land reform in forcibly acquired territory? 
On the one hand, advancing a united front and implementing the Party‘s Ethnic Policy 
had meant appealing to rich peasant as well as poor. Yet these same social positions 
rested on their historically unequal access to land resources. So, on the other hand, the 
Party-state‘s decision on what to do about land relations risked losing the support of 
one class-identified group or another. The DRV‘s public agenda for revolutionary 
social transformation was at odds with its own underlying territorial imperative. 
If access to productive land is central to social reproduction in agrarian 
societies, then the Black River region has long illustrated this rule. For this historic 
hinterland, where labor was relatively scarce and land seemingly abundant, the 
mountainous topography meant that choice irrigable land was actually in short supply. 
Thái Federation rule had re-empowered hereditary Thái nobility accustomed to the 
muang form and granted them control over irrigable land, labor, taxation, and 
residence. The peasants who grew irrigated rice in the Federation‘s system had only 
partial control over their labor and even less control over land. During the 1952 
Northwest Campaign, peasants impressed DRV officials by working ―day and night to 
meet the harvest, not letting fields go fallow‖ in spite of strafing and bombing by 
French warplanes. They greeted the ―liberators‖ with calls to redistribute wet-rice 
fields equally among them, particularly land held by the Thái nobility in common 
(ruộng công) and land used to pay Federation officials (ruộng chức). ―Almost 
everywhere in each and every place,‖ observed the Northwest‘s Party Committee, 
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―people who have no wet-rice land ask the Government to divide the land of traitors 
and officials on the people‘s behalf; the people‘s general aspiration is desire for even 
redistribution of common land.‖178 
The ―Government,‖ however, was loath to risk elite Thái support for fear of 
losing its recent territorial gains. If VWP and DRV leadership heard the calls of the 
region‘s poor peasants, then they listened to the Prime Minister‘s delegate. Although 
―the Northwest generally and Thái majority areas particularly have many complex 
social problems, many feudal relationships,‖ observed Phan Mỹ, he warned that, ―if 
cadres do not investigate [problems and relationships] thoroughly, do not adhere to 
guidelines closely, then the reactionary feudalists can easily spread counter 
propaganda.‖179 In early 1953, central Party leadership reversed united front policy 
and approved measures on how to deal with a ―feudal‖ and ―exploitative‖ regime, i.e. 
to smash it. Yet peremptorily stripping the Thái elite of land privileges aggravated 
tensions between them and cadres.
180
 In the Northwest Zone, therefore, the VWP 
suspended this prescription in favor of caution and delay, ordering cadres to conduct 
―careful research on the complex problem‖ and to develop detailed plans that only the 
Center could approve.
181
 In other words, pursuing an alliance with Thái elites was 
unsavory but necessary to maintain tenuous social and territorial control.  
Over the next year, the spatial limits of ostensibly ―national‖ agrarian 
transformation became clear through a series of orders issued by the Central 
Government and enforced by the Northwest Zone‘s Party Committee. Ultimately, the 
evolving Ethnic Policy and agrarian reform agenda converged to declare the 
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Northwest Zone an ―ethnic minority area,‖ exempting it from the full extent of state-
directed agrarian change.
182
 Throughout DRV-controlled Vietnam, soldiers, local 
officials, and poor peasants chafed at the slow rate of change.
183
 In the Northwest 
Zone, they responded to Central Government decisions and regional enforcement with 
a sense of betrayal, revealing tensions between center and emergent frontier as well as 
splits within ―the state‖ itself. Exploring how, why, and to what effect agrarian reform 
differed in the Northwest offers insight into the terms of national inclusion, the 
absorption and reproduction of traditional authority, and the spatial heterogeneity of 
rule. What emerges is a tale of accommodating an ethnicized social hierarchy, elite 
resistance to even modest change, and conflict over the revolutionary agenda.  
 
In early 1953, as cadres took stock of land relations in the Northwest Zone, the 
question of agrarian reform took on new urgency in Central Party discussions in the 
Việt Bắc base area. In January, the Workers‘ Party convened its Central Committee‘s 
4
th
 Plenum during which discussions on linking land reform to anti-colonial struggle 
featured prominently. In respective speeches inspired by the ―great success‖ of land 
reform in the People‘s Republic of China, President Hồ Chí Minh and Party Secretary 
Trường Chinh declared it time to commence the first stages of agrarian land reform 
through a process of mobilizing the masses.
184
 The struggle against foreign 
imperialism, explained Trường Chinh, could succeed only by striking feudalism at 
home, making land reform the ―crux‖ of the national democratic revolution. He 
declared, ―The national democratic revolution is a peasant revolution. The war of 
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national liberation is also, essentially, a peasant war.‖185 Nonetheless, the Secretary 
recognized that such a potentially divisive program required a broad mandate. Thus, 
he called for a vigorous discussion ―at all levels‖ and declared that the National 
Assembly would meet to debate and decide on the issue of land reform, which they 
did (for the first time in seven years) in December 1953. The aims of national 
liberation (i.e., anti-colonial war) and agrarian revolution (i.e., class-based social 
transformation) now converged—and conflicted.    
The modified central policy left the desired ends of land reform and the stages 
in which it unfolded much the same. Agrarian reform had begun several years earlier 
in 1951 with the implementation and centralization of a progressive agricultural tax.
186
 
Early stages of land reform proper commenced with rent and interest reduction; and 
then proceeded with the confiscation and redistribution of land held both by ―traitors‖ 
and in common.
187
 Only later, when conditions permitted, would land reform evolve 
into full-scale, equitable land redistribution or, ―land to the tiller‖ (người cày có 
ruộng).188 In the DRV‘s emerging territory and among its subject population at large, 
these stages played out between 1953-56 and were followed by a ―rectification of 
errors campaign‖ in 1957.189 
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What did change, and what mattered most in 1953, was a new campaign to 
―mobilize the masses‖ (phát động quần chúng) as the force used to implement 
agrarian reform.
190
 If equitable land distribution was still the desired end result, then 
mass mobilization was now its means. Prior to the 4
th
 Plenum, Party policy had 
admonished peasants to please wait, to adhere to the united front in favor of forming a 
broad anti-colonial resistance. Now, Trường Chinh and Hồ Chí Minh encouraged the 
peasants to press forward with their demands, to rally around their class interests, and 
to strike landlords.
191
 ―The content of mass mobilization,‖ stated Trường Chinh, ―is to 
lead the peasants in the struggle against traitors and village tyrants,‖ and, through such 
mass action, to weaken the power of ―feudal‖ control in rural areas.192 The ―enemy‖ 
was no longer just an externalized foreign colonial bandit; now its meaning had shifted 
and expanded subtly to include an internalized feudal criminal. Yet, as the following 
discussion of the Northwest indicates, the presence or absence of officially-recognized 
―ethnicity‖ among the DRV‘s subject populations rendered the persecution of alleged 
class crimes spatially uneven.  
Of course, as the President and Party Secretary both emphasized, leadership of 
such popular action was reserved for the DRV and the VWP. Following the Chinese 
example, they ceased to entrust agrarian reform to local cadres, authorities, and mass 
organizations because of their suspect class backgrounds. Instead, teams of specially-
trained cadres traveled to each commune to learn from and educate its poorest 
constituents by practicing the ―three togethers,‖ i.e. working, living, eating together.193 
These cadres arrived with orders to reorganize Farmers Councils (Nông hội), local 
mass organizations considered the ―nucleus‖ (nòng cốt) for rural reform. After 
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reforming Farmers Councils, these cadres would then lead the ―rectification‖ of all 
commune level institutions—including Party cells—by replacing membership with 
mostly poor and landless (and some middle) peasants.
194
 Farmers Councils thus played 
a crucial dual role both in land reform and the reorganization of local government. In 
this way, DRV and Party leaders increased their own capacity to regulate village-
based power relations and to mobilize agrarian resources.
195
  
Even during the Northwest Campaign itself, local Party reports document 
popular discussion of these issues and signal an awareness of debates among the 
DRV‘s central leadership. Once again, in late February, the Zone‘s Party officials 
forwarded requests from ―each and every place where some people do not own land‖ 
to redistribute equitably the land held by traitors, officials, and in common.
196
 For 
cadres in and peoples of the Northwest, however, following the Central Government‘s 
response meant delaying land reform indefinitely and curtailing mass mobilization.  
Central Government and Party orders in spring 1953 invoked a special status 
for the Northwest and other ―ethnic minority areas.‖ Decree 149-SL of 12 April 1953 
issued a formal mandate both to reduce rent and interest as well as to redistribute land 
commonly held and confiscated from ―traitors.‖197 Just after Decree 149-SL was 
promulgated, however, the Party‘s Central Executive Committee issued a companion 
order to limit its implementation. Party Secretary Trường Chinh instructed cadres in 
―areas of entirely ethnic minorities, especially those areas still adhering to a hereditary 
nobility,‖ to postpone mass mobilization.198 Only in select ―ethnic minority areas‖ and 
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only with approval from the Party‘s ―upper level‖ could mass mobilization proceed. 
Even then, several strict criteria applied: participation of qualified local cadres; ―ethnic 
unity‖ based on ―equality, interdependence, cooperation, fraternity‖; respect for the 
masses‘ customs and beliefs. If and when ―mass mobilization‖ were to be carried out, 
his instructions warned, ―do not allow class struggle to evolve into disagreement 
between ethnicities.‖199 Indeed, the center‘s fear of ethnically-coded unrest in the 
Northwest Zone largely forestalled radical efforts to lead class-based reform there. 
From their perspective, not only was the Zone‘s territory ―strategic and important‖ 
because of its borders and frontiers, it was also home to a population of ―entirely 
ethnic minorities.‖ 
Such directives indicate the intent of Trường Chinh and Party leadership to 
maintain tight control over mass mobilization for land reform broadly and in ―ethnic 
minority areas‖ particularly. In response, the Northwest Zone‘s Party Committee in 
spring 1953 departed from its earlier advocacy on behalf of landless peasants to 
comply with the Party line. As the region‘s highest VWP office, the Zonal Committee 
closely monitored the process and disciplined any ―errors‖ in the field. In line with the 
Party guidelines and criteria above, the Zone‘s regional officials implemented these 
measures on a very small scale and only in limited areas. Efforts at transforming 
agrarian land relations followed the same tripartite spatial matrix—zones considered 
free, newly liberated, or occupied—used to regulate the construction of state 
institutions. In general, agrarian reform began in free zones before moving to areas 
more recently ―liberated.‖ Only the agricultural tax was broadly applied. In terms of 
land reform proper, in those few areas where conditions permitted, teams of cadres 
were sent to work with Farmers Councils to reduce land rents and to redistribute a 
portion of land held by ―traitors.‖ Even given such limited implementation, however, a 
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re-emergent elite sabotaged each stage of agrarian reform. 
 
In 1952 and into 1953, the Northwest‘s landed proprietors resisted taxation and 
demonstrated their continuing power in relation to state institutions charged with 
reforming agrarian relations of production. In so doing, they established a pattern that 
would characterize early efforts at agrarian reforms there more generally. ―The class 
of landlords, rich peasants, [and] hereditary nobility,‖ wrote the Zone‘s Political 
Commissar in mid-April 1953, ―still find ways to make false declarations of area and 
yield and disperse their fields in order to reduce their contributions…‖200 Indeed, elite 
resistance to taxation indicates their collective strength as well as the weak 
institutionalization of agrarian reforms.  
Even in free zones, efforts at land reform proper were similarly thwarted by 
elites bent on maintaining control over land. As of January 1953, in Yên Bái and Lào 
Cai, wealthy peasants and landlords continued to charge ―excessive‖ rent either in 
secret or undermined rent control by claiming payment in labor. They also seized 
capital (seedstock, draft animals) cadres had just distributed to the poor.
201
 By late 
February, what little land redistribution had occurred in these two provinces—13 
fields confiscated from French cultivators and ―traitors‖—was beset by difficulties. 
Once cadres left a village, poor farmers often returned the fields to their former 
owners, a pattern that points to the continuing power of local elites. Traders (not 
farmers) improperly received a share. Cadres allocated land on quantity alone and did 
not attend to its productive quality, leaving poor farmers—once again—farming land 
of poor fertility.
202
 In short, elite resistance to agrarian reforms overpowered cadres‘ 
limited efforts to organize poor peasants and expand access to the means of agrarian 
                                                 
200
 Nguyễn Kháng, ―Báo cáo…‖ 15 Apr 1953, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 471, p. 5. 
201
 Đảng LĐVN, ―Báo cáo…‖ 27 Feb 1953, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 471, p. 11. 
202
 Ibid. p. 12. 
 216 
production.  
In light of these experiences in free zones, the Zone‘s Party Committee 
evaluated Farmers Councils and local party infrastructure as weak and unclear about 
Central Government policy. Though membership in Farmers Councils and other front 
organizations had soared, members still lacked sufficient ―education‖ and their 
activities were ―disconnected.‖203 In response to these and other calls for clarification 
and guidance, the Central Government would issue revised guidelines in September. 
Meanwhile, by mid-April, newly liberated zones in Sơn La and Lai Châu 
further illustrated the fraught nature of agrarian reform. The Province of Lai Châu 
established a ―policy‖ (chủ trưởng) to reserve a portion of land held in common to 
furnish commune officials and village heads with royalties, effectively re-
institutionalizing an old Thái practice. In several (re)liberated districts of Sơn La such 
as Mường La, Tuần Giáo, and Quỳnh Nhai, local cadres took the initiative to 
redistribute official and common land to poor peasants. In addition to extending poor 
peasants their sympathies and a concrete solution to their poverty, local cadres aimed 
to fulfill the intent of another policy (to boost production) by bringing fallow land into 
production during the upcoming growing season. Yet each of these efforts met with a 
reprimand from the Zone‘s Party Committee for violating the Center‘s cautionary 
policy, for ―solving the land problem hastily.‖ Whether the local response to land 
reform was reactionary or radical, the Committee issued the same order to both 
deviants, instructing Lai Châu province and Sơn La‘s local cadres to ―repair these 
errors.‖ Further, the Zone‘s Party leadership ordered local cadres to study the problem 
of class and land ownership in order to prepare for future mass mobilization.
204
  
In September, a proposal specified the character of ―mass mobilization‖ in the 
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Northwest Zone.
205
 Introducing ―this important area in our country‖ in terms of its 
―strategic importance‖ for the military, the program described how mass mobilization 
would apply to this ―ethnic minority area.‖ This is a two-fold claim, both to territory 
and on subject populations, and a militarized prescription for securing both. The 
proposal assessed the region‘s unique social conditions and noted the persistence 
under French colonial rule of a Thái hereditary landed nobility (phìa tạo) commanding 
bonded labor (cuông nguột). Similar to Trường Chinh‘s assessment of ―Vietnam‖ as a 
whole, these conditions ―clearly prove[d] [that] imperialism and feudalism closely 
collude with one another.‖ Whereas for Central Party leaders the collusion of domestic 
and foreign exploitation merited a national program of mass mobilization for land 
reform to smash feudalism, by contrast, the particular character of this Northwestern 
collusion now only merited mass mobilization there as such, i.e. divorced from 
reforming land relations.
206
 ―The goal of this mobilization is principally political,‖ 
reads the proposal, ―this is not the mass mobilization to implement land reform like in 
downstream areas.‖ Whereas mass action undergirded land reform in downstream 
deltas, mass action was deliberately separated from land reform in upstream 
mountains. In recently liberated ―ethnic minority areas of the Northwest,‖ orders the 
proposal, ―to mobilize the masses is to topple traitors to the Vietnamese nation, sweep 
out remnants of enemy armies, spring a surprise attack on local bandits, construct a 
people’s government...‖207 Without land reform, what remained in the vessel of ―mass 
mobilization‖ was, essentially, a military program to ferret out Federation and French 
forces and a political program to remake and incorporate a loyal Thái elite.  
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If ―national unity‖ always euphemizes an unequal distribution of power 
relations, then its function in an emerging Vietnam had spatially and temporally 
specific dimensions. Downstream it disguised an ascendant agrarian proletariat while 
upstream it cloaked a renewed, ethnicized agrarian aristocracy. In the Northwest Zone, 
much to the chagrin of local revolutionaries and poor peasants, a particular form of 
pan-ethnic mobilization took precedence over class-based action for social 
transformation. According to the September clarification, this ―preliminary‖ (sơ bộ) 
form of mobilization took into account the Northwest‘s different ―level‖ (trình độ) in 
relation to ―our country.‖208 In this region, a ―unified ethnic front‖ (mặt trần dân tộc 
thống nhất) took on a specifically ―broad‖ character to ―include all ethnicities and all 
classes who love the country, resist French imperialism and national traitors.‖ As long 
as one declared loyalty to the new regime, the Government overlooked one‘s 
involvement in class crimes. In ―newly liberated areas,‖ as long as Thái lords were not 
―traitorous,‖ the order not only permitted bonded labor (cuông nguột) but went further 
by advocating it as ―advantageous‖ in Thái Federation-held areas of ―not yet 
liberated‖ Lai Châu!209 In the short term then, ―liberation‖ portended profoundly 
different meanings in a highly stratified society: renewing privilege for an elite and 
bondage for poor peasants. This long-awaited clarification sent a clear message to 
cadres in the field: in order to facilitate militarized territorial expansion, they should 
incorporate loyal elites and not disturb the foundations of their power and prestige.  
By prioritizing the category of ethnicity over class or gender, the Party-state 
afforded male Thái elites ample opportunity to reproduce their control over land, 
labor, and office. In addition to the ―tricks‖ aimed at dodging agrarian reform, these 
same elites had completed the circle by staffing emergent institutions charged with 
                                                 
208
 Anon., ―Đề nghị…‖ Sept 1953, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 1258, p. 2, 3. 
209
 Ibid. p. 3. 
 219 
implementing policy emanating from the Central Government, the Party‘s Central 
Committee, and the Zone‘s Party Committee. That Thái elites composed a majority of 
officials in a majority of local government offices illustrates their continued hold on 
bureaucratic power as well. Later, after the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign, the Zone‘s Party 
officials in October 1954 called what they contributed (un)intentionally to creating—
and what was still in effect—an ―ethnic contradiction.‖210 
 
 How did conditions look on the ground? Answering this question builds on a 
report by Duong Hông Quang dated 22 November 1953, entitled, ―Land holding and 
feudal power in ethnic Thái areas of the Northwest.‖211 The report required translation 
into ―Vietnamese letters‖ and its text is accompanied by Chinese characters, perhaps 
indicating that its author was an advisor from the PRC and his name an alias. The 
identity of the author is significant not only because it may indicate how, and to what 
degree, Chinese advisors participated in the DRV‘s land reform.212 Moreover, that the 
author may not have been Vietnamese and therefore not a VWP member, perhaps 
enabled him to disagree so emphatically with the Northwest Party Secretary. At a 
conference in September 1953, the Secretary had opined that ―the Thái lords (phìa 
tạo) have no economic power (thế lực)‖ and, as such, the ―alleged Thái lords‖ were, in 
fact, only ―landlords‖ (địa chủ) and, further, that village chiefs (tạo bản) were simply 
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―middle peasants‖ (trung nông).213 In response, Duong Hông Quang noted, 
parenthetically, ―on what basis?‖ His report provides a closely argued and richly 
documented rebuttal based on regional data as well as a field survey conducted 
subsequently in Quang Huy commune, Phù Yên district, Sơn La province. The 
following analysis draws on his findings. 
The Cầm clan‘s success at retaining office and dominating land access in a 
corner of Sơn La serves as a concrete example of a broader pattern. Emerging DRV 
rule reproduced regionally-specific, locally-inflected, mutually-constituted relations of 
rule and production.  
Originally, prominent Cầm clan members had held positions in the colonial 
regime but fled into exile once they turned to support the revolution. After the 
Northwest Campaign, they returned to positions of prominence. Cầm Văn Nô became 
district chair of Phù Yên. Among his two sons, one became secretary of Quang Huy 
commune‘s Party cell and earned a seat on the district‘s standing committee; the other 
served in the military as a political officer. All three were Party members. Ensconced 
in these positions, through ―work as our cadres,‖ they also maintained a grip on ―good 
land‖ while poor peasants continued to labor on ―poor land.‖ In Quang Huy, 67 of 240 
families claimed membership in the Cầm clan (28%), enabling a powerful minority to 
claim a majority of land, or 126 of 173 mẫu Thái (73%); 130 other families controlled 
the remaining 46 mẫu (27%) and 36 families were left landless.214 Just as male Thái 
elites regained positions of official power, they also managed—through covert 
resistance and overt participation in political processes—to hold onto land resources 
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and maintain economic power as well.  
Although the Central Government was most concerned about inter-ethnic 
divisions (i.e., threats to ―national unity‖), the Black River region‘s many societies 
were also divided intra-ethnically along lines of class, status, gender, and age. Even 
within a given ethnicity or, further, within a given ethnically homogenous settlement, 
relations among ―peasants‖ were predicated on a hierarchical ordering of access and 
control to land and labor resources. Among the Thái, noble senior males allocated land 
rights.
215
 And these unequal social relations of land and rule were persisting through a 
period of what was, ostensibly, to be their revolutionary change.  
This renewal of elite power revealed a contradiction in the revolutionary 
program as it unfolded in the Northwest. Because Central Government and Party 
leadership prioritized expanding territorial control, they reproduced elite control over 
office, land, and labor. The Central Government‘s interest in maintaining stable rule, 
therefore, undermined its program of agrarian reform. Furthermore, another even 
larger inequality was off the table: redistributing wet-rice land controlled 
disproportionately by Thái elites to Hmong, Dao, Khu Mu, and other swidden 
cultivators was not even mentioned. Refigured as the Northwest Zone, the Black River 
region was becoming an exceptional ―ethnic‖ place existing, uncomfortably at times, 
within the bounds of national space.  
This exceptional place enjoyed de facto local autonomy during the war and its 
de jure form afterwards, following the establishment in 1955 of what would be called 
the Thái-Mèo Autonomous Zone. During the anti-colonial war, the Party-state‘s 
decision to forego transforming rural relations of land and rule facilitated the 
expansion of territorial control by absorbing muang structures and leaders into the 
(seemingly) uniform grid of spatialized institutions. Forming an alliance with local 
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leaders, such as select members of the Cầm clan, carried great strategic weight during 
the war.
216
 Co-opting the local muang spatial unit and its leadership spared time and 
effort. The emerging Ethnic Policy remained in effect: win over the upper classes—i.e. 
preserve their privileged positions—and recognize their traditional authority 
bureaucratically. Regionally specific orders on mass mobilization—i.e., ―do not allow 
class struggle to evolve into disagreement between ethnicities‖—allowed for wet-rice 
land to remain in Thái control. 
If central and regional leaders intended the incorporation of local political and 
economic structures to facilitate the spatial expansion of national territorial rule, then 
this program gave rise to a number of unintended consequences as well. Perhaps most 
of all, one ethnically defined group assumed in the new regime a position of local rule 
once reserved for another ethnic and familial group in the old regime, i.e. the now 
discredited Đèo clan. If Central Government policy cast the Northwest Zone as an 
―ethnic place,‖ then the Thái enjoyed a privileged position within it. The multitude of 
other ―ethnic‖ groups living on the slopes and mountains must have viewed the DRV‘s 
preferential treatment of the valley-dwelling Thái with suspicion. For the multitude of 
highland Hmong, Dao, and other social groups, Thái rule of the Black River region 
continued much as before. Only this time the Thái were no longer supported by French 
empire but, instead, by a nation-state in the making. Indeed, there were uncanny 
parallels, and concrete relations, between emerging territorial and demographic 
majoritarianisms: between the Thái upstream in the Northwest Zone and the Kinh 
downstream in the Central Government. In this light, what was called ―Thái-Kinh 
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unity‖ in the mid 1940s foreshadowed the formation of a powerfully exclusive—and 
ultimately dis-unifying—political alliance. 
Unintended consequences also compromised prominent items in the DRV 
agenda. Like the agricultural tax, recruitment for labor service suffered legitimation 
problems and fell prey to abuse. The DRV empowered local commune officials to 
recruit peasant labor to build roads and assist the military in the name of national 
citizenship duty. Yet the old guard‘s continuing involvement in labor recruitment and 
allocation risked tainting citizenship duties (dân công) by associating it with a 
―feudal‖ Thái tradition (cuông nhốc) and its ―exploitative‖ Federation variant (bắt 
phu). Accustomed to commanding bonded labor as lords in the Thái tradition, many 
new officials reproduced this tradition in new guise by manipulating the dân công 
program to funnel labor towards personal gain. Or they allowed family members to 
shirk their duties. Cầm clan and Party members alike drew on their new authority to 
avoid labor obligations, leaving poor families to pick up a disproportionate burden.
217
  
Abuse of institutional powers and limited land reform also led to splits in 
supposedly unified entities. Official reports from the Northwest Zone in the 1950s are 
littered with descriptions of the ―people‖—i.e., the revolutionary peasantry—as 
―anxious‖ or ―worried‖ (thắc mắc). Their expression of thắc mắc points to a feeling of 
deep unease concerning relations of power.
218
 Poor peasants wondering about their 
place in the new regime must have felt great anxiety. Though problems related to class 
allegiance were a social cleavage in ―Vietnam‖ as a whole, what is curious about the 
Northwest—something not lost on local observers—is their inversion. Whereas ―mass 
mobilization‖ targeted bourgeois and landlord everywhere else, in the Northwest Zone 
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these class and status factions enjoyed a renewed right to privilege, leaving poor 
peasants to toil and endure as usual. The rising tide of expectations generated by the 
promise of revolutionary social change stopped at the mountains. 
This curious state of affairs threatened the anti-colonial resistance and revealed 
splits within ―the state‖ itself. By late November 1953, poor peasants and local cadres 
alike greeted the ―united ethnic front‖ with growing anger and frustration. Faced with 
an entrenched Thái elite who bent any attempt at agrarian reform to their advantage, 
Duong Hông Quang described the land situation as, ―very severe, and the people are 
very dissatisfied (bất mãn).‖ Frustrated in their attempts to ―reform society,‖ Phù 
Yên‘s district cadres vented ―disagreement with the Central Government‘s 
circumscribed policy of ‗mass mobilization.‘‖ They offered a radical counter-
proposal: ―to carry out zealously the work of purging all unclean elements belonging 
to the upper class.‖219 That district cadres advocated violence against the Cầm clan—
recognized Party members, military officers, and DRV officials—points to the 
tensions embedded in emerging relations of rule and the instability of ―the state‖ as a 
mythically unified entity. Through 1953-54, the Center worked through the Northwest 
Party Committee as a moderating influence on the designs of such radical local 
cadres—and poor peasants—opposed to re-institutionalized traditional power. Such 
splits within ―state‖ reveal the formation, if only temporary, of spatialized alliances 
belying any neat state-society divide: poor peasants allied with radical cadres; 
officialized local elites and regional cadres with central leaders.     
If cleavages in the social hierarchy proved a potent source of division in this 
―ethnic area,‖ not all peasants responded according to class interests. Like the story of 
the lightning bolt at Mộc Châu, the persistence of popular traditions running counter to 
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rational interests points to the limits of revolutionary logic. Power in Thái 
communities was diffuse and permeated everyday social life—at once outside of, yet 
still embedded within, positions of recognized authority and means of agrarian 
production. ―The veneration of the masses regarding the house of Cầm,‖ stated Duong 
Hông Quang, ―is very clear in everyday activities.‖ In ritual activities such as harvest 
festivals, prayers, feasts, funerals, and any other routine ―holidays,‖ Thái peasants all 
continued to grant the Cầm an elevated stature. Returning from exile to reclaim their 
hereditary positions, members of the Cầm clan likened their homecoming to a late 
blooming flower:  
 
A lotus flower in a pond, for many years did not bloom,  
[but] this year it blossoms.  
Because the house of Cầm was dispersed the flower did not bloom,  
now they have returned and the lotus flower blossoms.  
 
Duong Hông Quang observed that many people believed this metaphor to be ―true.‖ 
Similarly, peasants in Quang Huy interpreted the changing course of a stream (Suôi 
Tuc) to announce the failure of French military forces. ―Everyone‖ believed that the 
French failure was linked causally to the house of Cầm‘s ritual efforts to change this 
stream‘s course.220 Interpreting natural events as omens of social change points to an 
element of the Cầm clan‘s power that perplexed cadres but swayed Thái peasants. 
Elite power extended beyond office and rice paddy to capture culturally-embedded 
meaning as well. 
The elite‘s ritual hold on meaning fed back into control over labor. The Cầm 
clan‘s power to call on peasant service exceeded even that which their office extended 
them (a bureaucratic power which they also abused). Cầm Van Khoa returned from 
exile to find his home destroyed by warfare. Known locally as Lord Khoa, he said to 
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peasants, ―Now I am weak and poor, so [I] must request that you help me carefully.‖ 
And many peasants, though hungry and in need of their own labor power, nonetheless 
felt such a mixture of ―love‖ and ―fear,‖ that they built him a new home ―voluntarily.‖ 
Notwithstanding any anger expressed in private to cadres, even radicalized members 
of the peasantry fell silent in public settings attended by this senior member of the 
Cầm clan.221 In spite of their best efforts to forbid such practices, local cadres could 
not stop them. Nor could they understand why a ―liberated‖ peasantry continued to 
follow their former masters. 
They did so only in part because of an old sense of loyalty based on muang 
traditions. Peasants continued to follow their old masters in another part because the 
new regime allowed these relationships to continue. If achieving the nation-state‘s 
expansion into the Northwest required building as large a local coalition as possible, 
then assembling that coalition meant over-riding the revolution‘s transformative 
agenda and leaving ―feudal‖ relationships intact. Its status as an ―ethnic minority area‖ 
meant that efforts to eliminate gender, class, and status based domination were, at least 
temporarily, suspended. The September proposal analyzed above is one of many 
decrees regarding the differential implementation of ostensibly national policy in this 
exceptional place. An October circular, for example, ordered the rectification of 
commune leadership along lines of appropriate class and gender composition but 
stipulated an important caveat. In ―areas of many ethnicities,‖ commune committees 
must reflect ―that ethnic situation‖ and waived class and gender considerations.222  
DRV and Party policy re-inscribed markers of social difference by ascribing 
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―ethnicity‖ to specific locations in abstract national space. Mass Mobilization, Land 
Reform, and Ethnic Policy were of a piece with nationalizing space and re-making 
place. Together, such policy reproduced a binary set of markers, tying social 
categories to elevational gradients in imagined national space and concrete state 
territory. In the delta and plains, one‘s class position and gender were salient and valid 
means of selection for political office; one‘s Kinh identity merited no notice. In the 
mountains, one‘s ethnic identity merited political consideration and, conversely, one‘s 
class and gender position were overlooked. Ascribing social markers differentially in 
terms of national space were (and, in many ways, still are) part and parcel to powerful 
processes of state formation regulating place-based subject formation, resource 
control, and access to bureaucratic office. 
Even if the postponement of agrarian reform was just that—i.e., temporary—
then the association between ethnicity and the mountains was ultimately more lasting 
and consequential. Although this idea and practice had colonial roots, national rule 
embraced a spatialized ethnologic.
223
 On multiple scales, ethnicity was always linked 
discursively to space and place, from generic terms like ―ethnic minority area,‖ to 
select military zones and counties like ―Hmong Zone 99,‖ to enormous official units, 
like the Thái-Mèo Autonomous Zone (created in 1955). Similarly, an emergent nation 
was linked to a bounded terrain, i.e. ―Vietnam,‖ even if its final form was still a 
subject of dispute. In both cases, the emergent DRV drove to construct and consolidate 
abstract space, to remake it into bounded administrative place, and to set the terms for 
national inclusion and exclusion.  
Underlying the war with France was a territorial imperative, to secure terrain 
within national boundaries and to institute a spatialized form of rule. To expand fully 
within its boundaries, pursuing the territorial imperative drove the DRV to incorporate 
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an ethnic-place, a semi-separate frontier space produced in empire and ultimately 
reproduced in nation-state. What remained, in late 1953, was for the People‘s Army to 
embark on another military campaign to secure the Northwest Zone and, consequently, 
drive the French from DRV-claimed ―Vietnam.‖  
 
The Battle of Điện Biên Phủ 
In the midst of DRV debates over how to conduct mass mobilization and land 
reform, the French military began preparations for what would become their decisive 
military showdown at Điện Biên Phủ. In autumn of 1953, the Central Government‘s 
leaders interrupted their debates by responding to the French plan with preparations 
for their own military campaign, forcing local cadres to refocus on the anti-colonial 
struggle. The DRV was about to embark on another push into the Black River region, 
using the People‘s Army to topple the Thái Federation and defeat the French military 
in an attempt to enforce its territorial claim fully and completely. The road to 
centralized power in Hanoi wound through the Black River‘s mountains and reached a 
crossing at the frontier post of Điện Biên Phủ. 
 French military and civilian leaders in the metropole were anxious to stem 
further losses in Indochina. Following the autumn 1952 Northwest Campaign and the 
April 1953 Lao Campaign, the People‘s Army had secured much of the Lao/Viet-
Tonkin hinterland. In May 1953, the arrival in Hanoi of a new Commander in Chief, 
General Navarre, signaled the metropole‘s renewed commitment to Indochina‘s 
territory and prompted a reassessment of military strategy. After its acceptance by 
France‘s Joint Chiefs of Staff in July, what became known as the Navarre Plan 
outlined a military strategy to recover military initiative in Indochina in order to 
negotiate a political settlement with the DRV from a position of strength.
224
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Following on the heels of ceasefire and partition on the Korean peninsula, 
Indochina had emerged as the next hot front in the Cold War. As a result, United 
States government aid to France grew substantially. The Eisenhower administration 
followed the Truman administration‘s precedent by supplying military hardware, 
transport, and funding in support of France‘s war there. Aside from military hardware 
provided through the Pentagon‘s Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP), US 
financial support for France‘s war effort steadily grew year by year in the early 1950s. 
By the fiscal year 1954, US contributions amounted to 78% of the war‘s total cost. 
The US offered Navarre‘s plan crucial financial and diplomatic support, underwriting 
his offensive with $385 million.
225
 As a result, for DRV leaders, the official ―enemy‖ 
was changing again, appearing as an alliance between imperialist French and US 
powers. Likewise, the DRV‘s ―friend‖ now included the People‘s Republic of China.  
The Navarre Plan provided for the construction of an ―air-land base‖ at Điện 
Biên Phủ where the French Expeditionary Forces intended to concentrate their 
strength. They hoped to lure the People‘s Army to this fortified ―airhead‖ position 
(i.e., supplied and reinforced by aircraft) and launch a devastating counterattack. 
Confident in their ability to resupply this remote area by air, they did not imagine that 
the People‘s Army could do the same over land. French military strategists 
underestimated their adversary‘s capacity for fixed position warfare.226  
In addition to protecting a gateway to Laos, General Navarre and his superiors 
miscalculated that building an entrenched camp at Điện Biên Phủ could build on local 
support for the Thái Federation.
227
 Ironically, locating a large French base there 
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actually undercut any of the Federation‘s remaining prestige. Military planners had 
forgotten to account for historic rivalries among two courts now coexisting, uneasily, 
as protectorates within a reconstructed French empire.
228
 For Đèo Văn Long, 
protecting the Lao city of Luang Prabang at the expense of the soon-to-be abandoned 
town of Lai Châu subordinated his domain to French interests in Laos. In addition, 
many residents of Điện Biên were already distrustful of the Thái Federation and 
demonstrated support for the DRV.
229
  
French military planning did not go unnoticed by leaders of an emergent 
Vietnam, who responded, in part, by adjusting their own plans for militarized 
territorial expansion. Chinese intelligence intercepted a copy of the Navarre Plan and 
sent it to officers in the People‘s Army in September 1953, enabling them to amend 
plans for the upcoming winter-spring offensive.
230
 As autumn approached, soldiers 
and officers awaited marching orders and trained in attacking entrenched 
fortifications. In late September, General Giáp and his Chief of Staff Hoàng Văn Thái 
attended a meeting of the Politburo convened in the Việt Bắc to decide military 
strategy. With President Hồ Chí Minh acting as chair, the Politburo meeting was also 
attended by Deputy Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng, Party General Secretary Trường 
Chinh, and Lê Duẩn who led the VWP‘s southern branch. They decided to avoid a 
direct confrontation in areas of French military strength (i.e., the Red River Delta) and, 
instead, opted to launch spatially dispersed operations intended to compel French 
forces to spread thinly.
231
 The resulting Winter-Spring Plan included opening another 
offensive directed towards the Northwest, which, at that point, was defended by only 
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2,000 soldiers in Lai Châu. They hoped to defeat the Thái Federation and to claim for 
―Vietnam‖ the entire northern border with China, from the eastern Việt Bắc stronghold 
westward through the Northwest Zone. By joining forces with Pathet Lao allies across 
the western border, the People‘s Army intended to link this expanded area of military 
control with the territories of northeastern Laos it had already secured in April.
232
  
The French military struck first at Điện Biên Phủ, precipitating the decline of 
the Thái Federation. On November 20
th
 1953, French paratroopers dropped from the 
sky and, over the next two days, reoccupied a valley lost to the People‘s Army only a 
year earlier. They set about digging into the Mường Thanh plain, improving its 
airstrip, and transforming hilltop pastures and swiddens into garrisons ringed with 
barbed wire. On November 23
rd
, these paratroopers welcomed a unit of Thái partisans, 
commanded by Đèo Văn Long‘s son in law, who had just withdrawn from Lai Châu. 
His withdrawal foreshadowed the final French abandonment of Lai Châu two weeks 
later. On December 8
th
 the Thái Federation‘s President, his family, and a troop of 
dancers left on a Boeing C-47 transport plane bound for Hanoi. Đèo Văn Long died in 
exile in France several years later.
233
  
The French landing at Điện Biên Phủ signaled to General Giáp the beginning 
of the People‘s Army‘s own military campaign. On December 6, the Politburo 
approved the General Command‘s Winter-Spring Plan.234 Shortly thereafter, the main 
force once again crossed the Red River and headed back up and into the Black River 
region. The Điện Biên Phủ Campaign had begun. After securing Lai Châu in 
December, some People‘s Army units launched a diversionary attack into Laos before 
regrouping and settling into siege positions surrounding French forces on the Mường 
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Thanh plain. And then they all dug in.  
During the lengthy preparation for fixed position combat, General Giap had 
time both to settle into his bunker in Mường Phăng, situated in the mountains above 
the plain, and to solidify local alliances. In early February, he and his fellow officers 
in the Front Command celebrated the Lunar New Year (Tết) with two key allies. Wei 
Quoging of the Chinese Military Advisory Team offered to share documents from the 
People‘s Liberation Army on lessons they had gleaned from Korea on tactics for siege 
warfare. And, in addition to expressing their New Year‘s wishes, Lò Văn Hạc led a 
delegation of Thái, Hmong, and Dao ―compatriots‖ who expressed their resolve to 
fight alongside the People‘s Army.235 
Full-scale combat did not begin until 13 March 1954. Total French forces, 
including reinforcements, amounted to some 15,000 troops.
236
 They confronted an 
estimated 50,000 combatants from the People‘s Army.237 Combat ended on May 7th in 
victory for the People‘s Army.  
 
Reorienting Center and Frontier 
Nationalist and official narratives of Điện Biên Phủ build irrevocably towards 
the battle‘s outcome and then use the ―great victory‖ there to interpret the region‘s 
prior history anachronistically.
238
 More broadly, scholarly histories periodize 
Vietnam‘s history by using the battle‘s conclusion in 1954 to posit an end and a 
beginning.
239
 In other words, simple stories of Vietnam‘s rupture with French 
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colonialism mask complex tales of conflict and boundary-making among socially 
diverse and politically wayward peoples. This historiographic tendency merits a 
revision.  
The People‘s Army‘s triumph at Điện Biên Phủ was made possible only by 
defeating the Thái Federation‘s rival claim to territory and by enlisting Lai Châu‘s 
population as national subjects and peasant laborers willing to supply a military and 
construct a state. Viewed locally, the capture of Lai Châu meant its people labored to 
support the People‘s Army at Mường Thanh. The Thái Federation‘s collapse meant 
there was no longer a local, viable alternative to hegemonic rule under the DRV. It is 
worth pausing in this moment of transition to analyze how a rising state attempted to 
justify powerful claims with regards to its own legitimacy, as ―state,‖ and to recruit 
Lai Châu‘s people by casting them as members of an imagined community, as 
―nation.‖ Militarized territorial expansion linked these two processes together, 
contributing to an unsteady union between state and nation, or the country of 
―Vietnam.‖ 
What form of rule would replace the Thái Federation? How were existing 
political relations transformed under the new regime? Based on the discussion above, 
one might surmise that autonomy appeared to be the answer. By the time the People‘s 
Army stormed Lai Châu in December 1953, almost two years had elapsed since Party 
Secretary Trường Chinh had recognized a right to autonomy yet chose to delay it; 
almost one year since President Hồ Chí Minh‘s stated it time to grant self-rule; and six 
months since Vice President Phạm Văn Đồng modified their divergent opinions and 
codified the DRV‘s Ethnic Policy. Yet a public bulletin posted by the DRV in Lai 
Châu on 22 December makes no mention of autonomy. 
Written in Romanized Vietnamese (quốc ngữ) and accompanied by a 
translation in White Thái language script, the ―Appeal by the Resistance and 
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Administrative Committee of Lai Châu Province‖ appears similar to the bulletin 
posted on Sơn La‘s ―liberation‖ 14 months earlier.240 Both documents draw on the 
authority of President Hồ Chí Minh, the Government, and the military. Both are 
signed by the respective Chairman of each provincial Resistance and Administrative 
Committee. Whereas Sơn La‘s Bulletin was signed by a critic of the Thái Federation 
and early supporter of the August Revolution, Xa Văn Minh, Lai Châu‘s Appeal 
marked the return of a prodigal son, Lò Văn Hặc.  
If these emergent governing structures in Sơn La and Lai Châu belonged to the 
DRV, so did the leader of each come from old Thái ruling families. Regardless of 
one‘s class-based or ethnic identification, the local population must have recognized 
the significance of some Thái men rising at the expense of others. Far from a 
revolutionary rupture, in fact, it must have appeared to members of local Khumu, 
Hmong, or other marginalized groups that Thái elites remained the externally-
supported and militarily-protected sovereigns of their highland domain. Substitution, 
incorporation, and domination were social processes all part and parcel to making 
relations of state and expanding its territorial domain. For the many non-Thái social 
groups and poor Thái peasants who lived and farmed much as before, local rule 
persisted according to patterns of spatially-specific social relations predicated on the 
muang and its domination by a hereditary elite.  
 Although incorporating an old elite into new state structures implies 
continuity, radical change underlay how new rulers represented themselves and 
relations with their ostensible subjects. The Appeal‘s ambitious text encapsulates a 
revolutionary logic that proposed to re-order collective senses of community, time, 
and space. And this re-ordering of fundamental social, temporal, and spatial moorings 
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was not without purpose: it was meant to galvanize popular support for the DRV‘s 
military ambitions. At this conjuncture in the anti-colonial war, the Appeal articulated 
a logic through which rising political and military leaders staked a claim on scarce 
agrarian resources. This revolutionary logic had been tested and improved in other 
contexts within the evolving boundaries of ―Vietnam,‖ such as neighboring Sơn La. 
For the audience in Lai Châu, this logic was novel, perhaps even moving. 
The Appeal‘s opening lines conjured a revolutionary alliance. Like a letter, the 
Appeal begins by addressing a specific audience: to ―compatriots from the province,‖ 
to ―brother and sister dân công,‖ and to ―all officers, soldiers, and militiamen within 
the province.‖ Note that people from the province, the ―compatriots,‖ retained an 
ethnicized moniker while itinerant dân công—or conscripted laborers—were cast as 
family members. Within this paper alliance, only the official agents of state, i.e. the 
military, gained inclusion without some marker of difference.  
Next, the Appeal deployed an inclusive term of address to bind its audience to 
a new community—the nation. ―For over 80 years,‖ reads its first line, ―the French 
bandits and gang of puppet traitors has exploited our people…‖ Immediately, any 
differences between the three addressed social groups dissolved and reformed under 
the banner of ―our people‖ (nhân dân ta). The ―people,‖ as Trường Chinh defined, 
were actors who were—or, rather, could become—revolutionary partisans; this was 
their intended social function.
241
 More subtle was the use of the particle ta—meaning, 
―we‖ or ―our‖ or ―us‖—that, at once, rendered a collectivity into being.242 It was a 
collectivity predicated on national community and, hence, worked dialectically to 
include some and exclude others. Excluded were the French and the ―traitorous‖ 
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members of the Đèo clan (or other compradors), any remnants of which were recast as 
―bandits‖ (phỉ) to be ―wiped out.‖ Included were these revolutionary partisans. Yet the 
terms of inclusion were—and would remain—problematic: the ethnicized 
―compatriots‖ as somehow other and, according to evolving DRV policy, numerically 
and culturally inferior ―ethnic minorities‖; the dân công as junior family members, or 
common laborers, within a metaphorical national household.
243
  
If the Appeal worked to institutionalize relations of rule (i.e., state) and to 
legitimize them in terms of community membership (i.e., nation), then it also worked 
to establish new conceptions of time. Determining when exactly the national ―we‖ 
expanded to include Lai Châu reveals an equally important and, likewise, problematic 
sense of chronology. As indicated in the opening line, ―For over 80 years…,‖ the 
Appeal recast local history according to a new extra-local periodicity, one that began 
with French conquest of Vietnam‘s northern salient (Bắc bộ or Tonkin). The Appeal 
pointed an accusatory finger directly at the Đèo clan and the French for perpetrating 
an unjust, exploitative system of rule. This indictment marks a crucial departure from 
the bulletin posted in Sơn La which, notably, had glossed over the Thái Federation to 
accuse some vaguely conceived ―Western bandits.‖ Evidently, with Đèo Văn Long 
and the Thái Federation toppled, the enemy‘s local face could be revealed—if only to 
berate and condemn. According to this new story of the past, it was within the period 
of colonial rule that the ―we‖ first appears, as in ―The French bandits divided us…‖; 
how the ―yoke‖ of unjust rule made ―the people of our province‖ suffer.244 So the 
―we‖ worked to capture the (loyal) people of Lai Châu retroactively, reaching into a 
new vision of the past to include them—and exclude their enemies—in a version of 
the present.   
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This is history in service to the present. Indeed, for the authors of this appeal, 
the danger posed by a renewed French force in late 1953 required enlisting ―the 
people‖ to perform arduous, dangerous work. How did they solicit them? Or, how did 
a powerful institutional coalition bound to hereditary elites legitimize claims on 
agrarian resources? By pointing to accomplishments achieved in neighboring Sơn La 
since 1952—redistribution of official land, ―freedom to make a living,‖ government 
assistance—they offered a vision of a brighter future to Lai Châu. And this future 
would begin with the proclaimed end of colonial rule, with the ―total liberation‖ of 
―our cherished province.‖ To escape past exploitation and to achieve future freedom, 
the new government called on Lai Châu‘s people to accept and perform duties in the 
present. This emphasis on future gains in exchange for enduring present difficulties 
cuts to the quick of what was, after all, an appeal, a document intended to enlist 
support for ―our President, Government, military‖—in short, to create and sustain a 
national state with teeth. 
Accepting the authority of ―our‖ state structure meant, also, acknowledging its 
spatially re-oriented relations of rule. Lai Châu‘s population and territorial expanse 
were no longer subject to the Thái Federation, no longer part of French empire. 
Rather, should its readers act on the Appeal, they joined a national liberation 
movement directed by a new center, organized as state according to a hierarchy of 
territorialized institutions. Should they not be persuaded by the appeal‘s revolutionary 
logic, then the suddenly ubiquitous People‘s Army backed it with force. Either way, 
the confederated villages (bản muang) remained in place but their spatial position 
within larger relations of state and interstate rule shifted inexorably. Lai Châu was no 
longer the seat of a semi-autonomous unit of French empire headed by a local ruler. 
Rather, Lai Châu town was district capital (thị xã) of Mường Lay and its surrounding 
area a provincial unit within DRV territorial administration, both refigured as part of a 
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newly consecrated state space known as ―Northwest‖ Vietnam.245    
Of course, not everyone did submit to DRV rule. For the Thái elite, historic 
loyalties to DRV or Federation rule led to career advancement or to death or 
displacement, respectively. Over the next several decades, Xa Văn Minh and Lò Văn 
Hặc rose upwards in the DRV‘s bureaucratic ranks, achieving leadership positions in 
the Autonomous Zone, reaching even the National Assembly. Yet their upward 
mobility pales in comparison to the outward trajectories of their deposed rivals.  
Many supporters of the Federation and French in Sơn La fled in the wake of 
the Northwest Campaign. When the French evacuated the stronghold of Nà Sản on 11 
August 1953, along with 4,750 military personnel including two Thái battalions, they 
airlifted out 1,500 Thái peasants as well.
246
 After a route that wound through Laos, the 
Thái Federation‘s head of Sơn La Province, Bạc Cầm Quý, wound up in Iowa.247  
In areas ―liberated‖ during the Lai Châu and Điện Biên Phủ Campaigns, the 
Đèo clan either fled or faced retribution in place. Đèo Văn Long, the Federation‘s 
ousted President, fled with his retinue to the colonial metropole.
248
 Members of his 
family who remained faced terrible consequences, such as his son Đèo Văn Ún who 
was captured following the battle‘s conclusion. After enduring a public trial, he was 
executed by firing squad on 10 June 1954 near his former office in Điện Biên Phủ.249  
For the common folk of the new Northwest, be they Thái, Hmong, Khumu, 
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etc., the new regime brought change as well as continuity in their daily lives and in 
their relationships to emerging institutional power. Some refused to accept DRV rule 
and took advantage of territorial sovereignty‘s limits by crossing a border, escaping to 
Laos or China. But most stayed behind, to become agents caught up in the process of 
this centralizing power‘s militarized legitimation and territorialization. The next two 
chapters deal with their lot in more detail. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MILITARIZATION, LIBERATION, AND THE POLITICS OF CALCULATION 
 
Introduction: theory, method, and militarizing spaces 
 Theoretical touchstones 
This chapter and the next explore the making of an economy during a time, and 
for the purposes, of war. I begin with Timothy Mitchell‘s argument that the economy 
was, and is, a ―set of practices that puts in place a new politics of calculation.‖1 The 
economy‘s distinguishing feature, its ―character of calculability,‖ signaled the 
emergence of new relations between people and people, people and things. Realized 
and recognized in the 20
th
 century as a realm in and of itself, the economy was a result 
of social processes both real and abstract, material and cultural—all of which in Egypt, 
as in Vietnam, emerge from a longer history of colonialism.
2
   
Discussing militarization and liberation in the Black River region in 1952-54 
serves to apply and enrich arguments about a politics of calculation. When the 
People‘s Army conquered much of the Black River region in late 1952, an emerging 
political elite deployed the idea of ―liberation‖ (giải phóng) to make a dialectical claim 
both to the legitimacy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and to the 
illegitimacy of French colonial and Thái Federation rule. Liberation also figured in the 
categorization of the DRV‘s ―recently liberated‖ and ―temporarily occupied‖ (i.e., not 
yet ―liberated‖) territory. Here, I expand on the idea of liberation to assess a popular 
response to military conquest and to an underlying project enabling more military 
conquest. What I call the liberation effect among an emerging community moved 
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through a series of moments—from enthusiasm for possibility to anxiety about its 
limits—as the project to enumerate, calculate, and claim this community‘s productive 
capacity grew in scale and intensified in scope. ―Liberating‖ a population meant, also, 
subjecting them to state claims on labor and agrarian produce. 
The ambivalence that greeted liberation unfolded during, and was inseparable 
from, the making and remaking of social relations in support of militarized state-
making. ―Militarization,‖ writes Michael Geyer, ―is the contradictory and tense social 
process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence.‖3 
Although Geyer‘s definition locates its origins in ―civil society,‖ he describes how 
militarization blurs any boundaries between forms of civil and military organization.
4
 
Indeed, militarization is tense precisely because the process exposes and engenders 
conflict among and between ostensibly unified entities such as ―state‖ and ―society.‖5 
Underlying this tension are two contradictory social processes. First, militarization 
involves the simultaneous production and destruction of things both social (persons, 
formations, values, relations) and material (land and goods). Second, centralization of 
power among a rising elite accompanied increasing socialization of their political 
project. Geyer identifies the ―site of twentieth century processes of militarization‖ as 
the ―rearrangement of the triangular relations between mass participation, institutional 
domination, and elite formation.‖6 In other words, as mass participation increased in 
politics, so too did institutional-professional domination rise with elite capacity to 
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centralize their power. Not all participation was voluntary nor did the masses always 
work as intended: ―these were always,‖ observes Geyer, ―embattled processes.‖7 Here, 
I use militarization to describe tense and contradictory social processes whereby an 
emerging elite attempted to reorganize social relations of subjecthood, production, and 
exchange nationally in order to serve a coercive project of consolidating and 
expanding state territory. In short, militarized state-making was a political project with 
economic dimensions and profound social consequences. 
Analyzing how an economy was unmade, made, and remade in relation to 
processes of militarization and ―liberation‖ enriches this study theoretically and 
historically. Just as Mitchell describes how realizing an economy enabled practices of 
development and government, Shelley Feldman calls for rethinking development and 
government in relation to militarization.
8
 Feldman argues that state-organized violence 
not only constitutes politics but also enables forms of development intervention.
9
 
Indeed, ―development‖ (sự phát triển) emerged historically as a political and 
economic agenda for the ―Northwest‖ in the wake of its military conquest. At once an 
ideological and material project, the DRV development agenda aimed to increase 
production in order to allocate more agrarian resources to drive more military 
conquest. Like militarization, development among a ―liberated‖ population was tense 
and contradictory: just as cadres attempted to increase production and reorient 
exchange, so too did popular hunger rise as cause and effect of agrarian interventions. 
If the technical project of development was predicated on linear improvement, then the 
inherent cyclicality of agriculture and accompanying seasonal food shortage revealed 
its limits.
10
 Notwithstanding state efforts to manage relations of production and 
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exchange rationally, increasing claims on agrarian resources exposed an underlying 
contradiction: diverting scarce resources away from peasant producers and to military 
consumers unintentionally decreased the peasantry‘s ability to reproduce socially.  
In addition to responding to current scholarly debates and concerns, this study 
of making an economy draws on ideas and concepts from an earlier generation of 
sociologists. When I speak of labor and commodities, I use these terms in appreciation 
of Karl Marx‘s work to demystify their representation. Labor is at once an abstraction 
and a real, historically concrete category.
11
 As such, I investigate the project of 
making labor, of how different persons became abstracted, enumerated, and 
represented as ―people‘s laborers‖ (dân công). Making labor increased mass political 
participation through coercion and consent, violence and legitimation. Hunger exposed 
the limits of legitimation, both revealing and stimulating violent practices compelling 
people to become laborer-producers on behalf of an elite political project. Marx notes 
as well that the commodity form always conceals and reveals forms of value.
12
 Salt, 
for example, was distributed by the DRV both to provide nutrition to a desperate 
population (i.e., use value) and to legitimize relations of rule (i.e., exchange value). 
Salt figured in emergent, state-regulated relations of exchange for locally produced 
agricultural goods such as rice and non-timber forest products which, in turn, made 
their way towards financing war and feeding soldiers. Contemporaneously in state 
reports and, later, in commemorative histories, official acts of recounting 
―contributions‖ to the war effort work to abstract living, breathing people as labor and 
socially necessary food as provisions. As C. Wright Mills noted only two years after 
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the battle at Điện Biên Phủ, such (mis)representations amount to mystification, what 
he called a ―military definition of reality.‖13 
Narrative recounting is predicated on prior acts of counting and accounting. 
When I speak of rationalization, I draw on Max Weber‘s work on the use and 
emergence of calculation and measurement as hallmarks of bureaucratic domination.
14
 
As discussed previously, bureaucratic domination did not displace traditional 
domination in the DRV‘s emerging Northwest region but, rather, merged in a 
powerful hybrid form to produce and rearrange relations between regional, local, and 
central elites. Nonetheless, rationalization of authority and economic action continued 
apace, working to centralize economic and political decision-making. State Shops 
formed the vanguard of a planned economy by selling consumption and capital goods, 
buying local agrarian produce, and circulating DRV currency.
15
 Even if planning and 
management often went awry in practice, the State Shops set prices and rules for trade, 
deciding what was lawful and unlawful exchange. The police enforced their rules and 
decisions. Furthermore, amidst intense legitimation work, the DRV drew on its 
emergent authority, and increased its capacity, to stake claims on agrarian resources 
by recruiting civilian labor and levying agricultural taxes.
16
 By issuing codes and 
regulations, central and regional political elites legitimized claims as efficient, 
appropriate, and equitable; and their fulfillment as prerequisites for national 
citizenship. Even if claim-making often worked inequitably, cadres and planners 
developed efficient bureaucratic means of counting and accounting for labor and 
grains. In short, they contributed towards making society calculable, legible, and 
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abstract.
17
 Through successive iterations of recruiting labor and taxation, they learned 
of the population, increased the efficiency of collection and, in so doing, intensified 
the claim-making process.  
Counting, accounting, and recounting unfolded within heavily contested, 
multiply claimed territory. The DRV‘s capacity to levy claims on real or potential 
subjects was contingent on its military‘s ability to secure a territorial claim: as the 
People‘s Army expanded state territory, the process of making claims on its 
population also expanded and, over time, intensified.
18
 These reciprocal and iterative 
processes accelerated when the People‘s Army defeated French garrisons on the 
northern border in late 1950 and, shortly thereafter, the People‘s Republic of China 
granted diplomatic recognition to a reorganized DRV led by the Vietnam Workers‘ 
Party (VWP). Opening a passage for aid and earning diplomatic relations enabled the 
People‘s Army to escalate armed confrontation. As the war expanded spatially and the 
People‘s Army grew numerically, the DRV endeavored to extract resources latent in 
the masses to meet military logistical requirements. ―The primary nexus between the 
DRV and the population during the resistance,‖ writes Gareth Porter, ―was the 
mobilization of foodstuffs and labor to support its constantly growing army.‖19 
Enforcing a sovereign territorial claim, then, relied not only on the military‘s ability to 
fight but also on the government‘s ability to claim and collect resources from real or 
potential subject populations.  
Just as the nationalization of space preceded and legitimized military 
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enforcement of a territorial claim, so did the nationalization of subject populations 
precede and legitimize recruitment of labor for, and on behalf of, a military. The 
DRV‘s 1946 Constitution obliged citizens to perform military service.20 Because 
scholars have amply documented formal soldiering duties in the People‘s Army 
elsewhere, I focus instead on an understudied form of civilian ―people‘s laborers‖ (dân 
công) whose service was similarly legitimized in terms of national citizenship.
21
 Being 
a civilian noncombatant demanded duties and labors as necessary, onerous, and 
dangerous as soldiering itself.
22
 Moreover, it was noncombatant labor service that 
most directly involved Black River peoples, whose sense of national community in 
1952-54 (and beyond) was very much in the making. ―The process of militarization,‖ 
Geyer observes, ―compresses processes of community and nation-building under 
dictates of scarcity.‖23 Although his idea of compression is significant and his 
emphasis on scarcity crucial, I make a fine distinction by focusing on processes of 
state-making. Given that the notion of a Vietnamese nation was carried by cadres and 
soldiers promising ―liberation‖ to, for, and of Black River populations, I argue that 
militarization compressed processes of remaking relations of rule, production, and 
exchange—all of which were legitimated with reference to national community. 
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Methodological perspectives 
This chapter and the next draw on and elaborate these theoretical arguments 
based on an observed empirical shift. I divide these chapters in order to highlight two 
overlapping moments of militarization when, in late 1953, claim-making practices 
shifted from an emphasis on reciprocal exchange to intensified social mobilization. 
Reciprocal exchange generated local resources through a voluntaristic trade in goods 
and ideas predicated on an idea of state as benevolent and helpful. Mobilization 
generated resources through less voluntaristic, more coercive modes predicated on 
emergent institutional capacities and the simultaneous construction of state as a 
―higher‖ authority. The shift was not complete and the two practices were related. 
Even after mobilization became dominant in late 1953, reciprocal exchange continued; 
exchange also conditioned mobilization‘s emergence by forming relations between 
cadres and local elites in late 1952 and early 1953.  
In spite of their temporal overlap, the empirical shift between modes of claim-
making in late 1953 illustrates a qualitative change and quantitative increase in 
intensity and scale. Some rough numerical estimates place the shift in perspective. The 
population of the entire Northwest Zone in the early 1950s was 300,000 residents. The 
Northwest Military Campaign in November-December 1952 lasted two and a half 
months, involved 35,000 People‘s Army soldiers, and relied on 70,000 dân công 
laborers, of whom 9,000 came from the Northwest Zone itself. By contrast, the Điện 
Biên Phủ Military Campaign lasted, officially, from November 1953 to May 1954, 
involved 50,000 People‘s Army troops, and relied on 260,000 dân công laborers, of 
whom 30,000 came from the Zone itself. Compared with the Northwest Campaign, the 
Điện Biên Phủ Campaign lasted four times longer, involved 50% more troops, and 
relied on five times as many laborers, of whom three times as many were local. I 
discuss these figures, their origins, and their making in these two chapters—as well as 
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their social consequences.  
In order to analyze this empirical shift and its theoretical implications, I use a 
comparative historical approach. Methodologically, I incorporate comparisons by 
attending to multiple and malleable social formations, what Philip McMichael calls 
―parts and wholes,‖ evolving in relation to one another historically and spatially.24 
Concretely, I reference three social formations in relation to the Black River region: 
emerging national community, an associated land reform agenda, and its limited local 
implementation (discussed in Chapter 4); earlier, but disrupted, revolutionary 
organizing in 1948-50 (Chapter 3); historically deeper, still ongoing, and enmeshed 
muang-based, colonial, and Thái Federation rule (Chapter 2). Here, in Chapter 5, I 
incorporate multiple comparisons into analysis of emergent DRV-regulated relations 
of exchange and production in 1952-53. I continue this discussion in Chapter 6 with 
respect to large scale social mobilization in 1953-54.  
Beginning in the late 1940s, cadres strove to make relations of production a 
point of contest and, then, to remake them in support of the revolutionary cause. Wary 
of reproducing the Thái Federation‘s unpopular tax and corvée regime, the Sơn-Lai 
Committee in 1948-50 attempted to reduce cadre and guerilla demands on the local 
population and, instead, imported commodities (especially salt) to alleviate conditions 
of scarcity and build legitimacy. Out of these early encounters emerged what I called a 
revolutionary exchange in which cadres and guerillas supplied scarce goods and, in 
turn, demanded local agricultural produce and peasant labor. Through this exchange, 
this movement of goods and ideas, emerged a nascent community, one that, over time, 
cadres would harness to a nation in the making. The exchange was material and 
symbolic or, in short, eminently social.    
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When the first cadres arrived in the late 1940s and returned in late 1952, their 
claims on agrarian resources were made in explicit comparison with those levied by 
the Thái Federation which, in turn, held to longer traditions. In the Black River region 
generally, as with much of montane Southeast Asia, labor had historically been in 
short supply.
25
 Thái lords of scattered and confederated muang domains used a system 
of bonded labor (cuông nhuột) in an attempt to fix a supply of manpower to grow wet-
rice. Recognized as officials by the colonial regime and, in 1948, by the Thái 
Federation, Thái lords gained bureaucratic power to recruit corvée and formalize 
taxation. For some Thái subjects and many highland communities (such as Dao and 
Hmong peoples), swidden cultivation presented an alternative and maximized returns 
to scarce labor resources.
26
 Although highland groups avoided bonded and corvée 
labor, the Federation did tax their agricultural produce, especially opium.  
In late 1952, the People‘s Army initially relied on imported labor and supplies 
from downstream to feed and move its soldiers. During and after the Northwest 
Campaign, regional leaders attempted to restart reciprocal exchange (what I called the 
revolutionary exchange in Chapter 3) by supplying scarce commodities in exchange 
for loyalty, labor, and rice. In addition, they initiated a ―development‖ program to 
begin transforming the means of production and to increase output. In contrast to 
comprehensive land reform conducted elsewhere in an emerging Vietnam, central 
DRV and Northwest regional leaders—much to the chagrin of radical cadres and 
radicalized poor Thái peasants—settled on this more modest agenda. Meanwhile, a 
new program to mobilize resources in support of militarized state-making began to 
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unfold and picked up pace over 1953. It was during and after the Điện Biên Phủ 
Campaign when mobilization emerged as state practice and complex social process, 
becoming an everyday form of state formation intended to reallocate agrarian 
resources to militarized state-making.  
As such, agents of colonial and revolutionary political projects alike staked 
claims to agrarian labor and produce. If both claimed labor, what differed was their 
relation to the means of production and, consequently, how they legitimized their 
claims. Whereas the French colonial state and the Thái Federation claimed the fruits of 
agricultural production (i.e., ends), these regimes were less concerned with how fruits 
were produced (i.e., means). The emerging DRV demanded a share of these same 
products and was very concerned with how they were cultivated and distributed. Even 
though the agrarian reform agenda was relatively limited, DRV and Party leaders 
determined to transform the means of production through time discipline, labor 
reorganization, agricultural extension, etc. As Feldman reminds us, development 
interventions must be seen in the context of their emergence.
27
 In the early 1950s 
Black River region, stated efforts to ―improve rural society‖ appeared in war and 
intended to enable its conduct. In spite of efforts to defuse a trade-off between keeping 
resources on-farm or moving them off-farm, doing both posed a potential 
contradiction, one that became real and concrete in mid-1953 during conditions of 
hunger and starvation. 
What had changed by 1953 was the capacity of multiple local communities of 
swidden and wet-rice farmers to bear what had become an overwhelming emphasis on 
military struggle. Provisioning was no longer a matter of immediate community as it 
had been in 1948-50, of sharing what meager supplies were available to cultivators 
with members of an armed propaganda team. In the interval of 1950-52, an emerging 
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political elite—the DRV‘s enmeshed Party, state, military leadership—reorganized 
institutions and reoriented the ―national‖ economy towards making war. The 
Northwest Campaign signaled that the military had become a regular fighting force of 
tens of thousands, their activities now routinized, disciplined, and apparently separate 
from ―the people,‖ yet demanding much more of their labor and agrarian produce.28 
Informal exchange relations predicated on shared struggle, i.e. the revolutionary 
exchange of 1948-50, were no longer sufficient to meet demands organized by state 
and allocated to military consumption. Cadres, as socially recognized representatives 
of ―state,‖ appeared in village settings to mediate evolving and embedded realms of 
state and economy, military and society. In the newly consecrated and forcibly 
acquired Northwest Zone, monitoring, stabilizing, and boosting output to meet targets 
for military demands overshadowed radical land reform. Yet contextually-specific 
conditions of scarce labor, land, and capital limited any potential agrarian surplus. In 
concert with ongoing institutional reorganization and centralization, reciprocal 
exchange relations began in 1953 to yield to a rationalizing and intensifying program 
of mobilization. Chapters 5 and 6 analyze two iterations of militarized claim-making 
as well as their social consequences and spatial dimensions. 
  
 Militarizing spaces: rear, front, frontier 
The year 1953 figured as a time of preparation and increasing labor 
recruitment, particularly with regards to building roads and other transportation 
infrastructure.
29
 In addition to contributing towards the making of an economy, 
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wartime infrastructure work had long term consequences for binding the Black River 
region to an emergent Vietnam. At the time, recruiting labor for doing so was a 
contested project with unintended outcomes. Logistics is a seemingly neutral military-
technocratic term that tends to gloss these struggles and their consequences. For 
example, a volume published by the Ministry of Defense in 2004 to commemorate the 
battle of Điện Biên Phủ‘s 50th anniversary recounts all this preparatory work as 
―securing logistics.‖30 Although issued by the Ministry‘s General Department of 
Logistics, this same institution was known half a century ago as the military‘s General 
Department of Supply (Tổng cục Cung cấp) which worked closely with the civilian 
Council on Front Supply (Hội động Cung cấp Mặt Trần). I call attention here to the 
idea of logistics, or military supply, with reference to emergent spatial categories of 
front, rear, and frontier.  
In Vietnamese, as in other languages, ―rear‖ is always understood in relation to 
―front.‖ During this round of conflict and others subsequently, military operations 
conducted on the front (mặt trận or tiền tuyến) drew on and reproduced the rear (hậu 
phương) where, not coincidentally, lay the largely agrarian manpower and resources 
of the population at large.
31
 To paraphrase Mao Tse-Tung, without a rear one cannot 
sit down and regain one‘s strength.32 Etymologically, the Sino-Vietnamese root word 
for rear (hậu, meaning ―back of‖ or ―behind‖) is spatially defined in relation to the 
root for front (mặt, or ―face‖). Notably, hậu also forms the root both for hậu cần, or 
logistics, including the work of ordnance, transportation, and food to serve the 
military; and for hậu phương, or rear, the location in which these resources are 
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collected and out of which they flow towards the front (mặt trận).33  
The making and remaking of the Northwest as military rear and front 
overlapped historically with processes of making and remaking its territory a frontier 
of Vietnam. The spatial distinction between, and growing emphasis on, rear and front 
not only confirms a growing preoccupation among elite political leaders as to the 
conduct of military struggle. The distinction also maps onto the Northwest Zone as 
territory featuring both a singular front as well as multiple rears and fronts 
simultaneously: as an interior part of Vietnam that faces an exterior space not Vietnam 
(i.e., Laos and China); and site of multiple interiors and exteriors inside itself (i.e., 
remaining Thái Federation territory as well as fortified French positions at Nà Sản 
and, later, Điện Biên Phủ).  
The Vietnamese language etymology of rear and front has a parallel in English 
and French. ―Frontier‖ or ―frontière‖ also has roots in the idea of a military front, what 
Lucien Febvre calls a ―line of troops disposed in battle formation facing the enemy.‖34 
Although this military definition of frontier covers the distinction contained within a 
singular front (i.e., national/international spaces), it neglects multiply contested terrain 
within the Northwest itself. It was precisely the presence of multiple frontiers, 
moreover, that posed such difficulties for legitimizing sovereign territorial control 
there, particularly in terms of foreign enemies and national friends.
35
 The emerging 
Northwest frontier, then, was a Janus-faced construction both within DRV territory 
and partially outside its control, at once a site of multiple internalized rears and fronts 
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and an externalized border. In this light, the military project intended to singularize 
multiple fronts and, consequently, to align an emerging rear with sovereign territory. 
In the meantime, internalizing the Northwest‘s heavily contested spaces posed 
particular problems for logistics. Conducting the Northwest Campaign of late 1952 
underlined to planners that moving and feeding the People‘s Army required enormous 
logistical work: collecting massive amounts of manpower and provisions as well as 
building and rebuilding transportation infrastructure. As the People‘s Army expanded 
its range of movement and grew numerically—to over 250,000 regulars in mid-
1953—so, too, did demands placed on a rural population to move and provision it.36 
―Securing logistics,‖ then, can be thought of as a process of reforming state-society 
relations to direct agrarian production and labor towards the ostensible ―national 
liberation struggle.‖ No longer a guerilla war waged in and amongst the population, 
the People‘s Army, on behalf of the DRV, mediated processes of social and spatial 
differentiation. Coercive territorial expansion of centralizing power produced both 
front and rear, the latter reproduced as site, its population as subjects, of mobilization. 
Notwithstanding its growth in numbers, in the early 1950s the People‘s Army 
was essentially a non-motorized force reliant on pedestrian forms of transportation and 
local food supplies. Equipping the military with a steady stream of porters and 
laborers enabled its mobility throughout national space. Providing the military with 
food grown by peasant producers enabled soldiers to march and fight. Through what 
social processes did the territorializing state loose peasant labor and foodstocks from 
                                                 
36
 General Giáp estimated ―French‖ forces at 445,000 regulars including some 299,000 Vietnamese 
soldiers, a sub-total that—ironically—outnumbered the entire People‘s Army. Võ Nguyên Giáp, Dien 
Bien Phu: Rendezvous with History (Hanoi: NXB Thế giới, 2004b), 9. Scholars remain uncertain about  
People‘s Army‘s force strength. William Turley estimates PAVN strength a year later, in July 1954, at 
350,000. ―Army, Party and Society in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: Civil Military Relations in 
a Mass-Mobilization System,‖ PhD Thesis, University of Washington (1972): 85. Cf., Lockhart (1989), 
ch. 7; Fall (1956), 81; Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam (Novato: Presidio Press, 1986), 
ch. 2; King Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 270. 
 255 
farm and household? How did cadres and soldiers legitimize these claims on actual or 
potential DRV subjects? 
 
Nationalizing labor  
Establishing codes to regulate the recruitment, collection, and duties of civilian 
laborers fit into a larger historical pattern. Enmeshed Party and DRV leaders were 
busily preparing for mobile warfare in the Black River region: in July 1952, the 
Party‘s Central Committee created the (imaginary) Northwest Zone and empowered 
the Northwest Party Committee to lead it; in August 1952, the Politburo approved the 
―Party‘s Ethnic Policy‖; in September 1952, President Hồ Chí Minh approved the 
―Eight Orders on Military Conduct.‖  Indeed, DRV guidelines on how to mobilize 
labor to serve military campaigns was part of a broader effort to prepare for 
militarized state territorial expansion in space claimed as Vietnam‘s ―Northwest.‖   
Deputy Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng signed the ―Temporary Regulations 
on the mobilization and use of dân công‖ on 30 June and the Government enacted 
them on 14 July 1952.
37
 Like President Hồ‘s Eight Orders, the regulations codified 
relations between cadres, soldiers, and civilians in a time of war. Although 
revolutionary organizations had relied on local labor for several years, the newly 
reorganized Central Government meant to regularize and legitimize labor usage as 
―equitable and appropriate‖ (công bằng, hợp lý).  
By establishing rules to regulate state recruitment and employment of civilian 
laborers, the Central Government signaled awareness of how enacting this claim could 
lead to problems and expressed its intent to solve them. In the recent past, though ―the 
people‖ had been ―enthusiastically fulfilling their duties to the resistance,‖ 
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mobilization had been prone to ―errors‖; such ―waste‖ had damaged, in turn, levels of 
production and manufacture.
38
 As was the case with Sơn La‘s nascent, and short-lived, 
experience with revolutionary organizing in the late 1940s, state claims on the 
peasantry‘s labor to support the war effort reduced agricultural output. In light of the 
war‘s escalation, the regulation‘s preamble stated that resolving this problem 
demanded the Central Government‘s attention: 
 
The work of the resistance war develops in excess with comparison to 
the growth of manpower contributions. Therefore, there is a growing 
need to regulate the work of mobilization, the use of dân công that is 
truly equal and appropriate in order, on the one hand, to guarantee the 
demands of the resistance war and, on the other, to economize and 
foster the people‘s energy, to advance the production and economizing 
movement.
39
 
 
The regulations acknowledged a broad tension between allocating labor either to 
warfare or to production. Faced with a decision, the Central Government resolved not 
to choose between the two but, rather, to do both: rational regulation proposed to 
integrate labor mobilization with a movement to boost production. Although these 
regulations attempted to mitigate mobilization‘s unintended negative production 
effects, this tension remained and would grow in scale, particularly in the Black River 
region where labor was in short supply and food supply was seasonally tenuous.  
Before analyzing the regulations‘ content, note two important items of 
legitimation work. First, the neologism ―dân công,‖ defined in one Vietnamese-
English dictionary simply as ―conscripted laborers,‖ expressed a new means of 
legitimating a state claim on society.
40
 No longer were those who labored in service of 
military campaigns, as they had been in the late 1940s, called simply ―manual 
laborers‖ (lao công) or ―manpower‖ (nhân công). Now, by neatly reversing the 
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particles of the Vietnamese word for ―citizen‖ (công dân), this regulation christened 
them, ―people‘s laborers‖ (dân công).41 Their identification with the ―people‖ placed 
them, as Party Secretary Trường Chinh had explained, in a revolutionary alliance 
between the proletariat and peasantry struggling for national liberation. Performing 
one‘s duty to labor was thus equated with citizenship, with belonging to, and in, a 
nation in the making. DRV leaders cleverly recognized reciprocal claims of 
citizenship rights and duties by coining a term that, literally and figuratively, did the 
work of both. They legitimized as national service what, in fact, amounted to state 
conscription of unpaid labor.  
Second, use of the word ―contributions‖ builds on this relationship between 
duties and rights in relation to an emergent community. Because ―contributions‖ was a 
category in contemporaneous official reports and, since, has been repeated pervasively 
in official and nationalist histories, it is worth dwelling on what its meaning implies. 
One never just ―contributes‖ (đóng góp) as an atomized individual but, rather, always 
gives socially.
42
 To contribute is a social act that simultaneously calls on and 
constitutes a community through a form of reciprocal exchange; to give something as 
part of a collective and, in so doing, to bring that collective into being. To whom or 
what did these laborers ―contribute‖?  
It is significant, I argue, that these regulations do not state a recipient explicitly 
but, rather, leave to whom or to what ambiguous. On the one hand, leaving the 
recipient of ―contributions‖ out of the equation amounts to a discursive trick, an 
omission that signals a larger commission. After all, it was leaders of an emerging 
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state who wrote and enforced these regulations and stood to benefit from its products. 
Behind this legitimation work lay a powerful claim to rule over and for a national 
community—in short, a state-making project. Ranking members of the VWP and 
DRV claimed rights to labor power and delegated to subordinates the task of 
―mobilizing‖ (huy động) it. ―Mobilizing‖ the peasantry meant granting an emergent 
state powers both to free labor from the everyday tasks of farm work and to reallocate 
it to a project of nation-state formation. By creating and reserving powers to decide 
who had to serve and who did not, members of an emerging political elite arrogated 
for themselves the task of regulating an uncertain boundary between ―state‖ and 
―society,‖ or ―Government‖ and ―people.‖ Instituting rules aimed to discipline 
relations between state and society also contributed to their social formation as 
ostensibly distinct realms, hierarchically organized.  
On the other hand, leaving a recipient out of ―contributions‖ allowed for an 
emergent community to continue emerging in terms its members could choose for 
themselves. Anyone who consented—or was coerced—to participate could also 
choose the intended beneficiary: movement, army, community, friend, cadre, lord, 
official, etc. There was at this time ―a‖ community in the making cobbled together 
from many pre-existing communities; forms of symbolic and material exchange 
played a crucial role in constituting ―it.‖ If this emergent community was a nation, 
then it was imagined, evolving, and contested. These regulations betray a political 
project to harness any emergent community or communities to a statist vision of 
national subjecthood and its responsibilities. This idea of ―contributions‖ ascribes a 
directionality and purpose to the movement of local labor power and provisions off the 
farm—i.e., towards ―the‖ Vietnamese nation, always already formed.  
Regardless of why in fact a peasant might give to the military or to cadres, to 
call this act a ―contribution‖ ascribes a telos, an ultimate cause, to this form of public 
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social action. According to DRV nationalist ideology, there was a continuum 
describing the degree of self one might (not) give to the stated Vietnamese nation. On 
one end, withholding support was individualistic, reactionary, or, even, traitorous. In 
the middle, one could ―contribute‖ labor or grain and earn a sense of membership. 
More extreme, and more admirable, was to give up one‘s own labor and food at cost 
of one‘s own detriment; recall Sơn La‘s peasants in 1950 whose giving, and 
consequent hunger, was recognized as ―sacrifice‖ (hy sinh). At the far end, the 
ultimate form of giving was ―martyrdom,‖ or granting one‘s life to the national 
liberation movement.
43
 Such nationalist language ascribes and reinscribes an ultimate 
purpose to multiple forms, and underlying logics of, exchange and giving.   
 
The July 1952 labor regulations‘ content points to broad application and 
notable exemptions. The first, and most important, rule states: ―All citizens (công dân) 
aged between 18 and 50 years are obligated to serve as dân công.‖ This statement 
effectively amended the 1946 Constitution: not only were citizens obliged to serve in 
the military, they were also obliged to serve for the military. The regulations allowed 
―temporary‖ exemptions for pregnant women and sickly persons; ―full‖ exemptions 
for war wounded; ―reduced‖ service for commune officials subject to province 
approval. Those whose duties were ―completely waived‖ included most government 
personnel, workers in state enterprises, and teachers. The exemptions indicate a form 
of service that had, and would continue, to draw largely on men and women working 
in agriculture, i.e. the peasantry. Whoever tried to shirk their obligation could be tried 
in public tribunals and sentenced to prison for up to 6 months.
44
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How long did a given period of rquired service last? Although this might seem 
a simple question, the regulations provide no simple answer. The only mention of 
service durations comes in a section on participant ―rights‖ (quyên lợi) regarding how 
laborers themselves were fed and provisioned. In general, although ―persons doing 
dân công must support themselves (tự túc),‖ the regulations mandated different 
guidelines with respect to service duration. Whereas dân công serving ―short periods‖ 
of less than 5 days ―always‖ provisioned themselves, those serving ―from five days to 
one month‖ only did so for the initial three days. How long was this long period? Did 
self-provisioning guidelines mean that one month was the upper limit? Notably, 
written in long-hand next to this typed order, someone added, ―first seven days if the 
dân công period lasts longer than one month.‖45 If we assume that the handwriting 
indicated a limit beyond one month, then what was the limit? Two months? Three 
months? Or was there no limit at all? That service duration was ambiguous, I argue, is 
in and of itself analytically significant, allowing emerging institutions to use (and, in 
some cases, abuse) dân công labor for lengths of time at their own discretion.  
The regulations point to the arduous nature of working at behest and on behalf 
of state and military. After the initial period of self-provisioning, laborers had ―rights‖ 
to between 1.0 to 1.4 kilograms of rice and 16 grams of salt per day; offices that made 
use of dân công assumed responsibility for providing this ―fee‖ (tiền thù lao), or what 
amounted to a subsistence ration. Tasks ran the gamut of preparing and supplying the 
battlefield; transporting foodstuffs, cash, tools, munitions, etc.; constructing granaries; 
building and repairing roads; shoring up waterworks and irrigation infrastructure; and 
rebuilding structures damaged in combat. Pedestrian porters were to carry between 20-
30 kg per person over distances proportionate to topographic relief (and time of day): 
in level areas, walking between 20-25 km per day (15-20 by night); in mountainous 
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areas, between 15-20 km/day (12-18 by night). Porters riding boats, horses, or bicycles 
carried more weight: pack bicyclists, for example, were to carry between 60-100 kg 
from 20-25 km/day. After working 6 days in a row, dân công were entitled to one day 
off; or, after 5 nights in a row, one night off.
46
 
To initiate the process of making its subjects into citizen laborers, the Central 
Government instructed Resistance and Administrative Committees at each 
territorialized administrative unit—from military Interzone to civilian province and 
district—to generate plans based on their own requests and those gathered from 
subordinate specialized agencies and military units. Moreover, actually collecting data 
on eligible citizens and ensuring their compliance fell on the commune, the local 
branch of government in closest day-to-day contact with the population. Commune 
committees (UBKCHC xã) had already begun working with Farmers Councils (Nông 
hội) to tax agriculture, generating both grain for soldiers and data on society‘s 
productive capacities. Now they were ordered to expand data collection with regards 
to off-farm labor potentials for villages inside their bailiwicks. In partial recognition of 
anticipated burdens, the Temporary Regulations also ordered commune committees 
and Farmers Councils to organize workteams to assist households whose labor was 
depleted by a member‘s dân công service.47  
If these regulations empowered cadres, soldiers, and officials to decouple labor 
from subsistence activities and reallocate it to a state-making project, then ―freeing‖ 
such labor was a complex and contested process that produced results not always as 
intended. Subsequent drafts and redrafts of this policy by Central Government 
officials point to its terms‘ continuous negotiation and renegotiation. Bureaucratically, 
local cadres and regional governments negotiated with superiors over which form of 
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labor to prioritize, agricultural production or state service, in order to find a balance 
between work on-farm or off-farm. All the while, in a dialectical process, local 
officials transformed labor from abstract category, made it concrete, and then rendered 
it abstract all over again.
48
 In other words, cadres and local officials negotiated with 
peasants over how to allocate their labor either for military campaigns or tending 
crops, home, and hearth. With regards to household and farm, they bargained over 
how to apportion agricultural work to fulfill either state claims on production or 
household consumption for reproduction. Finally, cadres reported back to their 
superiors on the ―contributions‖ of local peasants represented as abstract national 
labor. Analytically, I aim to differentiate, humanize, and make this labor concrete 
again. 
 
Early miscalculations 
Recruiting labor was contingent on the spatial expansion of state authority. 
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the DRV‘s incomplete consolidation of its 
territorial claims contributed to the Sơn Lai Committee‘s decision, relatively speaking, 
to limit claims on local labor. When the People‘s Army returned in force in autumn 
1952, the People‘s Army still relied officially, yet not entirely, on labor from afar.  
Only a small fraction of the dân công laborers involved in the Northwest 
Campaign came from the Northwest itself. The Party‘s Ethnic Policy had instructed 
the military operating in ―ethnic minority areas‖ to ―limit collection of local dân công‖ 
in order to avoid both ―troubling the people‖ and excessively damaging their 
livelihoods.
49
 As dân công policy had stated, recruiting labor had to be balanced with 
maintaining local production; at least initially, the balance tilted towards the latter. 
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Further, propaganda and education would take time to teach the newly ―liberated‖ 
population, first, that they belonged to a nation and, second, that such belonging 
entailed obligations.  
For the military, moving some 36,000 soldiers into the newly created 
Northwest Zone presented its own problems.
50
 Their engagements with French and 
Federation forces took them some 300-500 km distant from sources of (already) 
mobilized labor, food, and supplies. Linking mobile units with base areas necessitated 
stringing together a pair of long supply lines reliant on extra-local pedestrian transport. 
One group from the southern Red River Delta and adjacent areas traveled up through 
Hoà Bình along Road 41 (now, National Highway 6). Another group from the Việt 
Bắc base and the northern Red River delta traveled through Nghĩa Lộ along Road 13.51  
Leading this second group was General Giáp who, later, recalled how the 
region‘s mountainous, narrow pathways had forced soldiers and laborers to march in 
single file. Without specifying their number, he remembered clearly that dân công 
outnumbered combatants: lined up behind the soldiers, he said, they formed an 
―interminable file.‖52 How many laborers actually assisted this expedition between 
October and December 1952?  
Quantifying the number of laborers and porters involved in the Northwest 
Campaign was of profound strategic interest to military and DRV leaders: armed with 
this data, they could plan more effectively for the next military campaign. Yet a 
simple answer to this question was, and still remains, elusive. That there was and 
remains no consensus is significant for several reasons. First, the lack of knowledge 
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demonstrates how state and military planners had yet to institute measures to track 
civilian labor. Second, investigating divergent answers is of analytical and 
historiographic interest. Notwithstanding lingering questions about the accuracy of 
either source, official military figures reported long after the fact contrast tellingly 
with contemporaneous local figures—indicating compliance or violation, respectively, 
of reigning DRV regulations. 
Military planners estimated that 35,000 dân công would be needed to transport 
supplies from rear areas to ―the‖ front.53 Yet these estimates fell short of the amount of 
manpower (and supplies) actually required to serve multiple and mobile fronts. 
Official military histories state unequivocally that the Northwest Campaign ultimately 
required a total of 194,000 dân công, performing 7 million labor days.
54
 Dividing the 
labor days (7 million) by the number of dân công (194,000) yields an average service 
duration of just over one month per person (36 days). If we assume that the 1952 
Temporary Regulations capped service durations at one month (according to the typed 
―long term‖ duration), then these figures roughly correspond, producing a result nearly 
in compliance.
55
 If the Regulations did not limit time durations by keeping them 
vague, then there was no violation. 
By contrast, local contemporaneous reports present divergent figures. In late 
December 1952, just after the campaign‘s conclusion, the Northwest Party Committee 
praised ―the spirit of sacrifice‖ among the 65,000 dân công mobilized up to then who, 
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measured from ―Centerpoint to frontlines,‖ had performed 5 million labor days.56 
Nguyễn Kháng added that this count did not include an additional sum of over 9,000 
dân công mobilized in ―newly liberated zones‖ of Nghĩa Lộ, Sơn La, and Lai Châu.57  
These latter figures indicate one potential and one actual violation of Central 
Government policies. First, each laborer worked, on average, two and a half months 
(77 days), a duration that makes sense because it matches the length of the campaign. 
This duration endured long beyond any vaguely-defined outer-limits of the Temporary 
Regulation‘s non-short term typed period of one month. However, if there were no 
time limits, as the handwriting suggests, then there was no violation: vagueness 
worked to the advantage of ―state‖ which simultaneously wrote and enforced 
regulations. Second, using local people from ―newly liberated zones‖ as military labor, 
all of whom must have been from ―ethnic minority areas,‖ did violate the Party‘s 
Ethnic Policy.  
Even these figures on local participation, however, were revised steadily 
upwards and reach no internal agreement. In February 1953, a Northwest Party 
Committee report stated that 8,412 dân công laborers had been ―mobilized‖ in Yên 
Bái, Lào Cai, and Mộc Châu to serve the Northwest Campaign.58 In October 1954, the 
Northwest Administrative Committee reported that, populations in ―free zones‖ of Lào 
Cai and Yên Bái had been educated in the dân công policy during the Northwest 
Campaign, and, as a result, 8,800 laborers were ―mobilized‖ to serve the Northwest 
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Campaign.
59
 Were either of these figures the same as the 9,000 figure reported by 
Nguyễn Kháng above? Or were they both different and additional to his earlier 
estimate? As if these confusing figures were not enough, the Northwest Committee‘s 
October 1954 report adds that, by January 1953, 16,421 laborers had been 
―mobilized… to serve the front.‖60 Which front is unclear: did they serve the 
Northwest Campaign proper, subsequent combat at Nà Sản and Lai Châu, or all of 
them? Where they came from is also vague: the Northwest‘s newly liberated zones, 
free zones, or both? Was this latter figure a sum total of all the above? Or a 
supplement? 
The variance in reported labor participation at this time reveals much about the 
operations and capacities of an emerging state. If the contemporaneous figures are 
accurate, then military officers and regional officials may have abused extra-local 
laborers by working them beyond service durations; and pressed locals into service 
against the prevailing Ethnic Policy. Years later, official historians attempted to 
finesse their predecessors‘ potential and actual violations by inflating the figure of 
laborers to produce a fictive compliance. Yet nothing indicates acknowledgment of 
these violations or, even, what kind of punishment they may have merited. By 
contrast, should a citizen-laborer not perform his or her duties, the regulations stated 
explicitly that he or she end up in jail. 
This observed disparity between rules and their application raises a number of 
thought-provoking questions. To whom did central policy apply? To whom did it not 
apply? If violating laws was routine, what did this codification do? Was its social 
function theatrical? To demonstrate a (fictive) rationality? To give an illusion of 
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central control not followed in practice? With respect to labor recruitment, I might 
argue that such central policy partially legitimated the work of cadres and local 
officials who did not, necessarily, follow all the rules. 
Finally, that variance in the reported number of laborers was very wide—by a 
factor of three—is, in and of itself, noteworthy. Evidently, different institutions had 
different and widely variable figures, pointing to bureaucratically-isolated accounting 
measures. The variance between them points to limited capacity of ―state‖—i.e., 
bureaucratically and institutionally integrated—to anticipate and enumerate claims on 
an emerging national society. Growing awareness of this fact stimulated enmeshed 
Party, DRV, and People‘s Army leaders to develop a centralized system, and 
accompanying institutions, for counting and accounting for civilian labor. Thus was 
initiated another iteration in a process of institutional learning. 
 
The liberation effect or, mobilization by example 
Military operations were intended not only to acquire territory but also to 
perform legitimation work among the population they ―liberated.‖ The military‘s 
intended role in legitimation work was unambiguous. Just prior to the Northwest 
Campaign, Hồ Chí Minh told cadres assembled before their departure, ―[we] must 
ensure that each soldier is a propagandist.‖61 By demonstrating exemplary behavior 
codified in President Hồ‘s ―Eight Orders‖ on military conduct, the People‘s Army 
reflected—and attempted to impart—ideals of service to nation.62 Before the onset of 
the campaign, civilian cadres and military officers all received training in these ―Eight 
Orders‖ and, as they moved through the region, they educated people in their content 
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both implicitly and explicitly. How they comported themselves in fulfilling their 
duties was an act, one to be performed in front of their local audience. 
Together, in addition to their fighting and hauling, the soldiers and dân công 
who marched into the Northwest in late 1952 set an example of self-sacrificing service 
among the local population. Phan Mỹ recognized the ―attitude‖ and ―behavior‖ of 
soldiers who, through their conduct, ―made the people respect and believe in the 
Government and in the army.‖63 Embodying national ideals was a performative act 
intended to galvanize support for the anti-colonial war-effort among former subjects of 
the Thái Federation.  
Of course, the military and their dân công laborers did not move through the 
region alone. Guiding them were cadres versed in local conditions and acting under 
orders from the Zone‘s Party Committee.64 Indeed, members of the emergent local 
government closely tracked the military as they moved through, reoccupied, and 
acquired—or, ―liberated‖—Thái Federation territory. Together, by defeating counter 
claimants to territory and by building institutions for monopoly rule, soldiers and 
cadres formed the DRV‘s spearhead. Historically, their actions were integrated and 
inseparable as a form of militarized state-making. For purposes of analysis, the 
following account assesses the army‘s role distinctly before resuming, in the next 
section, assessing how cadres capitalized on this initial enforcement to legitimize and 
institutionalize a new form of power recognized as state.  
 
Recall that the Northwest Campaign‘s timing overlapped with the region‘s 
annual rice harvest. How the People‘s Army positioned itself in relation to food and 
agricultural labor, therefore, became an opportunity for legitimation work. Soldiers 
                                                 
63
 Phan Mỹ, ―Báo cáo sơ lược…‖ 22 Dec 1952, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 456, p. 3.  
64
 Nguyễn Kháng, ―Báo cáo…‖ 29 Dec 1952, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 1306, 5-7.  
 269 
and laborers marching through the region not only encountered farmers pre-occupied 
with agricultural work. They also assisted cultivators during the season when demands 
on local labor were at their peak. Or, in line with the ―Eight Orders,‖ soldiers 
―defended the people‘s livelihoods‖ by assisting farmers with the autumn rice 
harvest.
65
 Soldiers and laborers also ―defended the people‘s property‖ by refraining 
from picking vegetables or fruit without first obtaining permission from the cultivator. 
At the crossroads of Heo Village, for example, thousands of soldiers and laborers 
marching by night left roadside gardens intact because they had not obtained 
permission to trade from cultivators.
66
 
Just as President Hồ had declared that ―each soldier is a propagandist,‖ 
members of the military engaged in construction and deconstruction. Army Engineers 
built bridges that facilitated movement by soldiers and farmers alike.
67
 Moreover, the 
military enacted the old regime‘s dismantlement as well as the demonstration of new 
norms and regulations. Soldiers assumed control over the Federation‘s grain 
storehouses and redistributed their contents to the same rice growers who had 
produced its stores. As mentioned above in Chapter 4, they abrogated the old regime‘s 
restrictions and released people from ―concentrated settlements,‖ allowing them to 
return to their home villages, to stay in huts close to their fields, to fish, and to resume 
hunting in the forest at night.
68
 Soldiers, officers, and laborers were often the first 
DRV representatives to encounter the region‘s population. By forming disciplined 
institutions and performing their legitimacy, they played a deeply symbolic role in 
front of what could be a skeptical audience. 
Of course, not everyone celebrated when the People‘s Army appeared on the 
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horizon, particularly those areas where DRV affiliates had yet to make any prior 
contact. Recall that the area in and around Lai Châu remained under Thái Federation 
control, now considered to be a ―temporarily occupied area.‖ As for ―recently 
liberated areas,‖ particularly those places ―where we have no infrastructure,‖ recorded 
Nguyễn Kháng, the ―enemy‖ spread ―counterpropaganda about the Viet Minh‖ among 
people as they did harvest work, leaving them ―suspicious and scared of us.‖69 French 
and Federation propagandists, in other words, were able to mimic the DRV‘s own 
strategy, to politicize pre-existing forms of collective organization. As the People‘s 
Army approached these areas, residents ―melted‖ into the forest or, subsequently, tried 
to avoid villages where cadres and soldiers frequented. In order to avoid such popular 
avoidance of contact, soldiers and cadres alike foregrounded the work of ―assuring the 
people‖ and to spread their own propaganda or, to counter counterpropaganda, based 
on the ―Eight Orders.‖70 
Some reactions to the arrival of the People‘s Army were vague and uncertain. 
Villagers of Sa Haj Village, Quang Huy commune, Phù Yên District fled the 
advancing People‘s Army to take refuge in the forest. Before they left, however, the 
villagers held a feast over the course of five days: they slaughtered five water buffalo 
and six pigs because, reportedly, ―they could not bring livestock with them.‖71 Recall 
that prior to the Northwest Campaign Quang Huy had been site of Cầm clan power 
before its senior men sought refuge elsewhere. Perhaps the orgy of feasting was meant 
to consume livestock that belonged to departed clan members. Or, peasants feared that 
the People‘s Army or returning clan members might repossess their own livestock. 
Overall, however, military advance and political legitimacy were inextricably 
tied in the minds of cadres, soldiers, and many local residents alike. In an intoxicating 
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display of force, military ―liberation‖ simultaneously, if only partially and temporarily, 
legitimized and instituted DRV rule. By defeating French-allied forces, dismantling 
Federation regulations, and reaching out to the population, the DRV and its military 
produced an intended two-fold ―liberation effect‖ among the population: to galvanize 
a new sense of community in the image of state and, second, to predispose them, as 
the ―people,‖ towards its service. The Northwest Zone‘s Political Commissar, Nguyễn 
Kháng, observed the Northwest Campaign‘s effect among the population as follows:  
 
The victory in the Northwest has made the soldiers and people happy, 
elated, and increasingly confident in President Hồ, the Center, the 
Government; confident in the strength of the military, in a long, 
difficult, but certain-to-be-victorious resistance; manifested by 
compatriots in free zones who harvested early and contributed their 
agricultural tax and rushed forward excitedly to perform dân công. In 
particular, according to people in the Northwest‘s newly liberated 
areas, the victory has already broken the enemy‘s exploitative and 
oppressive yoke, and has replaced [it] with freedom and happiness such 
that the compatriots excitedly express their heartfelt gratitude for 
President Hồ, the Government, and military. The victory in the 
Northwest has improved soldiers‘ morale and has made the remaining 
puppet authorities and military feel puzzled and disconsolate.
72
 
 
Although ―victory‖ was only partial (French Expeditionary Forces had regrouped at 
the Nà Sản stronghold; the Thái Federation was still in control of Lai Châu) and the 
outcome would prove only temporary (French paratroopers would retake Điện Biên 
Phủ in late 1953), passages such as this are some of the only traces available for 
assessing the Northwest Campaign‘s popular reception. According to its logic, popular 
enthusiasm among soldiers and civilians alike was an intended effect of ―liberation.‖ 
The military victory of one regime and defeat of its rival worked dialectically to 
legitimize the DRV and to delegitimize the Thái Federation. The words used to ascribe 
and/or self-describe—the difference is analytically significant but textually unclear—
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―the people‖ reverberate with the revolution‘s own mantra: ―independence, freedom, 
happiness.‖73  
The exemplary performance of overwhelming, coordinated, and disciplined 
military force re-appeared, reflection-like, in society. Perhaps only temporarily and 
certainly unevenly, disparate residents became ―a‖ people of the Northwest connected 
with and part of some larger—be it national, anti-colonial, revolutionary, and/or 
resistance—community in the making. This communal solidarity is the first moment 
in the liberation effect. Next, their initial enthusiasm for the new regime and distaste 
for the old regime appeared to inspire a sense of gratitude, one that predisposed them 
to obey the former‘s regulations, such as the agricultural tax, and to serve it bodily, as 
dân công laborers. This willingness to ―contribute‖ to an emerging yet ill-defined 
community is the liberation effect‘s second moment. 
If the liberation effect appeared as communal enthusiasm and willingness to 
serve, then state-makers also endeavored to harness any popular response to an 
ongoing political project. Nguyễn Kháng continues the above passage and ends on a 
telling note:  
 
This victory has made the human and material resources in the 
Northwest into a reserve force to train and foster for the resistance 
forces.
74
 
 
The emerging Northwest, in other words, was territory endowed with human and 
material resources. Political leaders intended the military victory not only to claim 
territory for the rising DRV but also to transform the local population into loyal 
citizens and obliged subjects of the DRV. This was the liberation project, a state 
claim-making practice enabling and enabled by militarized territorial expansion.  
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In addition to doing their jobs, members of the military and their support crew 
did them well. They produced the liberation effect by engaging in social learning 
predicated on an idea of emulation. For laborers to carry their loads, or for the military 
to fight, was only marginally more important than how they comported themselves 
while fulfilling these duties. Completing their proximate tasks was only the first move 
in creating a broader, collective sense of responsibility: they also demonstrated 
exemplary national service and invited others to perform similarly.  
By performing tasks in a model fashion, the military and downstream dân công 
also encouraged the local population to emulate (thi đua) their model behavior and 
attitude. As a model of social learning, emulation, also known as mirroring (làm 
gương), has a long tradition in Vietnam, one the Workers‘ Party cultivated and 
renewed.
75
 The desired effect was to mobilize by example: to constitute the local 
population as ―the people‖ and to encourage this new collective form to participate in 
the war-effort—as productive peasant subjects willing to share resources—ostensibly 
on their own behalf.  
As Nguyễn Kháng indicated above, leaders were interested in how the mobile 
forces might make ―a reserve force,‖ or inspire a willingness among the local 
population to perform dân công service in subsequent military campaigns. The 
Northwest Party Committee singled out the visiting dân công for praise, for displaying 
a ―spirit of sacrifice [while] serving the front,‖ for exemplifying a ―supportive and 
enthusiastic people.‖ It was their example as a people, as a revolutionary national 
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community, that Party leadership hoped would rub off on their new subjects, i.e. to 
instill a new sense of membership and responsibility. The Committee recognized those 
local residents who acted like brave soldiers, performing duties in spite of any danger 
who, for example, had prior to 1952 ―thrown themselves (lăn lộn) into secret 
activities‖ or who, in late 1952, ―enthusiastically loaned rice to soldiers, worked as 
dân công, and assisted cadres and soldiers to appeal to former [Thái Federation] 
soldiers.‖ To complete the circle, they rewarded such exemplary service with 
―commendations (khen thưởng) for work on behalf of the revolution‖ by staging 
displays of official gratitude at commune and district complexes, hoping to encourage 
and propagate such behavior among a still larger audience.
76
  
Local officials were also aware, however, that the Northwest‘s relatively low 
population density posed a potential labor shortage in the future, compromising the 
making of a ―reserve force.‖ Thus they endeavored to expand the pool of eligible 
laborers in two ways. Ideals of service extended to all ―races‖ (chủng tộc), by which 
officials most likely meant Hmong and other highland groups unaccustomed to corvée 
or bonded labor.
77
 Second, although military service in the regular army may have 
been an exclusively male activity, providing logistical support extended to both male 
and female citizen subjects.  
In line with revolutionary socialist ideals, emphasizing social equality as 
constitutive of membership in the evolving national resistance community entailed 
obligations. Through performative example, local officials hoped to transform customs 
regulating gender and cultural relations. ―Before‖ the campaign, observed Nguyễn 
Kháng, women were unaccustomed to tread far from their natal village. Yet, after 
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seeing ―women dân công from downstream,‖ he claimed that local women also 
became ―enthusiastic participants.‖ While their mothers hauled rice, small Hmong 
girls accompanied them to their destination, just to catch a glimpse of soldiers 
guarding a grain storehouse. Even a blind Hmong woman from Phù Yên 
―volunteered‖ to work as a dân công porter.78 Whether these women actually 
volunteered is open to question. If they did volunteer, it is unclear why they did so—
whether out of a sense of patriotic fervor and/or because they wished to challenge 
local patriarchal norms. In any event, the emerging revolutionary community 
presented a new range of possibilities, and its project carried a new set of obligations, 
for highland peoples and women. The making of labor was a deeply cultural process 
involving not just the legitimation of rule per se but also, according to Philip Corrigan 
and Derek Sayer, ―the regulated formation of identities and subjectivities (male as 
much as female).‖79 
Although their reception was spatially uneven, the military and their laborers‘ 
embodiment of national ideals appeared to have a cumulative effect on the ―newly 
liberated‖ local population: to articulate a new sense of community based on shared 
suffering and triumph. By the end of the autumn 1952 Northwest Campaign, the 
Central Government‘s delegate Phan Mỹ felt emboldened to declare:  
 
The people understand clearly the need to help the army strike the 
French, have the consciousness to participate in the resistance, and 
welcome their chance to do their duties like the downstream 
compatriots who work as dân công up here.
80
  
 
For the local people to feel suddenly motivated to perform arduous, backbreaking 
labor may seem improbable. But imparting a sense of duty through an ethic of 
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emulation was an intended, and significant, component in socially producing the 
liberation effect. Even if the number of local laborers was still relatively small, the 
military campaign‘s impact on the broader population was immediate. Cadres were 
quick to capitalize on the soldiers‘ advance. 
The arrival of the military in force and the return of cadres signaled the onset 
of a territorializing form of power. Although the military moved on to different fronts, 
the cadres remained to their rear: rear and front emerged during this period as new 
spatial forms regulating relations of rule, production, and exchange. Although the 
DRV‘s hold on the Northwest Zone was still contested and only partial, cadres 
nonetheless established and drew on DRV power to institute and legitimate reciprocal 
exchanges. In so doing, they stimulated processes through which emerged 
collectivized and individualized forms of identity, subjecthood, and responsibility. 
Over the course of the Northwest Campaign and through the next year, these cadres 
transformed what had been an informal exchange in the late 1940s. They worked to 
institute a more formal exchange predicated on, and mediated by, an emerging 
boundary between state and society.  
 
An Economy of Anxiety 
Creating a ―reserve force‖ produced social responses widely divergent from 
any welcome to ―liberation.‖ If the population initially greeted the army with 
enthusiasm in an expression of communal recognition, then they responded to warfare 
and growing state claims with anxiety. The former was the intended liberation effect 
and popular affect; the latter its underlying project and lurking, unintended affect. 
The same reports that describe popular enthusiasm for liberation note also its 
opposite, that of anxiety, and present the analyst with a puzzle. On the one hand, the 
liberation effect appeared to constitute a ―people‖ and, among this new collective, to 
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instill a sense of ―enthusiasm‖ (hăng hái) regarding membership in an emergent 
community accompanied by spontaneous outpourings of labor and material support. 
On the other hand, this emergent community (referred to as the ―people‖) is often 
described as ―anxious‖ or ―worried‖ (thắc mắc) in reference to labor obligations and 
provisioning requirements—i.e., the state-levied responsibilities of being a member of 
this community.
81
 How does the analyst reconcile such conflicting and contradictory 
social responses? Were the different reactions sequentially ordered? Did initial 
enthusiasm give way to anxiety as the weight of obligation became clearer to those 
who would bear its load? Or, were the two responses always there? Did worry lurk 
behind excitement, only to surface when possibilities associated with Thái Federation 
defeat yielded to realities—including real or threatened coercion—of DRV rule? I 
argue that these seemingly differential responses were not mutually exclusive.  
One way to assess the initial social response to the DRV is to reconsider the 
liberation effect, to understand popular enthusiasm, willingness, and anxiety together 
and as sequentially related. Though this answer may appear ambiguous and uncertain, 
relations at the moment of ―liberation‖ were similarly laden with ambiguity and 
uncertainty. One of the few local responses quoted in full brings these qualities to the 
fore. ―Many compatriots in Phù Yên,‖ reads a report, ―spoke aloud‖ that,  
 
―If the cadres and military several years earlier had done the same as 
cadres and soldiers did this year then certainly [they would have] won, 
and the Westerners (Tây) would not have been able to be here until 
now.‖82  
 
Although Nguyễn Kháng interpreted this statement as evidence of successful 
legitimation work, its meaning was not, nor is not, fixed. To interpret it differently, 
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recall that an earlier round of cadres and guerilla soldiers had been in this same area in 
the late 1940s, when and where they shared conditions of scarcity and danger with 
peasant supporters. It was a moment of being together. When faced with a French 
counterattack in 1950, however, cadres and guerillas had fled to regroup elsewhere. 
For residents left behind who faced retribution and continuing deprivation collectively, 
it was a moment of separation and subjective differentiation. As such, this statement 
can be read as divergent from its cited meaning, as both critique of an earlier 
abandonment and a half-hearted welcome back. In other words, what took you so long 
to come back here, to us? Had you—i.e., ―cadres and soldiers‖—done this earlier, then 
we—i.e. your supporters in place—might have been spared two years of additional 
suffering. For these people of Phù Yên, the presence of DRV soldiers and cadres 
reminded them of a prior absence, stimulating an affective response marked by 
resentment and gratitude, anxiety and enthusiasm, worry and hope.  
Another way to analyze varied responses to ―liberation‖ is to think about the 
DRV intervention‘s intended and unintended effects. I have analyzed above 
liberation‘s intended effects, i.e. enthusiasm, as a product of emulatory modes of 
teaching and learning. I address unintended effects below by showing how a statist 
project that anticipated, accompanied, and followed military conquest elicited anxiety. 
 
 Harvest and taxation 
Because the autumn 1952 military campaign coincided with—and 
threatened—the region‘s rice harvest, agrarian production was foremost among 
farmers‘ concerns. As rice matured in late October, the people were ―alarmed that 
airplanes might destroy [seed-bearing plants], concerned about leaving for dân công 
duties, and, overall, very worried about the harvest.‖ These worries were well-
founded. Troops moving about invited French warplanes to bomb and strafe rice fields 
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doubling as battlefields. Supplying and supporting the People‘s Army diverted scarce 
resources away from repair and reproduction. As wet-rice rice harvest approached, the 
Northwest Party Committee convened a Cadre Conference in November to emphasize 
the ―crux‖ of cadres‘ work: safeguarding the fall rice crop.83  
Through this harvest period, cadres remained in village settings both to ensure 
the rice crop‘s safety as well as to begin modifying agricultural practices. In line with 
Conference orders, they set about instituting a program aimed to keep farmers in their 
fields, to increase their labor efficiency, and to transform agricultural work. Because 
enemy planes scared farmers away from their fields, cadres taught them evasive tactics 
such as wearing camouflage, avoiding brightly colored clothes, and harvesting fields 
in sections before hiding in the forest. Cadres attempted to improve labor efficiency by 
teaching new techniques for cutting rice in bunches rather than by individual stalks. 
They tried to instill a sense of time discipline by encouraging farmers to work longer 
daylight hours, extend the work week, and do fieldwork by night. They organized 
mixed gender youth groups to reap and thresh rice, hoping to discredit local customs 
structuring such tasks as appropriate only for women or people of ―correct age.‖84 
Though modest at first, these state efforts foreshadowed more sustained projects to 
transform the means and claim the ends of agricultural production. 
During the extended period of warfare, of all the agrarian reforms to be 
implemented in the Northwest Zone, the DRV‘s agricultural tax was perhaps the most 
significant. Beginning with Decree 13/SL of May 1951, the Central Government had 
moved to simplify and centralize the agricultural tax (thuế nông nghiệp) with 
payments collected in kind.
85
 According to a progressive scale, farmers surrendered a 
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variable amount of harvested grain. By facilitating assessments in public village 
settings, cadres hoped to impart an appreciation for ―equitable and appropriate‖ 
government policy such that farmers would ―vigilantly‖—i.e., a self-disciplined form 
of voluntarism—bring forward their assessed amount to state-controlled granaries.86 
Most grain then belonged to the Central Government which, in turn, distributed much 
of it to feed the growing People‘s Army. A smaller portion remained in local granaries 
to balance regional budgets.  
Taxation not only provided grain for the military but also yielded knowledge 
of the population to emerging state institutions. Its iterative application enabled the 
rising state to collect all manner of data on new subjects which, in turn, increased state 
capacity to lead subsequent transformative projects. All in all, the agricultural tax 
served more than what one scholar calls a ―dual purpose,‖ i.e. an instrument of class 
struggle against landed proprietors and a means to rationalize government coffers.
87
 
By collecting data on cultivators as well as storing rice for the army, the agricultural 
tax underpinned increasing state capacity to govern its population and to expand 
territorially.  
Just as Phan Mỹ had described the Northwest‘s four largest ―rice baskets,‖ 
subsequent reports echoed the region‘s territory in terms of ―economic and financial‖ 
values and described a state program for collecting a share.
88
 Yet the Zone‘s Party 
Committee reported what, at best, appears to be checkered results for year 1952 tax 
assessment and collection. Of ―free zones‖ Yên Bái fulfilled 100% of its targets by 
collecting 5,363 tons; Lào Cai fulfilled 88% by collecting 1,941 tons. Of all the 
―newly liberated zones‖ only one district in Sơn La had implemented the tax, but this 
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district (Mộc Châu) did not report any data.89 The province of Lai Châu is not listed: 
although much of its area was still ―occupied,‖ the omission of ―liberated‖ Điện Biên 
Phủ—the region‘s rice basket—is notable and curious. Because of late collection, 
inappropriate assessments, elite resistance, and suspicious cultivators, even these 
modest results were achieved only on the basis of an extensive ex post facto 
recalculation.
90
  
Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered in applying the agricultural tax, 
the Party Committee learned from these early experiences by pointing to the ―success‖ 
of Yên Bái. Just as data on Văn Chấn‘s ethnic profile (also in Yên Bái) emboldened 
cadres there to discuss the Ethnic Policy publicly, initial knowledge facilitated more 
knowledge and, in turn, a growing state capacity. The Zone‘s Political Commissar 
singled out the provincial government for praise because, during the Northwest 
Campaign, they integrated the work of ―serving the front‖ with the task of assessing 
taxes.
91
 In other words, the local government was able to collect grain from producers 
and distribute it to the advancing army in a timely fashion. In addition, they learned 
how many farmers contributed to the tax and how many cadres were necessary to 
collect it. After the campaign‘s conclusion, therefore, regional government was able to 
―concentrate knowledge‖ of agricultural capacity and state manpower.92  
The emphasis on concentrating knowledge means the lack of knowledge about 
the Northwest‘s western reaches, including Điện Biên Phủ, fits a pattern. Through 
taxation, the emergent state accrued knowledge about itself and its real or potential 
subject population. In the next round of taxation for year 1953‘s harvest, more local 
government institutions would apply this model elsewhere, marching steadily 
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westward. This process of social learning and its centralization among state agencies 
worked iteratively, enabling officials in the next round of taxation to claim still more 
provisions from an even broader population. In reciprocal processes, state learning 
both of itself and of an agrarian society empowered militarized territorialization: the 
Điện Biên Phủ Campaign of 1953-54 would require many more provisions from many 
more peasants to feed many more soldiers.  
 
Uneven Exchange 
The cadres who returned on the heels of soldiers in late 1952 found conditions 
of scarcity among Black River peoples similar to what had confronted their forebears 
in the late 1940s. Some cadres quickly realized that cultivating symbolic legitimacy 
hinged on restarting and expanding forms of material exchange. Once again, those 
cadres sensitive to the nature of this exchange observed what goods were in short 
supply and reported to their superiors the importance of importing and distributing 
them. Other cadres, however, were too preoccupied with the military campaign to 
observe who bore its costs. The pattern of reciprocal exchange was at a crossroads.  
In late 1952, many farmers could barely meet their own household 
consumption needs, never mind those of the military. In addition to the hazards 
combat posed to farm work, a profound shortage of agricultural capital limited the 
ability of farmers to return to agricultural production. Though they were now ―free‖ to 
return to their gardens and fields, farmers accustomed to war-time shortages and high 
prices often lacked the tools necessary to work their land. If residents from villages 
who had been evicted and ―concentrated‖ during Thái Federation rule faced extreme 
conditions of scarcity, then their experiences serve as indicators of the ―recently 
liberated‖ population more broadly. For example, the 30 families of Coi Village in 
Phù Yên, ―did not have even one farm tool; no knives to harvest swidden, no plows, 
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no draft animals, no seedstock; every day [they] had to go up to the Dao and Hmong 
and beg for food, or go and dig tubers.‖ Bereft of agricultural capital, they missed the 
wet-rice planting period and, further, the time for opening swiddens was almost past.
93
   
Guerilla actions from 1948-52 had aimed deliberately to disrupt the Thái 
Federation‘s economy and, by late 1952, succeeded in restricting trade by making 
virtually impassable what few roads and only river (the Black) led into the area.
94
 In 
essence, local residents now asked the returning DRV to make up for what earlier 
DRV actions had, in part, deprived them. Evidently, some local cadres heard popular 
requests, understood their political significance, and requested assistance from their 
superiors. Although it was in the interest of DRV cadres to ameliorate conditions of 
scarcity, the legacy and practice of war either limited their ability to do so or blinded 
them to increasing desperation.  
Phan Mỹ heard these concerns, echoed them to his superiors, but described a 
daunting set of transportation problems. The material dimensions of supplying 
productive capital were daunting: providing the population of just two districts (Nghĩa 
Lộ and Phù Yên) with even a bare minimum of agricultural tools, i.e. two knives and 
one spade per family, amounted to some 30,000 items. Moving these goods to points 
of distribution in newly liberated zones was forbiddingly difficult. Travel upstream on 
the Black River was slow: to move one ton of salt from Suối Rút (Mai Châu) up to 
Văn Yên took five days, reaching Ta Khoa took 10 days, and Quỳnh Nhai 20 days; 
even then, salt and other goods were still days of overland travel away from 
communities in, for example, Điện Biên Phủ. The riverine journey was fraught with 
perils, involving ―many rapids‖ and ―hiding by day in caves‖ to avoid aerial strafing. 
                                                 
93
 Phan Mỹ, ―Báo cáo sơ lược…‖ 22 Dec 1952, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 456, p. 7. 
94
 Because roads and rivers were virtually impassable, the Đèo family and their patrons were forced to 
rely on airplanes to import (very limited quantities of) salt and manufactured goods. Phan Mỹ, ―Báo cáo 
sơ lược…‖ 22 Dec 1952, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 456, p. 6. 
 284 
By comparison, overland transport even within the province of Sơn La itself required 
enormous human resources: moving one ton of salt from Dôn Vang to Quang Huy 
required 70 people traveling 6 days and 6 nights.
95
 That one ton of salt was used as a 
metric for comparing transportation labor outlays indicates the enduring political 
significance, and scarcity, of both labor and salt. 
Phan Mỹ expressed regret, however, that scarce labor for pedestrian and 
riverine transport had already been allocated to the military for transporting their 
provisions.
96
 As such, during the campaign itself, the military‘s command and 
logistical staff was preoccupied with supplying the military and, hence, was largely 
unable to meet the material needs of the newly liberated population. The rising state, 
and particularly its local agents, inherited the economic problems of supply and 
transport their predecessors had in part created and their present superiors could not 
spare the resources to fix. Furthermore, the urgency of supplying the military 
campaign meant that rising DRV institutions immediately exacted claims on, or 
extracted labor and rice from, this same population.
97
  
As a result of these constraints, restarting trade resembling the revolutionary 
exchange was slow and spatially uneven. During the campaign, the Northwest Party 
Committee formed teams of cadres to inspect granaries, solicit data from each 
province, and present targets for newly liberated areas. Then the goods and a new 
monetary medium were assembled at distribution points. Allocated to Sơn La and 
collected at Dôn Vang were 50 tons of salt, 1000 packs of tobacco, 10,000 farm tools, 
10,000 meters cloth, and 1 billion đồng. Allocated to Yên Bái were 45 tons of salt, 
2350 boxes of matches, 1500 packs of tobacco, and 2 billion đồng. DRV-issued đồng 
currency would be used to substitute for Indochinese piastres and withdraw the latter 
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from circulation.
98
 Note that these allocations included commodities for immediate 
consumption (salt, tobacco, and cloth) and capital improvement (farmtools).  
Nowhere did the Committee meet provincial targets for distributing these 
goods. Statistics from late November 1952 indicate that the closer a given site‘s 
location to the Việt Bắc base area, the more material goods it received. Yên Bái 
Province on the Northwest Zone‘s eastern boundary distributed a much higher portion 
of goods to recipient populations in Nghĩa Lộ and Than Uyên (expressed as 
percentage of targets): 15 tons salt (33%), 1000 packs of tobacco (66%), and all the 
matches. Sơn La, farther to the west, received a lower portion: 8 tons salt (16%), 600 
knives (6%), 402 packs tobacco (40%), 400 bolts of cloth (4%). Lai Châu, farthest to 
the west, ―had only begun to move‖ 6 tons of salt from Quỳnh Nhai.99 Yet the same 
locations that received the fewest supplies, i.e. Sơn La and Lai Châu, were also home 
to populations most desperate for material assistance. As a result, delivering promptly 
on the material promises of ―liberation‖ was less a function of need than of distance to 
an emerging center of integrated political power and material goods.  
In particular, salt‘s uneven distribution was indicative of hardship and posed an 
opportunity and a risk for the DRV in terms of its political legitimacy. Residents of 
Nghĩa Lộ who visited the newly opened State Shop said it was the first time in 5-6 
years that they had ―seen someone holding salt.‖ Praising the new government, they 
described how ―before liberation,‖ there was quantity sufficient only for immediate 
consumption and not enough to preserve meat.
100
 Farther to the west, in Lai Châu and 
Sơn La, much to the dismay of local residents, there was still not ―one handful‖ (hốt) 
of salt available to the general population as late as December 1952. When residents 
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there saw soldiers flavoring their rations with salt, they begged for just ―a few 
pinches‖ in order to make ―medicine.‖ Several people in Lai Châu began to wonder 
aloud ―whether or not the Government would supply salt to the people.‖101 These 
patterns of spatial un-evenness continued to grow over time. 
The un-evenness of exchange and claim-making resulted in state ―errors‖ and 
widespread social ―anxiety.‖102 Unlike the late 1940s and notwithstanding the 
―enthusiasm‖ with which Nguyễn Kháng praised payees of the agricultural tax, there 
are no reports of the peasants ―zealously‖ giving away food to cadres and soldiers. 
Rather, a gradual shift from exchange to institutionalized provisioning (i.e., 
mobilization) implied an enforcement of state claims on an agrarian population, 
eliciting popular ―anxiety.‖ Agricultural producers now confronted an obligation to 
―loan‖ (cho vay) the military portions of their recently harvested rice crop. They 
worried aloud that if they ―loaned‖ too much, they would be hungry and, further, did 
not know when the Government might return what it had ―borrowed.‖ Just as dân 
công requirements could easily be confused with forms of corvée or bonded labor, so 
could provisioning the People‘s Army be associated with earlier ―post payments‖ (nộp 
bốt) to French-allied forces. Just as dân công requirements often fell 
disproportionately on the poor, so did the poor often ―loan‖ the military more than the 
rich.
103
 Such inequality may be explicable in light of two ongoing processes: first, the 
old elite, by assuming positions in the new government, could shirk their new 
obligations; second, poor peasants, because they anticipated land reform, were eager 
to support the People‘s Army. These class-based inequities in provisioning and 
laboring, and the anxiety they created, continued to build through 1953 and 1954.  
Aware of these state errors and popular anxiety, at least one regional Party 
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leader also understood that allowing such lopsided exchange to continue might 
undermine the state‘s own programs. In late December 1952 after the campaign‘s 
conclusion, Nguyễn Kháng argued passionately for increasing the flow of goods both 
to alleviate scarcity and, in so doing, to protect programs reliant on popular support. 
By then, supplying the people in newly liberated areas with salt and farmtools still had 
yet to reach levels sufficient ―to resolve the people‘s anxiety.‖ The region‘s Political 
Commissar explained that subordinate cadres and Party cells were ―not yet truly 
caring of the people‖ and, worse, had viewed this work with ―indifference‖ (lơ là) 
because of their preoccupation with the urgent work of ―mobilizing foodstuffs and dân 
công.‖ Yet, he argued that these two activities were inseparable, that problems cadres 
had experienced in gathering labor and food were caused by neglecting local 
livelihoods. ―To treat lightly the everyday needs of the people,‖ he stated, ―is an error‖ 
and, moreover, fails to recognize that meeting these needs was linked to the 
―mobilization of manpower and material resources.‖ Concluding his appeal, he spoke 
in language that central planners might appreciate: without resolving the shortages, 
thereby increasing the people‘s trust in the Government, mobilization would yield 
only diminishing returns.
104
  
The Northwest Party Commissar‘s emphasis on reforming the attitude and 
behavior of cadres echoed a key phrase from the ongoing ―ethnic conference 
festivities.‖ Just as local representatives to these meetings learned about the ―solicitous 
care of the cadres,‖ Nguyễn Kháng underlined that cadres must embody a willingness 
to ―care for‖ or ―help‖ (săn sóc) the people.105 To help, nurse, or care for a collective 
may seem neutral or even benevolent. Yet one can only ―help‖ someone else if one‘s 
self has some thing, knowledge, or capacity that the other lacks. Moreover, in 
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Vietnamese, săn sóc is used with reference to caring for the infirm, elderly persons, or 
children.
106
 As such, ―helping the people‖ both presupposes separability between state 
and society and imbues these realms with hierarchically-organized power. The 
language of helping, therefore, serves also an ideological function, to mask a project to 
expand bureaucratic power as helpful while, simultaneously, inculcating perceptions 
of helplessness among certain kinds of people.
107
 Just as the DRV expanded 
territorially, its cadres also worked to enlarge and intensify their own capacity to 
regulate the means and ends of agrarian production, supposedly, on behalf of Others.  
The regional Party Commissar‘s reflections demonstrate that emergent 
processes of ―mobilization‖ were caught up in larger relations of state, economy, and 
society. Loosing labor and foodstuffs from local producers was embedded in modes of 
exchange which, in turn, were part of a broader program to institutionalize and 
legitimize DRV power. Failure to reciprocate state claims risked not only a project to 
remake human and material resources into a ―reserve force‖ necessary to feed and 
equip a growing regular army. Such failure also risked an evolving relationship 
between the DRV and subjects over which it claimed benevolent rule. Used to 
legitimize the expansion of state authority, the political function of helping applied as 
well to ideas of improvement and development. The rising state reserved the 
leadership of and apportioned to itself the power to transform society. With these ideas 
in mind and on their lips, cadres set about to remake the frontier‘s economy in 1953, 
to construct a reserve for the military‘s demands. 
 
Development, production, and (re)emergent relations of exchange 
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Although the Labor Party‘s 4th Plenum in January 1953 initiated Mass 
Mobilization for Land Reform elsewhere in DRV territory, redistributing land was not 
a Central Government priority in its Northwest region. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the center‘s decisions stimulated debate, and exposed splits between, cadres 
and emerging institutions charged with interpreting mass mobilization. It appears that 
warfare remained the center‘s higher priority. Although the Northwest Campaign 
ended formally on 10 December 1952, combat continued through 1953 with French 
and Federation forces on multiple fronts criss-crossing the Black River region: west 
into Laos (March-April), south at the fortified base in Nà Sản (until August), and north 
to the Thái Federation at Lai Châu (until December); and then, all over again, at Điện 
Biên Phủ (beginning in November).  
Eventually, according to reports in March and April 1953, the Zone‘s political 
leadership settled on a revised interpretation of the Party‘s 4th Plenum: to emphasize 
military struggle by enacting state claims on labor and produce and to restore 
agricultural production by increasing its productivity and distributing capital and 
consumption goods. ―The Center‘s plan for production and economizing,‖ stated the 
Northwest‘s Administrative Committee, ―aims to guarantee levels of cereal production 
that are enough to eat, enough to fight the bandits, enough to prevent hunger.‖108 
These goals did not depart from, but rather rearticulated, previous and ongoing 
practices. On the one hand, regional leaders claimed provisions and local labor power 
to support the military effort. On the other, they stimulated local production in order to 
increase any potential agrarian ―surplus‖ available for claiming; and regulated 
economic relations within an emerging, nationally-bounded system of exchange. 
In early 1953, the Black River region‘s economy was precarious: labor supply 
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was already limited and its productive capacity unevenly distributed. Any manpower 
allocated to the military effort reduced scarce labor available for agrarian production. 
Furthermore, warfare‘s legacy and ongoing practice rendered much of the landscape 
unproductive, in need of additional labor power to restore abandoned wet-rice and 
swidden fields. Regional production and material exchange were spatially uneven. In 
free zones, the masses were ―relatively well-off‖ and ―able to develop‖: Yên Bái, for 
example, became a site of farmtool manufacture. Recently liberated zones, by contrast, 
suffered severely from recent and ongoing combat: agricultural land in Sơn La and 
Phù Yên, for example, lay fallow and farmers lacked capital to work it.
109
  
How did the regional leadership propose to resolve a potential contradiction 
between making war and making food? Just as Phạm Văn Đồng had warned in mid-
1952, increasing support for the resistance reduced labor available for agricultural 
production. In much the same way that the Vice Prime Minister proposed not one or 
the other but to do both better, the Northwest Zone‘s leadership proposed to integrate 
the mobilization of agrarian resources with a movement to boost production through 
rational regulation and planned improvement. The Zone‘s political leadership 
articulated a new agenda for ―development‖ (sự phát triển) oriented towards 
increasing output and supporting the military agenda. To restore and increase 
production across the region, the Zone‘s Administrative Committee instructed cadres 
to lead a charge towards development, to ―enhance livelihoods in free zones‖ and to 
―improve the livelihoods of people in newly liberated zones.‖110 In other words, cadres 
were to advocate, generate, and demonstrate progress through state intervention in 
agriculture and (limited) transformation of rural society. Notwithstanding all their 
efforts to do so, the potential contradiction did not go away but, actually, grew into a 
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real contradiction—with unintended, costly, and spatially uneven results.  
The idea of development must have appealed to a peasantry long accustomed 
to shortage, frequently unable to claim their own labor power, and often frustrated in 
attempts to access land resources. Yet, given the restrictions placed on agrarian 
reform—allowing unequal social relations of land and labor to persist—how did 
cadres ―improve‖ rural livelihoods? Who benefited and who bore the cost of changing 
relations of production and exchange? How did ―development‖ fit into the larger state 
agenda for the Northwest Zone? 
  The Northwest Administrative Committee explicitly conceived of 
―development‖ as an ―ideology‖ (tư tưởng) to be deployed in territories where it 
aimed both to establish legitimate power and to make claims. Development was at 
once an agrarian agenda and a self-conscious ideological project, a set of ideas to be 
cultivated among cadres and peasants alike. Higher echelon cadres attached to the 
Party Committee, for example, were required ―to make [subordinate] cadres 
understand clearly the importance of improving the people‘s lives‖ in order to ―lead 
thought‖ (lãnh đạo tư tưởng) among the people.111 To become leaders of ideology, 
agents of state re-presented a project designed to intensify state claims on society, 
reshape the means of production, and extract a share. The ideology of development 
was a means of representing a powerful project—to expand and intensify state 
power—to, and among, a population now included in DRV territory. As with any 
attempt at gaining ideological hegemony, however, this project was incomplete, 
conflicted, and contested. 
In particular, cadres were ordered to deploy this ideology to legitimate projects 
for transforming agriculture and reforming regional finances. Like the emulation 
model used by the military to transmit collective forms and ideals of service, cadres 
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organized farmers into mass organizations and pointed to them as ―paragons‖ (gương 
mẫu) of new modes of agricultural practice.112 Organizing workteams (tổ sản xuất) by 
economic sector, such as weaving cloth and cultivating swiddens, aimed to increase 
labor efficiency and, furthermore, provided a site for disseminating plans and 
justifications for mobilizing resources for war.
113
 Each team sent representatives to 
attend ―production conferences‖ where participants learned (or, became 
―enthusiastic‖) about policy priorities and, in particular, the practices and goals of 
mobilization. At the same time, cadres used these conferences to gather knowledge 
about local production capacities, i.e. what surplus was available for redistribution and 
military consumption.
114
  
Boosting production was never intended, simply, to provide more food for 
local consumption. More and more, cadres cajoled peasants to increase output in order 
to supply increasing state demands. Cadres instructed them to plant vegetable gardens 
―in order to eat and to sell a portion to the army.‖ Improving the quantity and quality 
of livestock was a priority to ―produce enough meat to eat and to supply the army.‖115  
The logic and language of progress structured both a political economic project to 
increase production and, simultaneously, an ideological agenda to justify state claims 
on any resulting increase. 
Taxation and exchange were central to state efforts to transform agriculture 
and reform the accounting of state claims. Implementing and expanding the 
agricultural tax fed statist ambitions to know society, to rationalize institutional 
coffers, and to collect military provisions. The agricultural tax was most fully 
collected in ―free zones‖ where DRV territorial control was more secure, and 
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ideological hegemony more stable. Cadres there were ordered to ―make the people 
understand clearly that they need to boost production not only to serve their own 
private needs but also to help the economies of newly liberated zones recover.‖116 
Areas such as eastern Yên Bái and Lào Cai sent livestock and seedstock west to 
subsidize reconstruction.
117
 In newly liberated zones of western Yên Bái and Sơn La, 
cadres had to educate farmers, ―from the moment of planting to harvest time,‖ that 
producing for one‘s own needs now required ―contributing one part to the resistance‖ 
and preparing for taxation in 1953.
118
 To set the tax in motion required educating 
farmers to believe, first, that their production was not merely their own and, second, 
that any increases were due, and belonged, to the DRV. Taxation was part and parcel 
to ongoing efforts not only to legitimize state claims but also to rationalize them and, 
more broadly, to recentralize power relations.
119
  
The material and ideological project of development was simultaneously an 
understanding and a misunderstanding of how DRV claims worked in practice.
120
 On 
the one hand, cadres were instructed to embody ―solicitous care‖ towards the 
population and their livelihoods, helping to construct an idea of state as ―helping‖ the 
people. On the other hand, any tangible increases in the people‘s material welfare did 
not belong entirely to them. Labor mobilization and agricultural taxation always 
lurked in development‘s shadow. 
Throughout the contested territory of ―Vietnam,‖ the agricultural tax was 
subject of conflicting and competing representations, indicating the contested politics 
surrounding claims to agrarian production. Just as the DRV legitimated taxation as a 
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form of ―contribution,‖ the French-supported (Associated) State of Vietnam attacked 
this policy and offered alternative understandings. ―Because of the agricultural tax,‖ 
read one bulletin, ―compatriots in Việt-Minh areas are stressed all year, but are still 
hungry.‖ Another bulletin claimed that between taxation and military provisioning, the 
―communists‖ took 90% of a given farmer‘s produce. A cartoon illustrated taxation in 
a damning circular progression: from rice to DRV flag to weapons to fighting and, 
ultimately, to burning villages; at the center is a play on Hồ Chí Minh‘s statement 
(―there is nothing more precious than independence and freedom‖), reading, ―There is 
nothing strange here at all, because you have killed yourself!‖ Notwithstanding the 
illustration‘s lack of subtlety, the text was in keeping with traditions of Vietnamese 
political satire, involving complex wordplay and multiple interpretations.
121
 Although 
it is unclear whether these counter-representations reached a Black River audience, 
they nonetheless indicate that the DRV agenda did not go uncontested.  
Within the contested territory of the ―Northwest,‖ cadres had exhorted peasants 
to ―loan‖ rice and foodstuffs to the People‘s Army during the late 1952 military 
campaign. In spring 1953, the Northwest Administrative Committee now worked to 
balance its coffers and it did so, in line with Central Government guidelines, through 
providing goods, like salt and farmtools, to amortize accumulated debt.
122
 Ironically, 
this system was aptly described in ―counter-propaganda,‖ by purveyors of alleged 
misinformation. ―The Việt Minh,‖ went a line by alleged spies and reactionaries, 
―fooled the people before when borrowing rice in exchange for future salt; now they 
sell salt and take money.‖ Such ―counterpropaganda‖ led the people to suspect ―us‖ 
(ta), continued a Northwest Party Committee report, and increased the ability of the 
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enemy to ―win over‖ the people.123 Such collective (mis)representations underlined 
just how important the work of legitimating exchange was to enabling, or disabling, 
the circulation of materials and loyalties.    
 
Just as the ―counterpropaganda‖ alleged, a growing network of State Shops did 
sell goods, albeit at subsidized prices. To meet popular demands, State Shops (Mậu 
dịch quốc doanh) were charged with trading commodities. To meet state demands, 
they collected local agrarian produce and exchanged Indochinese piastres for DRV 
đồng. In addition to capital goods such as sickles, knives, and seedstock, the shops 
supervised the distribution of consumption goods such as tobacco, cloth, and salt. 
Traders (thương nhân) worked with State Shops to reach out of the way places.124 
State Shops fulfilled larger policy guidelines regulating the movement of material 
goods into the region. Central and Regional leaders agreed ―not to provide rice but 
most essentially to provide tools,‖ explaining that rice could not be provided ―in time‖ 
but, with knives and spades, ―compatriots‖ could dig for forest tubers, open swidden 
fields, and expand wet-rice cultivation.
125
 One might well ask, ―in time‖ for what? The 
answer became clear over the next several months. Meanwhile, the emphasis on 
agricultural tools fit a logic of militarized development, to increase production for 
increasing consumption by providing capital goods. 
If providing tools fit developmentalist logic, then why provide goods for 
immediate consumption, such as salt, tobacco, and cloth? Like the 1940s, salt provides 
an analytical clue as to the priority attached to legitimation work. A representative on 
the Northwest‘s Administrative Committee explained simply: ―With salt, the people 
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say, ‗By having great-grandfather Hồ, only now do we have salt to eat.‘‖126 Great-
grandfather (cụ) is an honorific title referring to President Hồ Chí Minh. ―The work 
had results, the policy guidelines were correct,‖ explained the representative, because 
they ―were able to produce good influence.‖127 By work, he means legitimation 
activities. By influence, he means their political effect.  
Given its political significance, the delivery of salt remained a high priority. 
After the initial shipment of 45 tons in October - November 1952, Nghĩa Lộ and Than 
Uyên received in December 1952 - January 1953 another 70 tons; of the latter total, 
State Shops delivered 42 tons and independent traders 28 tons. In sum, Yên Bái 
received 115 tons of salt between October 1952 – January 1953. Over this same four 
month period, by contrast, the amount of salt reaching Sơn La did not increase but 
may have actually decreased: the earlier estimate of 45 tons was revised down to 35 
tons in one report and back up to 46 tons in another. Salt supply in Lai Châu was even 
more uncertain. Of the six tons ―only just now moving‖ in late December 1952 in 
Quỳnh Nhai and intended for Lai Châu, 5 tons had ―only just arrived‖ in Điện Biên in 
February 1953; meanwhile, Tuần Giáo was slated to receive salt moving not eastward 
from the Red River delta but westward from Laos. Inspections in Lai Châu reported 
what turned out to be rumors: that independent traders were moving 24 tons more salt 
to Điện Biên and another 24 tons ―on its way‖ to Lai Châu as of January; a report from 
February indicates that only the initial 5 tons had actually arrived. Phong Thổ, located 
in western Lào Cai on the eastern edge of remaining Thái Federation territory, 
received 3 tons salt as of February 1953.
128
  
If salt‘s delivery was problematic, its distribution was even more so. By 
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February 1953, people in newly liberated areas were ―very short of salt.‖ Within these 
overall conditions, however, there was a re-emergent spatial pattern. On the one hand, 
people in Nghĩa Lộ, Phù Yên, and Mộc Châu ―had relatively enough salt to eat.‖ 
These locations were on the Northwest Zone‘s eastern reaches, closer to downstream 
sources. On the other hand, ―all other districts, especially [those in] Lai Châu still are 
very lacking.‖ These locations were on the Northwest Zone‘s western reaches, closer 
to Laos and farther from downstream sources.
129
  
The last available report on salt‘s delivery and distribution comes from mid-
April 1953 and confirms these emergent patterns as well as their political effect. By 
then, Yên Bái had received a total of 160 tons salt (45 since January); Sơn La 82 tons 
total (47 or 36 since January); Lai Châu 7 tons total (2 since January); and Phong Thổ 
4 tons (1 since January). If the rate of transportation had increased 30% in February - 
March 1953 compared with previous months, any improvement was a drop in the 
bucket. ―Presently,‖ observed Nguyễn Kháng, ―those close places have relatively 
enough salt to eat but those far places like Lai Châu and all districts in northern Sơn 
La are still very short.‖ The descriptors ―close‖ and ―far‖ are spatial referents posed in 
relation to the Việt Bắc, i.e. the emergent center of material and symbolic power. 
Evidently, the Laos Campaign had altered supply networks yet again: somewhere else 
in Lai Châu was now a point of distribution for Quỳnh Nhai (and not the other way 
around) and Tuần Giáo no longer, or never had, received shipments from Laos. Not 
only was salt‘s distribution in ―far‖ regions of Lai Châu and Sơn La insufficient, its 
movement was constantly disrupted. The political ramifications of these emergent 
patterns were clear. ―Any place where salt has been distributed to the people, the 
people ebulliently welcome, and are fully confident in, the Government and trust the 
cadres,‖ wrote Nguyễn Kháng. ―By contrast,‖ he continued, ―any place where salt has 
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yet to arrive, the people are often anxious (thắc mắc) and short of confidence.‖130  
Salt indicated emergent political and economic relations, its uneven 
distribution reflecting and shaping (lack of) legitimacy for the DRV and its agents. 
Like the 1940s, salt in 1952-1953 rendered an abstract and symbolic relationship 
between the DRV and real or potential subject populations concrete and material. Salt 
contributed tangibly to constructing an idea of ―the state‖ that was personified as 
caring and helpful; and a mirror-like idea of ―the people‖ who were undifferentiated as 
trusting, grateful, and welcoming. In practice, however, the intended political effect of 
salt‘s presence was accompanied by an unintended, dialectical opposite: salt‘s absence 
delegitimized the DRV‘s power and intent. 
The spread of capital goods such as spades, water buffalo, and seedstock 
tracked salt‘s uneven distribution and, presumably, produced a similarly differential 
social effect. Although parts of Sơn La and Yên Bái had ―relatively enough‖ to 
produce agriculturally, ―the areas of worst shortages are northern Sơn La and Lai 
Châu; and Hmong and Dao areas in Văn Chấn, Than Uyên, and Phù Yên.‖131 This 
observation adds topography to otherwise flat spatial patterns. Even within ―close‖ 
areas of Yên Baí were ethnically-coded, geographically-specific disparities: evidently, 
Thái muang communities received more and upland non-Thái communities less. The 
spatial and social patterns indicate an emergent system of exchange bounded by, and 
regulated by the DRV within, an emergent ―national‖ territory differentiated internally 
according to its own ranked categorization of ―ethnic minorities.‖  
 
If salt had its own unique political value, the commodity also serves as an 
indicator of emergent relations of exchange, nodes of which were the State Shops. In 
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addition to amassing and exchanging consumption and capital goods, State Shops used 
DRV money (đồng) with the intent of changing currency over from Indochinese 
piasters. Like other elements in an evolving system of exchange regulated within and 
as national space, DRV currency and exchange programs unfolded unevenly in place 
and with unintended effects.  
Just as the spread of salt and farmtools had spatial disparities, so too did the 
DRV‘s ability to collect old piastres and substitute them for đồng. As of February 
1953, cadres had changed money in three districts of Yên Bái (Nghĩa Lộ, Than Uyên, 
Văn Bàn), yielding a total of 1.5 million piastres; and in four districts of Sơn La 
yielding half a million piastres, of which Phù Yên district accounted for the largest 
share (380,000). Elsewhere in Sơn La monetary substitution stalled: residents of 
Mưòng La and Yên Châu continued to hold onto old currency because, should the 
―enemy‖ return, they worried about being short on cash; and there was no currency 
exchange at all in Mai Sơn and Sông Mã because these districts were ―short on 
specialized cadres.‖132  
What few data are reported suggests that the currency program elicited a 
spatially continuous response overlapping with material exchange: stronger in areas 
closer to the Việt Bắc and weaker towards the west and the Lao frontier. Not 
surprisingly, currency exchange was weakest where less salt and farmtools were 
available: together, their effect contributed towards a lack of faith in the DRV‘s 
anticipated, self-proclaimed ―certain victory.‖ Note, however, that these are only the 
places where currency exchange had already happened. Although the data are not 
complete nor are they reported on subsequently, most of the Northwest Zone‘s 
districts appeared to have no exchange program at all. Like the districts and 
underlying communes whose leaders carried over from the Thái Federation, the 
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medium of exchange appeared to remain the Indochinese piaster. 
Notwithstanding the limited spread of the Vietnamese đồng, its use was 
significant as a means of accounting and exchange by DRV institutions. All tax 
receipts were reported in đồng and grains collected as tax were converted into đồng 
equivalents.
133
 Moreover, State Shops bought and sold commodities in đồng-based 
prices. In spite of official efforts to maintain price stability, inflation increased over 
the course of 1953, complicating efforts to regulate exchange in and for the new 
currency. In Lào Cai, for example, officials attempted to maintain price parity 
predicated on salt as the baseline, where: 1 unit salt (kg) = 9 units (kg) rice and 1 unit 
(meter) cloth = 7 units (kg) rice. Yet as the time from the fall harvest increased, so too 
did the price of locally-produced rice, outstripping any comparable inflation in salt. In 
Yên Bái, the price of rice quadrupled over two months of Jan-Feb 1953 (from 950 to 
4680 đ/kg) while that of salt rose only marginally (from 14,000 to 15,000 đ/kg). 134 
Two months later, by mid-April, rice‘s price had continued to rise: up to 5,600 đ/kg in 
Yên Bái; and from 2,800 to 4,500 đ/kg in Lào Cai. To the west, prices were more 
stable but still high: Quỳnh Nhai and Tuần Giáo from 4,000-4,500 đ/kg; in Sơn La 
pegged at 5,000 đ/kg; the only exception was Điện Biên where the relatively low price 
of rice (1,500 đ/kg) was testament to its prodigious agricultural output and, perhaps, 
lower military demand.
135
 If salt remained per unit more valuable than rice, the latter‘s 
increasing scarcity led broader price inflation. Unbeknownst to state accountants and 
planners at the time, rice‘s rapid price inflation pointed to regional grain shortage.  
Monetary payments were not meant to substitute fully for barter in kind. In 
exchange for providing scarce commodities, State Shops collected opium, among 
other so-called ―local forest products‖ (lâm thổ sản). Indeed, the Party‘s Ethnic Policy 
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stated this priority clearly: ―State Shops must prepare goods for sale and exchange, 
especially salt, cloth, farm tools; and to collect forest products.‖ Opium was the most 
valuable of these ―forest products‖ and the Policy forbade any efforts to ―prohibit, 
confiscate, or buy cheap the people‘s planted opium.‖136 In other words, opium was a 
valuable commodity and, like salt, its exchange value was politically elastic.  
Although Phan Mỹ noted in late December 1952 that the collection of forest 
products was only a trickle, later reports revealed a torrent in the east and a blockage 
in the west.
137
 For year 1952, State Shops in free zones of Yên Bái collected 48 tons of 
cinnamon. In year 1952 in Lào Cai province alone, the State Shop collected an 
enormous 1.395 billion đồng worth of vaguely-specified (but most likely opium) 
―forest products‖; for comparison, the total 1952 amount of credit the State Bank 
loaned out to the province‘s residents was only 200 million đồng, or 1/7th this one 
stated form of revenue.
138
 Yet State Shops in ―newly liberated zones,‖ i.e. Lai Châu 
and Sơn La, fared far worse: in spite of popular interest and willingness to trade tea, 
cotton, cinnamon, and other ―local forest products‖ for money, salt, or farmtools, State 
Shops there were ―unable to collect anything‖ in 1952 and for the first three months of 
1953.
139
 Notwithstanding this institutional failure, popular desire for trade, and state 
regulations encouraging its regulation and stimulation, all remained strong. In another 
report on the region‘s economy and finances—stamped ―secret‖—cadres were 
―encouraged to organize the people to exploit forest products like opium, cinnamon, 
cardamom, etc…‖ In the margin next to this order, a reader added in ink: ―push hard‖ 
(đẩy mạnh) and, next to another similar order, ―important.‖140   
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This state-led barter and trade, buying and selling was intended to absorb all 
forms of exchange, with force if necessary. State Shops supplied itinerant traders with 
commodities and monitored their prices. They also forbade smuggling and encouraged 
traders to embrace an ethic of ―contribution.‖141 Should traders or anyone else attempt 
to trade outside approved channels, they became the responsibility of the Northwest 
Zone Police (Công an Khu). Just as the State Shop positioned itself at the center of 
emerging material exchange in the Northwest Zone, the police enforced their 
monopoly claim to trade there. In April 1953, Nguyễn Kháng reported on two forms 
of ―illegitimate‖ (không chính đáng) trade, one in piastres and another in opium; 
police and customs agents were investigating.
142
 Likewise, a plan originally designed 
to patrol for spies by monitoring boat traffic on the Red River served also a dual 
regulatory function. The Zone Police interdicted ―smuggling‖ (buôn lậu) activities, or 
unlawful exchange, oriented along the cross border, upstream / downstream axis.
143
 As 
discussed below, the police also enforced compliance with dân công duties. 
 
Cycles of labor and hunger 
State claims on labor and produce continued through 1953 just as the zone of 
recruitment expanded steadily westwards. As of January 1953 cadres had already 
―mobilized‖ from the Northwest Zone both 16,421 laborers to serve ―the front‖ as well 
as 1,396 tons of locally-produced rice. The tonnage of rice added to another 789 tons 
collected by 10 December 1952.
144
 Which front is unclear but it is likely these laborers 
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served and their rice fed ongoing combat at Nà Sản. Where they came from is also 
underspecified but it is likely that many laborers and much of the rice came from 
newly liberated zones in Lai Châu, Sơn La, portions of Yên Bái (Văn Chấn, Than 
Uyên), and Lào Cai (Phong Thổ).  
Although these statistics on labor ―mobilization‖ indicate more or less when 
they served, roughly how many participated, describe generally what they did, and 
locate approximately from where they came, the data leave much to be desired. 
Indeed, archival sources for 1952-1953 and beyond leave many questions unanswered. 
From which communities, and where exactly, did dân công laborers come? How long 
did each laborer serve? How did the process of recruitment work locally? Why did 
anyone participate? Based on gaps and conflicts in available data, I have argued that 
regional authorities themselves did not fully know the answers to these questions. 
Growing awareness of their own ignorance stimulated a process of state learning and, 
as a result, answers to some of these questions became more available, and archivally 
locable, during the November 1953 to May 1954 Điện Biên Phủ Campaign.  
What does become clear during this period in early to mid-1953 are four inter-
related facts. Peasants did not always comply voluntarily with obligations. Agents of 
state sometimes used coercion to force compliance. Working as a dân công was 
onerous and increasingly unpopular. Providing labor and food to the military bore 
increasingly severe local consequences.  
In a report resulting from a Cadre Conference held between 22-27 February 
1953, the Northwest Party Committee first aired problems encountered in ―mobilizing 
dân công.‖ What they described as ―bad points‖ (khuyết điểm) included a number of 
failures: to meet time-based and numerical targets, ―not yet‖ fulfilling policy 
guidelines (i.e., breaking what stood for law), unequal service, and ―burdensome 
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feelings‖ (i.e., legitimation problems).145 As evidentiary support, the report cited a 
number of telling examples from the Northwest Zone‘s free zones in eastern Lào Cai 
and Yên Bái. When these problems occurred is unclear (i.e., during the past campaign 
in late 1952 or during ongoing combat in early 1953?) but when they reported them is 
significant. That Party cadres first discussed these problems and then the Committee 
reported their findings in late February 1953 indicates a growing awareness, and 
willingness to reveal to superiors, complex and unresolved issues associated with 
labor recruitment. In short, broaching these concerns appeared to open a space for 
subsequent official reporters to air more problems and, in his report of mid-April 
1953, Nguyễn Kháng described a litany. 
The Committee‘s February report cited examples from Lao Cài and Yên Bái of 
improper oversight, counterpropaganda, ongoing coercion, and widespread avoidance. 
In Trấn Yên, a commune representative did not accompany dân công laborers to the 
front nor were there enough Party members to oversee communes. Recall that one 
member of each commune committee was charged with military logistics and supply; 
Party members (i.e., Kinh representatives on these committees) were supposed to, but 
evidently did not, monitor their local peers. Use of labor was ―wasteful‖ (lãng phí), 
perhaps a veiled reference to use of ―people‘s laborers‖ improperly for pet projects or 
personal gain. Education in dân công policy was not ―decisive,‖ leading people to 
―still avoid‖ labor service; in Văn Bàn ―traitors‖ disrupted meetings by calling on 
people to ―skip‖ service. These are failures in legitimation work as well as indications 
of alternative norms structuring labor allocation. Moreover, in contrast to their stated 
role, cadres did not sufficiently ―attend solicitously to the livelihoods and health of 
dân công.‖ Worse, in ―many a places‖ in Lào Cai, cadres ―still beat up dân công.‖146 
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That these beatings occurred in many places is alarming enough. Moreover, that 
cadres still resorted to coercive measures indicates that use of force was routine and 
ongoing. All these problems, the Committee concluded, had led 902 persons out of 
3,785 dân công in Yên Bái to ―hide out‖ during ―wave 1‖ and avoid service; that over 
one-quarter of targeted laborers did not show up for work ―caused problems 
transporting grains to the front for the military.‖147   
That the assessment ends with acknowledging a failure to provision once again 
indicates an official priority attached to making war. Underlying this assessment, 
moreover, was a growing awareness of institutional failures to justify and regulate 
state claims on peasant labor; and a corresponding response among peasants to contest 
and avoid recruitment. Although when these problems occurred is unclear, they were 
clearly part of a larger trend: dân công service was unpopular and emerging state 
institutions used not only legitimation to attract laborers but also coercion to enforce 
their compliance. In July 1953, in addition to finding and punishing smugglers plying 
the Red River route, the regional police force also found nestled in its banks the 
hideouts of people avoiding state claims on their labor. ―Gangs of dân công‖ used the 
riverbank‘s thickets, reported the Zone‘s Police Chief, ―to hide from their duties to the 
resistance.‖148 The Chief of Police was wrong about these people: they were not dân 
công nor did they want to be treated as such. 
 Nguyễn Kháng‘s mid-April report revealed that people all over the Northwest 
complained of worsening inequities in dân công duties and recruitment, i.e. that not all 
citizens performed their share equally.
149
 Worse still, working as a dân công portended 
danger for one‘s self as well as for one‘s family. Not only did such work mean 
departing from farm and neglecting household production, it also risked one‘s own 
                                                 
147
 Ibid. 
148
 Thu Bộ Công an, ―Kiểm soát…‖ 1 Jul 1953, NAVC 3, phông UBHC KTTTB, file no. 2350, p. 1. 
149
 Nguyễn Kháng, ―Báo cáo…‖ 15 Apr 1953, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 471, p. 5-6 
 306 
health and wellbeing. These costs were not born evenly: rather, in addition to 
following class and status inequities, dangers mapped onto an emerging spatial 
pattern. Unsanitary conditions on the road and exhaustion from arduous work 
contributed to communicable disease among dân công laborers: although Yên Bái had 
several clinics to treat and inoculate them, Sơn La and Lai Châu did not have 
comparable health ―infrastructure‖ and the few nurses there performed duties in sub-
par fashion. Farmers in free zones of Yên Bái and Lào Cai expressed interest in 
establishing time-limits on service so that they could ―put their minds to rest and make 
a living.‖ Meanwhile, residents of recently liberated zones in Lai Châu and Sơn La 
were ―anxious,‖ complained of dân công duties, and ―still fled‖ when asked to work 
on roadcrews or to transport salt and farmtools. Worst of all, in these latter areas there 
was increasingly widespread hunger and, even, scattered starvation.
150
 
What accounts for these observed problems of labor recruitment? Nguyễn 
Kháng ventured one explanation based on emerging patterns of exchange and their 
spatial unevenness. He described how the Zone‘s Administrative Committee was 
unable to meet the material needs of its own population: salt and farmtools remained 
scarce, especially in Sơn La and Lai Châu. In terms of their production effect, the lack 
of spades limited farmers‘ ability to reopen fallow land and contributed to spreading 
food shortages. In terms of their ideological effect, ongoing shortages of salt and 
farmtools and resentment towards labor practices tracked one another: no longer 
―enthusiastic,‖ peasants in these western reaches had become ―anxious‖ and 
―insufficiently believed in the Government and cadres.‖151  
I interpret this first explanation as a breakdown in exchange relations. As 1953 
wore on, the DRV failed to reciprocate locally gathered labor and food resources. Not 
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without his protest and advocacy to the contrary, Nguyễn Kháng was describing early 
stages in an historic shift in state claim-making practices, from an emphasis on 
reciprocal exchange to intensive mobilization. If the former was more voluntaristic 
and predicated on successfully legitimating power as authority, the latter was less 
voluntaristic and predicated more on coercive institutional power. His observation of 
spatial unevenness maps onto emergent spatial categories: rear and front structured 
provisioning practices and labor recruitment particularly and exchange relations 
generally between People‘s Army, DRV institutions, and Black River peasantry.  
Another explanation, somewhat speculative, also suggests itself. 
Notwithstanding the mention of Hmong women inspired to assist the military in late 
1952, in 1952-53 it appears as though dân công labor service was largely concentrated 
in Thái communities. Only in late 1953 and through 1954 does evidence support the 
inclusion of highland peoples more broadly, a topic discussed in the following chapter. 
Therefore, what went unspoken in the Zonal Political Commissar‘s analysis were 
deeper problems in legitimating and institutionalizing old Thái relations of rule in new 
form and practices of labor recruitment embedded in both. Recall that the majority of 
DRV officials in most locations of the Northwest were, in fact, former Thái Federation 
officials. As such, they had been accustomed to impressing corvée (bắt phu) under 
Federation rule, particularly for roadwork. Recall also that their district and commune 
bailiwicks built on and reproduced hierarchical social relations specific to the muang 
spatial unit. As such, officialized Thái lords were also accustomed to older—and still 
ongoing—patterns of bonded labor (cuông nhuột). For Kinh cadres, describing fine 
distinctions between ―people‘s labor‖ in terms of national citizenship duties in contrast 
to officially abolished practices of colonial corvée or feudal bondage presented a 
forbiddingly complex problem of translation and interpretation. Although linguistic 
barriers were an acknowledged problem of legitimation work, any explanation in any 
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language aimed at justifying labor recruitment must have appeared superfluous. If 
rulers and ruled were the same people in the same places, then it is hard to imagine 
that local practices of labor recruitment changed substantially.  
In this light, providing material or consumption goods might be seen as 
compensation to poor Thái peasants expected to submit to reproduced relations of 
domination. Poor peasants who had greeted liberation with enthusiasm found their 
aspirations for land reform denied by central and regional officials; even more modest 
attempts at agrarian reform, such as rent control, were subverted by officialized lords. 
Once again, in addition to traditional power, Thái lords enjoyed renewed bureaucratic 
power—backed with formidable force—to claim local labor. What changed with DRV 
rule was the addition of Kinh officials to a local bureaucracy: their task was to direct 
respective communes to meet urgent quotas levied by senior Kinh military officers 
and civilian officials. Just as traditional and bureaucratic authority merged in a 
powerful hybrid form, so too did the combination of substantive and formal rationality 
produce powerful hybrid norms and expectations predicated on techniques of 
calculation.
152
 If anything, the rationalization of labor recruitment meant more far-
reaching and increasingly intensified labor obligations, not less. For poor Thái 
peasants subject to re-emerging and reinforced relations of domination, the dân công 
program must have appeared like old wine overflowing new bottles. Once again, they 
were called on, or forced, to build and rebuild roads.  
 
In spring 1953, just as the area of recruitment expanded westward, dân công 
duties for local laborers extended beyond pedestrian transportation and military 
support to include road work. On 2 April 1953, 4,000 dân công were ―mobilized‖ in 
Yên Bái and another 4,000 in Sơn La: they joined 3,000 laborers from the delta 
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province of Vĩnh Phúc (supplied by the military‘s General Department of Front 
Supply); and supplemented the ranks of still another 2,000 local laborers already 
working on the Northwest‘s road network. Ironically, these 13,000 dân công laborers 
repaired the very same roads that guerillas had sabotaged several years earlier.
153
 
In June, still more local and extralocal dân công laborers were called on to 
―serve‖ and continue work on roadcrews.154 Central DRV, Party, and military leaders 
wanted to restore bridges and rebuild routes in order to facilitate traffic along the 
winding road network linking the Việt Bắc and Northwest Zones. Calling this ―the 
bridges and roads campaign,‖ the Academy of Military History states that ―several 
dozen tens of thousands of dân công‖ were ―mobilized‖ from provinces throughout 
Vietnam‘s (contested) northern salient, or Tonkin.155 ―Human resources,‖ the official 
military history continues, ―that plentiful energy of the rear, were all maximally 
mobilized in preparation for winter-spring‘s large strike.‖156 The areas from which 
these roadcrews were mobilized—the Northwest, Việt Bắc, as well as Interzones 3 and 
4—were the same ones that, later, would supply the still more demanding and onerous 
Điện Biên Phủ Campaign.157  
Although the specific military plans for the coming winter-spring offensive 
were approved only later, in October, the Academy‘s history claims that preparations 
(i.e., labor mobilization and roadwork) were not only ongoing but had begun much 
earlier. The Academy‘s narrative finesses one problem but rehearses others that 
characterize many official and nationalist histories. For example, an author in the 
General Department of Supply‘s commemorative volume Securing Logistics writes: 
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with regards only to Road 13 and only to labor gleaned from this one province, Sơn La 
―contributed‖ 20,000 laborers working 2 million days—sometime after the Northwest 
Campaign and in ―preparation‖ for the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign.158 If the Academy‘s 
history is correct in observing that preparation for the winter-spring campaign was 
ongoing, then the General Department‘s narrative frames the Điện Biên Phủ battle 
teleologically: whether April or June 1953, neither French nor Vietnamese leaders 
knew that the battle would be located there.
159
 How could planners prepare for a 
particular event they did not yet know would happen?   
This telos adds to a second problem with regards to tracking labor recruitment 
temporally and spatially. From where exactly did the Academy‘s ―several dozen tens 
of thousands of laborers‖ or the General Department‘s 20,000 Sơn La road workers 
originate and when? Attending teleologically and disproportionately to the event 
itself—i.e. the battle—mystifies the historical processes of its making. Furthermore, 
the idea of ―contributions‖ obscures questions of why and how peasants became state 
laborers. Such enumerative tendencies and ascribed voluntarism work to obfuscate 
opportunity costs of not working at home or in the fields.
160
 The so-called ―plentiful 
energy of the rear‖ was anything but abundant in the Black River region at any time.  
Particularly at this time and in this place, moreover, food supplies and labor 
were desperately scarce. In April 1953, Nguyễn Kháng reported that, ―hunger had 
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already appeared in many places.‖ In Sơn La, hunger affected an estimated 5,000 
people in the districts of Mường La, Mộc Châu, and Phù Yên. At least five people 
died from starvation in Quang Huy commune, the same place where the Cầm clan was 
renewing familial rule with DRV backing.
161
 More died elsewhere in Yên Bái.
162
 
Farmers in Tân Lâp suffered multiple corn crop failures and residents of ―several 
villages‖ in Mường La were wandering about, searching for anything to eat. In Lai 
Châu (Quỳnh Nhai, Tuần Giáo) and Yên Bái (Văn Chấn, Than Uyên), ―all 
communes‖ inhabited by Hmong, Dao, and Khu Mu peoples were ―also hungry‖ and, 
while waiting for their corn to mature, ―only survived‖ by digging for forest tubers.163 
For all those who suffered or perished from hunger, any promise associated with 
development must have rung hollow. 
Yet hunger and starvation did not just ―appear‖ nor did it just ―happen‖ as 
though without any causal influence from historical actors shaping and shaped by 
political and social forces.
164
 Rather, food shortages were produced historically and its 
causes were, at least partially if not substantially, related to the mobilization program 
itself. Note that all of the affected districts were ―rear‖ in relation to one or more 
―front‖: Mường La and Mộc Châu were close to Nà Sản; Mộc Châu was a staging area 
for the cross-border offensive into Laos; Quỳnh Nhai and Tuần Giáo were proximate 
to remaining Thái Federation territory; Phù Yên, Than Uyên, and Văn Chấn were at 
the crossroads of soldiers moving to and from the Việt Bắc to serve on all three of 
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these fronts.
165
 Notwithstanding other proximate causes such as weather and pests, 
hunger was conspicuously present in ―rear‖ areas of intensified provisioning and labor 
recruitment close to ―front‖ areas of combat and military consumption. The dangers 
that mobilization for the ―front‖ posed to non-combatants in the ―rear‖ was spatially 
uneven, with hazards increasing with proximity to fighting. Even holding the danger 
of combat constant, the likelihood of suffering in the rear increased as distance to the 
front decreased.
166
   
Like the Great Famine of 1945, who bore the blame for this episode of 
hunger—and under acknowledged starvation—in the Northwest was a politically 
significant and sensitive question. Nguyễn Kháng blamed prior colonial 
―exploitation.‖167 In May 1953, central Party leaders blamed hunger on the colonial 
legacy, natural disasters, and village-based feudalism.
168
 Nowhere did any of them 
acknowledge their own complicity in reproducing feudal relations of rule or in 
snatching scarce resources away from producers. Rather, the Party insistently 
deflected blame from itself and redirected it towards nature, careless local peasants, 
and foreign occupiers.
169
 A report on ―hunger alleviation‖ from 1956 acknowledges 
earlier hunger but describes how adhering to an ultimately ―correct‖ policy—i.e., 
distributing capital goods not food aid—tied official hands.170 Nonetheless, Party 
leaders recognized the event‘s political significance and positioned itself as uniquely 
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capable of solving the food shortage. They ordered the Zone‘s leadership to work with 
district and commune committees to ―prioritize hunger prevention above all else‖ and 
underlined that, ―hunger prevention and hunger relief is important political work.‖171  
Hunger in this ―newly liberated area‖ in 1953 differed from earlier episodes in 
several important respects. Unlike the 1945 experience in the Red River delta, a given 
cadre‘s self-identification as Kinh did not signal similarity with the local population 
but, rather, differentiated him. By and large, the newly arriving male cadres in the 
Northwest were not of these people: they grew up in the delta plains, dressed in shirts 
and trousers, spoke Vietnamese, farmed wet-rice, ate water spinach, etc. Communal 
recognition was predicated in terms of the national liberation project, the same one 
that was contributing so much to local suffering. Unlike the hunger of 1950, when 
Kinh guerilla fighters endured scarcity together with their local supporters, three years 
later many Kinh cadres clamored to quit this place and work somewhere else. As a 
result, using hunger as a cause to unify collectively against a grain-hording enemy was 
far more complicated: storehouses were no longer in the hands of some foreign 
―enemy‖ (be it Japanese or French) but, rather, belonged to a stated ―friend,‖ i.e. the 
grain-collecting, tax-assessing DRV. In short, hunger among Black River peoples in 
1953 complicated legitimation work by further destabilizing the already uncertain 
categories of ―friend‖ and ―enemy.‖ 
Perhaps not surprisingly, central Party leaders proposed solutions to regional 
hunger either modest in scope or largely adhering to practices already in place: borrow 
rice from rich farmers, with force if necessary; draw on relief funds in rice storehouses 
(collected through the agricultural tax) to loan out rice; put people to work (in 
transportation, roadcrews, or irrigation repair) in exchange for payment in food; 
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collect forest products (through State Shops) in exchange for rice.
172
 Note that they 
prescribed more off-farm labor programs to solve the same on-farm production 
shortages to which their own labor recruitment had contributed. Like so many other 
programs during this period, these efforts produced socially uneven results: ―landlords 
did not loan out the proper amount,‖ perhaps indicating elite resistance to state-led 
redistribution programs; people with ―means‖ were able to borrow emergency rice 
provisions while ―poor people,‖ unable to repay these loans, were not granted 
privileges.
173
 
Hunger relief was much like development, both of which must be analyzed in 
relation to broader processes and practices of militarization. Just as the ideology of 
development and hunger relief masked growing inequality and spatial uneven-ness, 
their projects contributed to widening these same social and spatial inequities. As the 
liberation effect wore off and provisioning strategies shifted in emphasis from 
reciprocal exchange to mobilization, popular affect shifted from ―enthusiasm‖ to 
―anxiety.‖ This episode of hunger signaled that an old tension—whether to leave labor 
on-farm for production or allocate it off-farm for making war—had resurfaced all over 
again. In spite of central and regional policy-making efforts to anticipate and defuse 
this tension, conditions of hunger and scattered starvation indicate unresolved 
contradictions. Amidst consequent popular anger and dissatisfaction, the next military 
campaign, an even larger one, would begin.
174
 Hunger followed military campaigns, 
and both followed a seasonally cyclical pattern.  
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Linear state learning, or preparing for mobilization  
If making war was a cyclical activity, then military planning and preparation 
was predicated on improving each cycle linearly. Waged when roads were passable, 
warfare was a dry season project (fall-winter) and alternated annually with its planning 
during the wet season (spring-summer) when heavy rains limited mobility.
175
 In 
spring-summer 1953, the DRV‘s enmeshed military and civilian leaders reflected on 
their experience conducting one of several past military campaigns to plan the next, 
anticipating what would be an even larger confrontation. As the largest mobilization to 
date, the Northwest Campaign became a learning experience: improving the efficiency 
of transportation and logistics enabled a growing military force to secure the DRV‘s 
territorial claim. General Giáp recalled that, ―The logistic work we had done for the 
Northwest Campaign had given us useful experience.‖176 With an eye towards 
improvement, the integrated civilian and military command reviewed the social means 
with which they had and, would continue, to support their fighting forces.  
In a mutually reinforcing process, military campaigning expanded DRV 
territory and generated knowledge of how to provision the People‘s Army. Expanding 
and increasing state capacity to claim and collect agrarian resources enhanced the 
People‘s Army‘s fighting ability. This process of state and military learning was 
similar to, and intertwined with, successive rounds of agricultural taxation: based on 
data gathered along the way, iterative implementations informed the next round‘s 
subsequent spatial expansion and social intensification. Just as local and regional 
institutions generated data to inform the DRV‘s central command, the latter, in turn, 
used this knowledge to demand and effect efficiency, discipline, and improvement 
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among its regional and local institutions. As this knowledge loop tightened, so did 
state and military programs expand spatially and their capacities intensify. 
The calculus of military logistics was complex. Take, for example, a real 
logistical question posed hypothetically: how many porters were required to pack 
enough rice to feed one infantry division of 10,000 combatants moving 300 
kilometers? According to the Temporary Regulations on dân công, pedestrian porters 
were supposed to, on average, walk 20 km per day and carry loads of 25 kg. Assume 
that a given dân công was entitled to 1 kilogram of rice per day for his or her own 
caloric subsistence.
177
 If a 15 day march reached a 300 km distance, then a porter 
consumed 15 kg of rice, leaving only 10 kg per porter to meet combatant 
requirements. Assuming this same rate of subsistence for the combatants (1 kg/day) 
means that one division required 150 tons rice for combatants or, at 10 kg per porter, a 
total of 15,000 porters.  
Of course, real logistical calculus unfolded historically, amidst manifold 
contingencies and uncertainties. Not all combatants received the same amount of rice 
per day (officers received higher rations) nor was rice the only thing dân công carried 
(including, also, ammunition, weaponry, wounded, medical supplies, salt, etc.). Nor 
did infantry divisions simply move to one place where supplies awaited them, as if by 
magic: after 15 days, they had to be re-provisioned, setting in motion columns of dân 
công moving back and forth between front lines and secure rear areas. Moreover, all 
campaigns lasted longer than 15 days, meaning that considerably more porters than 
15,000 (per division per two weeks) would be required to sustain troops in the field. 
Most importantly, as the residence time on any abstract front—what were, in fact, 
multiple actual fronts—increased linearly, so did the number of contingencies increase 
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exponentially: just as one can never fully plan for weather, so too were rain-fed 
harvests variable; military tactics and movements changed constantly to maintain an 
element of surprise. Thus, scholarly estimates of dân công numbers required to feed a 
division over 300 kilometers range considerably higher than the hypothetical estimate, 
to between 40,000-50,000 porters.
178
 Historical figures confirm them.
179
  
Whatever the exact figures, manpower estimates demonstrate that labor was 
inseparable from figuring the amount of rice necessary to feed laborers and soldiers. 
Although the total amount actually consumed was calculated only after the fact (and, 
even then, still remains uncertain), what preoccupied military planners in mid-1953 
was the high rate of consumption observed among porters themselves. General Giáp 
recalled that out of 5000 tons rice collected in the Red River Delta (Interzone 3) and 
Thanh Hoá (Interzone 4), only 1,250 tons remained when the dân công arrived in the 
mountain depot of Suối Rút (Mai Châu); on arrival in Cò Nòi to feed combatants on 
the Nà Sản front, only 410 tons were left. In total, over the course of a 400 km trek up 
and down mountainous terrain, dân công laborers themselves consumed 92% of the 
rice intended to feed combatants.
180
 In short, laborers charged with carrying rice 
consumed considerably more than the soldiers the shipment was intended to feed. As 
state and military planners looked ahead to the next campaign, they anticipated 
mobilizing more labor and more rice than before. Increasing the efficiency of labor 
and provisioning became a priority concern. 
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Likewise, calculating the number of laborers and the amount of provisions was 
inseparable from transportation infrastructure and its ongoing improvement. In early 
1953, the Central Government sent a team of cadres to conduct ―research‖ in and of 
the newly secured Northwest. In collaboration with the regional Party and 
government, the team worked to ―solve problems of national livelihood policy‘s 
integration with defense.‖ In particular, they performed topographical surveys to 
expand knowledge of existing and potential road routes.
181
 From spring 1953 onwards, 
improving transportation infrastructure connecting the Northwest to the Red River 
delta and Thanh Hoá supported both ongoing combat as well as any anticipated 
confrontation. The military‘s General Department of Supply led efforts to rebuild 
roads and flatten riverbeds and, further, to establish a system of depots and wharfs to 
facilitate movement of supplies along them.
182
 They learned how to use explosives to 
destroy the Mã River‘s steep gradients (i.e., waterfalls and rapids) and facilitate raft 
traffic; their experience informed army engineers and supply officers who would later 
domesticate other passages, such as the Ba Nậm Cúm River to connect the Điện Biên 
Phủ front via Lai Châu to China.183  
Prior and ongoing efforts to inspect, repair, and expand overland and riverine 
networks linking the Northwest to other DRV-claimed territory deliberately contested 
colonial territorial control. Earlier, in mid to late 1951, the French Expeditionary 
Forces had countered these efforts with what Jean Jerusalemy called a ―new 
conceptual tactic‖ to protect the Thái Federation: in order to overcome the People‘s 
Army‘s advantage in troop numbers, the colonial military aimed to restore Thái 
Federation advantage by fortifying their positions. ―It was decided,‖ wrote Jerusalemy, 
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―to reinforce the entire front of the Thái country, facing East, with modern and solid 
strongholds.‖ A network of blockhouses or pillboxes (blockhaus) was constructed 
from Phong Thổ to Mộc Châu, including Nà Sản, in order to ―protect solidly the Thái 
Country from the Red River.‖184 Although the People‘s Army surmounted or avoided 
many of these obstacles during the Northwest Campaign, the Expeditionary Forces 
and the Thái Battalions nonetheless held out for months against People‘s Army‘s 
assaults at Nà Sản. French military planners interpreted the Nà Sản experience as a 
sound military tactic, one they drew on later at Điện Biên Phủ.185 Moreover, that these 
blockhouses ―faced East‖ towards and against the Red River delta indicates a late 
colonial attempt to enforce an old social boundary between upstream and 
downstream—a heavily contested effort to separate colonial Thái allies from a rising 
Kinh-organized challenge.  
Just as their ―enemy‖ erected barriers to regulate movement between upstream 
and downstream, the DRV countered by improving transportation infrastructure and 
facilitating flows between the mountains and the plains. Expanding transportation 
infrastructure bonded the Northwest Zone to downstream areas from three directions 
(north, east, south) and, in the process, surmounted geographic obstacles, such as 
waterfalls and high mountain passes, that had historically slowed and inhibited traffic 
in goods, ideas, and people. Drawing on dân công labor power, military engineers 
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built a new route from the north, Road 13, to cross the Black River and link Yên Bái 
to Sơn La, where it intersected with Road 41 at Cò Nòi. They also lengthened and 
improved Road 41 from Hoà Bình all the way to Lai Châu town‘s doorstep, making it 
the principle east-west route through the Northwest Zone‘s southern stretch.186 From 
the south, laborers and engineers lengthened and improved a road to link the ―free 
areas‖ of Interzones 3 (Red River delta) and 4 (Nghệ An, Thanh Hoá) with Road 41 at 
Suối Rút.187 Supplementing this southern route, engineers and laborers flattened 
waterfalls and smoothed rapids along the Mã River from Thanh Hoá westward into 
Laos up to Sam Neua. Finally, another overland route linked Sam Neua with 
Vietnamese territory, intersecting with Road 41 in Mộc Châu.188  
Building and rebuilding all this transportation infrastructure served a statist 
agenda. During wartime, improved transportation facilitated movement of goods, 
ideas, and people in order to provision a mobile military force. Such movement eroded 
topographical barriers between a centralizing DRV and a site of alternative 
sovereignty. In the time to come, these routes worked to close spatial and cultural 
distances, and contributed to transforming relations, between montane peoples and 
downstream neighbors.   
 
Coordinating and implementing all this work—calculations, preparations, 
collections, allocations—presented an enormous task in and of itself, leading the 
Central Government to create new institutions to do so. In January 1953, the Party‘s 
4
th
 Plenary created the Council for Front Supply (Hội đồng Cung cấp Mặt trận) and 
charged this body with ―guaranteeing supplies for the military‖ and, ―especially, to 
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emphasize transportation work.‖189 This new organization and its personnel also 
reinforced the Party‘s leadership position among and across territorializing military 
and civilian institutions. That Vice Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng was named the 
Council‘s Chairman (Chủ tịch) indicates the importance of military provisioning to the 
civilian government as well as the task‘s integration—and priority placement—in the 
work of existing agencies.
190
  
The Council worked closely with the General Department of Supply whose 
leadership and political activities, likewise, blurred boundaries between military and 
civilian institutions. From 1950-55, Trần Đăng Ninh served both as the General 
Department‘s Director (Chủ nhiệm) and, meanwhile, as representative on the 
Military‘s Central Party Committee (Tổng quân ủy). At the Party‘s Second Congress 
in February 1951, in recognition of his work for the Borderland Campaign, he had also 
been elected to the Party‘s Central Executive Committee.191 Not only was he ―directly 
responsible‖ for supplying ―the front‖ during all the military campaigning in the Black 
River region, from the Northwest, to the Lao, Nà Sản, Lai Châu, and Điện Biên Phủ 
Campaigns.
192
 Party Secretary Trường Chinh also ordered all provincial and interzone 
Party Committees (cấp ủy) to submit plans for local road and bridgework in 
compliance, and towards fulfillment of, the master plan developed by ―comrade 
Trần.‖193 Like Phạm Văn Đồng‘s leadership of a ―civilian‖ provisioning institution, 
Trần Đăng Ninh‘s leadership of a ―military‖ equivalent illustrates how the Party 
bridged institutional gaps between military command and civilian government by 
embedding members in already enmeshed institutions. Through such ongoing 
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reorganization, an emerging political elite centralized their power. 
Just as its leadership blurred its ―military‖ status, so too did the General 
Department of Supply‘s everyday work blur distinctions between labor and its 
representation. Early on, the military supply unit instituted mechanisms to cultivate a 
proper ideological perspective among the dân công laborers on whose energies its 
work depended. From September 1951, the General Department housed a Department 
of Politics (Cục Chính trị) whose work was explicitly ideological, to correct any 
―biased perceptions‖ among laborers doing military transport service. During the 
upcoming Điện Biên Phủ Campaign, the General Department‘s Vice Chairman, Trần 
Lương, served also as Political Commissar (Chính ủy) of the campaign‘s rear areas. 
Under his leadership, the General Department developed an institutional network both 
to intensify mobilization of labor and provisions and to educate farmers and laborers 
in the meaning of the campaign, i.e. how their (in)voluntary participation would 
―liberate‖ them. Further, the General Department housed a Dân công Leadership 
Council (Ban cán sự dân công), a subunit charged overtly with ―leading ideology‖ and 
solely with educating laborers politically.
194
 In his capacity as a cadre in the General 
Department, Hoàng Công Phẩm, whose narrative opens the next chapter, recruited dân 
công laborers, supervised their duties, and monitored their morale.  
Although the General Department of Supply had been operating since the 
Borderland Campaign of 1950, the ―civilian‖ supply unit and its duties became 
concrete over 1953, during the season of planning for the upcoming winter-spring 
military campaign. In July, the Party Secretary‘s Council (Ban Bí thư) charged the 
Council for Front Supply with providing the front with grains, transportation facilities, 
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and dân công laborers.
195
 These orders fit the Council for Front Supply‘s work into the 
broader ―development‖ agenda—i.e., agricultural taxation, regulation of trade (State 
Shops), rebuilding transportation, and recruiting labor—already being implemented in 
the Northwest Zone. Not only did this order aim to boost agrarian production, the 
Party also increased the government‘s capacity to regulate this production, and its 
means, through the work of accounting and ―economizing.‖ This regulatory capacity, 
in turn, was explicitly oriented towards serving the means and ends of militarized 
state-making. ―To develop the economy and finance, to develop production,‖ stated the 
Secretary‘s Council‘s orders, ―is to foster the forces of the people, of the resistance; to 
construct the material infrastructure of resistance and state building.‖196  
Preparing for and conducting warfare provided impetus to increase state 
regulatory capacity, serving to centralize power and to normalize its practice locally. 
The ―[Party] Center and the Government‖ empowered the Council for Front Supply to 
work ―directly‖ with ―all‖ military interzones and civilian provinces to enforce central 
orders and ensure military supplies.
197
 Subsequent orders underscored that each 
territorialized unit, be it military or civilian, must make the Council sub-unit 
―permanent,‖ i.e. staffed with dedicated personnel. In this way, DRV leaders aimed to 
normalize and centralize power to claim agrarian resources and local government 
manpower: ―the work of providing for the front will gradually become regular…‖ The 
composition and staffing of these sub-units indicated the scope of its activities: local 
front councils consisted of several cadres (―who cannot be changed so as to maintain 
experience and secrecy‖) who supervised ―specialized‖ cadres from line agencies such 
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as transport, granaries, state shops, health, post, police, propaganda, and roads.
198
 In 
short, central Party and DRV leaders distributed Council powers at regional and 
provincial nodes to collect, tabulate, and allocate—in short, to commandeer 
rationally—both agrarian and bureaucratic resources.  
As the dimensions of large-scale fixed position combat became clearer, such 
efforts to centralize state capacity accelerated, particularly with respect to ratcheting 
the DRV‘s local institutional powers to regulate agrarian production‘s means and 
ends. Just as the Navarre Plan stimulated an ambitious People‘s Army‘s winter-spring 
plan, so too did enmeshed DRV and Party leaders redouble efforts to institutionalize 
mechanisms to mobilize agrarian resources and rationalize claims. Armed with data 
from prior military campaigns, central leaders conducted a comprehensive policy 
review of dân công laws and provisioning guidelines. Aiming to increase efficiency in 
service to militarized state-making, they equipped themselves with tools to intensify—
and make ―permanent‖—claims on agrarian labor and output. 
 
If remaking the peasantry into a pool of labor was an ongoing process, so too 
were efforts to know and regulate the process from afar. Admitting in July 1953 that 
dân công work and organization during the Northwest Campaign had been troubled by 
―many violations and mistakes,‖ the Party Secretary‘s Council pointed ahead to new 
reforms.
199
 In September, the Prime Minister‘s Secretariat rendered the Temporary 
Regulations (183/TTg) on the mobilization and use of dân công into a formal 
Government Decision (308/TTg).
200
 Signed by Vice Prime Minister (and head of the 
Council on Front Supply) Phạm Văn Đồng, the new iteration performed a two-fold 
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function: to initiate the rationalization and enumeration of service durations in terms 
of days worked (công); and to delegate to the Ministry of Labor the explanation and 
implementation of these procedures. The law also hinted at the broad range of 
institutions granted powers to request and recruit labor in the name of state.
201
 
The Ministry of Labor codified the amended dân công procedures in a circular 
dated 12 October 1953 sent to all manner of institutions and all territorial units 
throughout DRV territory, including the Northwest Zone.
202
 After expressing concern 
with stagnating productivity among the dân công labor force, the Ministry‘s circular 
claimed to have identified, at one stroke, a cause and solution for any problems related 
to mobilizing and using dân công labor—a system of accounting for days worked. 
With no relevant mechanism under the Temporary Resolution, the circular 
acknowledged two problematic trends. First, there was a broad disparity between some 
―vigilant‖ individuals serving 3-4 months, to ―lazy‖ ones working only 5-10 days, to 
still others shirking their duties altogether. As a result, the ―vigilant‖ people became 
―heavily jealous‖ and caused overall dân công labor productivity to flatten. Second, 
laborers wished to know beforehand the duration of their assignments in order to 
―make a living,‖ pointing to what was, at root, a deeper tension over the rightful site of 
peasant labor (i.e., on- or off-farm). ―These are several very legitimate aspirations of 
the people,‖ read the circular, ―and they need to be resolved so that dân công can serve 
with peace of mind.‖ Thus the Ministry of Labor instituted a system to record and 
enumerate an individual‘s service duration, a measure designed both to provide him or 
her with official certification and to leave a paper trail for government inspections.
203
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Note that the regulations still did not set an upper limit on service durations. Rather, 
far from alleviating a burdensome requirement of citizenship, rationalizing claims to 
labor served a dual purpose, in both senses of the word: both to justify claims and to 
apply them with increased efficiency.  
Dân công policy changes and adjustments illustrated how central policy-
makers self-consciously joined tasks of legitimating and institutionalizing their own 
power with respect to regulating labor of ostensibly national subjects. Recall how, at 
the same time, mass mobilization for land reform allowed for the appearance, and 
encouraged the identification, of new individual enemies to appear within national 
society (i.e., class criminals). Together, the DRV arrogated the role of monitoring and 
surveilling individualized behavior among populations collectivized as national 
labor.
204
 Through these processes, the Central Government positioned itself as the first 
and final arbiter of a given individual‘s public behavior both as cadre and as citizen, to 
decide whether one‘s social actions merited award or deserved punishment.  
These simultaneously individualizing and collectivizing regulations were 
accompanied by an ideological shift with regards to an evolving idea of state 
propagated and cultivated by central leaders. In addition to an earlier state idea as a 
solicitous, parental figure, now the state idea incorporated a disembodied disciplinary 
element—as though a parent might keep track of a child‘s behavior from afar, even in 
his absence.
205
 In a letter to cadre and dân công building roads and bridges dated 
September 1953, President Hồ Chí Minh articulated a subtle change in tone: ―I, along 
with the Party and Government, will always watch over each of your work.‖206 The 
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word ―theo dõi‖ (or, ―theo rõi‖) captures the ambivalent nature of accepting a higher 
authority, like a policeman or parent, empowered to ―watch‖ or to ―follow closely‖ a 
real or potential subject.
207
 This is an idea of state as embodiment of verticalized 
power.
208
 By entering into this relationship, the effect is to discipline the individual in 
his or her performance of collective work. Crucial to this emergent relationship was 
both a notion of (dis)embodied authority responsible for inspecting officials and 
peasants alike; and a set of institutions empowered to punish ―lazy‖ individuals and to 
reward ―vigilant‖ ones. Use of this surveillance concept not only paralleled ongoing 
work to centralize regulatory, planning, and inspection capacities. Hồ Chí Minh also 
echoed its very language.
209
  
The Central Government‘s emphasis on justifying claims to labor and 
improving efficiency portended a particular transformation for peoples in and of the 
Black River region. By November 1953, preparations for the winter-spring campaign 
reached a fever pitch: the Politburo had decided on confronting the French in the 
Northwest, meaning that the People‘s Army faced squarely the difficult problem of 
supply at a distance from more readily available labor and provisions. In a break with 
previous public policy, their logistics plans called for mobilizing provisions and labor 
in proximity to the front, a plan known as ―mobilizing logistics in place‖ (huy động 
hậu cần tại chỗ).210 Securing food locally trimmed dân công consumption rates and 
reduced the amount of labor necessary for transport. General Giáp credited this idea to 
Trần Đăng Ninh, director of the General Department of Supply.211 Meanwhile, French 
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military planners dismissed the notion that the People‘s Army could muster sufficient 
logistical resources to sustain the kind of engagement envisioned in the Navarre Plan. 
If the battle at Điện Biên Phủ hinged on the tactics of siege warfare, then the longer 
and underlying Điện Biên Phủ Campaign hinged on the practice and process of social 
mobilization in and of a centrally marginal place. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MOBILIZATION IN PLACES 
  
Mobilization intensified and expanded in 1953 and 1954. The empirical shift 
has theoretical ramifications: the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign was a crucible of 
militarized state-making. This chapter builds on the previous chapter‘s arguments to 
extend the analysis of militarization, calculation, and spatial regulation in and through 
this period of intensification. As an everyday practice of state formation, mobilization 
drew on, reproduced, and transformed historically-generated relations of rule both 
among Black River peoples and between them and an emerging national center of 
power. In other words, mobilization appeared concretely at a particular moment but 
figured in a longer process of making a DRV state in the Black River region.  
Mobilization arose as a militarized practice of claim-making contingent on, 
and generative of, underlying and ongoing—and heavily contested—social processes 
of state formation. Intensifying and expanding the recruitment of peasants as dân công 
labor and collecting their rice as taxes depended on prior and emerging relations of 
rule. As such, mobilization drew on and reproduced these relations of rule—
recognized as DRV authority—just as recognition of power in state form partially 
legitimated claim-making practices. The spatial un-evenness of the DRV‘s legitimate 
power influenced processes, practices, and outcomes of social mobilization. How 
these processes worked together or apart varied from district to district, or according 
to underlying muang and surrounding highland communities. The process was not 
uniform nor was its outcome everywhere the same: it was not mobilization in one 
place but, rather, mobilization in a number of places.  
If mobilization, like state-making more generally, followed and reinforced 
locally configured relations of rule, then neither unfolded always according to plan. A 
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contingent decision in early 1954 to extend the Điện Biên Phủ campaign meant that 
claims levied on northern Vietnam‘s agrarian population increased to unprecedented 
levels. Unlike prior military actions in the Northwest Zone, the policy of mobilization 
in place intensified and expanded claims on its people‘s labor and food resources. 
Centrally-organized claims were hardly unprecedented but built on, and worked 
alongside, patterns of reciprocal exchange. Nor did these claims materialize only with 
the presence of military or centralized institutions. By describing the rise and decline 
of centrally-organized institutional capacity, this chapter illustrates that such capacity 
was not established finally, nor was its change always linear. Rather, making and 
enforcing claims both drew on and strengthened local institutions that, themselves, 
were constructed by incorporating Thái elites and social relations embedded both in 
the pre-colonial muang and in colonial notions of ethnicity and territoriality.  
Mobilization in general, and dân công service and military provisioning in 
particular, involved violence and produced unintended consequences. Violence, 
coercion, and policing not only accompanied state formation but also backed up 
legitimation work. To mislabel the result of state claims ―contributions‖ motivated by 
a ―cheerful spirit of voluntarism‖ only underlines subsequent efforts to recount and 
represent what was at the time a contested, open-ended social process.
1
 Loosing labor 
and capital from peasants and remaking relations of rule to do so involved educating 
consent as well as organizing armed force and policing individual behavior.  
Analyzing mobilization in places such as districts of Điện Biên Phủ and 
Mường Lay reveals a spectrum where coercion and consent differed only by degree; 
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militarized state-making relied on both. If coercion accompanied legitimation, then 
legitimation also accompanied coercion. Even in the Thái Federation‘s former capital 
of Lai Châu, where revolutionary organizing did not precede DRV occupation and 
social mobilization, the smashing of old symbols, distribution of scarce goods, and 
redistribution of official and private property all helped to under-write popular 
legitimacy for reconfigured ruling relations. Yet such intensive mobilization entailed 
hidden costs and unexpected outcomes. Extracting scarce resources from Black River 
agrarian societies caused hunger, stimulated population flight, and generated 
organized opposition.   
 
Encounter, mobilization, boundaries 
In October 1953, Hoàng Công Phẩm was appointed to serve as a political 
instructor for Brigade 325 in the People‘s Army of Vietnam. Called up at a pivotal 
moment in the anti-colonial war, he served in the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign in a range 
of capacities: first, as a commander mobilizing labor and supplies to support frontline 
soldiers; then, as an inspector monitoring battlefield morale; and, following the French 
surrender in May 1954, as a delegate arranging prisoner exchanges. Departing along 
with other former combatants, he left what he called the ―beloved land of Điện Biên 
Phủ‖ in the summer of 1954 ―to return home downstream.‖2  
When the cadre Hoàng Công Phẩm traveled to the highland frontier in late 
1953 to take part in a military campaign of grand scale, he followed a path blazed by 
earlier waves of revolutionary soldiers and officials. Whereas Hoàng traveled through 
newly-secured territory to participate in an offensive maneuver against an isolated 
French force, political cadres in the late 1940s were engaged in a guerilla action deep 
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in enemy-controlled territory. Hoàng and his predecessors alike participated in a 
political project pitting them against the French empire and its local instantiation, the 
Thái Federation. Over the course of the First Indochina War (1946-54), how he and 
other like-minded revolutionaries appealed to local people and secured resources to 
support a statist agenda was crucial to the French defeat. Their encounters also built on 
and generated enduring relations, categories, and ideas of rule. How Hoàng and others 
remembered these encounters illuminates how recounting a past in Vietnamese figures 
in prior and ongoing legitimation work. 
 
Amongst the copious literature chronicling the battle of Điện Biên Phủ, Hoàng 
Công Phẩm‘s reflections stand out for what he witnessed, enacted, and remembered in 
the longer campaign. His memoir, entitled, ―We went on the Điện Biên Phủ Military 
Campaign,‖ shows Hoàng to be a careful participant observer in the months he spent 
on Vietnam‘s emerging Northwest frontier.3 Recalling experiences as an officer 
responsible for the muster of labor and supplies, his recollections humanize a power-
laden encounter between state functionaries and local residents expected to yield 
scarce resources. Through his memories of encounter and mobilization, we can see 
multiple boundaries in the making. 
Born in 1925 near the old imperial capital of Huế, Hoàng had a wife and child 
in late 1953 when the People‘s Army of Vietnam assigned him to the General 
Department of Supply.
4
 He was one of many serving in a military campaign of 
remarkable scale. Over 50,000 soldiers in the People‘s Army faced some 13,000 
French-allied soldiers on the hills and plain of Điện Biên Phủ.5 Feeding and equipping 
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these two armies squared off in a mountain valley distant from secure base areas was, 
for both, a difficult and pressing problem. The French relied on air transport and 
dismissed their adversaries‘ allegedly rudimentary logistical capacity. The People‘s 
Army supplied itself over land across topographically tortuous terrain on lines 
stretching up to 500 kilometers. Solving this logistical problem required many more 
personnel than the number of combatants: Hoàng joined 3,000 logistics officers who 
oversaw an estimated 260,000 dân công laborers and porters.
6
 In fact, the number of 
combatants and noncombatants mobilized during the campaign surpassed the 
Northwest Zone‘s total resident population. 
As a cadre in the military supply department, Hoàng grew familiar with the 
forested, mountainous terrain in Vietnam‘s present-day provinces of Sơn La, Lai 
Châu, Điện Biên, Hà Giang, and Lào Cai. It was on one side of this Sino-Vietnamese 
frontier zone where, he said, ―[we] had to collect dân công for transport.‖ In other 
words, it was Hoàng‘s job to remake the women and men of these hills into 
conscripted laborers—to organize them into lines of marching porters to bear rice and 
weaponry to the battlefield. Although Vietnam‘s official historical record 
acknowledges dân công ―sacrifice‖ for, or ―contributions‖ towards, an implicit 
national community, the people themselves often appear merely as abstract, summary 
statistics; their actions explained as ―voluntary.‖ Hoàng‘s memoir helps restore 
historicity to dân công service in all its ambivalence to Điện Biên Phủ‘s story.   
Hoàng and his team plied a newly opened, cross-border route with China 
called ―The Glorious Line‖ (tuyến Vinh Quang). It was the northernmost of three 
supply lines leading to the battlefield. From the southeast, dân công porters from 
Thành Hoá pushed heavily-laden pack bicycles along the banks of the Mã River. From 
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the east, automotive transport, including over 600 Soviet-manufactured Molotova 
trucks, plied roads connecting with the Việt Bắc revolutionary base. From the north, 
when food supplies from Vietnam‘s own farmers proved insufficient to feed 
combatants, Chinese aid flowed overland and downstream from Mengtse, Yunnan 
under Hoàng‘s watchful eye.7  
Hoàng began his tour on the Glorious Line supervising army engineers who 
detonated explosives along the Nậm Na River‘s rapids and waterfalls, rendering its 
waters navigable. It took a month for a battalion of sappers to tame the river before 
Hoàng and his crew could float rice downstream from China. The line followed the 
Nậm Na, traversed mountain passes, and connected with a supply depot at Mường 
Tòng.
8
 Chinese laborers hauled rice and bamboo logs to a wharf at Ba Nậm Cúm. 
Then Hoàng oversaw Vietnamese laborers who fashioned rafts from the bamboo, 
loaded them with rice, and floated downstream together towards the depot. The 
perilous round-trip journey took three days.  
At this point, we can see a spatial boundary coming into view. For Hoàng, 
what defined the Sino-Vietnamese border was, literally, a division of labor. Whereas 
inanimate objects crossed this spatial boundary, Chinese laborers worked on one side 
and Vietnamese on the other. Goods but not people flowed over the border.
9
 
Respective states retained sovereign power to regulate their populations as a national 
people. As individual citizens, these people were subject to particular state claims on 
their labor power: note that dân công was, at the time, a neologism created by neatly 
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inverting the particles for ―citizen‖ (công dân). Performing as a laborer thus came to 
be equated with citizenship, with belonging to, and in, only one nation. Hoàng helped 
legitimize as national service what amounted to state conscription of unpaid labor. 
On the Vietnamese side of this international border, Hoàng‘s recollections 
point to the remaking of intranational boundaries through processes of militarized 
encounter and social mobilization. Of everyone he tasked with dragging rafts and 
hauling rice around waterfalls, the majority were, he observed, ―ethnically‖ Hmong 
and Thái. ―On one occasion,‖ he wrote, ―a female Hmong dân công sat down crying 
and did not work; I was perplexed but I could not speak their language, could not 
understand the reasons why.‖ Later, he consulted a fellow cadre specializing in such 
―ethnic areas.‖ His colleague said, ―[Hmong] customs are that men and women must 
be together in one place and, when night falls, they sing and dance happily.‖ He 
continued, ―[If] you force them to live in isolation like people downstream,‖ alluding 
to the cadres‘ shared regional origins, ―they do not work at all.‖ Though why she cried 
remained unknown to Hoàng, he no longer ―pestered‖ Hmong workers on his crew. 
In March 1954, after three months of digging into the hills and lining the plain 
with trenches, the People‘s Army began their siege on the French stronghold of Điện 
Biên Phủ. Meanwhile, Hoàng had completed his stint supervising riverine rice 
transport and reported to the depot at Mường Tòng for reassignment. His narrative 
pauses there to reflect personally on the place‘s national significance. Located 15 km 
north of Điện Biên‘s plain, Mường Tòng lay at a strategic junction where an outlying 
road joined with another route linking Điện Biên to the town of Lai Châu. Little did he 
know that the route was known in French as the ―piste Pavie‖ (Pavie track) in honor of 
the explorer and mapmaker who, in the 1890s, had negotiated with the local ruler, Đèo 
Văn Trì, to bound this region and bring it into French empire. Rather, Hoàng was 
proud to be stationed at this crossroads because of its role in a recent battle.  
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In December 1953 when a unit of Thái partisans pulled out of Lai Châu to join 
the main force in Điện Biên Phủ, the People‘s Army temporarily blocked their retreat 
at Mường Tòng.10 The unit was led by Đèo Văn Long‘s son in law—or Đèo Văn Trì‘s 
grandson by marriage—and their departure spelled the end of the Thái Federation. 
Again, for Hoàng, the significance lay elsewhere. It was on this hallowed ground 
where Bế Văn Đàn had ―sacrificed‖ (hy sinh) his life to counterattack the ―enemy‖ 
unit. Because high shrubs and heavy rain obscured the gunner‘s view, Bế hoisted the 
machine gun over his head, propped the bipod on his shoulders, and held it fast. 
Although Bế died shortly thereafter, his manner of death achieved recognition 
befitting a ―revolutionary martyr‖ (liệt sỹ). 
It was at the depot in Mường Tòng where Hoàng observed that, ―the Hmong 
way of life is very different from that of the Thái.‖ He also became personally familiar 
with the ―Thái way of life.‖ He and his commanding officer on the Glorious Line lived 
in close proximity to Thái villages and visited them frequently. In the evenings, the 
villagers invited them to participate in folk dancing (xoè) into the wee hours. He was 
blissfully unaware that fellow cadres cited xoè style performances before French and 
Thái military audiences as typifying the colonial exploitation of women.
11
 ―Thái 
women are very sentimental,‖ chided his commander, ―make sure you don‘t get 
reprimanded for that!‖ Evidently, though Hoàng had a wife and child in Huế, the Thái 
women appeared to him as a source of temptation. ―Thái women were very gentle and 
sweet,‖ he recalled. ―Sometimes they would call out to us very endearingly, ‗Oh, Mr. 
soldier! Over here, Mr. soldier!‘‖ 
After his stint at Mường Tòng and until the French surrender on 7 May 1954, 
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Hoàng served the General Political Command inspecting soldier morale on Điện Biên 
Phủ‘s frontlines. At this point, his memoire turns away from local observation towards 
a more standard narrative of the military‘s steady advance to triumph.  
In addition to his local observations, Hoàng also describes how he remembers 
his time in the frontier warzone. On the one hand, he expresses mixed feelings about 
working the Glorious Line. ―One thing still troubles me from this period,‖ he writes, 
recalling how one day, ―Some number of dân công from Phú Thọ province along with 
two Party members rode a raft that drifted into a grotto where they all went missing.‖ 
Although he knew that they died in that cave, what still bothers him is less their death 
per se and more whether or not their death was officially recognized, whether they had 
―yet achieved consecration as revolutionary martyrs.‖ On the other hand, his time in 
the Northwest crystallizes as a bundle of gendered and nostalgic memories. After 
returning home ―downstream,‖ whenever he heard the popular song ―Remember the 
Northwest‖ Hoàng describes how his heart would stir. Its lyrics conjure the region as a 
place of feminine smiles and natural beauty.
12
 He harks back to the region‘s forests 
and mountains, recalling his days there as ―arduous but dreamy and romantic.‖ He 
remembers the place as a site of nostalgia, a stage for manly struggle and valor. 
 
These selections from Hoàng‘s experiences in the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign 
narrate his participation in a series of encounters with local residents in a concretizing 
frontier of Vietnam. The notion of encounter refers, simply, to a meeting between 
people or peoples.
13
 Yet the 1950s Black River region encounters retold by Hoàng 
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unfolded in a field of force where actors recognized social differences and, as a result, 
manifold boundaries appeared, reappeared, and assumed lasting shape. The militarized 
encounter was at once a process of social differentiation; and the recognition and 
legitimation of one form of difference, that of state, to regulate all other forms—with 
force if necessary.   
Encounter, then, also refers to the establishment of formative relations between 
peoples who conceive of themselves as somehow different from one another. Hoàng 
was an agent in militarized encounter, forming and reforming powerful boundaries 
within national community and generating conceptions of idealized self and other. In 
the above story, the ―other‖ figures as the mountain-dwelling, ethnicized, gendered 
subjects who labored, as dancers or porters, on his behalf. Emotion among these 
female subjects ran a thin line between sensitive and hysterical: whereas the female 
Thái were sexualized as ―sweet‖ and tempting, the crying Hmong woman was 
virtually inscrutable. Local men are curiously absent from his narrative. In contrast, as 
a young male embarking on an expedition to serve the nation bravely, perhaps even 
heroically, Hoàng embodied an idealized national self. Like his colleague from 
―downstream,‖ his ethnic identity goes unstated, serving to naturalize Kinh-ness and 
its dominant presence within national communal space. As discussed previously, state-
making dichotomized relations within national space between upstream and 
downstream, majority and minority, state and society. To this list, Hoàng adds the 
bifurcated gender categories of male and female. The young cadre not only regulated 
the appearance of these enmeshed boundaries but enacted their consequences.  
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At this moment, not only were the social boundaries of national community in 
flux but so were its spatial limitations. During this phase of military struggle, political 
elites determined to expand national territory throughout what they called Vietnam, 
including the Thái Federation‘s remnants, up to projected international borders with 
Laos and China. Fulfilling this claim hinged both on militarized enforcement and on 
making a state that could call on a corresponding nation‘s collective labors. If 
militarization quickens and compresses state-making, then the Điện Biên Phủ 
Campaign accelerated an already rapid process of institutionalizing, territorializing, 
and legitimating relations of rule.  
Armed with an authority vested in his self to command others, Hoàng 
presented state power to mobilize subjects as natural, as an unquestioned legitimate 
right. Yet mobilizing land, labor, and capital involved making institutions empowered 
to do so and naturalizing these transformed social relations. Mobilization, in other 
words, aimed to legitimate profoundly unequal social relations and render them 
natural or normal. Conscripting women (and men) to serve as porters required staking 
claims on their energies bound up in household and farm, remaking them as dân công 
laborers, and diverting labor as such to road and river. Gathering food for the military 
required a similar claim-making practice and transformative process: increasing 
agricultural production, diverting foodstocks away from farm and market, and 
reallocating provisions as such towards sites of military consumption.  
Social mobilization reproduced state and society, and lent them concrete form, 
as mutually-constituted realms, each endowed with a particular relation to, and claim 
on, the means and ends of production. Demolishing rocky rapids with explosives on 
the Nậm Na River illustrates the transformation of wild nature into a navigable 
waterway, from unusable to productive landscape. Domesticating nature also serves as 
a metaphor to describe the modernizationist terms in which the DRV conceived of its 
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militarized social intervention: to destroy feudal and colonial exploitation and, in their 
place, build a rational socialist state to deliver progress to a national society. Like the 
stochastic tendency displayed even by tamed rivers, however, people often overflowed 
the categories constructed to contain them. Social mobilization was an everyday form 
of state formation, at once a state regulatory practice and a complex, non-linear, and 
highly contested social process.  
Legitimating relations of rule occurred not only in the moment but also 
subsequently. In modern Vietnam, where history-making is an official endeavor, state 
power also resides in an ability to re-present the past in particular ways. Who is 
empowered to tell and retell stories of encounter and mobilization speaks to 
knowledge-production as well as to memory and its collective remaking. Hoàng wrote 
his memoire in Vietnamese, using the national script (quốc ngữ), from the perspective 
of a loyal, ranking cadre. Such eye-witness accounts, like contemporary official 
reports more generally, produce authoritative knowledge of social difference in 
national space, informing readers about ethnicity, language, customs, etc. Such 
language facility and official position, however, were largely beyond the reach of 
those people Hoàng and others like him mobilized. The diverse peoples reproduced as 
abstracted dân công had stories too but their circulation was bounded in place by 
orality, vernacularity, and differential power.
14
 Vietnamese vocality works in tandem 
with multiple silences to Vietnamize the historical record. By reading Hoàng‘s 
account and archived reports for what they say and what they do not, I attempt to open 
up these silences by locating historical subjects, or their ambiguous traces. 
Vietnamizing the past, or nationalizing collective memory, is an ongoing 
project. Successive iterations of Vietnamese states have worked hard to commemorate 
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people and events as exemplars of national service.
15
 Even within his text, state power 
to memorialize one‘s ―sacrifice‖ was on Hoàng‘s mind. Whether worrying about his 
missing comrades‘ official status or exalting the memory of a hero, he recognized and 
acknowledged state power to declare one a ―martyr.‖ In Bế Văn Đàn‘s case, the DRV 
in 1955 awarded him posthumously with the nation‘s highest military honor, Hero of 
the Armed Forces. Roads, songs, and schools in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
now bear his name.  
Commemoration works, from cemeteries in Điện Biên Phủ to annual 
celebrations of the ―great victory,‖ shape and reshape an isomorphism between nation, 
society, and state. After all, Hoàng‘s memoir, republished in honor of the battle‘s 50th 
anniversary, was part of a massive, centralized effort to celebrate a triumphant 
outcome at Điện Biên Phủ. The introduction accompanying his memoir captures a 
curious paradox on display during these commemorations: the publishers write, ―the 
Điện Biên Phủ Campaign has entered the history of 20th century mankind as a noble 
and eternal history.‖ Even as the events in question are located in time, they are 
presented as outside of history. The publishers go further still: by equating military 
victory with ―victory for the strength and unity of the Vietnamese people,‖ they 
contribute to extricating a particular idea of nation from the vicissitudes of 
contingency, contest, and disunity.
16
 Although the commemorative volume was 
published in 2004, it does not specify when Hoàng Công Phẩm wrote his piece. Such 
reproduction of his memoirs, then, remakes a tale written at a particular moment into a 
temporally transcendent piece. The volume represents a historically specific 
recollection as one that stands both outside time yet always with and for Vietnam.  
Finally, Hoàng‘s narrative also provides a fleeting glimpse of what has been 
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forgotten in these official narratives. Neither the Vietnamese nation nor its heroes 
alone were responsible for the ultimate outcome. His experience moving rice from 
China to the front is potent reminder that the revolution was not hermetically-sealed as 
nation, emerging triumphant over foreign invaders. Rather, the anti-colonial 
revolutionary struggle depended, in part, on timely overseas aid from (sometimes) 
friendly international sources. His experience mobilizing local labor is reminder that 
even heroic soldiers earned renown only through efforts of underacknowledged 
civilians and their mutual suffering. Whatever the People‘s Army accomplished in 
1953-54, their efforts depended on the many un-named porters and farmers who fed 
them and kept them moving. It is to their mobilization, representation, and hidden 
stories that we now turn. 
 
Preparation, organization, contingency 
In contrast to the 1952 Northwest Campaign when, at least initially, most 
supplies and labor came from neighboring regions, the strategy to ―mobilize logistics 
in place‖ shifted the burden of supplying labor and food on to the region‘s local 
residents. Preparations for the winter-spring 1953-54 military campaign, known only 
later as the Diện Biên Phủ Campaign, were predicated on a heightened military 
confrontation. This shift and the anticipated scale of combat renewed ongoing 
instititutional reorganization.  
In a November Circular issued only a week and a half before French 
paratroopers landed in Điện Biên Phủ, Central Party decision-makers underlined how 
all manner of claims would not only extend to the Northwest Zone but, in line with the 
above strategy, intensify there. The Party Secretary Council‘s Circular delimited the 
spatial expanse of intensive mobilization: from the mountainous Northwest and Việt 
Bắc Zones into neighboring Interzones 3 and 4. For residents and officials in this 
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territorial arc, the ―duty‖ of supplying the front, stated the Circular ominously, ―is 
about to be very heavy.‖17  
In terms of provisions, the Council ordered Administrative and Resistance 
Committees ―to attach special importance to rice and meat, especially the Northwest 
Zone, to rice harvest, rice milling, tax collection and transport…‖18 Attending to rice 
milling and meat preservation indicated the Central Government‘s intent to transform 
local farm capital into portable foodstuffs. Sixty millers traveled from ―downstream‖ 
up to the Northwest to instruct ―locals‖ in processing harvested rice, to facilitate 
turning their harvest into the army‘s edible provisions.19 Additional quantities of salt 
were no longer intended for legitimation work alone but, also, to turn locally-managed 
livestock into transportable, preserved meat. Like before, the agricultural tax served as 
a state mechanism to learn about subjects, to gauge their productive capacity, and to 
demand a portion of their rice crop for military consumption.
20
   
In terms of transport, the Council ordered roadwork to continue and the 
adoption of new technologies to improve transportation labor efficiency. Maintaining 
the road network in face of aerial bombardment, especially at vulnerable chokepoints 
like river crossings, required constant inspection and holding laborers in reserve for 
quick repairs. Above all, the circular ordered, ―do not allow the enemy to cut off 
transportation.‖ The Council drafted all vehicles and watercraft into military 
transportation work, to ―reduce human energy.‖ Bicycles were singled out as the 
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―best‖ form of transport, because their higher load capacity (60-100kg) boosted 
productivity over pedestrian porters.
21
 Subsequent photographic representations of the 
campaign elevate pack bicycles (xe đạp thồ) as synonymous with individualized 
transport efficiency.
22
 
All this transportation work required laborers predisposed to work and 
presupposed as workers. ―Now and later,‖ stated the Council, ―we will still need to use 
dân công.‖ The order affirmed adherence to dân công regulations, particularly 
assigning service based on public assessments (bình nghị) and placing ―special 
emphasis on productivity.‖ Like President Hồ before the Northwest Campaign, the 
Circular stated, ―The work of dân công is political work.‖ As such, both a Party 
member and an ―excited‖ cadre well-versed in relevant policies were to accompany 
each team of laborers. Anyone operating in ―ethnic minority areas,‖ where 
―infrastructure is weak and cadres are insufficient,‖ had special instructions: to find 
―vigilant elements‖ and make them into cadres; to educate these local cadres and dân 
công in the Government‘s Ethnic Policy and, overall, to adhere to the policy‘s 
principal of ―unity.‖23  
As an ascribed ―ethnic minority area,‖ the circular carried a special message 
for the Northwest Zone. Mobilizing resources was an ends in itself as well as a means 
towards other ends: to recruit local Party members and state officials; to set the terms 
for national ―unity.‖ Mobilization, therefore, was also a project of national state-
making. What, then, did ―unity‖ mean? Gazetted as official DRV policy only in June 
1953, the Ethnic Policy offered terms of national inclusion and exclusion to real and 
prospective subjects in the Black River region. According to a summary cadres used in 
                                                 
21
 Italics in original. ―Thông tri…‖ 9 Nov 1953, Văn kiện Đảng vol 14, yr 1953 (2001), 345-6. 
22
 Cf., Nguyễn Đình Hưng, ―Sức mạnh dân công trong chiến dịch Điện Biên Phủ,‖ in Nhiều tác giả, 
(2004), 84-85.  
23
 ―Thông tri…‖ 9 Nov 1953, Văn kiện Đảng vol 14, yr 1953 (2001), 345-6, 348. 
 345 
popular study sessions held there, ―all ethnic majority and ethnic minorities must 
cherish, help, and treat one another as siblings.‖ To accept these terms means 
acknowledging how the category of ethnicity mediated one‘s membership in national 
community; the ethnic form was an ascribed minority identity in relation to an 
ostensible Kinh majority. ―Unity in equality and mutual assistance,‖ the summary 
continues, ―means that all Kinh, Thổ, Thái, Man [Dao], Mèo [Hmong], etc. are ranked 
equivalently regarding rights and responsibilities.‖24 Although the document describes 
the agricultural tax as one such ―responsibility,‖ the duty of dân công labor goes 
unmentioned. Moreover, notwithstanding such lofty ideals, the abstract idea of ―unity‖ 
contained an inherent contradiction between stated equality and underlying inequality. 
According to the dominant Kinh/Viet cultural context, siblings (anh em) are inherently 
unequal, ranked according to age.
25
 In practice, this inequality became manifest in the 
rank asserted by Kinh cadres in relation to non-Kinh peoples generally and to local 
cadres, prospective subjects, and potential laborers particularly.  
Legitimation work targeted not only imagined dân công laborers but actual 
cadres as well. Through exhibiting exemplary organization and conduct, according to 
the Council, ―all cadres and party members become nuclei, paragons pulling and 
prodding the masses to follow.‖26 State actors were to act as catalysts of social 
mobilization through their personal comportment, to be models for social emulation. 
According to this old mode of social transmission, the cadres‘ embrace of 
revolutionary ideals—such as immediacy, endurance, struggle, and vigilance—might 
inspire those they led. What went unstated, however, was that this Confucian idea was 
specific to Kinh/Viet cultural norms and, as such, might be unsuited to the Black River 
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region‘s different, multiple, and diverse social traditions.  
In a modernizing twist, the Council also ordered cadres to institute social 
learning by incorporating principles of efficiency and progress into iterative waves of 
mobilization. Convening sessions to learn from experience and engage in self-
criticism (kiểm thảo) singled out individual cadre in their work together, a technique 
designed to improve collective performance. In line with the broader development 
agenda and ongoing processes of bureaucratic rationalization, the Council prescribed 
tactics to achieve efficiency gains including organizational accounting, personnel 
inspection, and reduction of waste and corruption.
27
 Accordingly, the General 
Department of Supply organized trainings for cadres engaged in dân công work, like 
Hoàng Công Phẩm, to equip them with a proper ideological perspective, particularly 
with regards to emulation and efficiency.
28
 Like the mechanism to track dân công 
service, these bureaucratic measures placed the burden of accountability onto an 
individual performing within a rationally organized institution. Accounting for one‘s 
duties individually through practices of self-criticism and public assessments were 
institutional means to maximize labor efficiency as well as mechanisms to discipline 
erroneous cadres and lazy laborers alike.  
Empowered by these and other central directives, the military‘s General 
Department of Supply initially called for 7,730 tons of rice, of which 6,060 tons was 
to be collected principally in Sơn La and Lai Châu. By working with the Northwest 
Party Committee to collect rice locally, they hoped to reduce the amount consumed en 
route.
29
 Certainly, many goods still had to be brought from downstream including 140 
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tons salt, ammunition, medicine, etc.
30
 Nonetheless, the Department promulgated and 
followed the guideline, ―vigilantly mobilizing rice in place is foremost.‖31 Collecting 
provisions for the winter-spring campaign of 1953-54 commenced during 1953‘s fall 
rice harvest. Unlike the soldiers and cadres who had ―helped‖ the peasantry a year 
before to bring in the harvest, this time a pre-formed, specially tasked team showed up 
in villages to claim a portion of their crop.
32
 By educating cultivators in the 
campaign‘s official meaning—i.e., ―to liberate the Northwest‘s compatriots through 
all out resistance‖—these teams secured commitments to pay the agricultural tax, 
perform dân công duties, and increase production.
33
  
 
Notwithstanding all their centralized planning and localized preparation, 
enmeshed Party-military-state elites did not foresee a crucial contingency. By January, 
the forces amassed by the People‘s Army were inadequate to lay siege to French 
fortifications in and around the Mường Thanh plain. All the preparatory work invested 
earlier in the anticipated winter-spring confrontation paled in comparison to the 
concrete scale and dimension necessary to attack fortified positions at Điện Biên Phủ. 
As a result, General Giáp, in consultation with Chinese advisors and the Front 
Command, decided to delay the battle‘s opening and to change tactics from rapid 
mobile warfare to fixed position assault.
34
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The tactical decision took into consideration how to maximize heavy artillery, 
the newest weapon in the People‘s Army‘s arsenal. If artillery would ultimately prove 
decisive in the overall balance of forces, then deploying these cannons only added to 
the military‘s civilian labor requirements. By digging these cannons into the 
mountains ringing the Mường Thanh plain, the People‘s Army used the terrain to 
concentrate firepower on the valley below. Yet just one 105mm howitzer required a 
team of 500 soldiers and dân công to drag it into position; and there were at least some 
24 cannons of this type alone.
35
 Though substantial, the labor requisitioned to haul 
artillery and munitions accounted for only a fraction needed just to use this one form 
of weaponry. Transporting these artillery pieces from afar, in turn, required even more 
roadcrews both to widen the switchbacks on Road 41 and to add still more length to 
the local road network.
36
 
To make up for this contingent strategic adjustment, the DRV would have to 
mobilize still more labor and supplies. In early February, the Politburo agreed with the 
Front Command‘s analysis and instructed Interzone and Regional Party Committees to 
extend the campaign into the summer and, moreover, to ―prioritize above all the 
mobilization of manpower and materials to supply the front.‖37 Extending the 
campaign temporally multiplied initial provision targets and, as a result, the zone of 
mobilization expanded spatially. In keeping with guidelines to mobilize logistics in 
place, the Northwest‘s own population provided much of the military‘s labor and 
supplies. Delaying the battle‘s starting date, however, meant that local production was 
insufficient to fulfill overall demand. In line with the Politburo‘s instructions, 
collection intensified in neighboring regions of northern Vietnam—to the Việt Bắc, 
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Interzones 3 and 4—and expanded abroad to China and Laos.38 By the Điện Biên Phủ 
Campaign‘s end in May 1954, the total amount of manpower and supplies mobilized 
in its support more than tripled the General Department of Supply‘s early estimates.39  
 
Mobilization by numbers: counting, accounting, recounting 
How does one measure mobilization? More specifically, how did state agents 
measure claims made and to what effect? Strengthening DRV institutional capacity 
prior to and during the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign enabled the calculation of state 
claims with new precision if not always with accuracy. In this section, I describe how 
an institutional capacity to count state demands and supplies, accounted for in a post-
campaign report by the Council on Front Supply, has led subsequent analysts to 
recount these claims in a particular way: as ―contributions‖ from various territorialized 
DRV units always already directed towards a national resistance effort. As such, 
counts and accounts have become the narrative fodder for recounting the Điện Biên 
Phủ Campaign. I use this analysis to set up a broader discussion, arguing that 
enumerating logistics within bounded time and given spaces neglects the social 
processes that made mobilization work. Not only did these processes predate and 
outlast the temporal limits of the campaign itself but they also transformed the means 
and ends of agrarian production lastingly.  
On 10 July 1954 the Central Council for Front Supply led by Vice Prime 
Minister Phạm Văn Đồng issued a report providing, and celebrating, aggregate figures 
for military supply including provisions, labor, and means of transportation.
40
 
Significantly, the Council‘s ―Report on work to serve the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign‖ 
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begins by demarcating the campaign‘s temporal limits to an eight month period. ―We 
began in October 1953,‖ reads the opening line, ―by organizing the apparatus of 
supply and, simultaneously, by receiving the military‘s supply orders for winter-
spring.‖ In May 1954, on the occasion of the ―enemy‘s greatest defeat‖ and when the 
―nation‘s resistance stepped forward into a new era,‖ the Council‘s work ended.41 The 
report also delineated the spatial realm of the ―very expansive battlefield,‖ i.e. ―all 
zones and provinces‖ of northern Vietnam, within which and about which its narrative 
account unfolds.  
This boundary-making is analytically significant. The report‘s temporal bounds 
excluded all the work that had preceded, and was continuing beyond, the campaign‘s 
restricted eight month time frame. Not included were the Northwest, Lao, or Nà Sản 
Campaigns and all the roadwork that accompanied them. Likewise, the spatial 
boundaries excluded all the provisions and supplies originating outside of ―our 
nation,‖ i.e. from Laos and China. Only by drawing boundaries did the Council make 
its accounting finite. Spatially, this finitude mapped onto a portion of the DRV‘s 
sovereign territorial claim—itself in the process of negotiation at Geneva and resulting 
in partition at the 17
th
 parallel in July 1954.
42
 Predicated on this bounded counting and 
bureaucratic accounting did the Council‘s recounting of the campaign begin.  
Having established boundaries, the past work of territorialized units (i.e., zones 
and provinces) and supply agencies could now, according to the report, serve another 
purpose: as a ―lesson‖ (bài học). Presented at a conference summarizing the Council‘s 
experiences, the report‘s explicit aim was to educate government officials and 
agencies, to ―learn from its work.‖ This pedagogic intent rendered all the 
―difficulties,‖ whether or not they had been ―overcome,‖ into instructive lessons 
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enabling future work to ―succeed.‖43 Like data furnished through earlier military 
campaigns, this data could now be used by cadres, soldiers, and planners to forecast 
and execute future social interventions with increased productivity. The report formed 
the basis for another round of iterative state learning. 
Unlike data from earlier campaigns, the Council‘s institutionalized authority 
and centralized capacity enabled the calculation of data in a powerful way. Recall that 
President Hồ stated in July 1953 that he, the Party, and the Government would ―watch 
over‖ (theo dõi) the efforts of dân công on the roads and bridges campaign.44 He 
articulated an idea of surveillance embedded in the reorganization of state institutions. 
A year later, the Council noted how its ―state apparatus‖ stationed at provincial and 
regional units had done just this, to ―watch over normal, everyday work.‖45 Indeed, the 
Central Council embodied the outcome of institutional efforts to centralize 
bureaucratic authority, rationalize its practice, and expand its capacity. Now, the report 
summarized the work of monitoring and inspecting regional units, particularly with 
regards to commandeering bureaucratic personnel and securing agrarian resources.  
Having rationalized its claims in situ through the work of its local branches, 
the conclusive report now rationalized them ex post facto with reams of statistics. In 
both instances, rationalization was simultaneously a bureaucratic procedure to increase 
efficiency and an ideological tactic to justify state claims. The Central Council 
collected, classified, and synthesized data from all localities and supply agencies. This 
one report aimed to summarize authoritatively, in exacting precision, all the results of 
this one campaign‘s social mobilization. Armed with this authority, this centrally 
produced report has since overwritten, or outranked, all other locally produced reports 
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on the same topic.  
Because the Council‘s July 1954 report has since become the standard 
reference for scholars and memory-makers alike, it is necessary to review its contents 
critically, particularly its rhetoric and use of aggregate statistics. The report‘s most 
frequently cited data is apportioned according to two metrics: the amount of supplies 
mobilized at the point of origin and the amount the Council turned over to the 
military‘s General Department of Supply.46 By point of origin (tận gốc), the Council 
referred to territorialized state authorities, units responsible for amassing and counting 
the work of respective resident populations. By supplies, or logistics, the Council 
referred to mobilized foodstuffs (thực phẩm) and manpower (sức người), i.e. peasant 
producers‘ agricultural production, labor power, and means of transport. Table 6.1 
illustrates the amount of foodstuffs mobilized at the point of origin.  
 
Table 6.1: Food supplies mobilized at point of origin for Điện Biên Phủ Campaign, in 
metric tons.
47
  
 
origin: Northwest Việt Bắc Zone 3 Thanh Hoá Total: 
Rice 7,310 5,229 1,464 9,052 24,086 
Meat 389 454 64 1,700 head 907 
Dried foods  226 51 640 918 
Sugar  42 2 18 62 
Salt from Zone 3 and State Shops: 266  
 
Note, in particular, how the total of rice increased three-fold from the military‘s 
original estimate of 7,730 tons to an actual total of over 24,000 tons. Although the 
Council reported the total as 24,086 tons (far right column), note that the sum total of 
the four columns adds up to only 23,055 tons. It is unclear what accounts for this 
discrepancy. Note also that the total figure for meat does not include the 
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incommensurable number of animals (1700 head livestock) from Thanh Hoá province. 
Finally, shipped from the seaside drying-pans of the Red River Delta, salt retained its 
significance for visitors and residents alike. 
 Notwithstanding the large amount of total reported rice, it is safe to say that it 
underestimates the actual total. Other authors add another thousand tons.
48
 Moreover, 
these statistics reflect the effects of spatial boundary-making. The figure for total rice 
excludes an estimated 2000 to 4000 tons of additional rice originating in Laos and 
China.
49
 Recall all the rice that Hoàng Công Phẩm moved downstream from China 
along the Glorious Line. According to General Giáp, ―this line alone allowed us to 
move the 1,700 metric tons of rice the Chinese donated to the campaign.‖50 In part, 
this spatial boundary-making was a function of bureaucratic decision-making: the 
military‘s General Department of Supply supervised the Glorious Line, not the civilian 
Council on Front Supply.
51
 Either way, this counting does not figure into the 
nationalist statistical narrative and, hence, goes uncounted. 
These vast quantities of nationally-derived logistics elicited palpable pride on 
the part of the Council, an emotion to be shared with the government audience. The 
report declared: 
 
The figures above are truly great: not only must a few enemies be 
horrified, but we must also be surprised. [These figures] speak to the 
great strength of our people, made us believe all the more that the 
revolution had invincible strength.
52
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Like other government documents, the rhetoric of state is revealing. In particular, this 
selection exemplifies how the use of pronouns produced and reproduced collectivities 
as well as normalized relations between them. The third person inclusive (―ta‖ or, we, 
us, our) refers to the agents of state themselves recognized collectively as ―the state.‖ 
The inclusive ―we‖ was, in fact, an exclusive ruling elite. Not only were these cadres 
and soldiers united against foreign ―enemies‖ (French and, increasingly, American), 
they were also unified in exacting claims on their people, as if these political elites 
calling themselves ―the state‖ could or did possess them. Even if the DRV did not, or 
could not, possess its subjects bodily, these elites nonetheless strived to own a portion 
of their subject population‘s (―our people‘s‖) labor and production.  
These pride-inspiring figures portended a lesson for the statist audience and, 
perhaps, a veiled warning for those who might challenge them militarily. The report 
cited the Central Command‘s finding that, ―the work of supply was one among several 
decisive factors in our victory.‖ Reflecting on this statement, ―we realize,‖ reads the 
report, ―from now to posterity,‖ that the duty and idea of supply must increasingly 
―pervade collective consciousness.‖53 The achievements the Council trumpeted 
functioned simultaneously as description and prescription for the government officials 
who all shared in the rhetorical category of a collective state ―we.‖ They empowered 
themselves to claim resources from their population defined nationally and contained 
within their domain defined as sovereign territory. Anyone challenging this claim to 
sovereign territorial rule by breaking away and forming a separate republic—an item 
on the table at the Geneva negotiations—would face an elite willing and able to 
deploy a formidable army.   
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Because the gross tonnage of provisions above does not factor in the amount 
consumed en route, a second set of statistics reported what the Council actually 
delivered to ―the front,‖ or what were in fact depots managed by the army‘s General 
Department of Supply. The military unit managed two storage depots at Ba Khe (Văn 
Chấn) and Suối Rút (Mai Châu) to receive supplies and laborers from the Council, at 
which points its own personnel, like Hoàng Công Phẩm, assumed responsibility for 
delivery and distribution to combatants.
54
 Although the General Department worked 
with the Northwest Administrative Committee to collect supplies and recruit labor 
directly in the Northwest Zone, the Council‘s report includes these figures in the 
report‘s aggregated statistics.55 If these amalgamated statistics gloss over a complex—
and sometimes acrimonious—bureaucratic division of labor, the figures nevertheless 
do other work: they represent a deliberate attempt to describe, ex post facto, prior 
military and civilian efforts as harmoniously unified.
56
 Table 6.2 illustrates what 
supplies were delivered to the General Department‘s front depots. Note that figures in 
the far right column do not appear in the report itself but are calculated by adding 
sums from each territory.  
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Table 6.2: Supplies delivered to the front by point of origin, in metric tons.
57
  
 
origin: Northwest Việt Bắc Zone 3 Thanh Hoá Total: 
Rice 7143 4660 1,485 3,994** 17649* 
Meat 389 394 33 18 834 
Dried foods  177 51 320 548 
Vegetables 7-800    7-800 
Salt   126 16 142 
Sugar  42 2 18 62 
 
* Calculated by the author, including 367 tons of rice from Thanh Hoá. 
** Reported figure does not include 367 tons of rice provided to road crews. 
 
Based on these data, the Council singled out each territory for praise with respect to its 
particular form of ―achievement.‖ Above all, the Council pointed to the Northwest 
Zone‘s provision of rice as the ―largest achievement,‖ because this territory had 
surpassed its target and fulfilled ―one half‖ of all the military‘s requests. The Council 
commended the Việt Bắc for rapidly providing dried foods and bicycles far above its 
officially acknowledged capacity. Zone 3, or the western Red River Delta, earned 
praise for salt. The province of Thanh Hoá earned commendation for providing large 
quantities of rice at crucial moments of scarcity.
58
  
These second set of figures appear to validate the policy guideline of 
mobilization in place. The total amount of rice mobilized in Thanh Hoá (9,052 tons) 
was reduced by dân công consumption to only 3,994 tons when the shipment reached 
front depots. By comparison, the amount of rice originating in the Northwest Zone 
declined by only a small fraction, from 7,310 tons to 7,143. The report neglects to 
mention what accounts for a disparity in collected salt (266 tons) versus delivered salt 
(142 tons). Perhaps the unaccounted for 124 tons was used for legitimation work, i.e. 
to drive a renewed reciprocal exchange? Or perhaps the salt was used to process meat? 
Notwithstanding their precision, summary statistics on provisions delivered to 
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front depots display inconsistencies that call their validity into question. Take, for 
example, the figure for total delivered rice. The Council‘s Report claimed that the 
Northwest Zone provided ―one half‖ of military requirements. Secondary sources 
agree with this claim, citing a total of 14,950 tons, of which the Northwest‘s figure of 
7,143 tons would, indeed, be approximately half.
59
 Yet a simple calculation (i.e., 
summing across table two‘s first row) amounts to a figure of 17,649 tons. Where, then, 
does the oft-cited figure of 14,950 tons come from? What accounts for the 2,800 ton 
disparity?
60
 Or compare the two figures for rice from Zone 3 (i.e., 1464 tons at point 
of origin vs. 1485 tons delivered): given dân công consumption over a several hundred 
kilometer trek, how this amount of rice increased defies explanation.  
At first glance, the Council‘s reported figures for labor and transportation 
appear more consistent. The report estimates the number of dân công active during the 
campaign from four regions at over 260,000 individuals. This figure for total dân công 
is one of the few statistics cited by secondary sources without deviation. Note that 
figures in the far right column of Table 6.3 do not appear in the report itself but are 
calculated by adding the sums from each territory.  
 
Table 6.3: Laborers and means of transportation by point of origin.
61
  
 
origin: Northwest  Việt Bắc Zone 3 Thanh Hoá Total:* 
 dân công 31,818 36,519 6,400 186,714 261,451 
 bicycles  865 1,712 11,214** 13,791 
 
* Calculated by the author. 
** Includes 1,400 bicycles from Nghệ An Province. 
 
Note the figures for the Northwest Zone‘s labor: 31, 818 people reportedly worked on 
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the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign as ―short term dân công‖ and performed ―1,296,078 
labor days spent on roadwork and storehouse duty.‖62 If accurate, then 10% of the 
frontier‘s population performed dân công labor for an average of 42 days per person; 
this calculated average, however, smooths out the localities where participation rates 
exceeded 10%. Secondary sources repeat these regional and aggregate labor statistics, 
adding that all dân công performed a total of 14 million labor days.
63
 Or, if so, every 
laborer worked an average of 54 days.
64
  
As planners had hoped, using pack bicycles increased the load efficiency of 
each porter. Though the total number of bikes varies substantially by source, the 
Council estimated they carried one third the campaign‘s total tonnage.65 Certainly, the 
628 (or so) Molotova trucks plying the supply lines meant that not all supplies arrived 
at the front through the efforts of heroic individuals either walking or pushing over-
loaded bicycles.
66
 Yet it was such so-called ―primitive‖ forms of transport that proved 
best able to maneuver around broken roads and bridges; to evade strafing runs, 
bombing raids, and napalm attacks.
67
  
If nothing else, the Council‘s aggregate labor statistics for the Điện Biên Phủ 
Campaign reveal an astonishing fact: the number of people mobilized was greater than 
the population of the entire Northwest Zone. At this time, the population of the 
Northwest Zone—including those in contested territories—was estimated at between 
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300,000 to 320,000 residents.
68
 A conservative estimate places the total number of 
people mobilized, Vietnamese soldiers and laborers alike, at a minimum of 310,000; 
the actual number was undoubtedly much larger.
69
 At any given time over the eight 
month period of the campaign, therefore, the population of the Northwest Zone 
increased by approximately 1/3
rd
.
70
 Whatever the exact figure, this added population 
placed a tremendous burden on local food supplies. 
 
Where did these figures come from? Historicizing the genealogy of precise 
figures reported in the Council‘s report traces, also, the DRV‘s internal structure and 
points to the location of ultimate authority. The following example illustrates a feed-
back loop: the Council‘s centralized authority among local and competing state 
agencies empowered it, also, to stake claims on truth; in turn, this truth-claim 
reinforced the center‘s claim to legitimacy. 
In June 1954, a month prior to the Council‘s final report, the Political 
Commissar of the Northwest Zone‘s Party Committee summarized total labor and 
means of transportation supplied by the region‘s residents across all waves (đợt) of the 
Điện Biên Phủ Campaign. Nguyễn Kháng cautioned that these figures, gleaned from 
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the region‘s subordinate districts and provinces, were ―not yet adequate.‖ He reported, 
provisionally, that 31,818 dân công laborers had performed 1,296,078 days of labor 
(nhật công); in addition to pedestrian transport, these laborers had used 872 pack-
horses and 83 watercraft.
71
 Regardless of his caveat and any accompanying concerns 
regarding the data‘s accuracy, the Council then re-reported these same, precise figures 
as ―summaries‖ of all means of transport and all labor performed by the region‘s 
residents.
72
 The Central Council bestowed tentative estimates with truth-value. To 
complete the loop, local authorities back in the Northwest, from the Party Committee 
in October 1954 to mass organizations in December, re-re-reported these same, precise 
figures, implicitly citing the Council‘s report as the final, authoritative source.73 By 
then, it did not matter that the Zone‘s Committee had at its disposal alternative, and 
perhaps more accurate, sets of figures to enumerate the region‘s logistical 
―contributions‖ to the Campaign. What mattered, by contrast, was the Central 
Government‘s role as the final arbiter of ―our people‘s great energies,‖ as though the 
center alone could speak on behalf of the nation.
74
  
Statistics have a history, and a life, of their own. Since its original presentation, 
the authority with which this report was produced has meant that its content has been 
reproduced—warts and all—in all manner of government reports, scholarly books and 
articles, and official histories.
75
 Even those very few sources that report figures 
incompatible with the Central Council‘s still adhere to the temporal and spatial 
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boundaries its report established for measuring and quantifying resources allocated to 
the campaign. For example, Cao Văn Lượng‘s 2003 history of the French War in the 
Northwest Zone cites the Sơn La province military command‘s 1995 history of the 
French War in Sơn La regarding ―voluntary‖ mobilization for the Điện Biên Phủ 
Campaign. Both report that the residents of Sơn La mobilized 21,867 dân công who 
performed 2,434,759 labor days using 83 watercraft and 872 packhorses.
76
 If so, the 
residents of this one province alone provided double the amount of labor days 
compared to what the Council reported for the entire region‘s four provinces! As if to 
highlight a clash of statistics, the number of watercraft and packhorses these authors 
report for Sơn La is exactly the same as the figures Nguyễn Kháng and the Council 
attributed to the entire region.   
Quantifying the total amount of civilian labor and provisions required to 
support this one military campaign based on this ex post facto report (and others like 
it) raises a number of problems. Arithmetically, the Council‘s statistics frequently do 
not add up. Yet analysts, historians, and memory-makers continue to cite their figures. 
Though subsequent sources sometimes offer divergent quantities, the report remains 
the authoritative source. As such, the Central Council‘s report retains its authority 
even if its statistics are inaccurate. Indeed, not all numbers were, or are, created equal: 
the greater the authority of the enumerating institution, the more authoritative its 
accounting. Regardless of validity, the hierarchy of institutional authority determined, 
and still does, whose numbers count.   
Further, the Central Council report‘s temporal and spatial boundary-making 
delineated a realm of accounting that discounted all else. Included in the realm of 
accounting were four territories over eight months. Excluded was anything and anyone 
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from anywhere outside this realm‘s spatial limits. Even within these restricted spatial 
boundaries, also excluded was anything and anyone from anytime exceeding the 
realm‘s temporal restrictions. Spatially, measuring this one campaign within only four 
territorial units neglects any other campaigns happening simultaneously, for example, 
in Laos or the Central Highlands; as well as any goods and labor gleaned from 
international, or other intranational, sources.
77
 Temporally, aggregate figures from this 
one campaign do not account for prior mobilizations in the same territories, such as 
the roads and bridges campaign of spring-summer 1953, that played a crucial role in 
the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign‘s outcome. Nor do they account for any goods and labor 
directed towards Điện Biên Phủ, or in its name, after May 1954. 
Even within the realm of accounting‘s strict limits, the reported figures only 
account for what regional cadres could account for and did in fact count. For example, 
gross figures for the Northwest Zone (7,311 tons rice, 389 tons meat, and 700-800 tons 
vegetables) did not include whatever its peoples gave directly to the soldiers, i.e. 
bypassing the state supply system.
78
 In other words, unless an office of state mediated, 
and accounted for, any given exchange between peasant and state representative, the 
foodstuff or unit of labor did not count. Ironically, the spirit of such informal exchange 
came closer to a pure ―contribution‖ than the formal measures used to collect what 
grain the regional units collected and the Council reported. 
In spite of such problems with the practice of statistics, this statist enumeration 
and accounting does do other things. Statistics as given social facts emphasize effects 
over processes, ends over means. Enumerating and accounting illustrate the purposive 
efforts of state agencies to rationalize claims on society; and to improve the efficiency 
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with which they secured them. Such enumeration provided state agents with the tools, 
first, to know and measure society and, then, to direct its change in particular ways.
79
  
The report‘s rationalizing impulse also contributed to the reification of spatial 
and temporal boundaries. Temporally, the report and its followers made and remade 
the campaign as a discrete event ending with the final defeat of colonial rule and all 
forms of colonialism.
80
 Spatially, the report cast and recast the territorial units as 
uniformly representative of the populations they contained and attributed agency to 
spatial categories as such. The report personified these units, imbuing abstract spatial 
units with human-like abilities: for example, ―The Northwest fulfilled its targets…‖; 
or ―The Việt Bắc for several years now has contributed the most to the resistance…‖81 
Moreover, the powerful recapitulation of the Black River region as the ―Northwest‖ 
joined and rejoined a frontier to DRV territories and more loyal populations. Though 
these boundaries may be a matter of representation, they nonetheless shaped the 
dominant narrative of nation, state, and society in and of Vietnam. The ongoing 
practices and processes of mobilization made and remade these narrative boundaries 
constitutive of everyday power relations and forms of rule.  
From an analytical perspective, what this preoccupation with counting, 
accounting, and recounting overlooks are processes and practices that underlay and 
conditioned mobilization. Measuring mobilizations‘ intended effects works to obscure 
legitimation work and unintended outcomes. Even when the Council‘s report did 
admit to procedural problems, these are presented as lessons to inform and improve 
the outcomes of any future mobilizations. For example, reported problems included: 
mobilizing pregnant women and war-wounded as dân công; confronting protesting 
peasants anxious about surrendering even more scarce foodstocks; imprisoning 
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potential recruits who planned on shirking dân công duty; punishing landlords by 
forcing them to perform menial labor. Cadres in audience were admonished to learn 
from these mistakes, to improve collaboration and communication, to demonstrate 
care for the people, and—above all—to improve productivity.82  
Statistics served to euphemize state power to make and enforce claims on ―our 
people,‖ or an emerging national society composed of peoples sometimes ambivalent 
about being counted as such. The obsession with calculability contributed, and still 
contributes, towards the making of a national economy and, also, towards the silencing 
of its political project.
83
 To count the work of men and women as so many laborers 
and days of labor is an act of abstraction, one that presupposes their separability from 
their households and farms as ―free‖ labor. Similarly, abstracting the fruits of their 
labor as so much tonnage of supplies presupposes the separability of the means of 
subsistence from sites of social reproduction.
84
  
Such abstract accounting does little to describe the concrete, and often violent, 
processes with which labor and provisions were loosened from the local population, 
claimed by state, and allocated to the military. To focus on labor qua labor or 
provisions qua provisions distracts from a description and analysis of how 
mobilization worked in practice and as process. Though mystified in past and ongoing 
projects to normalize its practice, mobilization deserves greater scrutiny—both as the 
historically specific expression of power relations and the concrete process through 
which ideological constructs of ―state‖ and ―society‖ figured in everyday life.   
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Mobilization in Places 
The legions of French paratroopers who dropped from the sky in November 
1953 to occupy the Mường Thanh plain landed on fields laden with ripening rice. The 
Black Thái farmers who had planted and tended these fields lost much of their crop.
85
 
In what would be remembered as the drama of Điện Biên Phủ, the opening act 
featured soldiers walking on, crushing, and burning stalks of rice. It was a collision 
between forceful movements of armies and the everyday work of farmers. In the midst 
of all the combat to come, rice remained a staple of struggle both for the soldiers and 
cadres who claimed and consumed it as well as for the farmers who cultivated, 
harvested, husked, and hauled it.  
The two armies squaring off against one another deployed very different 
strategies to feed and move themselves. While French forces used coercive practices 
and air transport, the People‘s Army gathered food by securing claims locally and 
moving stores overland. These divergent logistics strategies drew on, and generated, 
very different relations of rule. What is relevant to this discussion of resource 
mobilization and state formation lies less in the battle itself than in underlying 
relations that enabled these armies to fight. Though the battle itself was spatially and 
temporally limited, the underlying campaign to support the People‘s Army rested on 
the DRV‘s territorialized authority, itself socially produced over a longer duration 
across a broader spatial scale.  
The People‘s Army‘s advances in late 1953, once again, shifted the terrain of 
state making and social mobilization in the Black River region. In contrast to the 
abstract spatial idea of the ―Northwest‖ recounted in histories and statistical figures, 
the DRV‘s territorialized authority was deeply uneven and violently contested. Not 
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only was the emerging national frontier criss-crossed by militarized zones of front and 
rear. Moreover, how a panoply of DRV institutions worked there hinged on a 
reappraisal of the Black River region‘s internalized territory. The Northwest Zone 
itself was reapportioned according to the revolutionary spatial matrix, i.e. zones 
considered free, recently liberated, or temporarily occupied. Expressed temporally and 
teleologically, this tripartite zonation was based on the degree of opposition to DRV 
rule or, alternatively, the degree to which DRV institutions had and might still gain 
legitimate rule among resident populations.  
 
Remaking the Northwest in a time of war 
By December 1953—notwithstanding internalized combat in Lai Châu 
province generally, its district of Điện Biên Phủ particularly, and along the Lào and 
Chinese borders—DRV officials considered most of the Northwest a ―free zone.‖ 
Sites of organized anti-colonial resistance since 1948 and ―newly liberated‖ during the 
1952 Northwest Campaign, the provinces of Sơn La, Lào Cai, and Yên Bái now had 
established state structures vested with institutional authority. These sites were 
nominally, or assertedly, ―free.‖ The Central Party Committee and Government 
ordered the Northwest Zone‘s Committee to prioritize two tasks broadly: serve the 
front and conduct Mass Mobilization.
86
 The Zone‘s regional leadership, through 
subordinate Resistance and Administrative Committees, integrated these tasks with 
ongoing programs, such as agricultural taxation, increasing production, and (limited) 
social transformation. New to this agenda, and significant with regards to 
mobilization, were coercive measures to eliminate any opposition to the DRV‘s 
militarized state-making project.  
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Though mobilization for the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign figures in historical 
documents as a separate line item, the effort to collect labor and provisions unfolded 
simultaneously with projects to discipline class enemies and punish disloyal subjects. 
In September 1953, Mass Mobilization in, and of, the Northwest‘s ―ethnic minority 
areas‖ had commenced according to a particular program: although emphasizing an 
―ethnic united front,‖ the agenda allowed for limited disciplining of internalized class 
enemies.
87
 Only in select areas of Lào Cai and Yên Bái did cadres lead poor and 
middle peasants to demand rent and interest reduction and ―overthrow wicked, 
tyrannical landlords.‖88 Yet their efforts produced nearly disastrous unintended 
consequences. Only 68 class enemies were found and tried. Even these modest results 
among ethnically diverse peoples (Kinh, Tài, Thái, Mưòng, Nung, etc.) resulted in 
―deep ethnic contradictions.‖ Of 43 communes mobilized to demand rent and interest 
reduction, 26 communes contained elites (―landlords‖) who counter-organized against 
the DRV‘s local government, sabotaged its policies, and prepared to ―welcome the 
French.‖89 Even co-configured efforts to ―build local government‖ met with mixed 
results. Through public denunciations, trials, and asset seizures, itinerant cadres 
identified 209 local recruits (bắt rễ) and organized local government agencies and 
Farmers‘ Councils. Yet all these recruits ―were brought into old organizations‖ and, 
instead of denouncing ―wicked‖ landlords, they chose to resist any efforts by 
―determined‖ peasants.90 In other words, organizing predicated on class allegiance 
backfired and new political institutions remained subject to old relations of rule. 
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More significantly and broadly, if agrarian reform was predicated on 
differentiations and gradations of class, then the list of enemies had by now expanded 
to exceed the boundaries and prescribed categories of class allegiance. In February 
1954, Lê Duẩn ordered all Party executives (cấp ủy) throughout claimed DRV 
territory to ―watch over‖ (theo dõi) and ―investigate‖ local political activities through 
intensified police work and heightened popular vigilance. ―Struggling against spies, 
commandos, bandits, traitors, reactionaries, and cruel tyrants,‖ explained the rising 
Party star, was necessary ―to protect the rear and serve the front.‖91 In other words, 
militarized statemaking articulated with agrarian reform to institutionalize and 
legitimate intensified coercive surveillance—the literal policing—of politically 
suspect individuals.  
What Lê Duẩn articulated was, in fact, an ongoing program empowering 
cadres and state institutions to ―watch over‖ national subjects. As early as October 
1953, Mass Mobilization in the Northwest meant that soldiers and policemen joined 
cadres and select peasants to ―crush traitors to the Vietnamese nation‖ (trấn áp Việt 
gian phản quốc), i.e. to capture and imprison subjects of suspect loyalty; and to ―wipe 
out bandits‖ (tiễu phỉ), i.e. to destroy pro-French militias and organized opposition. 
Only in part a reaction to the persistence of landed elites in the Northwest Zone‘s local 
government, central and regional officials moreover used coercive force to eliminate 
political opposition to DRV rule across the Northwest‘s ―free zones.‖ Presumably, the 
same elites who counter-organized against the DRV in Lào Cai and Yên Bái found 
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themselves targets for punishment or murder. By the end of 1953, 1609 ―traitors‖ had 
been captured and 406 tried; meanwhile, some 4,000 ―bandits‖ had been killed.92  
All these violent programs, and the vigor with which cadres, soldiers, 
policemen, and select peasants pursued them, accelerated over the course of the 
campaign and through 1954.
93
 In July 1954, the Zone institutionalized a committee 
named, euphemistically, ―Internal Affairs,‖ to coordinate what they called ―watching 
over‖ individuals (and alternately rewarding or punishing them), ―supervising‖ local 
government, and ―surveilling‖ the masses.94 That such militarized policing continued 
after the conclusion of the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign in May 1954 demonstrates that its 
goal was not only to pursue military triumph on this one battlefield. According to a 
committee charged with Ethnic Business, the so-called ―problem of unity,‖ by which 
they meant evident disunity, justified the ongoing ―capture and killing of bandits,‖ 
some of whom escaped to Laos. Murdering or intimidating politically wayward 
subjects worked explicitly to secure the Northwest Zone‘s strategic, yet vulnerable, 
territory in preparation for making it the DRV‘s first Autonomous Zone in 1955.95   
These violent programs belie the Ethnic Policy‘s prescription that ―Vietnam‘s 
ethnic majority and minority share a singular enemy,‖ i.e., an unreconstructed French 
colonial and American imperialist.
96
 Indeed, the enemy was no longer just a foreigner. 
Now, by class and allegiance, there were enemies within and amongst an assertedly 
Vietnamese nation—persons to be identified, prosecuted, jailed, and, perhaps, killed. 
On the one hand, these programs had an intended effect: coercion against unpopular 
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landlords, traitors, and other alleged deviants resulted in consent or intimidation 
among subjects whom these programs benefited or bypassed. On the other hand, these 
programs had unintended effects. All the class-based organizing and violent 
disciplinary activities were replete with ―errors,‖ an ominous indication that, in this 
frenzied atmosphere, cadres failed to restrain themselves or to moderate radicalized 
peasant aspirations.
97
 Particularly with regards to the so-called ethnic contradictions, 
these problems appeared to confirm why central and regional elites had, over the 
previous year, decided to withhold from the Northwest a radical agrarian reform 
agenda. Attacking an entrenched local elite frontally only served to unify opposition 
against any efforts to displace their rule.  
 
Available contemporaneous documents do not dwell on the problems of 
collecting provisions and labor from these free zones. With revealing exceptions, this 
archival silence speaks as mute testament to the effective, if not violent, 
institutionalization and legitimation of DRV rule preceding and accompanying the 
Điện Biên Phủ Campaign. What Nguyễn Kháng had described as a project a year 
earlier, to remake the Northwest‘s population into a military reserve, appeared now to 
bear fruit. In general, it appears that labor service had been normalized: having served 
several earlier military campaigns, performed multiple forms of dân công labor 
(roadwork, irrigation, transportation), and served the same officialized lords for years, 
peasant subjects were presumably accustomed to working on behest of nation and 
behalf of state. When the campaign began, village-based public assessments (bình 
nghị) apportioned the duties of local residents, assigning them principally to 
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roadcrews.
98
 They maintained and repaired the transportation arteries that linked the 
front to secure territories and, in so doing, contributed towards binding still tighter 
their homeland to downstream neighbors and a rising center.  
Two exceptions to this general observation indicate major shifts during the 
Điện Biên Phủ Campaign and, furthermore, illustrate the increased capacity of state to 
call on additional, and potentially troublesome, sources of labor. First, Thái women 
served as dân công at a much higher rate than previously, especially in road work, 
angering patriarchal traditional leaders and delighting egalitarian, productivity-minded 
cadres. In Tuần Giáo District, a site subject to DRV bureaucratic norms and 
procedures since late 1952, women had initially been reluctant to ―serve the 
campaign‖ but, over 1954, gradually started to process rice, heft weaponry, and work 
on roadcrews. Reflecting on these changes, Lò Văn Hặc praised women‘s increased 
participation in off-farm work as a ―general advance among the broader population.‖ 
Yet he admitted that not all officials shared his views. ―Women are certainly not able 
to do dân công,‖ stated the village chief Lò Thi Suong who continued, ―were the 
Government to capture and kill them, I would just put it aside.‖99  
Ironically, Lò Văn Hặc—an old feudal elite par excellence—positioned 
himself in relation to his peer as a modernizing figure. Yet their perspectives were not 
that far apart: just as the Chairman of Lai Châu Province‘s Administrative Committee 
praised women for their potential as laborers, the village chief dismissed them as not 
worthy of his care. Tellingly, there is no recorded impression from the women 
themselves, only these divergent judgments from male Thái officialized lords. Like the 
idea of liberation more broadly, the DRV‘s egalitarian gender ideology worked 
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ambivalently: potentially freeing Thái women from old forms of patriarchy but, at the 
same time, engendering new forms of state servitude.   
Second, in contrast to earlier forms of rule, DRV cadres and People‘s Army 
logistics officers climbed the hills during the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign and recruited 
dân công labor among highland communities. This was a significant departure from 
French colonial and Thái Federation rule during which time Hmong and Dao peoples 
were exempt from corvée. Recall how Hoàng Công Phẩm remembered a Hmong 
woman on his crew who cried inconsolably. Although his colleague at the time 
provided a culturalist explanation for her misery—that Hmong people were used to 
dancing and singing by night—archival sources provide a different explanation. 
Nguyễn Kháng observed,  
 
Mobilizing all the Hmong compatriots to descend to the plains without 
making special considerations for their circumstances—they are 
accustomed neither to hot weather nor to going far for long—has 
already impacted the compatriots‘ health; some return home wasting 
away, sick and dying, such that the political influence is not good.
100
  
 
Mobilizing Hmong people to descend from the heights and perform dân công duties in 
the valleys, on the road, or by the riverside caused them misery, frequent illness, and 
sometimes death. It is hard to imagine that any amount of ―special considerations,‖ 
except perhaps continued exemption from labor service, might have prevented these 
circumstances. What the circuitous observation about a ―not good political influence‖ 
makes clear, however, is that Hmong communities recognized a contradiction: by 
returning dân công laborers home in poor health and near death, the DRV failed to 
adhere to its own rhetoric of caring for or watching over national subjects. More than a 
short-term failure, increasing claims on Hmong people‘s bodies (as labor power) and, 
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in time, their agricultural produce (as tax revenue) bore long term consequences for 
the rising regime‘s political legitimacy among Hmong communities.101 
In addition to dân công labor duty, the agricultural tax remained the principal 
means through which the DRV secured claims on agrarian resources. To collect 
provisions for war in 1953-54, the Northwest‘s commune and district level committees 
used present and future agricultural taxation on wet-rice fields to collect grains and 
foodstuffs for the military. Overall, the implementation of fiscal year 1953‘s 
agricultural tax resulted in a collection of 14,400 tons of rice and, supposedly, 
―followed an orderly routine.‖102 Once farmers delivered a portion of their rice harvest 
to local storehouses, the military‘s distribution network—relying on local dân công 
labor—ferried it to combatants.103 In areas where farmers ―loaned‖ provisions to the 
military during the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign, the Northwest Zone used the subsequent 
round of taxation in fiscal 1954 to amortize accumulated state debt: half a given 
peasant‘s credit counted towards the assessed tax; the Ministry of Finance amortized 
remaining debt by providing supplies of salt and cloth through State Shops.
104
 
Underlying this general portrait of how taxation supplied the military with food 
were ongoing spatial disparities in implementation, widespread discontent, and elite 
resistance—all of which prompted a renewed cycle of state learning. Through the 
campaign and for fiscal years 1954 and 1955, swidden fields enjoyed a tax holiday, 
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exempting most highland communities.
105
 Whether intentional or not, suspending tax 
payments appeared to enable cadres and local government institutions to maintain 
harmonious relations with Hmong, Dao, and other swidden cultivators. The 
agricultural tax, therefore, fell primarily on Thái muang-based, wet-rice farming 
communities. Recall that year fiscal year 1952 was the first iteration of the agricultural 
tax in portions of the Northwest Zone. In fiscal year 1953, the area of taxation spread 
to all free zones and some newly liberated zones. It was not until fiscal year 1954, 
however, that cadres realized the extent of the mess left over from the campaign.  
Tax collection in year 1953, they discovered, had been subject to ―many grave 
and serious errors‖ such as cadres ―relying heavily on bureaucratism and 
commandism‖ to exact payment.106 Core cadres, local cadres, and peasants all 
complained that year 1953 tax rates were too high, expressing widespread discontent 
with the campaign‘s intensified claims on agrarian production. Meanwhile, Thái elites 
continued to dominate local government agencies and Farmers‘ Councils charged with 
assessment and collection, enabling them to draw on a deep bag of tricks to evade 
taxes.
107
 These findings stimulated another round of state learning.  
Reporting on these problems in 1953-54, the Zone‘s leadership declared in 
early 1955 that, along with development and disciplinary activities, the agricultural tax 
was one of three top inter-related priorities. Regional elites explained their logic as 
follows: only by increasing production could they boost tax revenue; increased 
revenue enabled them to ―wipe out bandits‖; eliminating political opposition protected 
taxation, expanded its area of implementation, and, in turn, enabled them to fight more 
                                                 
105
 Ibid; Letter from Buy Quang Tao, Chủ tịch UBKCHC Khu Tây Bắc to UBKCHC các tỉnh trong Khu 
v/v thuế nông nghiệp, 23 Sept 1954, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 2621, p. 4. 
106
 Le Trung Dinh, ―Báo cáo…‖ 16 Oct 1954, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 520, p. 12. 
107
 Nguyen Huy Thanh, Giám đốc Khu Tài chính, ―Báo cáo sơ kết đợt 1 công tác thuế nông nghiệp vụ 
đông ‘54 ở hai tỉnh Sơn La và Lai Châu,‖ 13 Nov 1954, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 
2621, p. 1, 5-6. 
 375 
―bandits,‖ and so on.108 Even during a time of ostensible peace, therefore, 
development remained integral to a militarized political agenda just as taxation 
continued to be both cause and effect of political unrest.  
During the campaign and for years to come, the practice of agricultural 
taxation, like dân công labor service, figured at the core of tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly changing relations of rule. Whatever the popular reaction, the claim-making 
processes of taxation and labor recruitment contributed towards making the very 
categories of rule and ruling, empowering a DRV ―state‖ to claim resources located in 
a national ―society.‖ Mobilization, as a militarized intensification of these same claim-
making practices and processes, performed the same ideological work. 
Even at the time, taxation did not unfold as planned but was subject to locally-
specific, contingently changing historical conditions. Prior to the campaign, the Zone‘s 
leadership had expected to implement the 1953 tax for the first time in three upgraded 
(i.e., from ―newly liberated‖ to ―free‖) wet-rice districts of Lai Châu province. During 
the harvest, assessments took place as planned in Điện Biên, Quỳnh Nhai, and Tuần 
Giáo. Yet the French re-occupation of Điện Biên and the onset of battle in proximity 
forced a revision of subsequent collection measures. In Quỳnh Nhai and Tuần Giáo, 
tax collection proceeded in early 1954 but, given the campaign‘s large and urgent 
demands, cadres ―violated policy‖ by resorting to ―commands‖ rather than educating 
consent among tax-payers. As a result of these ―errors,‖ the province‘s Administrative 
Committee later delegated a team to correct their colleague‘s mistakes, to resolve the 
people‘s ―anxiety,‖ and to encourage them to ―welcome‖ the year 1954 tax.109  
As for Điện Biên district, the arrival of French paratroopers supposedly made 
tax collection impossible in the fertile Mường Thanh plain. So province leaders issued 
                                                 
108
 Khu Tây Bắc, ―Báo cáo…‖ 27 Apr 1955, NAVC 3, phông PTTg (1945-54), file no. 2621, p. 2. 
109
 Lee San, ―Báo cáo…‖ 31 Dec 1954, NAVC 3, Phông UBHC Tỉnh Sơn-Lai, file no. 102, p.1-2. 
 376 
a new guideline: adopting a time-tested method from the Northwest Campaign, they 
instituted a system of ―temporary borrowing‖ of local rice stocks by and for the 
military, to be amortized in the anticipated 1954 round of taxation.
110
 Although this 
provincial document declared that there was no fiscal year 1953 tax at all in Điện Biên 
district, local sources show otherwise. District level reports reveal that residents of 
―free zones‖ in Điện Biên not only paid their taxes.111 They also bore the burdens and 
fed the forces of a militarized state-making project.  
 
Điện Biên’s contested territory 
The arrival of French soldiers in November 1953 split the district of Điện Biên. 
The DRV‘s spatial matrix apportioned the district‘s territory either to a temporarily 
occupied plain or to free zones in the surrounding hills.   
Điện Biên‘s (re)occupied territory covered five communes inhabited by Black 
Thái residents. All of the communes fell, uncomfortably, within French firebases on 
the Mường Thanh plain.112 Peasants in Cỏ Mỹ and Hồng Cúm villages, for example, 
either fled as refugees or stayed in an altered home.
113
 Those who fled were expected 
to serve the People‘s Army by ferrying supplies to soldiers in the trenches. Having 
abandoned their homes and lost their rice crop, food stores, and productive land, these 
refugees dug tubers in the forest for sustenance and lived in constant fear of starvation. 
Any who remained, however, were forced by the French military to live in 
―concentrated settlements‖ where soldiers appropriated their rice, shot and ate their 
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livestock, and dismantled the timber from their homes to make fortifications.
114
 
Though French-controlled territory was small in size, residents there were subject to 
intensified depredation, violence, and sexual assault.
115
  
Only a few kilometers apart but a world away from the combat below, the hills 
surrounding the Mường Thanh plain remained subject to sustained DRV power and 
intensifying claim-making on its behalf. If Điện Biên illustrates the processes of 
mobilization broadly, then its territory‘s strategic position and its population‘s 
vulnerability combined to endow the work of institutionalizing and legitimating power 
with heightened significance, surveillance, and violence.  
Like the Northwest‘s other ―free zones,‖ Điện Biên‘s local DRV institutions 
remained intact and continued to evolve mutually with practices and processes of 
mobilization. ―Through the processes of serving the front,‖ stated a report from Lai 
Châu province with respect to Điện Biên district‘s free zones, ―the infrastructure of 
local government has been authenticated and consolidated; the armed forces of 
guerilla militia and police have also been selected.‖116 Mobilizing resources for 
warfare, in other words, served to accelerate processes of institutional development: to 
select for and against personnel conducting everyday government work and enforcing 
state power. These old and new officials integrated collection of food and labor 
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resources into ongoing programs such as increasing production (opening swiddens, 
planting corn and vegetables) and implementing agricultural taxation. Coercive 
suppression of local political opponents also secured claims on resources: guerilla 
commandos ―watched over‖ the resident population and prevented them, and their 
livestock, from departing the DRV‘s claimed sovereign territory for Laos.117  
For many of Điện Biên‘s total 22,600 residents, the atmosphere was terrifying. 
French planes dropped bombs and napalm, killed residents and dân công, and lit entire 
villages afire.
118
 For the first eight months of 1954, State Shops throughout Lai Châu 
province largely ceased to operate and the People‘s Army assumed its functions: what 
scarce supplies of salt, farmtools, and tobacco were available were contingent on a 
preoccupied military and its distribution network.
119
 Water buffalo were either 
butchered for meat or killed by aerial bombs and landmines, leaving farmers short of 
draft labor to plow their fields. Refugees from the plain‘s French-occupied villages 
wandered about, begging for food: some of them, official commune leaders among 
others, lost faith in the DRV and fled for the relative safety of Laos. Beset with 
anxiety (thắc mắc) and worry (lo), ―compatriots all over‖ feared starvation, 
particularly if the People‘s Army delayed its attack any longer or did not fulfill its 
promised ―certain victory.‖120 In late spring 1954, during some of the bloodiest 
fighting and after a bomb detonated in Noong Nhai village killing hundreds of Black 
Thái residents, a rumor spread that the Americans would soon drop an atom bomb.
121
 
Real and imagined death was present everywhere, threatening social life with the 
possibility of its existensial absence.  
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DRV military and civilian officials responded to these worrisome conditions—
and the very real threat towards their own political project—by intensifying 
institutional development and legitimation work. Institutionally, the Military‘s Central 
Party Committee ordered cadres to strengthen commune leadership by recruiting local, 
loyal subjects through the practice and process of social mobilization. They underlined 
the commune‘s role as mediator between the target-setting district and the plan-
fulfilling villages. To meet these orders, the District Party Leadership Council (Ban 
Cán sự huyện) formed special Village Head and Stalwart Committees in each 
commune.
122
 Chosen ―stalwarts‖ (trung kiên) were ―good people‖ from families with 
proper class backgrounds and, presumably, counter-balanced the suspect traditional 
authority of elite village leaders. Because cadres knew little of local languages and 
customs, stalwarts took the lead in village-based public meetings intended to stress the 
importance of military supply and fighting together against a singularized enemy.
123
  
Stalwarts, cadres, and village heads used these meetings to conduct public 
assessments and to assign each family a level of provisioning and laboring duties. 
These mobilization practices served three institutional purposes: to gather resources, 
collect data, and select state personnel. Families yielded rice, corn, vegetables, and 
livestock as payment of the 1953 agricultural tax, sold them outright, or loaned grains 
against the projected fiscal 1954 tax. Dân công laborers, once separated from farm and 
household, worked either to ferry rice to trenches or mill un-husked rice brought in 
from afar.
124
 Second, public assessments provided the district with household-level 
data on production capacity and manpower availability, furnishing state agents with 
knowledge to plan and conduct subsequent rounds of agricultural taxation and labor 
recruitment. Data collected were detailed, including: households categorized by class 
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and villages by ethnicity; livelihood practices, agricultural production, and resource 
capacity; as well as impacts of and prospects for ongoing resources claims. Third, 
cadres selected for or against stalwarts based on their performance. ―Through the 
process of mobilization work,‖ reads a District Party Leadership Council report, 
―cadres always closely foster and assist their sibling stalwarts regarding work habits 
and how each bears responsibilities.‖ Of the district‘s 49 total stalwarts monitored in 
this way, 39 ―vigilant‖ ones were provided with additional training in respective 
communes; and 10 ―insufficient‖ ones were dismissed.125 In sum, these three practices 
show how mobilization and state formation worked reciprocally: collecting resources 
enabled a military to enforce a state claim to territory; knowledge of an agrarian 
society enabled state agents to levy future claims; recruiting personnel from local 
populations embedded state in society, and vice versa.  
The myriad meetings organized by the Village Head and Stalwart Committees 
also served as a forum for intensified legitimation work. Cadres educated the audience 
in the content of President Hồ Chí Minh‘s ―Letter to the Compatriots and Cadres of 
Lai Châu.‖126 His letter stressed loyalty to DRV Government and homeland (tổ quốc); 
unity (đoàn kết) and mutual assistance; helpfulness towards the military; and a policy 
of leniency (khoan hồng) for anyone who followed ―the wrong path‖ earlier and 
wished now ―to return to the Government and homeland.‖127 Note how homeland and 
Government figure together, as though a singular homey place: this is vernacular for 
nation, territory, and state configured together.  
Like the Provincial Committee‘s Appeal to the people of Lai Châu posted only 
ten days later, President Hồ‘s letter opened with a nationalist interpretation of the 
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region‘s history.128 ―For over 80 years now,‖ he wrote, ―the compatriots of Lai Châu 
have been exploited, oppressed, and tricked by French colonialists and reactionary 
Vietnamese traitors…‖ Once again, this is history in service to a presentist, 
dialectically-conceived political project. To accept this vision of the past was to 
acknowledge the illegitimacy of colonial rule and to embrace the legitimacy of the 
DRV alternative. If the Government and military promised to ―liberate‖ the 
compatriots by relegating ―exploitation‖ to the past, then these institutions requested 
resources, labor, and loyalty—now and in the future.  
Cadres presented this temporally-inflected, dialectical differentiation between 
regimes to gather resources for the People‘s Army. In fact, differentiating dialectically 
between the two army‘s provisioning strategies was in and of itself an ideological 
tactic. Cadres drew on examples of provisioning practices in occupied territory where 
the ―enemy‖ had, by late February 1954, ―surrounded villages and took pigs, chicken, 
water buffalo… but did not offer money in return.‖ By contrast, they argued, ―From 
before until now, the Government did not allow the People‘s Army to take anything 
from the people,‖ pointing to a practice ―truly appropriate with people‘s ideas and a 
point of honor.‖ The district‘s leadership committee provided a lesson plan for cadres, 
encouraging residents to think of the People‘s Army as akin to a water buffalo of one‘s 
own: ―it protects the country, protects the house, so one must care for it so that it has 
energy to strike the enemy.‖ Although this representation struck a chord with peasants 
accustomed to working with livestock, note the legitimation work it contains: equating 
a complex, coercive institution with a singular domesticated animal elides the 
(in)humanity of organized violence. ―That we in the rear are able to eat well and sleep 
peacefully,‖ continues the lesson, ―we must thank the sibling soldiers out on the 
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front.‖129 Just as a farmer is grateful to a water buffalo, so too must ―we‖—i.e., a 
national we in the making—be grateful to the army. Whether or not the local people 
who supplied the military actually did ―eat well‖ is another question, discussed below.  
Public meetings also provided opportunity for the audience to air grievances 
(tố khổ) and for cadres and stalwarts to monitor public morale. Cadres recorded and 
classified these popular sentiments as either ―good‖ (tốt) or ―bad‖ (xấu) ―reactions‖ 
(phản ứng) and then devised measures to reward or punish them, respectively.  
On the ―good‖ side, peasants supported the DRV and its policies and 
welcomed the chance to serve it. ―Selling pigs and chickens and paying the 
agricultural tax enables the army to eat and gain energy to fight the enemy and protect 
the order of our bản muang,‖ stated one Hmong resident, who summarized that, 
―caring for the military is like caring for a sibling who leans on me.‖ Another 
expressed support by likening the military to a guest for whom the local resident 
played host: ―This year while the bandits are in Điện Biên,‖ stated a resident of Hang 
Sông village, ―we all celebrated Tết by going on dân công to deliver rice to the army 
to eat.‖130 The personification of the military and incorporation of its members as akin 
to family are all social effects of legitimation work. 
Still others accepted a form of personal authority in the DRV‘s President and 
praised the work of liberation. One recognized charisma in Hồ Chí Minh and 
responded to his authority: ―Although far away, Great grandfather Hồ still always 
loves the people. He even writes a letter greeting and encouraging the region‘s people 
to work peacefully.‖ Indeed, the president‘s charismatic authority worked together 
with the idea of liberation in a powerful way, stimulating emotive, moving 
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responses.
131
 ―Before we were as though deaf and mute,‖ stated one poor peasant, 
―now, enabled by the Government, Great grandfather Hồ sends cadres back here to 
announce all kinds of differences, as though my deaf ears and blind eyes can be clear 
again.‖132 Hồ Chí Minh‘s charisma contributed to a personification of complex 
institutions, themselves produced and reproduced through melded traditional and 
bureaucratic authority. The President‘s letter writing to local residents, soldiers, and 
cadres continued throughout the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign and beyond.133 He worked 
to present a caring, determined, human face at the helm of a complex, unsteady, and 
violent state-making project. 
Of course, exchanging heartfelt sentiments between prospective leaders and 
followers featured as only the opening steps in a longer social process. Next, cadres 
expected these real and potential subjects to follow through with their assessments. 
Should someone fulfill and exceed his or her assessed duties, the district committee 
celebrated such ―outstanding individuals‖ in elaborate ceremonies, awarded them 
medals, and bestowed each with prizes of one kg salt and a shovel.
134
 The public 
ceremonies performed a tremendous amount of legitimation work, such as: 
representing officials from diverse bureaucratic constituencies to appear as 
―Government‖; establishing, and making visible, hierarchical relations between 
territorialized administrative units; individualizing performance of collectively 
assigned duties and collectivizing duties performed individually; and celebrating an 
evolving relationship between loyal subjects and newly recognized rulers. These were 
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heady displays of power that figured in a longer making of ―the state‖ as a unified 
body representing, watching over, and caring for ―society.‖ 
Lò Văn Ếng from Nà Tấu commune, for example, responded as intended. He 
had been poor during French rule, leaving his wife and child with not enough to eat. 
He and his family had ―requested‖ (nhờ) President Hồ and the Government to send the 
military up and ―liberate‖ Điện Biên. Then, he had ―vigilantly‖ increased his 
production such that he and his family did have enough to eat—and then some. During 
the campaign, not only did Lò Văn Ếng pay his tax of 330 kg rice: he also ―loaned‖ 
the military another 450 kg; ―helped‖ other villagers with another 450 kg rice; sold the 
military two water buffalo (wounded by airplane fire), 40 kg pork, and a half ton of 
green vegetables; performed two rounds of dân công labor, including acting as guide 
for soldiers building a ―secret‖ road (presumably for artillery); and led his commune in 
another movement to increase production. Though the degree of Lò Văn Ếng‘s support 
may have been exceptional—for which he earned the Northwest Zone‘s highest 
commendation—he was one of many district residents to be awarded honors for 
exemplary service.
135
 Taken together, their actions illustrate the two-sided nature of 
mobilization. Coercion and consent could work together, but they could also work 
apart. Lò Văn Ếng was among those who welcomed liberation, benefited from DRV 
programs, and consented to claims made in its name. 
Among the ―free zones‖ of Điện Biên, Lò Văn Ếng was resident of one of two 
communes that enjoyed a privileged relationship to the military. Located in proximity 
to the Front Command, Mường Phăng and Nà Tấu were the only communes where 
populations engaged in market-based exchange accounted for in official reporting.
136
 
Of course, many other farmers sold produce, particularly vegetables, to soldiers and 
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officers even if their activities went uncounted. But the act of accounting for these 
transactions indicates privileged access to state resources unavailable to regular 
soldiers. Situated at a safe distance from ground-based combat, General Giáp, his 
staff, and PRC advisors operated from a bunker in Mường Phăng where they enjoyed 
access to fresh supplies. The officer corps purchased chickens, water buffalos (two of 
which had belonged to Lò Văn Ếng), and swine.137 Such meat was in very short 
supply: water buffalo, in particular, were targets for French airplanes as well as 
desperately scarce sources of draft labor.
138
 Evidently, these officers drew on their 
institutional authority and their access to currency (đồng) to obtain exceptional 
provisions with exceptional exchange power.  
Not everyone consented to mobilization, indicating that DRV legitimacy was 
never fully accomplished but, rather, was always partial, negotiated, and sometimes 
contested. Among recorded ―bad‖ reactions to mobilization, people of suspect class 
backgrounds rejected legitimation work, expressed displeasure with their assessed 
duties, questioned whom their duties benefited, and complained about bearing the 
costs. ―Why all these meetings?‖ asked an old Thái lord, ―just take the rice and meat 
already.‖139 His response is fascinating because this lord (phìa tạo) recognized 
legitimation work as such, expressed impatience with its performance, declined to 
participate, and accepted the material loss. His response indicates a begrudging 
acceptance of material claims and a willful refusal of any accompanying explanations. 
That he gave up his rice and meat but cadres nonetheless recorded his response as 
―bad‖ indicates the deep significance of legitimation work embedded in mobilization. 
Claim making was about appropriating material goods and—just as significantly—
constructing new relations of rule and encouraging their recognition as legitimate. 
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Another lord expressed anxiety over how female participation in dân công 
labor service challenged patriarchal gender norms. ―Requiring women to go work 
brazenly,‖ he stated, ―spoils and embitters them; later, how will they become 
wives?‖140 As discussed above, labor service during the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign 
pulled more and more women off-farm to work on the road, milling rice, or delivering 
rice to soldiers. In fact, that Thái women in Lai Châu caught Hoàng Công Phẩm‘s 
fancy indicates the potential for romance between soldiers and local women. Perhaps 
it was such real or imagined rivalry to local male claims on women that contributed to 
the lord‘s reaction. In any event, off-farm laboring must have been a transformative, if 
not ambivalent, experience for women and men alike. Labor service exposed villagers 
to a broader realm of people and ideas that, on their return, led them to question 
customs—such as, but not limited to, patriarchy—in their home communities.  
One refused to participate in labor service and questioned the Ethnic Policy‘s 
logic. An ―upper class‖ resident opined that ―Kinh people,‖ faced with French military 
superiority elsewhere, opted to take advantage of favorable conditions in his backyard. 
―The Kinh come up here and just eat the rice of Thái people,‖ he stated, ―so no way 
am I going to do dân công work at all.‖ Not everyone shared the Ethnic Policy‘s 
prescribed unity between peoples conceived as Vietnamese. Nor did they all respond 
to claim-making as intended. In fact, this one man recognized myriad soldiers, 
officers, and cadres not as fellow Vietnamese but as un-welcome Kinh visitors. Their 
presence was an imposition and he refused to play host.  
Just as claim-making‘s reach broadened to include highland groups and its 
scope intensified among all those affected, so too did social recognition of its multiple 
unintended consequences expand and increase. One ―kulak‖ (phú nông) observed, 
―The military eats up all our rice and then leaves us; how can I save anything?‖ 
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Indeed, state claims on scarce food resources depleted household stores. Labor service 
added another burden. One Hmong ―compatriot‖ stated, ―This year requires going on 
dân công a lot such that many people fall ill.‖141 This supposedly ―bad reaction‖ 
nonetheless echoes Nguyễn Kháng‘s observation (above). Not only did dân công labor 
service affect the health and well-being of Hmong participants. As with earlier 
military campaigns more broadly, state and military claims on agrarian labor and 
produce risked the ability of local communities to reproduce socially. In addition, that 
the Hmong person‘s grievance resulted in a recorded ―bad reaction‖ also confirms 
what Nguyễn Kháng called labor recruitment‘s ―not good political influence,‖ i.e. 
detrimental to the legitimation project. Unintended consequences such as these 
threatened to unravel carefully constructed representations of state as caring for the 
people and cadres as solicitous of their needs.  
In these latter cases, when people of suspect class background aired their 
grievances and pointed to the failure of legitimation work, the stalwarts assumed 
another role. They ―watched over‖ (theo dõi) disgruntled rural elites to regulate 
compliance with their assessed duties. At first, stalwarts staged un-announced visits on 
their homes. When this system of monitoring worsened relations ―between the two 
rural classes‖ (i.e., between upper and lower class) and caused stalwarts to become 
hesitant and appear ―pained,‖ the District Party Leadership Council opted for other 
measures. The Council assigned a cadre to accompany stalwarts on their rounds and, 
in order to avoid suspicion, the cadre demonstrated to the stalwart how to ―observe 
discreetly‖ the activities of the ―upper class.‖142 Just as good reactions and fulfillment 
of assessed duties merited reward and state recognition, so too did bad reactions and 
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failure to meet assessed duties deserve punishment.
143
 In either case, cadres relied on 
local recruits to enact village-based scrutiny and to police individualized conduct. 
Although these forms of monitoring and surveillance were likely punishment 
enough, it is significant that officials accused of crimes were not dismissed. The chair 
of Đọc Lập commune, two committee representatives of Mường Luân commune, and 
three village heads were all accused of ―failing to meet targets and acting 
insufficiently as emulatory models.‖ In other words, their first crime was not to gather 
from respective populations resources demanded by the district. Their second crime is 
harder to interpret (perhaps they protested mobilization? Acted corruptly?) yet 
nonetheless demonstrates the significance of emulatory learning and modeling. 
Regardless of their exact crimes, however, they retained their jobs ostensibly because 
―time was too short to mobilize the people.‖144 Although urgency was certainly a 
factor, I would offer an alternative explanation for their retention. The DRV‘s local 
state structure in Điện Biên had been, and was still being, cobbled together from pre-
existing, localized relations of rule predicated on the enduring bản muang model. Kinh 
cadres and district officials could ill afford to alienate persons who merged locally-
recognized forms of authority, be it traditional or charismatic, with the bureaucratic 
authority vested in commune and village leadership. Although the district hired and 
fired ―lower class‖ stalwarts at will, they were reluctant to dismiss recognized local 
authorities from the ―upper class.‖ As such, DRV hiring practices contributed to the 
reproduction, and reinvestment with power, of the very same class distinctions the 
DRV‘s revolutionary agenda intended to overturn. 
In addition to illustrating the partial outcomes of legitimation work and the 
local basis of DRV power, disgruntlement with state claims also foreshadowed larger, 
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unintended consequences of expanding and intensifying social mobilization. The 
alleged kulak and the Hmong compatriot made astute observations that resonated with 
widespread fears of starvation. The military‘s claims were taking a toll, depleting 
household foodstocks in an area where seasonal hunger was, and would remain, a 
hazard of an agrarian livelihood.  
In late March 1954, the Điện Biên District conducted a sample survey in two 
communes to assess conditions of food security. Vinh Quang was identified as a 
―typical‖ Hmong commune located in hills east of the plain. The commune had six 
villages with 977 total residents and 148 families. Presumably, their livelihood was 
based on swidden agriculture and pastoralism. The district registered the following 
data regarding what the commune‘s residents yielded during mobilization: 23 tons rice 
(157 kg per household), two tons meat, and two and a half tons vegetables. Of the 
resident total, 229 residents performed 2,952 days of dân công labor. After this 
mobilization, 23 families in Vinh Quang were left only with seedstock (i.e., the bare 
minimum); 37 families had one month‘s supply of rice and two months‘ corn; 62 
families had two months‘ rice and three months‘ corn; and 17 families had four 
months‘ rice and ―enough corn to eat.‖ Although these data may be incomplete, it is 
clear that mobilization had significantly depleted food stores.
145
 Just over half the 
commune‘s families had enough grains to last beyond five months. The rest would 
soon be hungry. 
Mường Luân commune was identified as ―3 part‖ wet-rice farmers and ―1 
part‖ swidden farmers. In other words, 75% of the commune‘s presumably Black Thái 
population farmed wet rice and 25% grew, or supplemented their livelihoods with, 
dry-rice cultivation. Unlike the Hmong Vinh Quang commune, there was no registered 
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corn. Mường Luân contained 19 villages inhabited by 2,128 total residents distributed 
among 314 families. The district registered the following resources yielded during 
mobilization: 102 tons rice (325 kg per household), three tons meat, five tons 
vegetables. Of the resident total, 776 residents performed 10,253 days of labor. After 
―implementing the plan‖ in Mường Luân, 71 families had ―nothing left to eat, only 
seedstock‖; 74 families had ―only enough to eat for one month‖; 105 families for two 
months; 50 families for three months; eight families for four months; and six families 
for six months. Again, though these data may be incomplete, they show that 
mobilization had depleted foodstocks—and to a degree more severe than their Hmong 
neighbors.
146
 After mobilization, more than two-thirds the Black Thái commune‘s 
families had not enough food stored to last beyond the next two months. Perhaps it 
was speaking out about these worrisome conditions that led Mường Luân‘s two 
commune representatives to get in trouble with district officials. 
Just as mobilization yielded new forms of data, so too did this data reveal the 
consequences of mobilization. The official who recorded these statistics made an 
ominous, if understated, observation: ―if the rains don‘t come, [they] will be hungry.‖ 
Yet not one family in either commune had enough rice left to last until November 
when, if the rains came, the next rice harvest would be ready. Therefore, many of them 
would be hungry long before. Although the Hmong residents in Vinh Quang had corn 
to supplement a rice-based diet, the Black Thái in Mường Luân had only rice and, 
evidently, no corn. Although partial at best, note that the counts and accounts analyzed 
above date to 29 March 1954.
147
 As such, there were five more weeks before the 
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cessation of hostilities, during which time local residents most likely gave even more 
than these ―summary‖ data indicate. Indeed, hunger as well as real or feared starvation 
loomed over most everyone for whom Điện Biên was home.  
 
Lai Châu: liberated or occupied?   
The French reoccupation of Điện Biên Phủ in November 1953 and the 
People‘s Army‘s occupation of Lai Châu town in December meant that, according to 
the DRV‘s spatialized matrix, their statuses switched. Điện Biên was no longer ―newly 
liberated‖ but ―temporarily occupied.‖ Meanwhile, in line with the Appeal signed by 
Lò Văn Hặc and posted on 22 December, Lai Châu was not occupied—in spite of 
thousands of People‘s Army‘s troops there—but, ostensibly, ―newly liberated.‖ In 
other words, Lai Châu was no longer a military front but a rear area where the 
People‘s Army counted on gleaning provisions and labor from its local population. Lai 
Châu, therefore, was an internalizing nation-state frontier about to be made and 
remade through urgent and rapid mobilization. 
The Thái Federation‘s collapse signaled a profound and lasting shift in spatial 
regulation and claim-making on its relocated population. Lai Châu‘s town center was 
no longer proud capital of a semi-autonomous unit of French empire, its leaders able 
to draw on political relations all the way to Paris. Rather, DRV territorial 
administration humbled the town by recognizing it as capital (thị xã) only of Mường 
Lay district.
148
 Like most of southern Lai Châu province, the town by the same name 
was considered a newly liberated zone, transforming all these reconfigured spatial 
units into sites where mobilization began tentatively, then quickened. This was where 
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Hoàng Công Phẩm commanded laborers and collected ambivalent memories. To the 
north, in districts of Mường Tè and Sinh Hồ, armed opposition still troubled the 
military and prevented their population‘s immediate mobilization. In short, the 
People‘s Army had secured a DRV claim to most of the Federation‘s territory, 
enabling cadres and military officers to subject many of its residents to claims on their 
labor and foodstocks.  
Following the People‘s Army‘s advances, the mutually constitutive processes 
of state formation and social mobilization began in a flurry. Unlike elsewhere in the 
DRV‘s Northwest Zone, armed propaganda units never preceded large-scale military 
occupation of Lai Châu town, meaning that its residents had little contact with 
revolutionary organizers. Even the category of ―newly liberated zone,‖ therefore, 
concealed a difference relative to other Black River areas that had earlier shared this 
same status. Perhaps not surprisingly, the recently constituted Mường Lay District 
Administrative Committee found its work among the district‘s 20,079 inhabitants to 
be ―heavy.‖ When soldiers and cadres first arrived, the people abandoned their homes, 
ran off to the forest, and hid out in their swidden huts. Having been ―fooled‖ by the 
French and Đèo Văn Long, reported DRV officials, many residents feared the ―Việt 
Minh‖ would burn their homes and ―eat human flesh.‖ They worried that ―Kinh‖ 
people hated ―White Thái‖ people so much that they would be shot on sight.149  
Before cadres and soldiers could enlist the population‘s support for the military 
campaign, they ―called on the people to return to normal lives‖ (chiêu an). Because 
commune committees did not yet exist, the Ministry of Defense‘s General Department 
of Politics (Tổng cục Chính trị) assisted the district to construct DRV authority. Until 
the General Department‘s departure in August 1954, in other words, Lai Châu town 
was subject to an outright form of militarized rule. Assisted by military political 
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cadres, the district‘s first step was to organize occasions for the ―confused and 
suspicious‖ people of Mường Lay to ―study Government policy,‖ by which they 
meant a DRV monopoly claim on social regulation. They held meetings in each of the 
district‘s 113 villages and at 15 ―large‖ events, with a total attendance of 88,654 
people.
150
 Though these figures were reported as self-evident success of 
―propagandizing the people,‖ the scale and intensity of a rising state‘s self-
presentation should not be underestimated. On average, each and every district 
resident attended 4 study sessions, and some even more. Whatever form their new 
lives took, it was far from what they had known as normal. 
If anything, subsequent everyday activities demonstrated that the lives of 
Mường Lay‘s residents would not return to ordinary but, rather, had already changed 
extraordinarily. Given its strategic position, drawing on Mường Lay‘s population to 
serve as dân công labor was urgent and crucial if not fraught with difficulty. As Hoàng 
Công Phẩm‘s memoirs explained, Lai Châu was located on a crucial node of the 
―Glorious Line‖ over which flowed supplies from China to Điện Biên Phủ‘s frontlines. 
Completing this overland and riverine route included opening a new road, 90 km long, 
requiring arduous work that drew directly on the labors of Mường Lay‘s residents.151  
Military supply officers, including Hoàng Công Phẩm, and district cadres did 
mobilize a substantial portion of Mường Lay‘s population to work as dân công. 
During the campaign alone, through three waves of mobilization, the district reported 
that a total of 4,003 residents worked on land (roughly three-quarters) or on water 
(one-quarter). Those on land either worked as pedestrian porters, tended trains of pack 
horses (using their own 531 animals), or built and opened roads like the one 
connecting the Glorious Line. Those on water worked as sailors plying the Black 
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River with rafts. This figure means that, on average, 1/5
th
 the district‘s population 
served the campaign as dân công labor. Given a district total of 2,862 households, 
each supplied, on average, 1.4 persons to the front.
152
 A subsequent report by Lò Văn 
Hặc, representing Lai Châu province, confirmed the campaign‘s total of roughly 4,000 
dân công laborers, adding that each of them worked from one to three months.
153
 
The urgency of enlisting support for ongoing combat led officials, at least 
initially, to bypass standard legitimation procedures. Kinh cadres skipped recruiting 
local stalwarts to act as intermediaries and interpreters. Furthermore, these 
downstream officials ―did not attend to the good or bad reactions of the people.‖ 
Meetings to air popular grievances, in other words, did not take place, foreclosing this 
form of negotiation. Cadres implemented the dân công policy without explaining its 
content, i.e. to persuade citizens of their responsibilities and the program‘s ostensible 
benefits. Instead, they stressed ―the obligation of participating in resistance and state-
building.‖154 In short, it appears as though cadres were speaking to these audiences 
and not with them. If mobilization was always a mixture of consent and coercion, then 
in Mường Lay, at least initially, the balance tilted towards the latter. 
As a result, by the time these residents left as dân công, DRV labor recruitment 
reproduced old legitimation problems in a new locale. Few people understood the fine 
distinction between the new regime‘s labor policy and the corvée practices (bắt phu) 
of its predecessor. In fact, it is likely that this uncertainty over differently-legitimated 
claims worked to the advantage of officers and cadres: however unpopular dân công 
service was for its participants, they were nonetheless accustomed to claims on their 
labor power. Indeed, cadres themselves frequently violated standing dân công policy 
and practice: not only did they neglect to explain the policy, but in practice labor 
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recruitment was ―unequal‖ (i.e., some served longer than others), left fields short of 
farmhands, and included individuals too young or too old to participate.
155
 
Performing dân công labor was certainly unpopular among Mường Lay‘s 
residents. ―Going on dân công this much,‖ protested one Thái village head from Bản 
Ho Luong, ―will destroy livelihoods.‖ Although officials dismissed his protest by 
associating him with the ―old puppet regime,‖ the village head‘s concerns about labor 
service‘s opportunity costs were valid. More generally, and as usual, residents called 
up to labor expressed broad ―anxiety‖ (thắc mắc), particularly about the families they 
left behind. ―When the dân công hit the road‖ they ―did not have a spirit of 
mobilization nor were their anxieties resolved.‖156  
By acknowledging these ―mistakes,‖ officials opined that ―study sessions‖ and 
the increased use of stalwarts, i.e. procedures used in Điện Biên District, might have 
alleviated popular concerns with dân công recruitment.
157
 In response, I would argue 
that many such ―mistakes‖ resulted from structural inequalities embedded in the 
power-laden encounter between upstream men and women with male downstream 
cadres, socially recognized as White Thái and Hmong or Kinh, respectively. 
Negotiating mobilization unfolded on profoundly unequal terms and, not surprisingly, 
issues of ethnicity and gender once again became points of difference and dispute.  
As elsewhere, many Hmong residents were reluctant to descend from the 
heights to labor in the heat of the valleys in dangerous conditions. To avoid service 
and ―fearing death,‖ six Hmong families from Tu Chua escaped across ―enemy lines‖ 
to Sìn Hồ; others fled roadcrews dispatched to work on the Glorious Line; an 
underspecified ―number‖ even died. Indeed, death from labor service was not only a 
fear but an ever-present possibility. Many Hmong people fell ill, suffered from 
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exhaustion, and died from exposure to communicable diseases like mumps. ―Counting 
only the month of September,‖ reads a report from December 1954, ―the number of 
sick people reached more than 90 and one portion died.‖158 Although nurses did cure 
some cases, that the other eleven months of 1954 went uncounted indicates that the 
number of total Hmong people dead from labor service must have been far higher. 
As elsewhere, cadres actively targeted women for service, in line with 
egalitarian ideals and a pragmatic interest in increasing the eligible labor pool. Perhaps 
because local men had been drafted to serve—and perish—in the Federation‘s Thái 
battalions or were already serving as DRV civilian laborers, women composed an 
estimated 2/3
rd
 the district population. The district committee‘s chairman complained 
in December 1954, however, about his colleagues‘ ongoing inability ―to exploit 
women‘s capacities,‖ expressing frustration that he and his fellow officials, ―could not 
mobilize women.‖ The Hmong woman upset with dân công service whom Hoàng 
Công Phẩm encountered, therefore, must have come from outside Mường Lay district 
but elsewhere within the Northwest Zone. Even the district official‘s own report 
indicates that the gender composition of off-farm labor was changing: the data record 
no women at all until November 1954 when 23 of 218 road workers are listed as 
women; then, in December, of 500 people mobilized to work on roadcrews, 300 are 
listed as women.
159
  
Broader patterns of on-farm male and female labor were changing as well. 
District officials noted that Thái women did not customarily work in the fields, a task 
traditionally reserved for men. Pointing to this gendered division of farm labor, 
Mường Lay‘s district chairman accused Thái people, and women in particular, of 
―eating more than they work.‖160 His concerns foreshadowed an emerging Northwest-
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wide, regional program to increase ―women ethnic minority‖ participation in on-farm 
labor: because men were needed for dân công roadwork and transportation, women 
were expected to ―volunteer‖ to plough and plant. This was not simply a program to 
free women from patriarchal norms. Rather, finance officials forecast that increasing 
female work on-farm enabled male labor off-farm while, at the same time, maintaining 
regional tax revenue.
161
 Nor was the effort predicated entirely on voluntarism: a police 
report from December 1954 noted that women in Mường Lay, like elsewhere in Lai 
Châu, ―were learning how to plow, mill rice, and hoist the burden of dân công.‖162 
Rather, that the police reported on female work habits indicates an ongoing, 
militarized development agenda to regulate labor, increase production, and enhance 
tax receipts.
163
 A new front had appeared in the midst of war: the home front.
164
 For 
male, Kinh cadres like the district chairman, women‘s‘ rate of participation in 
agriculture and labor service was not only a problem. Solving it was a task that he and 
others like him empowered themselves to direct.  
All of these issues encountered in, and unresolved through, formal legitimation 
work raise questions about Lai Châu‘s role in the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign. How did 
mobilization work there at this time? Was it based solely on force coordinated by a 
centralized politico-military apparatus? Unlike sources for Điện Biên District, archival 
documents from Mường Lay District, including those drawn on thus far, date to 
December 1954, long after the cessation of hostilities at Điện Biên Phủ in May. This 
lack of contemporaneous documentation, I would argue, is analytically significant. For 
the newly ensconced officials of Mường Lay, this one military exercise merged and 
blurred with subsequent and ongoing campaigns. The Điện Biên Phủ Campaign may 
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have been exceptional but it was not unique. Militarized claim-making began, but did 
not end, with a singularized military event.  
Based on the evidence above, mobilization in Lai Châu town and Mường Lay 
District, relative to Điện Biên District and the Northwest Zone more generally, 
certainly appeared to lean more towards coercion and its threat. Notwithstanding 
militarized coercion, there is evidence to suggest that claim-making nonetheless 
contained reciprocal processes predicated on new forms of consensual exchange.  
Even military domination, in other words, still involved legitimation. When the 
People‘s Army arrived in December 1953, years of warfare had left the local economy 
―exhausted‖ (kiệt quệ): people did not ―have enough cloth to wear nor salt to eat‖; 
their livestock and rice had all been ―snatched up by the traitors and French.‖ State 
Shops, supplied by the military, quickly moved in to fill the void by distributing cloth, 
salt, and farmtools.
165
 Once again, cadres initiated a reciprocal exchange to 
delegitimize colonial and Federation rule as ―exploitation‖ and to legitimate DRV rule 
as ―liberation.‖ They presented themselves and represented ―state‖ as uniquely capable 
of improving people‘s lives and caring for their welfare.  
The development project was backed with considerable force. Cadres and 
officers seized symbols and materials associated with the old regime, now considered 
―war spoils,‖ and set about redistributing, occupying, or destroying them. Over the 
first half of 1954, the district confiscated and redistributed property belonging to Đèo 
Văn Long and other senior Thái Federation officials. They seized over 17 tons of rice 
once held by members of the Đèo clan and other compradors and stored the stocks in a 
new granary. Cadres then distributed some nine tons to peasants and, presumably, 
used the remaining eight tons to feed the legions of dân công laborers and soldiers.
166
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Cadres and officers confiscated 307 irrigable mẫu of wet-rice land (over 110 hectares) 
formerly held by the Đèo clan and other elites; and then redistributed this choice land 
among 680 Thái and Hmong families, benefiting one quarter of the district‘s 
households.
167
 Likewise, cadres seized and redistributed draft animals and goats 
formerly belonging to Đèo Văn Long. Ironically, kerosene confiscated from these 
now-departed elites became the midnight oil illuminating meetings held to decide on 
how to divvy up their forfeited property.
168
  
Not all property reclamation and redistribution was so ordered, particularly in 
the early stages of the People‘s Army‘s occupation. In late 1953, People‘s Army 
soldiers and officers seized furniture from ―several houses,‖ presumably once 
belonging to Đèo Văn Long and his family, and used them without care for their 
upkeep. When they found out, Lai Châu‘s province committee and Party leadership 
reappropriated these belongings and moved what remained of them into a storehouse. 
They declared the houses, any associated furnishings, and the Federation‘s former 
office complex all to be ―Government property.‖ After these civilian and Party 
officials picked up and moved south to serve the front, however, their property 
(re)claim evidently no longer held. Between February and June, units of the military, 
engineers, transportation officials, and dân công laborers—all from ―downstream‖—
used these homes and offices to ―rest their feet‖ and, moreover, ransacked their 
contents. They broke apart furniture for firewood and smashed wall mirrors into hand-
held ones, ―to the degree that not one thing was left intact.‖ Summarizing that 80% of 
the property was destroyed beyond use, the reporting civilian official expressed his 
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anger, embarrassment, and disappointment through clenched teeth by inviting the 
Zone‘s ―consideration‖ of his military counterparts.169 
These divergent examples of how the new regime handled property inherited 
from the old demonstrate power in multiple forms. First, both redistributive and 
destructive acts were symbolic and material. Appropriating the property of Đèo clan or 
Federation offices demonstrated both the dispatch of a once powerful family and the 
rise of a more powerful alternative. Second, redistribution of land resources, 
foodstocks, and capital goods all demonstrated a rising center‘s power and intent to 
regulate property relations. Cadres working to institute new relations of rule forged 
alliances with, and built support among, poor peasants who had suffered from prior 
forms of inequality. These acts worked together to legitimate a revolutionary program 
and to delegitimize Đèo clan rule. If the desired result was to represent ―Government‖ 
as mythically unified and willingly able to help ―the people,‖ then these ideas of state 
and society were intended effects of legitimation work.  
The wanton destruction of Đèo clan property and Federation office, by 
contrast, illustrates the underlying tensions between and among institutions competing 
for scarce resources. The thinly-veiled anger expressed by the province official 
towards shenanigans perpetrated in his absence by army units, sappers, and laborers 
may just be a case of mice at play while the cat was away. Nonetheless, civilian and 
military institutions did not always enjoy harmonious relations but, like cat and 
mouse, had differential coercive capacities and could be mutually antagonistic. Even 
the Center‘s priorities changed over time, from emphasizing military confrontation to 
instituting civilian rule. Notwithstanding their lumpen self-representation as the 
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Government, bureaucratic segments within the rising DRV state could and, sometimes 
did, work at cross-purposes.  
As the Appeal signed by Lò Văn Hặc made clear and the myriad meetings 
doubtlessly emphasized, the provision of goods and the redistribution of agrarian 
resources figured in an emerging symbolic and material relationship. Recall that the 
Appeal made on behalf of the Lai Châu Province Administrative Committee proposed 
a bargain: in exchange for ―freeing‖ the residents, redistributing the property of 
―feudalists,‖ ridding French ―brigands,‖ and providing scarce goods, the rising regime 
expected local resources in return to enable its ongoing military campaign. How did 
the appeal‘s legitimation work materialize, or what were its material effects? How did 
Mường Lay‘s district officials count mobilization? What do their accounting practices 
say about the claim-making process?   
Available archival evidence indicates that in the early days of ―liberation,‖ the 
district‘s farmers ―loaned‖ (cho vay) substantial quantities of rice and foodstuffs to the 
military. A district report from December 1954 lists loaned amounts of rice, corn, 
livestock (goats, water buffalo, cattle, pig, chicken), eggs, and vegetables all organized 
according to commune. These communes, however, were formed only after the initial 
round of mobilization, their leadership chosen during its processes. Notwithstanding 
this anachronism, the commune by commune data is summarized by district and 
includes quantities of rice (60 tons husked + 10 tons unhusked), vegetables (six tons), 
eggs (419), livestock (rendered into 26 tons fresh meat), etc.
170
 The system of loaning, 
like elsewhere in the rapidly consolidating Northwest Zone, implied that these 
amounts counted as credit towards the soon-to-be implemented yet differentially 
applied fiscal year 1954 agricultural tax. Whereas Thái wet-rice farmers did pay taxes, 
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collection problems among Hmong swidden farmers stimulated an internal review 
and, eventually, contributed towards granting them a temporary exemption.
171
  
As elsewhere in the Northwest Zone, mobilization was linked to ongoing and 
subsequent forms of claim-making. Mobilization of provisions informed and 
foreshadowed sustained agricultural taxation. What is significant about the above 
figures is less the reported counts than the means of accounting for them spatially and 
temporally. Spatially, making communes—not to mention district, province, etc.—
occurred during, and in support of, mobilization. Just as making territorial boundaries 
structured claim-making practice, Kinh cadres used the process of claim-making to 
select local leaders of emergent administrative units. Temporally, accounting for these 
quantities by date reveals that collection may have begun with the Điện Biên Phủ 
Campaign but did not end with it. Rather, for residents and rulers of a transformed Lai 
Châu, this campaign initiated practices and processes of mobilization exceeding any 
temporal boundaries.  
If mobilization was in the process of normalization, then its practice also 
reproduced abnormal effects. In August 1954, for example, office workers and youth 
brigade laborers borrowed another 25 tons corn from Hmong farmers and purchased 
another 7 tons rice from Thái farmers. To what ends did the office workers and youth 
brigade laborers put the corn and rice? Evidently, they consumed the rice or shipped it 
off elsewhere but used the corn to legitimate rapidly changing, localizing relations of 
rule. When the military‘s General Department of Politics departed in August 1954, 
they left not only a hungry population but also nascent civilian institutions to handle 
hunger‘s political effects. In a pattern consistent with the unintended consequences of 
intensive claim-making, Mường Lay‘s Thái farmers were hungry in August and 
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September. Although summer was (and still is) a season of annual food insecurity, 
mobilizing scarce food resources no doubt depleted household stocks. Even forest 
tubers had been stretched beyond their capacity to provide a substitute.
172
 It was 
another instance of bureaucratic segments within the DRV working at cross purposes. 
District officials had to clean up a mess made by the People‘s Army. With the 
departure of the military supply network, they had to find a creative solution to a 
pressing political problem.  
To deal with popular hunger, district officials once again turned to what they 
had learned, and what they could accomplish, through emerging forms of reciprocal 
exchange. First, they made several observations regarding local disparities between 
swidden and wet-rice cultivators. Whereas Thái farmers relied on rice, Hmong farmers 
cultivated a wide variety of crops including corn. The State Shops registered a lively 
trade with the latter who drew on corn surplus to buy salt and cloth. Hmong farmers 
also sold vegetables, squash, and livestock (ducks, chickens, goats) to ―many people.‖ 
In the meantime, hungry Thái residents ―borrowed‖ corn from their upland neighbors, 
indicating local forms of exchange.
173
 Second, district officials drew on these 
observations to position the ―Government‖ as uniquely capable of solving the problem 
of hunger—conditions to which the very same ―Government‖ had contributed! The 25 
tons of corn that the district ―borrowed‖ from Hmong cultivators in August was then 
―loaned‖ to hungry Thái people, including Lai Châu town residents, tiding them over 
until the rice crop matured.
174
  
                                                 
172
 Lam Sung, ―Báo cáo…‖ 12 Dec 1954, NAVC 3, phông UBHC tỉnh Sơn-Lai, file no. 90, p. 4, 9-10. 
173
 Reportedly, Hmong areas provided higher amounts of each good than Thái areas. Why? Hmong 
swidden farmers grew more diverse cultivars than wet-rice farmers, increasing the likelihood that one or 
more of them turned into good harvests. Hmong peoples likely felt more alienated by the Thái 
Federation and, therefore, were more inclined to support an alternative. It is also likely that higher 
elevation of swidden fields sheltered them from lowland combat. 
174
 Lam Sung, ―Báo cáo…‖ 12 Dec 1954, NAVC 3, phông UBHC tỉnh Sơn-Lai, file no. 90, p. 5, 9-10. 
 404 
In so doing, the district intercepted and reconfigured local patterns of 
exchange. By mediating the movement of use value, district cadres appropriated 
corn‘s exchange value to legitimate their own rule. As such, the actions of Mường 
Lay‘s officials fit a broader pattern. Regulating material—and deeply symbolic—
exchanges both contributed towards making a planned economy and obscured 
complex relations of rule as akin to a singular, caring, and benevolent figure.  
Like the claims on food resources that continued through 1954 and beyond, 
dân công service requirements did not stop with May‘s victory in Điện Biên. In fact, 
determining just when exactly the campaign ended reveals deep source disagreement. 
Unlike the Central Council on Front Supply‘s declaration that the Điện Biên Phủ 
Campaign ended in May with ―victory,‖ Lai Châu Province continued to pursue this 
same campaign—by the same name—through July when the last French prisoners of 
war departed.
175
 Temporal boundaries structuring the practices of counting and 
accounting, therefore, were themselves vague and conflicting.  
Even in Lai Châu Province‘s district of Mường Lay it is unclear when the three 
waves of labor mobilization for the nominal Điện Biên Phủ Campaign occurred. If 
they began with ―liberation‖ (presumably in December), when did these waves end—
May or July? Perhaps as late as August? No dates are provided. What is clear is that 
many more thousands of Mường Lay‘s residents were ―required to serve‖ the military 
or to work on roadcrews. In July, the military called on 800 residents to assist with 
hunting down ―bandits‖ holding out along the Sino-Lao-Vietnamese border in Mường 
Bum and Sìn Hồ; each of them worked for two months. From September through 
December, the district both called on another 638 laborers to do ―random, general 
tasks‖ such as rebuilding houses and constructing a market; and recruited another 933 
people to do roadwork. Added to the 4,003 involved in ―the campaign,‖ the district 
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summarized these figures as 5,736 dân công ―serving large projects‖ and 638 dân 
công on ―short term mobilization‖ for a combined 1954 total of 6,374 people. To these 
so-called ―summary‖ statistics, the district added a caveat: the sums ―do not count‖ 
another 2,867 laborers working out on Road 41 or still another 500 ―laborers in the 
process of being mobilized.‖176  
Adding these uncounted totals to the official account means that 9,741 people 
in Mường Lay district were called on to provide dân công labor in 1954. If the report 
conceals this total, then revealing it underlines the intensity and extent of labor 
mobilization. Assuming no repeat service assignments among participants, close to 
half the district‘s entire population worked as a dân công laborer at some point during 
1954. On average, 3.4 members of each household—half of each household‘s average 
composition of 7 individuals—worked off-farm at some point.  
These figures from just one district in one year alone may indicate an 
exceptional drudgery but they are hardly unique and, moreover, point to the remaking 
of regional rule. Mường Lay‘s experience may represent, what the Chairman of the 
Lai Châu Province Committee called, ―a particularly heavy burden on labor resources‖ 
relative to the province‘s other districts.177 That Lò Văn Hặc made this statement 
raises the possibility that disproportionate labor service may also have functioned as 
collective punishment for the wrongs of his avowed enemies in the Thái Federation. 
Whatever his motives, the rise of this one Black Thái star—among others like him—at 
the expense of White Thái compradors indicates regionally specific elite formation 
and the reproduction of Thái rule. 
For the masses, militarized legitimation and coercion discussed in Mường Lay 
illustrate spatially broader and temporally ongoing patterns of claim-making on their 
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agrarian resources. Just as mobilization during war foreshadowed and stimulated the 
agricultural tax, so too did it routinize off-farm labor duties. Making and securing 
claims on the Thái Federation‘s territory was not just an end of DRV state-making in 
the Black River region but also a fundamental means to this end. Just as important, 
and reciprocally constituted, were making and securing claims on a re-territorialized 
population‘s labor and food resources. Lai Châu, like the spatially reconfigured border 
outpost at Điện Biên Phủ, was now a site within a national frontier. 
 
Beyond the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign 
For residents of Mường Lay District, of its encompassing Lai Châu Province, 
and of the Northwest Zone more broadly, the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign was only one 
of three ―large‖ tasks in 1954 requiring mobilization of peasant labor and foodstocks. 
First, the nominal Điện Biên Phủ Campaign—supposedly ending in May—continued 
locally until August. Second, the People‘s Army waged another military campaign in 
Lai Châu‘s northern reaches in July against remnant French and allied forces. 
Although this campaign aimed to ―eradicate bandits‖ (tiễu phỉ) in the interim before 
the Geneva cease-fire agreement took effect, armed resistance nonetheless continued 
in Lào Cai through at least early 1955. Third, roadwork started anew in August: 
improving and repairing Road 41 linking the Northwest Zone to downstream 
territories; as well as remaking the Glorious Line into a sealed road to the Chinese 
border. All this regional military and infrastructure work—and the labor and 
provisions it required of local residents—carried over into the next calendar year of 
1955.
178
 Bounding the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign temporally and making it a discrete 
event discounts these subsequent and ongoing mobilizations.  
                                                 
178
 Đảng Lao Động Việt Nam, Ban Chấp hành Khu Tây Bắc, ―Nghị Quyết: Chường trinh công tác 3 
tháng đầu năm 1955,‖ 21 Dec 1954, NAVC 3, phông PTTg, file no. 6, p. 3-5; Lò Văn Hặc, ―Báo 
 407 
Although residents from Lai Châu, for example, continued working as civilian 
laborers, the province lost count of how many worked. With regards to uncounted 
labor recruited for military activities, the Chairman of the Provincial Committee 
blamed the districts for ―not summarizing specific counts‖ in his report of March 
1955.
179
 Lò Văn Hặc overlooked the readily available report issued by Mường Lay 
District in December 1954 discussed above. Does this indicate unintentional gaps in 
intra-government communication? Or deliberate concealment from his superiors of 
Mường Lay‘s unfair treatment? It is all too likely that this officialized Black Thái lord 
reserved punishment for the White Thái people he felt had betrayed him. Either way, 
miscounting was part of a broader pattern.  
With regards to labor allocated to roadwork, the province recounted only those 
laborers from the province who worked in the province. Lai Châu‘s annual 1954 
report registered two mobilization waves of 1,985 and 1,305 dân công from August to 
December, all of whom worked for two months turning the Glorious Line into a road. 
The report did not count the number of laborers who worked in other provinces on the 
regional route of Road 41.  
More revealingly, in addition to and pursuant with these three ―large‖ tasks, Lò 
Văn Hặc noted that the ―routine mobilization of dân cong‖ to transport military 
supplies, improve roads, build granaries, and ―other miscellaneous, trifling work was 
uncountable.‖180 The alleged uncountability of dân công labor points both to its 
pervasive and abundant practice as well as diminished capacity to count or 
unwillingness to recount burdensome claims on labor power. For the people who 
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performed this labor, none of the work required of them—as citizens of Vietnam and 
subjects of officialized Thái lords—was ever ―trifling.‖ Separated from families and 
farms, anyone who did dân công labor for months at a time endured drudgery that 
posed hazards to one‘s self, family, and community—all for uncertain rewards. 
What had changed with regards to claim-making was not the practice itself but, 
rather, institutionalized capacity to account for and enumerate its results. On the one 
hand, local elites recognized as DRV officials, such as Lò Văn Hặc, gained renewed 
power and ability to claim local labor and supplies. On the other hand, the dissolution 
or departure of centralized agencies—the civilian Council on Front Supply in May and 
the military‘s General Department of Politics in August, respectively—left the Central 
Government with diminished capacity to know the activities of local and regional 
institutions. Further, the withdrawal of a formidable supply network meant that local 
and regional authorities no longer fully accounted and recounted claims. As such, 
centrally-organized institutional capacity throughout the Northwest Zone actually 
decreased after the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign.181 Not only does this fact belie linear 
growth in centrally organized power and the finality of its establishment. It may also 
point to a renewed ability among Black River elites to use DRV office as a means to 
enhance their own power. 
For the Northwest Zone‘s rising civilian authorities more broadly, clearing 
their balance sheets of debt in the wake of the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign ―met many 
difficulties.‖ During the 1954 round of taxation, cadres found among loaning residents 
both a lack of evidence and gaps in knowledge: payees complained of having never 
been issued, or ―misplaced,‖ their receipts; or they professed ―not knowing‖ their loan 
quantities or 1953 tax assessment.
182
 Whether these were acts of dissemblance aimed 
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to dodge taxes, honest forgetfulness, or omissions by harried supply officers is 
unclear. What is clear is that regional authorities assumed responsibility for an 
accounting mess the Central Government had helped create. Like other military 
campaigns, this largest one featured an underlying cyclical pattern of unintended 
consequences, further undercutting a linear narrative telos. 
Military campaigns and hunger in the Northwest followed a cyclical pattern—
combat and hunger and then more hunger. Just as in 1950 after the failed general 
uprising and in 1953 after the Northwest Campaign, the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign 
depleted household reserves across the region, leaving local producers short of food. 
This was not what Lò Văn Hặc called, ―perennial compatriot hunger‖ as though 
outside of history.
183
 Rather, food insecurity was produced and reproduced through 
intensive, repeated militarized claim-making. Indeed, the policy of mobilization in 
place and combat itself had hidden costs both during and after the campaign. During 
the campaign, residents everywhere were hungry. Afterwards, the incidence and 
severity of hunger increased directly in relation to proximity to former and current 
military fronts.  
Hunger radiated outwards from the fighting in waves, first during the 
campaign and then, again, during the autumn months before the rice crop matured 
(giáp hạt). The first wave occurred in April-May before the corn crop came in. 
Residents in Điện Biên, Quỳnh Nhai, Sìn Hồ, and Mường Tè found food, ―only by 
going into the forest to dig tubers and collect plants.‖ Just as corn helped tide over 
Mường Lay‘s residents in July-August, the corn crop provided some nourishment for 
residents of these other districts in June and July.
184
 At hunger‘s center was the 
Mường Thanh plain where fighting had forced its residents to abandon their fields, 
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wander about, and scratch tubers from the forest floor. Much of this rice basket then 
remained unusable for several planting seasons: the scarred, mined, and pockmarked 
battlefield removed some 377 hectares from production for years afterwards.
185
 In 
neighboring Tuần Giáo, where residents ―exceeded quotas‖ during the campaign by 
―loaning a lot to the Government,‖ families were left, ―with only 10-15 days‘ worth of 
foodstocks.‖186 That summer, the monsoon rains did not come and, as the official in 
Điện Biên had predicted, drought conditions exacerbated conditions of hunger. 
Consequently, before the rice crop matured in autumn, a second, even more severe 
wave of hunger spread in August-October throughout Lai Châu.
187
 By the time of the 
normally festive lunar new year (Tết) in early 1955, Kinh youth brigades joining the 
locally-recruited roadcrews had no rice to celebrate but ate meager gruel instead.
188
  
Conditions of hunger indicated, and contributed to, broader tensions of rule in 
a consolidating but still heavily contested frontier. In September, Lai Châu provincial 
authorities organized Border Police units, part of a larger Northwest Zone program to 
regulate cross-border movement.
189
 Officials linked border patrols explicitly with 
other ―large official business,‖ especially dân công work and agricultural taxation. For 
their subjects as well, borders, taxes, and labor service all figured together. By October 
1954 as the reduced rice harvest approached and the tax season loomed, what was 
recorded as ―enemy propaganda‖ found a receptive audience. ―Over in Laos,‖ went a 
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typical line, ―there are no obligations to work as dân công, no obligations to pay taxes, 
and the Việt Minh is unable to stop you.‖190  
If taxation and dân công service required a stable, sedentary population, then 
some peasants responded by mobilizing themselves to avoid these claims. In 
increasing numbers through January 1955, peasants voted with their feet. Some, like 
36 Dao families from Mường Lay who migrated to Sìn Hồ, crossed into districts to 
seek lighter labor obligations.
191
 Many more took advantage of territorial 
sovereignty‘s limits, and the newly recognized national frontier, by departing Vietnam 
for refuge elsewhere. Some 15 families from Sìn Hồ crossed over into China but soon 
returned, raising suspicions among the Zone‘s officials.192 Overall, the preferred 
destination for the Northwest‘s outmigrants was Laos. Some 19 Hmong families from 
Mường Tè crossed into Laos; after officials persuaded 16 of them to return, they 
explained, ―only because of fear of going on dân công and paying taxes did we flee.‖ 
From October 1954, ―reactionaries in Điện Biên were hectically mobilizing the people 
to cross to Laos‖; by January 1955 at least some 59 families had fled, some of them 
never to return.
193
 Mobilization, evidently, could also work actively against DRV 
interests. By late 1955, self-mobilization reduced the 1954 population of Điện Biên 
District by an astonishing 14%, or over 3200 people.
194
   
All these examples from Lai Châu province illustrate a broader trend of cross-
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border movements happening simultaneously for similar reasons all across the 
Northwest Zone. To the south in Sơn La, people from Mộc Châu, Yên Châu, and Sông 
Mã, responded to a call, to ―come over to Laos where there is no tax, no dân công.‖195 
That such arguments were persuasive indicates the contested legitimacy of claims on 
agrarian resources as well as the fragility of state efforts to regulate a footloose 
population territorially. In a region with long and permeable borders, population 
movement and efforts to regulate it demonstrate the limits of territorial sovereignty. 
For all those who fled, flight was an escape from intolerable relations of rule. 
Most of the Black River region‘s peoples, however, did remain in a frontier of 
a newly recognized Vietnam as agents in and subjects of an ongoing state-making 
project. If state formation and mobilization unfolded together historically, they were 
not always in concert. During the military campaign, bureaucratic segments with an 
ostensibly unified ―state‖ jostled over access to and allocation of resources. After the 
campaign, the departure of centralized bureaucracies allowed regional and local elites 
to reassert power and to position themselves, in the name of state, to claim an 
increasing share of resources. Mobilization during and after the campaign may have 
enabled radical cadres to identify stalwarts with proper class backgrounds and to train 
them for official positions. Yet making mobilization work also relied on—and 
reproduced—the hybridized authority of local elites, many of whom were ―feudal‖ 
lords or ―kulaks‖ who subverted a centrally-directed reform agenda.     
Mobilizing the masses might secure resources for a statist project but levying 
excessive claims could just as easily delegitimize these enmeshed and (re)emerging 
relations of rule. The policing, coercion, and violence that accompanied mobilization 
from late 1953 through 1954 may be seen as cause and effect of popular discontent. 
Just as mobile peasants demonstrated the limits of territorial sovereignty, coercion 
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demonstrated the limits of formal legitimation work. Although this second phase in 
militarized claim-making did lean more towards coercion, domination was never total 
nor did reciprocal exchange cease to exist. Even among the strongest People‘s Army 
force assembled during the entire anti-colonial war and amidst its bloodiest fighting, 
residents of Điện Biên District demonstrated resistance, compliance, and refusal. Even 
in a district with no direct exposure to the DRV save for its military rule, residents of 
Mường Lay District engaged in forms of symbolic and material exchange. 
The intensity and expanse of mobilization in 1954 raises one final question in 
relation to reciprocal exchange in 1953. Why did more people appear to go hungry and 
starve during a lighter period of militarized claim-making in 1953 than the heavier 
period of 1954?  
The difference may be simply a matter of annual weather vagaries in growing 
conditions and highly variable local production.
196
 Or it may be related to the road 
construction and bureaucratic organization that accompanied militarized state-making. 
If we hold weather factors and production constant, one might surmise that 
infrastructure preparation, consolidation of contested territory, rationalization of 
service requirements, and increased flow of capital and consumption goods together 
nipped 1954 hunger in the bud before it developed into starvation.
197
 According to one 
report, when hunger did appear in 1954, transportation to affected communities was 
―easier than before because bandits and enemies no longer shot and sabotaged 
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 Both wet rice and dry field (swidden) cultivation at this time were highly dependent on monsoon 
rains. Growing seasons in both periods were affected by rainfall perturbations yet, in the absence of 
reliable data, it is hard to assess whether gross production changed significantly. Moreover, gross 
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led cadres to organize workteams in 1954 to assist households depleted by such service. The centrally-
organized supply network in 1953-54 may have provided rice after the campaign just as increasing 
provision of tools may have enabled farmers to open fallow land. What were multiple and criss-crossing 
fronts in 1952-53 during mobile warfare might have been more damaging to land and demanding on the 
local population than fixed warfare and a singularized front in 1953-54.  
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them.‖198 Certainly, the (partial) end of war and an improved road network for 
distributing food aid might have helped hungry people. The report fails to mention, 
however, that improved transportation infrastructure resulted directly from local labor, 
recruited at a time when the mid-1953 ―bridges and roads campaign‖ corresponded 
with local hunger and starvation.   
Moreover, I would argue that only if we go beyond the temporal boundaries 
structuring knowledge of Điện Biên Phủ—as battle, campaign, and the French war‘s 
endpoint—can we better assess the uncounted costs of militarization and a cumulative 
lag effect. Again, hunger serves to indicate broader social conditions and to reveal the 
unintended consequences of militarizing an agrarian economy. ―The food problem 
during the resistance was extremely difficult,‖ reads the opening line of a report on 
grain shortages in 1955. ―Now that peace has returned,‖ it continues, the food 
problem, ―has only become more difficult.‖199 If this report was speaking about the 
DRV as a whole, then the statement went double for its northwest corner. Although 
drought and pest conditions in 1955 caused hunger throughout the region, hunger was 
conspicuously pronounced among the same Black River populations affected by 
combat and claim-making during 1953 and 1954.
200
 If farmers survived the hunger in 
1954 by tightening their belts, then they had drastically diminished resources—energy, 
livestock, and foodstocks—to survive hunger in 1955.201 Repeatedly gathering 
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phông UBHC KTTTB, file no. 3177, p. 3. 
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supplies and recruiting labor from people already experiencing annual food insecurity 
now appeared to reach a logical, sad conclusion. By the close of 1955, a regional 
report stated that 32,503 people were ―hungry‖—10% of the Zone‘s population—and 
listed 41 dead of ―exhaustion.‖202 Even in a time of ostensible peace, then, 
militarization and concomitant state resource claims bore hidden, and all-too-often 
unaccounted for, social costs.   
Claims are not only about resources but also about meaning, truth, and 
knowledge. To challenge the spatial and temporal boundaries structuring knowledge 
of Điện Biên Phủ one must first acknowledge the effects of a powerful state-making 
project. State-sponsored national origin myths essentialize Điện Biên Phủ in 1954 as 
the end of colonialism and the dawn of an equally essentialized unitary, modern 
Vietnam. Even its very Vietnamese name—an administrative border outpost—belies 
the place‘s historic multiple sovereignty and enduring contests as well as the 
contingency of this one outcome. Making a national frontier oriented towards a 
singular center involved violence and, after the fact, silencing alternate trajectories and 
concealing multiple understandings of its past. Tracing a local place name, Mường 
Thanh—or heavenly muang—reveals people in place with their own center, different 
communal forms, and complex histories, none of which begin or end in 1954. Rather, 
they start long before and move through the date into an unfolding present. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
Official military historians argue that ―the whole country‖ of Vietnam came 
together to fight for the ―complete victory‖ of Điện Biên Phủ in 1954.1 How and why 
did Vietnam emerge in Điện Biên Phủ—at this time, in this form, and in this place?  
From a state-making perspective, we can answer this question based on 
processes and relations of legitimation, mobilization, militarization, and the 
reconfiguration of local rule. But in some ways, the official argument and the resulting 
question assume, incorrectly, that ―Vietnam‖ was fully and finally formed in 1954; to 
the contrary, Vietnam was and remains an ongoing project. The fact that a battle over 
a frontier outpost has come to assume center stage in national mythology is itself 
analytically significant: Điện Biên Phủ figures as shorthand for the lasting 
achievement of a unified Vietnam—nation, state, and territory—all arising 
triumphantly from the final defeat of colonialism.
2
 The battle over this marginal place 
in 1954 figures centrally in national mythology in part because an idea of ―complete 
victory‖ there masks incompleteness both there and elsewhere. Understanding the 
processes and outcomes of statemaking involves tugging at the loose ends of a 
singular nationalist narrative and unraveling multiple alternative histories. 
If official narratives explain the outcome of Điện Biên Phủ as a result of 
voluntarism, then scholars frequently explain mass participation there as a result of 
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 ―Even though economic conditions were still scanty,‖ reads the Ministry of Defense‘s history, ―the 
people from all localities still voluntarily contributed to the resistance Government tens of thousands of 
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popular consent predicated on land reform. According to this consensual explanation, 
peasants chose freely to support the anti-colonial struggle based on a rational 
understanding of costs and benefits. The National Assembly‘s decision in December 
1953 to pursue mass mobilization for land reform in a time of war indicated elite 
determination and stimulated a sense of possibility among a peasantry eager for 
change. Whether referred to as a ―propaganda effect‖ or as the force behind ―national 
integration,‖ this perspective enjoys broad support.3 Yet it explains only partially why 
many—but not all—peasants endured hardship as soldiers and laborers during the 
final, bloodiest phase of the French war.  
The rational consent hypothesis does not account for the spatial unevenness in 
the implementation of land reform. As discussed in Chapter 4, land reform in the 
emerging Northwest Zone followed neither the same timeline nor the same procedures 
as elsewhere in DRV-claimed northern Vietnam. Some scholars who argue for the 
consent hypothesis credit the Ethnic Policy for ―unifying the struggle among the 
ethnic minority compatriots‖ and ―creating great energy of mutual assistance.‖4 
Though this explanation does account for land reform‘s spatial gaps, it leaves untested 
a Party-state claim to unified and enlightened leadership among people who often 
greeted this claim skeptically. In wake of the 1952 Northwest Campaign, the ―newly 
liberated‖ population was hungry and, in some places, even starving. Further, during 
and between the Northwest and Điện Biên Phủ Campaigns, some residents fled rather 
than serve and many more expressed anxiety over state demands for provisions and 
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 Nguyễn Hữu Hợp & Nguyễn Hữu Đạo, ―Sức mạnh…‖ in Viện sử học (1985), 100-101.  
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labor. Socially and materially, these conditions hardly explain a willingness to part 
with scarce resources in exchange for uncertain rewards.  
Evidence from the Black River region, therefore, raises broader questions. 
How, and on what terms, did agents of state and military enlist socially diverse 
peasantries to support the war effort? How did mobilization work there? 
A nuanced argument must recognize that military action—i.e., organized 
coercive force—accompanied social mobilization. The practice and process of 
militarized mobilization was, in turn, embedded in broader processes of legitimation, 
making a planned economy, and centralizing power. I argued in Chapters 5 and 6 that 
state formation accelerated during, and because of, warfare.
5
 Although its form was 
initially ―limited,‖ mobilization transformed state-society relations such that a 
territorializing DRV could claim an ever-larger portion of local resources to serve 
war-making. The rapid expansion of state power meant that newly instantiated 
structures incorporated older relations of rule to claim peasant resources—sometimes 
unwillingly. A complex combination of coercion and consent accompanied the 
legitimation and institutionalization of power, all of which enabled a rising state to 
appropriate resources located, self-consciously, in a nationalized society.  
Learning from the Northwest Campaign increased DRV institutional capacities 
to equip the People‘s Army during the Điện Biên Phủ Campaign. In what would be the 
last phase of the first Indochina War, efforts to centralize knowledge and power 
among a political elite enabled even more intensive mobilization in, and more 
extensive mobilization of, the emergent Northwest Zone.
6
 Development and taxation, 
for example, were never restricted to the economy as such but, rather, worked 
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complementarily as political technologies: just as development increased production 
and justified state intervention, taxation increased state knowledge and secured claims 
to any production increase. State learning was predicated on modern ideas of progress, 
of linear improvement over time. Bureaucrat cadres learned from their experiences, 
increasing institutional capacities iteratively to secure growing claims on agrarian 
resources. Militarized state-making expanded the territory subject to, and rationalized 
the authority of, a rising bureaucracy. Through practices of counting and accounting, 
emerging institutions increased capacity to know, regulate, and normalize claim-
making practices. 
All the while, the cadres who made state institutions did so, in part, by 
performing their power among an audience well-acquainted with an allied military‘s 
force. Through education and propaganda, they shaped popular consent, self-
consciously legitimating their power to claim from, and contribute towards creating, a 
national society. The omnipresent armed forces and intensified police work served as 
potent reminders: if consent ever failed to yield resources, coercion was always there 
to back it up. Moreover, state-sponsored terror, either through everyday displays of 
military violence or by hunting and killing political opponents, silenced oppositional 
forms and dissident voices. 
As important as processes and practices of counting and accounting are to state 
making, to study them critically means also being aware of powerful bureaucratic 
tendencies embedded in official narrative recounting. First, state knowledge did not 
accrete linearly: the accrual process was not only broken by gaps, silences, miscounts, 
and obfuscations but also built on a cyclical temporality embedded in annual 
agricultural production. This tension between cycles of production and iterative efforts 
to capture its yields contributed to unintended resource depletion, mass hunger, and 
starvation—the traces of which are all too often forgotten or discounted. Second, 
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centralized state capacity was not established finally and fully forever. The departure 
of central accounting agencies as well as the military and its supply network allowed 
officialized regional and local elites to reassert old power in new form. Third, a 
violence of abstraction is not only visible but all too often taken for granted in official 
reports. If mobilization contributed towards making new subjectivities and 
collectivities, then we must beware its representational effects. Official reports 
produce diverse peoples and living subjects as nameless peasants and numbered dân 
công—what Jean-Luc Nancy calls ―human beings defined as producers.‖7 Subsequent 
recounting in other reports and in nationalist and official histories takes the additional 
step of reproducing these producers as ―contributors‖—always already defined in 
relation to a national state project. These are hazards of representation, of 
reconstructing the past from officially archived sources and from secondary sources 
that readily accept their terms.  
I have attempted to tell a history of human beings as complex, thinking persons 
with wayward agendas who did not always respond as intended. In spite of powerful 
statist efforts to dominate the Black River‘s many communities, peoples there did not 
always accept terms of legitimation predicated on their membership in a singular, 
national community. Even amidst quickening and increasingly violent statemaking 
processes, domination and legitimation worked partially, contingently, and unevenly. 
That Điện Biên Phủ and the Black River region remain a frontier stands as testimony 
to their peoples‘ willingness and ability to present themselves as somehow different 
than what others ascribe to them. 
Reading archival sources ethnographically provides a method for the study of 
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statemaking as well as its multiple silences, erasures, and reconstructions. In August 
1954, for example, the Northwest Zone‘s Administrative Committee held its first 
congress to assess the Zone‘s construction from 1952 to 1954 and plan more of the 
same. In October, a representative issued a report now archived in Hanoi in the Prime 
Minister Secretariat‘s record group, indicating its intended Central Government 
audience. In one revealing passage, the original author wrote in type and an 
anonymous editor added some hand-written corrections:  
 
We have already completed two duties: preparing and serving the _x_ 
Điện Biên campaign and Mobilizing the masses. In particular, 
performing {great} service to the _(x)_ campaign by surpassing targets 
ahead of time earned the people and Cadres of the Northwest the 
Government‘s highest Order for Resistance.8  
 
Certainly, the content here is significant, indicating recognition at the center of a 
margin‘s exemplary performance.9 But what is relevant to this discussion of archival 
ethnography is the long-hand editing that accompanies the typed passage. Someone 
circled the author‘s use of the descriptor {great} (vĩ đại) and placed one circled _(x)_ 
mark and one uncircled _x_ mark inside the passage to indicate the descriptor‘s 
allegedly proper placement. In the margins, the anonymous editor wrote, ―great Điện 
Biên.‖ As such, the edited passage no longer reads a ―great service‖ but, rather, 
features the ―great Điện Biên campaign‖ twice. The Zone‘s subsequent reports to the 
center used ―great‖ according to the editor‘s corrections.10 
Rather than discount these editorial remarks, I argue they need to be counted as 
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efforts in an ongoing process of recounting, of shaping and reshaping collective 
understandings of the past. Indeed, the anonymous editor above seemed to act in 
response to an earlier central directive, indicating recognition of centralized power. 
Only two days after the battle‘s conclusion at Điện Biên Phủ, central elites claimed 
credit for its outcome and publicized how its meaning should be understood. In a letter 
dated 9 May, the VWP‘s Central Executive Committee praised the ―great success of 
our people and military‖ and, in spite of enthusiasm over the ―great victory,‖ 
admonished them to remain vigilant with respect to ongoing ―enemy‖ plots.11 Not only 
did Party leaders urge continued militarization, but vĩ đại is also the same descriptor 
that later prompted editorial revision. In a similar twist, the volume in which the 9 
May letter appeared was subjected to rewriting when its editors added a title to the 
originally untitled document. In the 2001 edition—attributed not to the VWP but to its 
Communist Party of Vietnam successor—other editors expanded on the original‘s use 
of an undifferentiated ―people and military‖ to include, ―all comrade cadres, officers 
and sibling dân công at the Điện Biên Phủ Front, and local compatriots.‖12 In this 
instance, editing elided a distinction between ruling parties and differentiated subjects 
according to rank, family membership, and ethnic identity.  
Two days after the Central Executive Committee‘s letter, on 11 May 1954 the 
Party Secretary‘s Committee issued an order to organize propaganda celebrating the 
victory at Điện Biên Phủ, both specifying the means of its dissemination and spelling 
out the event‘s meaning. Among others, one slogan read: ―Trust thoroughly in the 
clear-sighted leadership of President Hồ, the Party, and the Government.‖13 These 
decisions, their content, and their subsequent edits all indicate a powerful intent both 
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to legitimize centralized rule and to craft a meaningful end to a brutal war. Central 
elites enmeshed in DRV state and ruling Party had embarked on moving Điện Biên 
Phủ out of its place and re-constructing it as an event. 
The original orders and reports from 1954 were only the beginning of a 
sustained commemorative project. If the Party established an event, then official 
historians continue efforts to dominate its interpretation, bound it in space and time, 
and fix it with a singular meaning out of a wide range of possibilities.
14
 During the 
American War, Điện Biên Phủ was even loosened from its spatial and temporal 
moorings and reconfigured as a metaphor for militarized social mobilization in an 
urban setting.
15
 In response to the US Government‘s ill-conceived Christmas bombing 
of Hanoi in 1972-1973, the DRV launched a ―Điện Biên Phủ Campaign in the skies‖ 
to galvanize civilian air-defense.
16
 On the occasion of the original battle‘s 40th and 50th 
anniversaries, official historians and military leaders were still working hard to 
determine how one should interpret Điện Biên Phủ.17 Their efforts are ongoing, their 
legacies written into the landscape. Mường Thanh‘s valley floor is carpeted with 
memorials, cemeteries, historical markers, museums, old tanks and artillery pieces, 
preserved battle sites, etc. As such, this ongoing effort to capture and secure symbolic 
meaning places official historical writing and commemoration in service to political 
legitimation.  
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In part, DRV and SRV political and intellectual elites have worked so hard to 
write an official past because the battle‘s outcome bequeathed an increasingly 
ambiguous and violent legacy. The cease-fire agreement reached in July 1954 at 
Geneva was predicated on a Cold War compromise akin to the partition of Korea and 
Germany, splitting Vietnam in two at the 17
th
 parallel. Though intended as temporary, 
the division between the two ―administrative zones‖ of North and South hardened over 
time into a political boundary between states. The Republic of Vietnam‘s presence in 
the south confounded the DRV‘s claim to represent all of Vietnam, to be the sole 
legitimate heir to a unified Vietnam.
18
 What followed was a bloody, decades-long civil 
war organized along the Cold War‘s ideological fault lines. Securing the DRV‘s 
Northwest Zone frontier, then, was only one of many militarized state-making projects 
in many frontiers.  
The historical record from the Black River region sheds light not only on the 
contingent outcome of the DRV and Vietnam‘s ultimate spatial expanse but also on 
the condition of coloniality in Vietnam. Neither the onset of revolution in 1945 nor the 
conclusion of one war in 1954 marked a rupture, a clean break with the French 
colonial past. Rather, the foundations of post-colonial Vietnam—whatever its state 
form—lie squarely in its entanglement not just with French colonial sensibilities but 
also with inherited institutions, spatial borders, and social boundaries.
19
 If this 
dissertation is about state-society relations broadly, then it was during the French war 
that terms like ―state‖ and ―society‖ or ―nation‖ and ―colonial‖ were socially 
constructed in spite of their uncertainty and analytical overlap. Just as national state 
inherited the externalized boundaries of colonial empire as well as Thái Federation 
personnel and institutions, so too did Vietnamese national society retain the colonially 
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derived, internalized markers of ethnicity. Notwithstanding claims to the contrary—
i.e., national unity and equality—Vietnamese society was and is predicated on an 
underlying hierarchy of social difference, one according to each group an ―ethnic 
place,‖ not all of whom agree(d) with their relocation.  
In spite of the telos nationalist histories accord it, the outcome of the supposed 
colonial-national confrontation pitched on the Mường Thanh plain was never 
foreordained. Indeed, to remember the result as ―national victory‖ denies both the 
uncertainty of constructing a community isomorphic with territory and the ambiguity 
of defining a singularity in terms of its multiple differences. Rather, the dramatic result 
at Điện Biên Phủ in May 1954 was a contingent product of multiple, mutually-
constitutive processes: securing territory through armed force; legitimating a 
centralizing claim to local resources; and institutionalizing a form of rule based on 
spatially and historically-specific social relations. What may have been an end to one 
set of hostilities at Điện Biên Phủ stimulated enduring conflicts over its meaning and 
contests over its outcome.  
On 7 May 1955, a year after the defeat of French forces at Điện Biên Phủ, the 
Thái-Mèo Autonomous Zone was formally established. It covered an enormous area 
of 55,000 square kilometers, fully 1/3
rd
 the DRV‘s territory, or 1/6th that of the 
contemporary Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Estimated at 320,000 residents, its 
population included 20 ―ethnicities.‖20 If it appeared as though the promise of 
autonomy had been delivered, recall Trường Chinh‘s distinction: self-rule here 
amounted to an administrative form, not full ―political autonomy.‖ In a letter to the 
Thái-Mèo Zone‘s ―compatriots,‖ Hồ Chí Minh explained to ―sibling ethnicities‖ that 
                                                 
20
 ―Tình hình khái quát về Khu tự trị dân tộc Thái Mèo ở Tây Bắc,‖ NAVC 3, phông UBHC KTTTB, 
file no. 22. 
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the Zone, ―is one integral part of the great family of Vietnam.‖21 Despite its affective 
appeal, the President‘s equation of family with nation belies an underlying hierarchy 
and permanence; for better or worse, once one is part of a family, one can never leave 
it. In spite of their overwhelming majority in the Zone itself, these ―sibling ethnicities‖ 
figured as minorities in relation to the family-nation and its majority Kinh population. 
Although colonial boundaries endured as external demarcators of state space, they 
were now refigured as the boundaries of (one) national community.  
Notwithstanding the novelty of these relations expressed as nation and state, 
relations of rule within the Zone reproduced older forms of inter-connected familial, 
communal, and spatial power. The Thái-Mèo Zone‘s very name—an exemplar of 
spatial ethnologic—concealed and revealed manifold tensions of rule, relations of 
production, and community identity.
22
 Xa Văn Minh and Lò Văn Hặc led the Thái-
Mèo Zone‘s Administrative Committee, pointing to the continued power of (loyal) 
elite Thái families.
23
 Reproduced as 16 châu or counties, the muang spatial form re-
emerged as an enduring internal unit of territorial administration and land 
management.
24
 In keeping with a pattern established during a time of war, 
territorialized Administrative Committees regulated collection of the agricultural tax 
and muster of dân công labor. All of these claims to rule, resources, and territory 
remained subject to evolving, contested relations between rulers and subjects.  
The Thái-Mèo Zone‘s own spatial boundaries—from interstate borders with 
                                                 
21
 Hồ Chí Minh, ―Thư gửi đồng bào Khu tự trị Thái-Mèo,‖ Bắc Hồ với Đồng bào các Dân tộc (Hanoi: 
NXB Thông tấn, 2006), 18-20. 
22
 Five years later, collectivization began to reorganize wet-rice land holding among Thái communities 
but they remained largely in control of choice bottomland. Moreover, the space was almost named, 
tellingly, the ―Thái Autonomous Zone‖ before local protest by non-Thái (especially the Hmong [Mèo]) 
groups forced a change to the more representative, but still tellingly exclusionary, ―Thái-Mèo 
Autonomous Zone.‖ Nguyễn Kháng, ―Báo cáo tháng 11, 1954,‖ 2 Dec 1954, NAVC 3, phông PTTg 
(1945-54), file no. 519, p. 2. 
23
 ―Hội đồng Nhân dân Khu tự trị Thái-Mèo đã bầu Ủy ban Hành Chính Khu,‖ Nhân dân, 13 May 1955. 
24
 From 1955 to 1975, the 16 main muang were recognized as châu under the DRV‘s two successive 
Autonomous Zones; after the abolishment of autonomy in 1975 in favor of the Socialist Republic‘s 
standardized administration, these muang survive(d) as either districts (huyện) or communes (xã).  
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Laos on its west and south and with China to the north; to the heights overlooking the 
Red River on the east—cast its population within another, if not more historically 
familiar, set of hierarchical social relations.
25
 Within this space, the Thái were 
recognized in DRV censuses and refigured themselves as an ―ethnic majority.‖26 The 
Autonomous Zone consolidated a Thái hold on local government and reproduced a 
sense of Thái superiority in relation to allegedly inferior non-Thái social groups. 
Among its supporters, Cầm Trọng equates Kinh and Thái ―majorities‖ in the nation 
and Northwest region, respectively, and assigns each a normative role to ―help small 
ethnicities to quicken development.‖27 Among critics, a Hmong resident on the Lao 
border pointed out surrounding power relations as follows: ―over there is Lao land, 
over here is the land of the Thái, down stream is the land of Kinh.‖28  
These spatial boundaries, at once an accident of mapping and a national 
reproduction of a colonial frontier, animated local politics among multiple, diverse 
social groups. Just as before, their relations unfolded contingently, in a process that 
produced results not always as intended. Far from being resolved, the question of 
ethnicity and its relation to territorialized power would express itself all over again. 
Between 1956-58 highland groups of disaffected Hmong, Dao, and Khu Mu 
communities, including local cadres working with them, led an armed royalist 
movement (called, xưng đón vua) against what they perceived to be an ―unjust‖ 
regime linking the historic muang to the downstream population, or ―Thai and Kinh 
rule.‖ Even though the military and police defeated them, this counter-movement 
                                                 
25
 At its founding, the Thái Mèo Autonomous Zone included all of Lai Châu and Sơn La provinces; the 
two districts (huyện) of Văn Chấn and Than Uyên in Yên Bái province; and Phông Thổ of Lào Cai.  
26
 Recorded as agglomerated ethnicities—i.e., not accounting for local sub-differentiations—as follows, 
from largest to smallest: 176,400 Thái (56% total), 61,500 Hmông (19%), 19,600 Mường (6%), 18,900 
Dao (6%), 9,600 Khư Mú (3%)… Note that Kinh (3,100) and overseas Chinese (2,600) amounted to 
less than 1% each. ―Tình hình…‖ NAVC 3, phông UBHC KTTTB, file no. 22. 
27
Cầm Trọng, Người Thái ở Tây Bắc Việt Nam (Hanoi: NXB Khoa học Xã hội,1978), 566.    
28
 ―Báo cáo tổng kết của khối miền núi,‖ 1958, NAVC 3, phông Bộ Văn Hóa, file no. 927, 10. 
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threw into sharp relief the tensions embedded in wedding the DRV state project to 
muang forms of rule.
29
  
In sum, I argued that attending to the archives critically and investigating 
historiographic omissions and commissions illuminates hidden histories in 
transforming a borderlands into a national frontier. I highlighted a particular moment 
of Vietnam‘s ―Northwest,‖ of making this space and its people Vietnamese—
sometimes against their will. If the narrative of ―national victory‖ at Điện Biên Phủ 
takes nation for granted, then I offered an alternative account that shows how making 
a nation was an exclusionary project, one that structured relations of community 
according to ethnic identifications, territorial imperatives, and political loyalties. This 
communal project, in turn, was central to forming state in contested territory, one that 
reformed relations of rule according to older patterns of spatial domination.  
Legitimation was, and still remains, central to processes of making state and 
constructing nation. During the first Indochina war, a time of transition between forms 
of rule, legitimation work produced lasting effects—boundaries—in socially produced 
understandings of time (history), space (state), and community (ethnicity and nation). 
Official histories and commemorations continue such legitimation work by 
reproducing boundaries already apparent in 1953 Lai Châu and 1954 Party 
directives—periodizing a past according to the purported ruptures and discontinuities 
across the post/colonial divide. By contrast, while acknowledging the radically new 
terms of legitimation, my alternative telling of local history emphasizes continuities 
across 1954 in forms of spatialized and ethnicized local rule as well as persistent and 
socially meaningful differences specific to frontiers.
                                                 
29
 Cf., James Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 317; 
Công an tỉnh Lai Châu, Lịch sử Công an Nhân dân huyện Điện Biên (1952-1975) (Hanoi: NXB Công 
an Nhân dân, 1994), 46-48; Vương Duy Quang, ―Hiện tượng ‗Xưng vua‘ ở người Hmông,‖ Dân tộc học 
122 (2003): 28-37. 
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